Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective

by Roger B. Myerson

A great power’s use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation’s use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.

34 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2007

About the author

Roger Myerson is the Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. He was awarded the Nobel memorial prize in Economic Science in 2007.