The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War

by Fred Kaplan

A finalist for the Pulitzer PrizeThe inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars who—against fierce resistance from within their own ranks—changed the way the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars.The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post–Cold War not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice.Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point’s Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies’ techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army.Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, War, Military Fiction, Military History, Politics, Biography

434 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 2, 2013

Reviews

[Judith E · Rating 4 out of 5]

A 5 star read for content and illustrating the evolution of counterinsurgency war techniques and the personality of General Petraeus. His commitment to changing warfare upon first reading the works of David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare, Sir Thompson’s Defeating Communist Insurgency, and Bernard Falls’ volumes about Viet Nam, along with Jean Larteguy’s The Centurians, and then promoting them to West Point educators is what changed the U.S. Army’s thinking of modern warfare. Turning the Army into a learning institution made a lot of sense but implementing it was another matter similar to me pulling a tank with my bicycle.

A 3 star read for the construction of the book and the unnecessary need to remind the reader that each and every player in this revolutionary action had read these works, they all knew each other at West Point, the Pentagon, or various wars, and they could recite the basic principles behind “clear-hold-build”.

Maybe not a perfect technique for future wars, but certainly some valuable lessons have been learned here.

[Paula K · Rating 5 out of 5]

Absolutely brilliant! I was totally engaged listening to the audiobook while commuting to & from work. Sat in my driveway having a very hard time shutting off the cd player each night. Wow! I had no idea the military has so many extremely well educated individuals driving the new COIN philosophy. The planning that went into coming up with counter insurgency strategy is mind boggling. The public has no idea about what needs to happen to really win a war and see it through.

Let David Petraeus tell you. He is the most brilliant man the Army has seen in decades. And I don't give a damn who he was sleeping with cause it's none of my business and nobody else's either.

This is a book for anyone, not just the military!!

[Liam · Rating 4 out of 5]

On November 9, 2012 (coincidentally my 42nd birthday), David Petraeus announced his resignation as CIA Director and admitted that he had had an affair with his recent biographer, Paula Broadwell. Unlike many people, I was not even slightly surprised. Several Months previously, on April 14, 2012 to be precise, I had just finished reading Ms. Broadwell's book (All In: The Education of General David Petraeus), and was discussing it with my wife. As soon as she saw the photograph on the back of the book (see photo here: Paula Broadwell), my wife immediately asked "Are they fucking?", to which I replied "I don't know, but it certainly looks like it...".

If it was that obvious to both of us, without being personally acquainted with either General Petraeus or Ms. Broadwell, it should have been obvious to nearly everyone as soon as the book was released the previous January. While I think that the puritanical attitude toward sexual infidelity in this country is infantile, hypocritical, destructive and frankly idiotic, it was absolutely clear to me that General Petraeus was heading for a fall, and would no doubt be publicly shamed & vilified by every political swine in this benighted country as soon as they took their heads out of their asses long enough to notice the obvious.

Having said all that, I nonetheless awaited this current book with intense curiosity. It is my opinion that David Petraeus was the most brilliant and talented U.S. Army officer since the late David H. Hackworth. One of the things I learned from 'All In' was that General Petraeus had tastes in reading material which were surprisingly similar to my own, and I looked forward to learning more about the group of officers & academics around him who had become so influential in recent years. I was not disappointed. This book was well-written and fascinating, and I would recommend it highly to anyone interested in either the recent history of the U.S. Army, insurgency/counterinsurgency or simply Military History in general.

[Imran Ahmed · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kaplan's book, though published in 2013, dates well. It is especially pertinent given recent events in Afghanistan.

Additionally, though the book is about military history, it is relevant for anyone who is (or wishes to be) a change agent. The 'how to execute and implement changes' in a large, bureaucratic organization (US military establishment) is well illustrated in these pages; enough information for a case study.

Kaplan's a storyteller and it comes out well throughout the novel. He develops characters, relationships and philosophies. If that sounds like the book is a novel well it reads like one ... Not one boring chapter.

I recommend the book to readers interested in military history and corporate management.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

Finally, a book about Afganistan, Iraq and the re-structuring of the US Military that actually makes sense and is readable. These insurgents have names like Nagel, McMaster, Ordierno and Petreus: they are American Officers who plotted to change the way the Amerian Military goes to war in a changing environment. This book was highly readable, well researched and almost impossible to put down.

[John · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an exceptional book on many levels. First, as a military history, it stands on its own rights. A detailed, well-sourced, readable look at the intellectual groundings of, the planning for, and the implementation of the US Army's new counterinsurgency manual.

But strip away the topic, and it's an exceptional story of organizational leadership, dealing with change, bureaucratic in-fighting, politics, and organizational culture. Any businessperson, or MBA student, will find parts of The Insurgents relevant.

Just a great book.

If there is any criticism of it, I would say that it focuses so heavily on Iraq that there is not enough focus on Afghanistan. That may be that the policies that "worked" in Iraq have not had the same effect in Afghanistan, or it may be for one of many other reasons. But I found it a telling note, and wanted to mention it.

[Charles Selden · Rating 5 out of 5]

General Petraeus was an intellectual insurgent who encountered an Army hierarchy wanting little to do with “low-intensity warfare,” the name for guerilla and insurgency warfare. The establishment preferred being ready for wars of based on past conflicts in which big armies battled other big armies, called “high-intensity” conflict.

Petraeus understood Pentagon resistance to change was its first step to irrelevance—and losing wars. But in the post-Vietnam military-mindset, direct confrontation by even a one-star general was a ticket to command of a small army to defend our border with Canada.

The need to develop ways to fight insurgency wars had been mostly ignored. In1962 President Kennedy told West Point graduates we had to learn how to fight these kinds of wars. Forty-one years later, the invasion of Iraq was a short-lived success. Petraeus spearheaded a conspiracy of sorts to overhaul our preparation for 21st Century wars. How he did it is skillfully explained in detail by Fred Kaplan’s book.

No American president has attempted to educate the American people about wars that will require a “counter-intuitive” approach, can last indefinitely, and—win, lose, or draw—do not end in parades.

The book is also instructive as an “organizational management” book. In 1986, Petraeus wrote a paragraph in an article frequently alluded to in Kaplan’s book. I replaced the original words [in brackets] with my Italicized substitutes to show that the Pentagon problem was adherence to a conceptual flaw in management of a gigantic operation. The book might be useful to making reforms at Hewlett-Packard, General Motors, JPMorgan Chase, and the Catholic Church.

We in [the military] top management…tend to invent for ourselves a comfortable vision of [war] our mission…one that fits our plans, our assumptions, our hopes, and our preconceived ideas. We arrange in our minds [a war] an environment we can comprehend on our own terms, usually with an enemy who looks like us and acts like us. This comfortable conceptualization becomes the accepted way of seeing things and as such, ceases to be an object for further investigation unless it comes under serious challenge as a result of some major event—usually a [military] business disaster. (Page 30)

An invaluable companion to Kaplan’s book is Sarah Sewall’s 24 page Introduction—subtitled “A Radical Field Manual”— to the University of Chicago Edition of the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual (University of Chicago Press, 2007.) The Field Manual represents an achievement in the long struggle with the Pentagon by Petraeus and other generals that will outlive the soap opera ending to his career.

The new Field Manual is the second step that might open up the organizational challenges and changes needed when America might be headed to a new war of insurgency.

The first step is to educate the public about the realities of wars of insurgency. They may be “low-intensity,” but they are longer lasting than wars as we have known them. Toward that end, the last 4 chapters of Kaplan’s book lay it out: We best know what we might be getting into before we get into it. It may astonish us.

[Paul D. Miller · Rating 3 out of 5]

As a work of history, tracing the development of the idea of counterinsurgency and its adoption by the US Army, this is top-notch and strongly researched. As a work of analysis weighing the merits and track record of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, this book is.

Kaplan clearly spent the bulk of his research on the first idea (the history of the COIN idea), and I have seen no better narrative that covers the same ground. But he tries to use that narrative as grounds for reaching some unwarranted conclusions about the validity of the idea of COIN. To reach such a judgment, Kaplan should have spent far more time researching and telling the story of what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, no general history of the wars has yet been written, and is unlikely to be written for decades.

In fact, Kaplan stumbles badly in his final conclusion-- essentially, counterinsurgency can't and won't work because Afghanistan. The idea that the war in Afghanistan disproved the principles of counterinsurgency is indefensible. Afghanistan is a very poor test case for the ideas of counterinsurgency. There are no proponents of counterinsurgency, no field manuals, and no case studies that recommend undertaking a counterinsurgency with fewer troops than the military recommended, after having under-resourced the civilian reconstruction effort for nearly a decade, under a pre-accounced withdrawal deadline. The United States did almost everything wrong in Afghanistan for so long that even a perfectly-executed and fully-resourced counterinsurgency campaign would have had a hard time bringing it back from the brink, let alone an under-resourced and time-constrined one.

This is an unfortunately weakness in an otherwise excellent book. Read this for the history of how COIN was rediscovered and adopted by the US Army. Ignore Kaplan's analysis of COIN's merits, which is frankly intellectually lazy and unsupported by his research.

[Frank Kelly · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kaplan gives a well-researched and fascinating account of the rise of the "insurgents" in US military strategy - i.e. those like General David Petreaus, Lt. Col. John Nagle (author of the modern classic "Eating Soup with a Knife"), David Kilcullen and other advocates of the still highly contraversal COIN (Counter-insurgency) strategy that was embraced by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. To understand COIN you must understand the devoted advocates who created it, fought for it and then implemented it. Kaplan does make one isightful ocmment at the very end of the book which says it all - COIN is a "tool, not a cure-all..." My guess is we will debating the effectiveness of COIN for many years to come. But it undoubtedly has forever changed the way the US military thinks about warfare.

[Bob · Rating 5 out of 5]

Eye-opening to be sure. Kaplan really shows us how Petraeus and friends worked from the inside to change the Pentagon's perspective on "insurgencies" and 21st century warfare. This is not a book about his love life or any of that lurid affair, but about how, through education and will, a group of officers and leaders opened the eyes of the top brass to 21st century realities. Anyone who is working to change or alter a culture would do well to read and re-read.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

What an amazing book. I have so many good things to say. But first a brief summary: The author Fred Kaplan takes a look at the US Army’s wrestling with the idea and practice of counterinsurgency after the post-Vietnam era. Kaplan makes the point that after the Vietnam War the leadership at the Pentagon never wanted to fight another counterinsurgency again. Instead the military as a whole focused on the more traditional concept of warfare such as big tank battles, heavy artillery and mechanized heavy infantry. A lot of this was due to the ongoing Cold War with the threat of Russia and the Eastern Bloc. It was also what was most familiar to many of the Generals and Admirals. But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of the fourth largest tank army during Desert Storm soon reduced the likelihood of the traditional warfare that the US wanted. Unfortunately after Vietnam the Army has stopped thinking, teaching and training for counter-insurgency. It didn’t even have a manual for that kind of warfare among its publications! This book focuses primarily on how this mentality hurt the US military and also on the men and women who tried to change the Army’s way of fighting war. It concentrate largely on the war in Iraq though it does give a brief look at Afghanistan. Having recently read a number of books on military history I must say this book was one of the best military history nonfiction I read in the first half of 2016.
This book was exciting and eye opening, scholarly yet highly readable for the general reader. It is a look at war but was quite unique with the book’s direction of exploring the role of higher education among a group of unorthodox officers. It is also an evaluation of the military as an institution while also describing in details the progress and growth of individuals who contributed towards the current doctrines of counterinsurgency. Contrary to the subtitle of the book this is not focus primarily on David Petraeus though I suspect the publishers must have added “David Petraeus” for marketing purposes of attracting sales. The last thing I wanted to read was a hero worship of Petraeus though I highly esteem this General. The book’s gives us numerous names and background of these individuals and how they crossed path. These stories demonstrate how incredibly well researched the book was—and also how connected the author was to these individuals.
I found the discussion of the contribution of the social sciences among the thinkers and practitioners of counterinsurgency to be the most fascinating. In fact in the beginning of the book the author traces the military’s rather interesting relationship with the study of social sciences to its origin at West Point many decades ago. For many officers they have a rather uneasy relationship with the social sciences but there are also a few critical thinking officers who saw the importance and value of the social sciences at West Point. These men form an informal clique that for decades have been known as the “Lincoln Brigade.” Important for the purpose of this book is how the innovative officers who contributed to the development of counterinsurgency in Iraq were from this “Lincoln Brigade.”
For many in the military during the early years of Iraq the word counterinsurgency was a bad word. The military and many of its generals were in denial of what the war in Iraq really was about. There were many cringed moments in the book in which the author demonstrate how clueless and incompetent certain generals were in the early years of Iraq. Yet while the lead generals were clueless there were also some lower level generals and Colonels who were learning and adapting. This was encouraging. I appreciated reading about the initiative some of these men and women took in changing the game. Those who have read Thomas Kuhn with philosophy of science would appreciate seeing the theory of scientific revolutions have relevant applications here with the doctrines of counterinsurgency in that there were politics and infighting between the mainstream army and these newer innovative officers with their new paradigm. As the author pointed out, these counterinsurgency thinkers were themselves ideological insurgents in the war of ideas and philosophy of war within the US Army itself.
After reading this book I appreciated the officers who “got it” with the war in Iraq. It was emotionally for me to read about the surge and how it lowered violence and stopped a civil war at that time. Of course one can’t read this book without thinking about the current problem of ISIS. I appreciated the leaders in the book who did their best to fix the mistakes of officers and leaders before them. The book makes you appreciate their contribution but the author at the end of the book reminded us that even legends like General Petraeus was human, capable of err and mistakes. The book also asked deeper questions of whether the US should ever be engaged in counterinsurgency in the first and also how counterinsurgency is not like the other historical counterinsurgency of the past with the changes that the US is officially not a colonial power, the world is ever more connected with CNN and the media and even how horrific so called successful insurgencies were in the past—numbers and suffering that is hard for policy makers to phantom knowingly enter into today. As a political conservative I also realize that there is too much statism in the assumption behind Counterinsurgency. One shouldn’t expect much success in “Nation building” if one understand the economics of how largely inefficient the state is as an agency of bringing about goods and services. Readers who think through this book critically would be more reluctant in their outlook of entering military ventures that often end up being a counterinsurgency.

[Jimmy · Rating 5 out of 5]

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. The title is, of course, ironic. The Insurgents are David Petraeus and others who worked to change the way America fought its wars. It was known as COIN or counterinsurgency warfare. I do have a problem with the subtitle referring to it as a "Plot." I think that was just a way of selling books.

I think the names and details of these men and women are worth mentioning:

1. David Galula: He was a retired French officer who wrote Counterinsurgency Warfare, now a classic of its type. He argued that this type of war required not only killing the enemy, but reforming the government and building up the economy.

2. Colonel George "Abe" Lincoln: He started a Social Science class at West Point just after WWII, realizing the Army needed officers educated in politics and economics, not just war. They would be adherents of Galula's ideas. Lincoln created a network of "Sosh" graduates, nicknamed the "Lincoln Brigade," which persisted in the Army for decades.

3. General John Galvin: Petraeus served under him in Central America, his first exposure to insurgency wars.

4. Lt. Colonel John Nagl: Wrote the classic Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. A protege of Petraeus at West Point. He lobbied for a COIN strategy in Iraq.

5. David Kilcullen: Australian officer-scholar. He later grew disillusioned with the cause.

6. Eliot Cohen: Professor who gathered 30 counterinsurgency specialists to discuss a better way to fight in Iraq.

7. Kalev Sepp: Wrote an article for Military Review which influenced the inner circle of COIN.

8. Colonel Bill Hix: Convinced Iraqi command to adopt COIN.

9. General George Casey: He adopted COIN in Iraq, but later pushed for speedy withdrawal.

10. General Pete Chiarelli: Pushed for COIN, but was overridden by Casey.

11. Celeste Ward: Wrote a paper concluding Iraq War was hopeless as long as US and Iraq governments diverged.

12. Sarah Sewall: Director of Harvard's Center for Human Rights. Helped legitimize COIN with war critics.

13. Conrad Crane: Led the COIN conference and helped write the manual.

12. Frederick Kagan: Wrote a paper arguing for the "surge" and shifting to a COIN strategy.

13. Colonel H. R. McMaster: Leader of the great COIN success in Tel Afar, Iraq. Traditional officers blocked his promotion.

14. General Jack Keane: Urged Bush to replace Casey with Petraeus.

15. General Ray Odierno: Former door-bashing commander who converted to COIN. To his credit, he admitted what he was doing was not working.

16. Emma Sky: Advised Odierno about Iraqi militants. She was a pacifist. For me, this is how a true pacifist can really accomplish something.

17. Meghan O'Sullivan: Bush's special assistant on Iraq.

18. Colonel Sean MacFarland: Crafted a COIN campaign in western Iraq's Anbar Province.

19. Sheikh Abdul Sattar: Charismatic Sheikh who helped MacFarland in Anbar to convince Sunni militants to ally with US forces against jihadists. He would be assassinated for his work.

20. General Stanley McChrystal: A Sosh graduate who tried to apply COIN in Afghanistan, but the formula didn't fit.

21. Defense Secretary Robert Gates: Switched from skeptic to supporter of COIN.

22. David Petraeus: Afghanistan stumped him too, just like it has so many others. He wanted to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but such a charismatic figure was no longer the type others wanted after Colin Powell.

Petraeus's affair is mentioned as "not so surprising." How can anyone expect young men to be away for so long without temptations. Yet that's all most Americans talk about. I remember reading about King Arthur in high school. I realized Lancelot did wrong. We all need to learn that there are things more important than we are.

[Bob · Rating 5 out of 5]

I don't think I've given 5 stars before but I think it's deserved in this case. This book is partially a bio of Petraeus and one of the things that kept me reading it was wondering what the author would conclude about him in the end. It is definitely not a hagiography of Petraeus but also, not a take down with malicious intent. Because of this I would say it is a very accurate and appropriate account of US war making in the first decade of the 21st century. In the end Petraeus is a bit of a tragic character. Intelligent, successful, and ambitious but perhaps misguided in his zeal. COIN methods turn out to have significant dependencies outside of the control of the commanders and several significant ambiguities.

[Ell, Ess Jaeva · Rating 5 out of 5]

such a necessary read...

there's the ethos of the war fighter, literally beat into West Point cadets via traditional hazings... it's pretty much “To crush your enemies. See them driven before you. And to hear the lamentations of their women.” – Conan

Then you have nerds like Petraeus seeking PhDs and consulting with other nerds to tailor a solution to a problem... You can't just shoot or bomb an insurgency. But you also must respect the US military tradition, and egos. then again, you never get your full requisition to institute the "intellectual" course, so you never, even today, know what truly works to end conflicts and make all stakeholders better off...

Sprinkle in politicians who only care about the perceptions that'll get them or those in their party re-elected. The US media-consuming-population, via instagram, apathetic but swayed by the dramatic... 2 star generals who wanna become 4 star generals... one freaking incident going viral...

before you include the foundation of imperialism... capitalism... sectarianism...

Nothing works because the budget gets pulled... Iraq lessons learned, uncertain, therefore not applied to Afganistan

it's all a F'n mess and this book let's you peek behind the curtain to understand why

[Vincent Solomeno · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fred Kaplan's "The Insurgents" is a must-read for anyone interested in understanding how the U.S. Armed Forces, and the U.S. Army in particular, adapted to the counterinsurgency threat in Iraq. Mr. Kaplan profiles a group of officers - David Petraeus and H.R. McMaster among them - who went "back to the future" to team with academics to study the lessons learned of America's experience in Vietnam. I led a group of Army officers and non-commissioned officers for our professional development reading group. We chose this book and every person in the group, regardless of education and interest, found it interesting and useful.

It was the finest book I read in 2014.

[David Pulliam · Rating 3 out of 5]

I enjoyed learning how American strategy in the US military (mostly Army) changed over time through Petraeus. Still, it left a bad taste in my mouth with how he resigned from the CIA and the fact that both Iraq and Afghanistan were wars that we lost. I doubt whether Petreaus deserves to be categorized as the greatest general of our age. Maybe he is, and there are no great generals alive right now.

This book probably makes me more skeptical of counter-insurgency strategy because of what happened in Iraq and Afghanistan. I think the key reason is that for it to have a high probability of success you have to use a lot of time and a lot of energy and be willing to lose many lives.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the plot to change the American way of war by Fred Kaplan. Fred M. Kaplan (b. 1954) is an American author and Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist. His weekly "War Stories" column for Slate magazine covers international relations and U.S. foreign policy. Fred Kaplan’s Insurgents thesis, in my opinion, is that Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools, and made it more tempting, for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid. Kaplan phenomenally illustrates how counter-insurgency doctrine won the “Hearts and Minds” of American political leaders as the way to achieve the desired end state for Iraq and Afghanistan, while not realizing the key component, that if host-nation government isn’t strong enough or willing to enforce its principles for COIN doctrine to be successful, the idea of a counter-insurgency strategy is folly.

Summary:
The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions - the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post-Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but small wars - in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting, but of "nation building" -often not of necessity but of choice. Insurgents lays out their pathway to implementation, the effects of COIN in practice, and their ineffective ability to change the American way of war.

Analysis:
To analyze the Insurgents, I will divide the book into three sections: First, the failures of Iraq that led to political leaders need for a new strategy. Second, COIN in practice as General Petraeus takes command in Iraq. Finally, I will analyze the sections written on the failure of COIN in Afghanistan.

Following the immediate success of the initial push into Iraq, American political leaders were left wondering what to do next. LTG Ricardo Sanchez was struggling as the commander to establish phase IV of the Iraqi Freedom War, which was not planned prior to the invasion of Iraq. As the war dove into a full-scale insurgency, many leaders, both militarily and politically, were unsure what course of action to take. Military leadership changed from Sanchez to General George Casey, which did little to quell the violence that was deteriorating Iraq. In pockets of Iraq, such as Mosel, where then Major General David H. Petraeus’ 101st Airborne Division owned operations, counter insurgency tactics where finding some semblance of success. Kaplan perfectly illustrates how the failure throughout the rest of country set the political stage for a new American way of war to take hold.

As the country asked for answers on Iraq, there was a need for progress and COIN provided a glimmer of hope. Kaplan successfully explains how General Petraeus acted on all the right opportunities to make counter insurgency doctrine an option for political leaders in Washington. While many new philosophies (Hearts and Minds, & Clear, Hold, Build) were being haphazardly used in Iraq, Petraeus continued to press COIN at Fort Leavenworth, KS. After continued failure, the loss of the majority in Congress, George W. Bush was forced to make changes (Sec. Rumsfeld resigned and GEN. Casey was removed). General Petraeus was inserted as commander in Iraq and the surge was initiated utilizing COIN as the way forward. Much success was found in Iraq, lead to the eventual implementation of COIN in Afghanistan as well. Kaplan effectively details how the strategy was partially successful in Iraq, but did not fit in Afghanistan.

Unlike Iraq, there were no key victories for COIN. Neither Generals McChrystal nor Petraeus were able to achieve key outputs. Kaplan argues, which I whole-heartedly agree, that counter insurgency is not A + B + C = D. It is A x B x C = D. If any of the inputs are zero, counter-insurgency does not work. In the case of Afghanistan, the political leadership was the value of zero. It is this revelation, which I assume was well known to those executing the mission, that led to the argument that COIN is, “Folly” if the host-nation government isn’t strong enough or willing to enforce its principles.

Summary:
Kaplan states that unless the political leadership’s goals are in line with that of the COIN force, the doctrine will not be successful. Furthermore, the American political leadership and population do not have the patience to deal with a war that is long or costly, therefore COIN will never be accepted as a prominent way of war. Instead, COIN should be used a tool to fight war during the short-term, but never used as a way to build host-nation forces. The COIN strategists made the American military more adept at fighting this kind of war, but they didn’t succeed at making this kind of war acceptable (p. 365) Overall, Kaplan phenomenally illustrates how counter-insurgency doctrine won the “Hearts and Minds” of American political leaders as the way to achieve the desired end state for Iraq and Afghanistan, while not realizing the key component, that if host-nation government isn’t strong enough or willing to enforce its principles for COIN doctrine to be successful, the idea of a counter-insurgency strategy is folly.

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some good coverage of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) and the politics around development of it (which included finding a way to lose less in Iraq). Interesting to see how institutional change happens in the Army -- slowly and then all at once -- with the people pushing for change initially resisted, then conflict, then put in charge (to make their own mistakes later).

Especially relevant given that we're finally drawing a line under Afghanistan and getting out, a decision which should have happened in 2001 or latest 2002.

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book provided me with a deeper understanding of institutional change based on the experience of the COIN group trying to modernize the US military. It also provides some useful perspectives on the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a general's struggle to reconcile past experience in a new setting.

[Jaclyn Ann · Rating 3 out of 5]

Would have liked this to be more focused ON Petraeus and how he came to be and where he pulled his ideas from rather than throwing around all the names that he was connected with and how he felt politically.
If only any of the advise was taken from these leaders on how to pull out of the middle east... sad that political games and big business got involved.

[James B · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a really interesting read, not so much as a history of American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, but as how a group of people can influence or change how a large institution thinks about or approaches a problem. Next up is "Moneyball".

[Zac · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book gives a great insight into top brass and their way of thinking and how PMESII-PT came into play. Some animosity from across the ranks towards one another was also a good insight into how the ”old way of thinking” was not the way forward. Good insight.

[Jonathan Cantor · Rating 4 out of 5]

A solid book. It shows how we have changed our perspectives on war. It is a nice overview.

[Sergio · Rating 4 out of 5]

Solid read.

Solid read that at times dragged. Overall very informative on COIN and CT perspectives. Gave good reference material for further readings.

[Martin Dubéci · Rating 4 out of 5]

Človeku sa chce až zaplakať, keď si to porovná s tým aká je väčšina našich generálov a ako k armáde pristupujeme.

[Nevins Smith · Rating 5 out of 5]

Outstanding. A must read for any student of American history since WW2.

[Bruce Wischow · Rating 2 out of 5]

Learned way too much about some counter insurgency manual and intellectual politics in the military. Probably good resource for those acutely interested in the subject.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting to read this as the last of the American troops leave Kabul. A long list of unlearned lessons.

[Aura Erickson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well-researched book. A sad reminder of the incompetence of the military generals, the lack of communication and cultural incompetence of both the political powers and the military.

[Josh · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great intellectual history of COIN in the modern US army