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Philebus
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162 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 361
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Plato
5,202 books8,607 followersPlato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
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September 24, 2024no l’he pogut acabar perquè el protagonista és un gaslighter 😔🙏🏻🧘♀️🙅🏼♀️ (socrates)
September 2, 2015
محاورة خطرة
مهمة
متعبة
ممتعة
مهمة
متعبة
ممتعة
August 31, 2016
Aesthetic of architectural facade brought me HERE.
December 13, 2021
A lesser-known dialogue, read in prep for a Derrida essay which I should get to soon. 3.5
Odd in its way- probably one of the last of Plato's works and apparently more humourless than we may be used to, though I had fun with the mostly-absent character of Philebus. He has only a handful of lines but there's a wonderful sense of him grumpily watching Socrates and Protarchus hash it out. Jowett is his familiarly grumpy self in his intro to this piece. He's clearly not a fan but I enjoyed it.
A lot of the content is familiar from Symposium and so on, though as Jowett points out, Socrates' arguments are a lot more psychological than theological in their backing. Perhaps due to the dialogue's place in the Platonic chronology.
Idea that the soul wants whatever is contrary to the body is rather unorthodox and eyebrow-raising. Was reminded of the old death wish and Freud's somewhat dubious that all organisms will their own destruction. Can't recommend this as more than a curiosity really, though brevity allures, as ever.
Odd in its way- probably one of the last of Plato's works and apparently more humourless than we may be used to, though I had fun with the mostly-absent character of Philebus. He has only a handful of lines but there's a wonderful sense of him grumpily watching Socrates and Protarchus hash it out. Jowett is his familiarly grumpy self in his intro to this piece. He's clearly not a fan but I enjoyed it.
A lot of the content is familiar from Symposium and so on, though as Jowett points out, Socrates' arguments are a lot more psychological than theological in their backing. Perhaps due to the dialogue's place in the Platonic chronology.
Idea that the soul wants whatever is contrary to the body is rather unorthodox and eyebrow-raising. Was reminded of the old death wish and Freud's somewhat dubious that all organisms will their own destruction. Can't recommend this as more than a curiosity really, though brevity allures, as ever.
July 23, 2011
Excellent Platon! Fidèle à sa prudente méthode non dogmatique, il invite naturellement à la réflexion en déroulant des dialogues clairs et lisibles, tout en donnant une leçon de pédagogie en faisant de Socrate un habile psychologue qui prend toujours garde à ne pas froisser ses interlocuteurs, cherchant plus à convaincre avec bienveillance qu'à en imposer vainement. A partir de la question de la prééminence du plaisir ou de l'intelligence, il utilise l'analyse pour distinguer précisément les différentes catégories des concepts qu'il manie et lever les apparentes difficultés de "l'un et du multiple", utilise toute sortes de comparaisons utiles pour éclairer les raisonnements, n'hésite pas à appeler les dieux au secours pour relancer l'interet des auditeurs. Si le bien n'est pas dans une vie de plaisirs, il est dans celle qui utilise l'intelligence pour gouter les plaisirs, purs ou mélangés, dans une juste mesure. Philèbe est un de mes dialogues préférés.
June 19, 2023
Does Socrates reject hedonism by making it a strawman? I'm just as interested in his ontology: forms/kinds arise as limits/laws bring order/structure.
March 28, 2021
Nie wiem, czy Fileb jest słabszy od pozostałych dialogów Platona, czy też po prostu przejadło mi się już to platońskie filozofowanie, ale jakoś wyjątkowo mi ta książka nie podeszła. Dosyć chaotyczna i momentami trudno zrozumieć, o co Sokratesowi w ogóle chodzi (tu jednak plus za to, że autor najwyraźniej zdaje sobie z tego sprawę, bo każe Protarchowi dopytywać o szczegóły). Zaskakujące jest to, że choć mając do wyboru rozkosz albo rozum Sokrates opowiada się, rzecz jasna, po stronie rozumu, to jednak już na samym początku dochodzi do wniosku, że sam rozum bez rozkoszy trudno uznać za stan idealny. Nie żebym się nie zgadzała, ale spodziewałam się bardziej surowego podejścia do tematu - a tu proszę, jaka przyjemna niespodzianka.
Może to wina tego, że 1) czytałam tę książkę w 3 etapach, z dość długimi przerwami pomiędzy poszczególnymi częściami, i 2) kończyłam ją późnym wieczorem, walcząc z sennością - ale nie bardzo rozumiem, skąd Sokrates wyciągnął swoje końcowe wnioski. Przez całą książkę zanosiło się na to, że miks rozkoszy i rozumu zajmie pierwsze miejsce, rozum drugie, a rozkosz co najwyżej trzecie - a tymczasem na samym końcu na pierwsze miejsca wskoczyły zupełnie inne wartości, o których wcześniej autor ledwo napomknął.
To był ostatni z dialogów Platona dostępnych na Wolnych Lekturach, a więc mogę (nareszcie!) zamknąć ten etap i przejść o krok dalej, do Ksenofonta. Podejrzewam, że kiedyś WL dodadzą kolejne dialogi i pewnie nawet chętnie wtedy do nich wrócę, ale na razie zdecydowanie potrzebuję przerwy. Chociaż nie powiem, czytanie Platona - tak, nawet Fileba - zawsze sprawiało mi przyjemność. Takie to spokojne, wprawdzie wymagające intelektualnie, ale za to kompletnie nieangażujące emocjonalnie. Pewnie to nietypowe podsumowanie, ale na mnie Platon działał zawsze bardzo odprężająco. No i przywrócił mi wiarę w to, że w starożytnych tekstach kryje się jednak jakaś mądrość - że nie są tylko niesłusznie przeceniane li i jedynie ze względu na swój zaawansowany wiek. Po Arystofanesie ta odtrutka zdecydowanie była mi potrzebna.
Może to wina tego, że 1) czytałam tę książkę w 3 etapach, z dość długimi przerwami pomiędzy poszczególnymi częściami, i 2) kończyłam ją późnym wieczorem, walcząc z sennością - ale nie bardzo rozumiem, skąd Sokrates wyciągnął swoje końcowe wnioski. Przez całą książkę zanosiło się na to, że miks rozkoszy i rozumu zajmie pierwsze miejsce, rozum drugie, a rozkosz co najwyżej trzecie - a tymczasem na samym końcu na pierwsze miejsca wskoczyły zupełnie inne wartości, o których wcześniej autor ledwo napomknął.
To był ostatni z dialogów Platona dostępnych na Wolnych Lekturach, a więc mogę (nareszcie!) zamknąć ten etap i przejść o krok dalej, do Ksenofonta. Podejrzewam, że kiedyś WL dodadzą kolejne dialogi i pewnie nawet chętnie wtedy do nich wrócę, ale na razie zdecydowanie potrzebuję przerwy. Chociaż nie powiem, czytanie Platona - tak, nawet Fileba - zawsze sprawiało mi przyjemność. Takie to spokojne, wprawdzie wymagające intelektualnie, ale za to kompletnie nieangażujące emocjonalnie. Pewnie to nietypowe podsumowanie, ale na mnie Platon działał zawsze bardzo odprężająco. No i przywrócił mi wiarę w to, że w starożytnych tekstach kryje się jednak jakaś mądrość - że nie są tylko niesłusznie przeceniane li i jedynie ze względu na swój zaawansowany wiek. Po Arystofanesie ta odtrutka zdecydowanie była mi potrzebna.
July 27, 2018
While I have read 21 other books by Plato where he praises the development of the intellect, I think that the following from this book is his best defense of pursing wisdom instead of just pursuing sensual pleasures as a means to true human flourishing.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Soc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?
Pro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.
Soc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?
Pro. I should.
Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be otherwise?
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/philebu...
__________________________________________________________________________________________
Soc. Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight?
Pro. Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.
Soc. Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures?
Pro. I should.
Soc. But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or pulmo marinus. Could this be otherwise?
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/philebu...
August 12, 2025
Platonin myöhäisemmän kauden dialogi Filebos käsittelee nautinnon ja järjen suhdetta sekä Platonin näkemystä siitä, että tieto ja ymmärrys oikeasta ovat parempia tavoitteita elämälle kuin nautinto. Platon ei Fileboksessa vaikuta tuovan esille mitään uutta, mitä ei olisi jossain aikaisemmassa dialogissaan jo ilmaissut: esitys on kuitenkin enimmäkseen erityisen selkeä ja johdonmukainen, mikä tekee teoksesta miellyttävää luettavaa.
Ansiokkainta Fileboksessa on mielestäni nautinnon jako kahteen luokkaan. Luokan A nautinnot johtuvat aina jostain puutteesta ihmisen harmoniassa: syöminen tuottaa nautintoa koska nälän aiheuttama kärsimys poistuu. Jos kaikkia nautintoja tarkastellaan tämän lähtökohdan kautta, käy todennäköiseksi (ilmeisesti joidenkin Pythagoralaisten kannattama) näkemys, jonka mukaan todellista nautintoa ei ole olemassa: koska nautinto johtuu aina puutostilan päättymiseen liittyvästä toivosta, sitä vastaa aina vastaava puutoksesta johtuva kärsimys. Kärsimyksen välttämätön rinnallaolo tekee nautinnosta rinnastettavaa haavan raapimiseen, joka aiheuttaa yhtä lailla kärsimystä ja mielihyvää.
Tätä näkemystä Platon ei kuitenkaan itse kannata, koska näkee myös toisen nautinnon lajin. On olemassa asioita, esimerkiksi kauniit muodot tai hajut, jotka herättävät ihmisessä ainoastaan nautintoa ja vain hyvin vähän jos lainkaan tuskaa. Samoin oppiminen ajassa tapahtuvana ilmiönä on nautinnollinen prosessi, eikä siihen liity mitään välttämätöntä pahaa. Näin Platon tulee löytäneeksi kaksi puhtaan, tahrattoman hyvän lajia, kauneuden ja totuuden sinänsä - ja aivan oikein yhdistää ne ideoidensa katoamattomuuteen vastoin aistimaailman katoavaa luonnetta. Samaa kaksinaisuus löydetään myös tiedosta: käytännön tieto tai Gorgiaan puhetaito ei voi vetää vertoja filosofiselle tiedolle olemassaolon kaikkein syvimmistä rakenteista.
Dialogin lopputulemaan en kuitenkaan voi samaistua: Platon päätyy jälleen tekemään arkkivirheensä korostaessaan järkeä ylitse kaiken muun. Parempi ratkaisu olisi ollut kuin Faidroksessa kääntyä takaisin ja asettaa etusijalle vähintään järjen rinnalle valtion kolmijaon (järki, tunne, halu) keskimmäinen tekijä, jumalallinen hulluus jonka kautta vasta ihminen todella kykenee tavoittamaan sen toisen, puhtaamman nautinnon lajin: nautinnon, jonka ihminen löytää hyvyydestä, totuudesta ja kauneudesta käsitteiden aidoimmissa muodoissa. Dialogi hylkää mahdollisuuden kohota Platonin parhaiden kirjoitusten joukkoon ja jää puolustamaan lähinnä elotonta stoalaista elämänasennetta.
Ansiokkainta Fileboksessa on mielestäni nautinnon jako kahteen luokkaan. Luokan A nautinnot johtuvat aina jostain puutteesta ihmisen harmoniassa: syöminen tuottaa nautintoa koska nälän aiheuttama kärsimys poistuu. Jos kaikkia nautintoja tarkastellaan tämän lähtökohdan kautta, käy todennäköiseksi (ilmeisesti joidenkin Pythagoralaisten kannattama) näkemys, jonka mukaan todellista nautintoa ei ole olemassa: koska nautinto johtuu aina puutostilan päättymiseen liittyvästä toivosta, sitä vastaa aina vastaava puutoksesta johtuva kärsimys. Kärsimyksen välttämätön rinnallaolo tekee nautinnosta rinnastettavaa haavan raapimiseen, joka aiheuttaa yhtä lailla kärsimystä ja mielihyvää.
Tätä näkemystä Platon ei kuitenkaan itse kannata, koska näkee myös toisen nautinnon lajin. On olemassa asioita, esimerkiksi kauniit muodot tai hajut, jotka herättävät ihmisessä ainoastaan nautintoa ja vain hyvin vähän jos lainkaan tuskaa. Samoin oppiminen ajassa tapahtuvana ilmiönä on nautinnollinen prosessi, eikä siihen liity mitään välttämätöntä pahaa. Näin Platon tulee löytäneeksi kaksi puhtaan, tahrattoman hyvän lajia, kauneuden ja totuuden sinänsä - ja aivan oikein yhdistää ne ideoidensa katoamattomuuteen vastoin aistimaailman katoavaa luonnetta. Samaa kaksinaisuus löydetään myös tiedosta: käytännön tieto tai Gorgiaan puhetaito ei voi vetää vertoja filosofiselle tiedolle olemassaolon kaikkein syvimmistä rakenteista.
Dialogin lopputulemaan en kuitenkaan voi samaistua: Platon päätyy jälleen tekemään arkkivirheensä korostaessaan järkeä ylitse kaiken muun. Parempi ratkaisu olisi ollut kuin Faidroksessa kääntyä takaisin ja asettaa etusijalle vähintään järjen rinnalle valtion kolmijaon (järki, tunne, halu) keskimmäinen tekijä, jumalallinen hulluus jonka kautta vasta ihminen todella kykenee tavoittamaan sen toisen, puhtaamman nautinnon lajin: nautinnon, jonka ihminen löytää hyvyydestä, totuudesta ja kauneudesta käsitteiden aidoimmissa muodoissa. Dialogi hylkää mahdollisuuden kohota Platonin parhaiden kirjoitusten joukkoon ja jää puolustamaan lähinnä elotonta stoalaista elämänasennetta.
October 12, 2025
finally reading again. this was for a class. i constantly waver in and out of respect for and interest in ancient philosophy. given the social and textual distance, i doubt much can mean much. this slightly invigorated an enthusiasm, being strange and stilted and bright
December 23, 2025
Interesante dialogo sobre la naturaleza del bien y la diferenciación de los placeres.
June 30, 2024
The dialogue in “Phibelus” concentrates on questions about human existence, the nature of happiness, and the means to have a good life. My key takeaway is that a well-balanced life, guided by measure and proportion, leads to true happiness and fulfillment. This can be a rewarding read for anyone interested in ethics, philosophy, and the pursuit of a meaningful existence.
September 1, 2019
Beogradski izdavačko-grafički zavod
Beograd, 1983.
Prevela sa starogčkog Ksenija Maricki Gađanski
Jezično kvalitetno odrađena knjiga. Još jedan britki, oštroumni i razigrani platonovski wok.
Ovaj dijalog je o uživanjima, ali je također i o mudrosti i ontologiji.
Prisutan je tipični obrazac Platonovih dijaloga, osnovni umak platonovskog woka, vodeća uloga Sokrata u dijalogu; koja je toliko hegemonijska da se u biti na neki način sam dijalog urušava.
Sokrat je alpha u svakom razgovoru; eto kako mu se divi momak Protarh:
"Nemoguće je, Sokrate, da se sa tim neko ne saglasi, makar tvrdoglavo želeo da zadrži suprotno uverenje"
Sokrat je poput mene, uvijek je u pravu. Također, druga sličnost je ta da njemu vjerojatno Protarh ništa ne plaća za njegove mudrosti kao što ni vi, moje čitateljstvo, ništa ne plaćate za moje umovitosti.
Evo par citata kao svjedočanstava Sokratove (Platonove) mudrosti:
"Sokrat: Da li bi ti Protarše, prihvatio da proživiš ceo svoj život uživajući u najvećim uživanjima?
Protarh: Kako da ne!
Sokrat: Da li bi smatrao da ti još nešto nedostaje ako bi potpuno uživao?
Protarh: Ne bih.
Sokrat: Pogledaj, ipak, zar ti ne bi trebalo nešto od ovoga: mudrost, inteligencija, predviđenje i ostalo tome slično?
Protarh: A što? Pa valjda bi mi sve bilo potaman kad osećam zadovoljstvo.
Sokrat: Dakle, živeći tako, ti bi se celoga života zadovoljavao najvećim uživanjima?
Protarh: Što da ne?
Sokrat: Ali kada ne bi imao ni inteligencije, ni pamćenja, ni znanja, ni istinite predstave, očigledno je neizbežno da ti ostane nepoznato upravo to samo , to jest da li osećaš zadovoljstvo ili ne osećaš zadovoljstvo, budući da si lišen svake mudrosti.
Protarh: Neizbežno.
Sokrat: A isto je tako, kada ne bi imao pamćenja, neizbežno je, valjda, da se ne bi mogao setiti da si ikad osećao zadovoljstvo, niti bi se, pak, uživanje koje doživljavaš upravo u ovom trenutku ma i najmanje urezalo u sećanje. A zatim, kad ne bi imao ni istinskog mišljenja, ti čak ni dok osećaš zadovoljstvo ne bi mislio da ga osećaš, a, lišenom sposobnosti predviđanja, čak ti ne bi bilo moguće ni da predvidiš da ćeš u budućnosti osetiti zadovoljstvo. Živeo bi tako, ne životom čoveka, već nekakve meduze ili kakve školjke, kao što ih ima u moru. Da li je tako ili bismo o tim stvarima mogli misliti i nekako drukčije?"
O razlici "postajanja" i "bića" i utjecaja tog odnosa na uživanje:
"Sokrat: Tvrdim, dakle, da se svi sastojci, sva oruđa i sva materija svuda primenjuju radi postojanja, a da se svako postojanje dešava radi bića, svako radi nekoga drugog, i da se celokupno postojanje dešava radi celokupnog bića.
Protarh: To je zaista veoma jasno
Sokrat: Dakle, i uživanje, ako je postojanje, nužno bi bilo da se dešava radi nekog bića.
Protarh: Svakako
Sokrat: Zacelo, ono zbog čega postaje ono što postaje zbog nečega spada u oblast dobrog; a ono što postaje zbog nečega drugog treba, prijatelju moj, da se stavi u drugu oblast.
Protarh: To je zaista nužno.
Sokrat: Sada, ako je uživanje zaista neko postajanje, da li ćemo ispravno postupiti ako ga stavimo u neku drugu oblast, a ne u oblast dobrog?
Protarh: Potpuno ispravno, zaista.
Sokrat: Dakle, kao što sam već rekao na početku svoga izlaganja, treba biti zahvalan onome koji je obelodanio da je uživanje postajanje, i da u njemu ne postoji biće ni u najmanjoj meri; očigledno je, naime, da se on ruga onima koji tvrde da je uživanje dobro."
Uživanje nije biće, ono je postojanje. Samim time jasno je da je ono inferiorno svemu što je biće. Postojanje je uronjeno u vremenu, biće je oduvijek bilo i zauvijek će biti. Biće je zato to što jest samo po sebi, dok je postojanje uvijek uzrokovano nečim.
Uživanje je zasigurno uzrokovano nečim što nije ono samo.
Kul je idući citat o onome što je bitnije, nešto radi samog znanja ili radi same koristi:
"Protarh: Pa ja sam, Sokrate, često čuo kako Gorgija u svakoj prilici ponavlja da se veština uveravanja veoma odlikuje od svih ostalih, jer ona postiže da joj sve ropski služe dobrovoljno, a ne silom, i da je daleko najbolja od svih veština; pa, sad, ja se ne bih suprostavio ni tebi niti, opet, njemu
Sokrat: Čini mi se da si hteo nešto da kažeš, ali da si se zastidio i odbacio oružje-
Protarh: Pa, neka bude zasad tako kako se tebi čini
...
Sokrat: Ono za čim sam ja težio, dragi Protarše, nije baš to- koja je veština ili koja nauka nadmašuje sve ostale kao najvažnija i najbolja i za nas najkorisnija, već koja istražuje šta je jasno, šta je tačno i šta je najistinitije, pa makar bilo sasvim malo i beznačajno po koristi- eto, za tim upravo sada težimo."
Ovaj citat baca poveznicu Gorgije i ostale šake sofista sa suvremenim self-help pseudoideologijama i cjelokupnom praktičnom psihologijom. Utilitarizam je poveznica sofista i life coucheva što, pak, baca poveznicu sa Spenglerom koji self-help filozofiju smatra bitnom odrednicom civilizacije koja umire. Stoici, sofisti i budisti su živjeli u civilizacijama koje su bile na svom kraju.
Dakako, s druge strane praktična psihologija je zbilja učinkovita da nam u životu bude bolje. U svakom polju ima cvijeća i korova.
Moja vlastita semantičko-terminološka odrednica jest ta da mi je kvalitetni self-help praktična psihologija, jer po mom sudu sam naziv "self-help" je po sebi pejorativan.
Zamislite da je Gorgija imao vlastiti jutjub kanal, i da mu je Sokrat radio respond videa?
Ma, ne bi to Sokrat, ni Platon, radili. Oni su ipak bili iznad reaktivne sfere bivstvovanja jer su kuleri.
Još jedan kognitvni zgoditak koji baca Sokrat (Platon):
"Sokrat: Znanje se, takođe, razlikuje jedno od drugog, jedno je usmereno na ono što postaje i na ono što propada, a drugo na ono što niti postaje niti propada, već jeste večno, istovetno i nepromenljivo. Imajući u vidu istinu, zaključili smo da je ovo znanje istinitije od onog."
Bez ikakve ironije Sokrat razara. Platonovi su dijalozi svevremenski.
Evo jedne za Sokrata, Platona, Heraklita Mračnog, Parmenida i druge iz ekipe s egejske obale.
Njihov žar i dalje gori.
Hvala i slava im!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u1mex...
Beograd, 1983.
Prevela sa starogčkog Ksenija Maricki Gađanski
Jezično kvalitetno odrađena knjiga. Još jedan britki, oštroumni i razigrani platonovski wok.
Ovaj dijalog je o uživanjima, ali je također i o mudrosti i ontologiji.
Prisutan je tipični obrazac Platonovih dijaloga, osnovni umak platonovskog woka, vodeća uloga Sokrata u dijalogu; koja je toliko hegemonijska da se u biti na neki način sam dijalog urušava.
Sokrat je alpha u svakom razgovoru; eto kako mu se divi momak Protarh:
"Nemoguće je, Sokrate, da se sa tim neko ne saglasi, makar tvrdoglavo želeo da zadrži suprotno uverenje"
Sokrat je poput mene, uvijek je u pravu. Također, druga sličnost je ta da njemu vjerojatno Protarh ništa ne plaća za njegove mudrosti kao što ni vi, moje čitateljstvo, ništa ne plaćate za moje umovitosti.
Evo par citata kao svjedočanstava Sokratove (Platonove) mudrosti:
"Sokrat: Da li bi ti Protarše, prihvatio da proživiš ceo svoj život uživajući u najvećim uživanjima?
Protarh: Kako da ne!
Sokrat: Da li bi smatrao da ti još nešto nedostaje ako bi potpuno uživao?
Protarh: Ne bih.
Sokrat: Pogledaj, ipak, zar ti ne bi trebalo nešto od ovoga: mudrost, inteligencija, predviđenje i ostalo tome slično?
Protarh: A što? Pa valjda bi mi sve bilo potaman kad osećam zadovoljstvo.
Sokrat: Dakle, živeći tako, ti bi se celoga života zadovoljavao najvećim uživanjima?
Protarh: Što da ne?
Sokrat: Ali kada ne bi imao ni inteligencije, ni pamćenja, ni znanja, ni istinite predstave, očigledno je neizbežno da ti ostane nepoznato upravo to samo , to jest da li osećaš zadovoljstvo ili ne osećaš zadovoljstvo, budući da si lišen svake mudrosti.
Protarh: Neizbežno.
Sokrat: A isto je tako, kada ne bi imao pamćenja, neizbežno je, valjda, da se ne bi mogao setiti da si ikad osećao zadovoljstvo, niti bi se, pak, uživanje koje doživljavaš upravo u ovom trenutku ma i najmanje urezalo u sećanje. A zatim, kad ne bi imao ni istinskog mišljenja, ti čak ni dok osećaš zadovoljstvo ne bi mislio da ga osećaš, a, lišenom sposobnosti predviđanja, čak ti ne bi bilo moguće ni da predvidiš da ćeš u budućnosti osetiti zadovoljstvo. Živeo bi tako, ne životom čoveka, već nekakve meduze ili kakve školjke, kao što ih ima u moru. Da li je tako ili bismo o tim stvarima mogli misliti i nekako drukčije?"
O razlici "postajanja" i "bića" i utjecaja tog odnosa na uživanje:
"Sokrat: Tvrdim, dakle, da se svi sastojci, sva oruđa i sva materija svuda primenjuju radi postojanja, a da se svako postojanje dešava radi bića, svako radi nekoga drugog, i da se celokupno postojanje dešava radi celokupnog bića.
Protarh: To je zaista veoma jasno
Sokrat: Dakle, i uživanje, ako je postojanje, nužno bi bilo da se dešava radi nekog bića.
Protarh: Svakako
Sokrat: Zacelo, ono zbog čega postaje ono što postaje zbog nečega spada u oblast dobrog; a ono što postaje zbog nečega drugog treba, prijatelju moj, da se stavi u drugu oblast.
Protarh: To je zaista nužno.
Sokrat: Sada, ako je uživanje zaista neko postajanje, da li ćemo ispravno postupiti ako ga stavimo u neku drugu oblast, a ne u oblast dobrog?
Protarh: Potpuno ispravno, zaista.
Sokrat: Dakle, kao što sam već rekao na početku svoga izlaganja, treba biti zahvalan onome koji je obelodanio da je uživanje postajanje, i da u njemu ne postoji biće ni u najmanjoj meri; očigledno je, naime, da se on ruga onima koji tvrde da je uživanje dobro."
Uživanje nije biće, ono je postojanje. Samim time jasno je da je ono inferiorno svemu što je biće. Postojanje je uronjeno u vremenu, biće je oduvijek bilo i zauvijek će biti. Biće je zato to što jest samo po sebi, dok je postojanje uvijek uzrokovano nečim.
Uživanje je zasigurno uzrokovano nečim što nije ono samo.
Kul je idući citat o onome što je bitnije, nešto radi samog znanja ili radi same koristi:
"Protarh: Pa ja sam, Sokrate, često čuo kako Gorgija u svakoj prilici ponavlja da se veština uveravanja veoma odlikuje od svih ostalih, jer ona postiže da joj sve ropski služe dobrovoljno, a ne silom, i da je daleko najbolja od svih veština; pa, sad, ja se ne bih suprostavio ni tebi niti, opet, njemu
Sokrat: Čini mi se da si hteo nešto da kažeš, ali da si se zastidio i odbacio oružje-
Protarh: Pa, neka bude zasad tako kako se tebi čini
...
Sokrat: Ono za čim sam ja težio, dragi Protarše, nije baš to- koja je veština ili koja nauka nadmašuje sve ostale kao najvažnija i najbolja i za nas najkorisnija, već koja istražuje šta je jasno, šta je tačno i šta je najistinitije, pa makar bilo sasvim malo i beznačajno po koristi- eto, za tim upravo sada težimo."
Ovaj citat baca poveznicu Gorgije i ostale šake sofista sa suvremenim self-help pseudoideologijama i cjelokupnom praktičnom psihologijom. Utilitarizam je poveznica sofista i life coucheva što, pak, baca poveznicu sa Spenglerom koji self-help filozofiju smatra bitnom odrednicom civilizacije koja umire. Stoici, sofisti i budisti su živjeli u civilizacijama koje su bile na svom kraju.
Dakako, s druge strane praktična psihologija je zbilja učinkovita da nam u životu bude bolje. U svakom polju ima cvijeća i korova.
Moja vlastita semantičko-terminološka odrednica jest ta da mi je kvalitetni self-help praktična psihologija, jer po mom sudu sam naziv "self-help" je po sebi pejorativan.
Zamislite da je Gorgija imao vlastiti jutjub kanal, i da mu je Sokrat radio respond videa?
Ma, ne bi to Sokrat, ni Platon, radili. Oni su ipak bili iznad reaktivne sfere bivstvovanja jer su kuleri.
Još jedan kognitvni zgoditak koji baca Sokrat (Platon):
"Sokrat: Znanje se, takođe, razlikuje jedno od drugog, jedno je usmereno na ono što postaje i na ono što propada, a drugo na ono što niti postaje niti propada, već jeste večno, istovetno i nepromenljivo. Imajući u vidu istinu, zaključili smo da je ovo znanje istinitije od onog."
Bez ikakve ironije Sokrat razara. Platonovi su dijalozi svevremenski.
Evo jedne za Sokrata, Platona, Heraklita Mračnog, Parmenida i druge iz ekipe s egejske obale.
Njihov žar i dalje gori.
Hvala i slava im!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u1mex...
August 25, 2016
This isn't a complaint, since I find Plato dialogues very charming for their miscellaneous banter, but half of the dialogue itself consisted of slight reworded repeats of the following:
Socrates: But you have forgotten one thing!
Protarchus: What's that?
Socrates: I will tell you now!
Protarchus: Please tell me.
However, when you get past it stylistically, this whole book, introduction and dialogue, gives very detailed analysis on Plato's views on pleasure and pain, and how they interact with knowledge and reason. Not a pinnacle piece to read to understand Plato's views and perspective, but I would definitely recommend it to anyone that is interested in Plato's opinions on virtues and the soul.
Socrates: But you have forgotten one thing!
Protarchus: What's that?
Socrates: I will tell you now!
Protarchus: Please tell me.
However, when you get past it stylistically, this whole book, introduction and dialogue, gives very detailed analysis on Plato's views on pleasure and pain, and how they interact with knowledge and reason. Not a pinnacle piece to read to understand Plato's views and perspective, but I would definitely recommend it to anyone that is interested in Plato's opinions on virtues and the soul.
January 17, 2018
Socrates teaches that the names mind and wisdom are to be honored most. These names may be said to have their best and most exact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true being.
April 16, 2019
A dialogue between Socrates, Philebus the hedonist and Protarchus specific to pleasure and a consideration of this as the greatest good. Socrates, however (amongst other things) considers varying types of pleasures and the intensities of such and highlights knowledge as a much better goal...
Read
May 8, 2025Rating Plato is a lot like rating Shakespeare, in that going any lower than three stars feels like heresy. It’s a good thing I don’t rate philosophy, then, because in this case I’d have to stoop!
I’d worked up a ranking of the dialogues I’d read as of the last one, and here’s how that went:
1. Phaedo (rocked my world)
2. Gorgias (page-turner)
3. Symposium (baby’s first banquet)
4. Phaedrus (overestimated)
5. Republic (over-long)
6. Apology (not bad)
7. Cratylus, selectively (not good)
8. Ion (what happened?!)
Well it looks like I read Ion without reviewing it, so I can’t jog my memory (uncoincidentally impaired? it was grad school) as to its apparently bonkers contents, but there were passages in Philebus that I marked “ridiculous line of argument” and “eyeroll,” indicatively speaking. Yeah, this really did not gel. Who’da thunk even Plato isn’t logically infallible.
I feel more empowered in saying so by having done my due diligence and sought out a second opinion on what I appeared to be missing. Goodreads hardly helped – I didn’t get the sense from most reviews that they had processed this dialogue any better than I did, – but one reviewer fortunately reminded me of the venerable Jowett, to whom I appealed for my annotative fix. Let me say here that reading Jowett’s introduction to / analysis of Philebus was in all probability more elucidating than reading the dialogue itself! So at least there’s that to be said for this addition to my shelves, that it wasn’t entirely for nothing, and I have made a mental note to consult Jowett whenever I read Plato next.
At risk of turning this review into a homage to the latter-day academician, I’ll say a few words about why I read Jowett with double the enthusiastic concentration that I had for Philebus. First of all, I actually learned something from Jowett, whose expertise in Greek philosophy was able to do what little, if any, scholarship achieves nowadays: teach, instead of opine. He was able to situate Philebus in its philosophical and historical context in a way that I, lacking his wider subject knowledge, could not have done, and this meant situating the dialogue for me in not only a new, but also a true and an illuminating light. So there was that to be said in Jowett’s favor. There was also to be said that his paraphrase of Philebus was actually very clear, and quite clarifying, and it stoked a bit of levity in me to think that Jowett’s Victorian-era pupils were perhaps not so far removed from today’s students of Shakespeare as I’d have despairingly thought: the ones consulted Jowett’s glosses, and the others turn to SparkNotes or LitCharts. And finally, Jowett did confirm me in my view that Philebus contains errors, or at least perplexities or irregularities, in reasoning.
To me, personally, this dialogue was a case study in circular reasoning, because if Plato’s task was partially to prove that reason trumps pleasure, he does this chiefly by prodding Protarchus, his interlocuter, to agree that surely reason is better. I mean, of course I exaggerate, but only so much. For example, one of his claims is that reason partakes of the divine cause of the universe, which must be most akin to an orderly mind (i.e. soul) on the evidence of the sublunary arrangement of things, and this somehow establishes that reason belongs to the fourth and highest category of causes, whereas pleasure corresponds to a second category of unlimited things. The four categories, by the way, are the limited, the unlimited, the mixed, and the causative, and while I might, okay, maybe for the sake of argument, accept that progression, what this dialogue really needs is a reckoning with how the various additional taxonomies it contrives interrelate. It also needs a more expanded vocabulary so as not to refer to elements of independent (interdependent? who knows) taxonomies by the same name.
But enough from me: let’s return to Jowett. Here is an example of why he’s cool: “It is difficult to acquit Plato, to use his own language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' when he overlooks such a distinction [omitted for the sake of illustration]. Yet, on the other hand, we are hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things differently from ourselves.”
And here is a flash synopsis of Philebus, containing a subtle critique: “The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after they have been duly analyzed, to the good.”
As for those relations themselves, and how those relations relate to other relations, I can’t say I’m much more enlightened heading out of this dialogue than I was heading in.
Updated line-up:
1. Phaedo (rocked my world)
2. Gorgias (page-turner)
3. Symposium (baby’s first banquet)
4. Phaedrus (overestimated)
5. Republic (over-long)
6. Apology (not bad)
7. Cratylus, selectively (not good)
8. Ion (what happened?!)
8. Philebus (come again?)
I’d worked up a ranking of the dialogues I’d read as of the last one, and here’s how that went:
1. Phaedo (rocked my world)
2. Gorgias (page-turner)
3. Symposium (baby’s first banquet)
4. Phaedrus (overestimated)
5. Republic (over-long)
6. Apology (not bad)
7. Cratylus, selectively (not good)
8. Ion (what happened?!)
Well it looks like I read Ion without reviewing it, so I can’t jog my memory (uncoincidentally impaired? it was grad school) as to its apparently bonkers contents, but there were passages in Philebus that I marked “ridiculous line of argument” and “eyeroll,” indicatively speaking. Yeah, this really did not gel. Who’da thunk even Plato isn’t logically infallible.
I feel more empowered in saying so by having done my due diligence and sought out a second opinion on what I appeared to be missing. Goodreads hardly helped – I didn’t get the sense from most reviews that they had processed this dialogue any better than I did, – but one reviewer fortunately reminded me of the venerable Jowett, to whom I appealed for my annotative fix. Let me say here that reading Jowett’s introduction to / analysis of Philebus was in all probability more elucidating than reading the dialogue itself! So at least there’s that to be said for this addition to my shelves, that it wasn’t entirely for nothing, and I have made a mental note to consult Jowett whenever I read Plato next.
At risk of turning this review into a homage to the latter-day academician, I’ll say a few words about why I read Jowett with double the enthusiastic concentration that I had for Philebus. First of all, I actually learned something from Jowett, whose expertise in Greek philosophy was able to do what little, if any, scholarship achieves nowadays: teach, instead of opine. He was able to situate Philebus in its philosophical and historical context in a way that I, lacking his wider subject knowledge, could not have done, and this meant situating the dialogue for me in not only a new, but also a true and an illuminating light. So there was that to be said in Jowett’s favor. There was also to be said that his paraphrase of Philebus was actually very clear, and quite clarifying, and it stoked a bit of levity in me to think that Jowett’s Victorian-era pupils were perhaps not so far removed from today’s students of Shakespeare as I’d have despairingly thought: the ones consulted Jowett’s glosses, and the others turn to SparkNotes or LitCharts. And finally, Jowett did confirm me in my view that Philebus contains errors, or at least perplexities or irregularities, in reasoning.
To me, personally, this dialogue was a case study in circular reasoning, because if Plato’s task was partially to prove that reason trumps pleasure, he does this chiefly by prodding Protarchus, his interlocuter, to agree that surely reason is better. I mean, of course I exaggerate, but only so much. For example, one of his claims is that reason partakes of the divine cause of the universe, which must be most akin to an orderly mind (i.e. soul) on the evidence of the sublunary arrangement of things, and this somehow establishes that reason belongs to the fourth and highest category of causes, whereas pleasure corresponds to a second category of unlimited things. The four categories, by the way, are the limited, the unlimited, the mixed, and the causative, and while I might, okay, maybe for the sake of argument, accept that progression, what this dialogue really needs is a reckoning with how the various additional taxonomies it contrives interrelate. It also needs a more expanded vocabulary so as not to refer to elements of independent (interdependent? who knows) taxonomies by the same name.
But enough from me: let’s return to Jowett. Here is an example of why he’s cool: “It is difficult to acquit Plato, to use his own language, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' when he overlooks such a distinction [omitted for the sake of illustration]. Yet, on the other hand, we are hardly fair judges of confusions of thought in those who view things differently from ourselves.”
And here is a flash synopsis of Philebus, containing a subtle critique: “The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders the progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas seem to emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original elements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are only partially connected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but should rather be described as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge, after they have been duly analyzed, to the good.”
As for those relations themselves, and how those relations relate to other relations, I can’t say I’m much more enlightened heading out of this dialogue than I was heading in.
Updated line-up:
1. Phaedo (rocked my world)
2. Gorgias (page-turner)
3. Symposium (baby’s first banquet)
4. Phaedrus (overestimated)
5. Republic (over-long)
6. Apology (not bad)
7. Cratylus, selectively (not good)
8. Ion (what happened?!)
8. Philebus (come again?)
October 22, 2020
Jag är inte säker på om detta borde vara tre eller fyra stjärnor; egentligen är det egalt. Det viktiga med denna bok är att den hanterar många spännande ämnen, men döljer dem under en kombination av tråkigt språk, och en ganska brutal och strawman-baserad kritik av hedonism.
Hedonismkritiken kan i princip sammanfattas till att vissa nöjen låter det komma surt efter och därför ger mer ångest, medan andra, som tex att ta hand om sig själv och sitt förnuft, snarare ger nöjen vid flera tillfällen än bara 1.
De mer intressanta delarna är dels en genomgång av hur Platon uppfattar egenskaper - att de, av religiösa skäl, måste anses flyta från det rena och starka, ut i det svagare; dels en beskrivning av hur människan karaktäriserar egenskaper. Han delar in dessa i fyra grupper: det obegränsade, där saker är mer eller mindre, det kategoriserade, där det går att göra definitioner, det blandade, där han särskilt fokuserar på skapande, och det förnuftiga - som rör sig mellan alla dessa. Det som fascinerar med dessa, är att de är så lika modern kognitionsteori; vi har heuristiker, medvetna definitioner, kreativt skapande och något slags jungianskt omedvetet.
Utöver detta beskriver dialogen det kardinalfel som präglar Platon; han försöker skilja skapandeprocessen från dess mål. De konsekvenser man får av detta är dålig förståelse för verkligheten, dålig förståelse för hantverk, arbetsförakt och oförståelse för hur tekne faktiskt är en nödvändig del av förmåga att verka i verkligheten.
När jag nu har läst om dessa delar av Platon, och i ren kvantitet har jag tagt mig igenom den första 1/3 av hans samlade verk i år, tror jag faktiskt att jag omvärderar min inledande inställning att han var moraliskt svag; en dålig människa. Jag är nog istället benägen att säga att folk läser honom dåligt, och att nyplatonismen nog är ett bättre filter för hans idéer, så som de framstår för mig nu, än vad den traditionstyngda auktoritära angelsaxiska läsningen är. Ingenstans i Platon så här långt förkastar han nämligen glädje, eller hävdar den kunskapsteoretiska måttlöshet som tillskrivs honom. Vem vet, det kanske kommer senare.
Hedonismkritiken kan i princip sammanfattas till att vissa nöjen låter det komma surt efter och därför ger mer ångest, medan andra, som tex att ta hand om sig själv och sitt förnuft, snarare ger nöjen vid flera tillfällen än bara 1.
De mer intressanta delarna är dels en genomgång av hur Platon uppfattar egenskaper - att de, av religiösa skäl, måste anses flyta från det rena och starka, ut i det svagare; dels en beskrivning av hur människan karaktäriserar egenskaper. Han delar in dessa i fyra grupper: det obegränsade, där saker är mer eller mindre, det kategoriserade, där det går att göra definitioner, det blandade, där han särskilt fokuserar på skapande, och det förnuftiga - som rör sig mellan alla dessa. Det som fascinerar med dessa, är att de är så lika modern kognitionsteori; vi har heuristiker, medvetna definitioner, kreativt skapande och något slags jungianskt omedvetet.
Utöver detta beskriver dialogen det kardinalfel som präglar Platon; han försöker skilja skapandeprocessen från dess mål. De konsekvenser man får av detta är dålig förståelse för verkligheten, dålig förståelse för hantverk, arbetsförakt och oförståelse för hur tekne faktiskt är en nödvändig del av förmåga att verka i verkligheten.
När jag nu har läst om dessa delar av Platon, och i ren kvantitet har jag tagt mig igenom den första 1/3 av hans samlade verk i år, tror jag faktiskt att jag omvärderar min inledande inställning att han var moraliskt svag; en dålig människa. Jag är nog istället benägen att säga att folk läser honom dåligt, och att nyplatonismen nog är ett bättre filter för hans idéer, så som de framstår för mig nu, än vad den traditionstyngda auktoritära angelsaxiska läsningen är. Ingenstans i Platon så här långt förkastar han nämligen glädje, eller hävdar den kunskapsteoretiska måttlöshet som tillskrivs honom. Vem vet, det kanske kommer senare.
December 10, 2022
Philebus is about the right ordering of all human possessions to the Good. The character Philebus is a hedonist who believes that pleasure is the ultimate goal of life, that all human strivings should be directed to pleasure, and that nothing - not even reason - can exceed pleasure in its ultimate value. Through the classic form of questioning, Socrates gets Philebus's friend, Protarchus, to understand that the Good is the highest aim of all, and that a human life is "mixed" intelligence and pleasure. I think it's important to note that our English word "intelligence" is not nearly as expansive as the Greek word νοῦς. In Platos's system, the νοῦς is mind, reason, intellect. It's also important to note that the νοῦς /pleasure dialectic is not a clash between the incorporeal/corporeal or the mind/matter; pleasure is specifically the effect that certain stimuli have on the body and mind and soul of a person. The purpose of this dialogue is to show the right relation of pleasure to every other "possession" in a human, and to demonstrate that the best life is one oriented toward the Good, with the Good binding the mixture of possessions within each human.
Towards the end of the dialogue Socrates says, "To me it appears that in our present discussion we have created what might be called an incorporeal ordered system for the rightful control of a corporal subject in which dwells a soul." Of all human possessions, beauty is in fifth place, after measured proportion, beauty or excellence, truth, and right opinions. Socrates points out that "the good has taken refuge in the character of the beautiful," and that one cannot "hunt down the good under a single form" but it can be secured by the conjunction of beauty, proportion, and truth. The human life is therefore ordered by beauty, proportion, truth, the arts (i.e. "right opinions"), and, finally, by pleasure.
This was an interesting dialogue to read right after reading and hearing Lloyd Gerson. Gerson's thesis is that Plato is far more metaphysically systematic than most modern commentators have admitted, though the ancients all knew this. Philebus is an example of a dialogue where the Good is in the background to everything, ordering all of human life from the top - down.
Towards the end of the dialogue Socrates says, "To me it appears that in our present discussion we have created what might be called an incorporeal ordered system for the rightful control of a corporal subject in which dwells a soul." Of all human possessions, beauty is in fifth place, after measured proportion, beauty or excellence, truth, and right opinions. Socrates points out that "the good has taken refuge in the character of the beautiful," and that one cannot "hunt down the good under a single form" but it can be secured by the conjunction of beauty, proportion, and truth. The human life is therefore ordered by beauty, proportion, truth, the arts (i.e. "right opinions"), and, finally, by pleasure.
This was an interesting dialogue to read right after reading and hearing Lloyd Gerson. Gerson's thesis is that Plato is far more metaphysically systematic than most modern commentators have admitted, though the ancients all knew this. Philebus is an example of a dialogue where the Good is in the background to everything, ordering all of human life from the top - down.
March 23, 2020
Ενδιαφέρων διάλογος, αν και με κούρασε πάρα πολύ.
***
Είναι φανερό πλέον σε όλους οτι έχω ένα love-hate relationship με τον Πλάτωνα - υπάρχουν διάλογοι του που ΑΓΑΠΩ και διάλογοι του που σιχαίνομαι. Τώρα απέκτησα και την κατηγορία "διάλογοι-που-με-κούρασαν-αλλά-δεν-ήταν-άσχημοι" και ποδαρικό κάνει ο Φίληβος, με την υποψία οτι και άλλοι όψιμοι διάλογοι θα ενταχθούν σε αυτή την κατηγορία. Ο Φίληβος μας μιλάει για την ηδονή, ζητήματα ηθικής και για το πως πρέπει να ζει ο άνθρωπος. Είναι ο βίος της σοφίας προτιμότερος απο τον βίο της ηδονής, ή κάτι ενδιάμεσο είναι προτιμότερο;
Με μια διαίρεση όρων που εκνευρίζει και τον πιο ήρεμο άνθρωπο, στον Φίληβο υιοθετείται μια σχεδόν αριστοτελική μεσότητα ανάμεσα στην ηδονή και τη νόηση. Στο σεμινάριο είπαμε οτι ομοιάζει πολύ με τον Schiller, αλλά επειδή εγώ δεν ξέρω απο δαύτα, φοβάμαι πλέον να διαβάσω τον κύριο. Διαβάζοντας τον διάλογο κατάλαβα γιατί δεν είναι τόσο γνωστός όσο οι υπόλοιποι - πέρα απο το γεγονός οτι είναι κουραστικός, είναι και απο τους τελευταίους διαλόγους και κατατάσσεται σε μια σχετικά δυσανάγνωστη περίοδο του Πλάτωνα, η οποία έχει ενδιαφέρον όμως για τα θέματα που πραγματεύεται.
Θα πρότεινα τον Φίληβο, αλλά μαζί με αυτόν θα σας έγραφα και τρία κουτιά λεξοτανίλ για τα νεύρα.
Γιατί κουραστικός είναι, εκνευριστικός είναι, αλλά σε κάθε περίπτωση είναι ένας πολύ όμορφος διάλογος που δεν πρέπει να πάει αδιάβαστος.
ΥΓ. το διάβασα απο Ζαχαρόπουλο, αυτή την έκδοση θα σας πρότεινα (όχι πως υπάρχουν πολλές ΑΛΛΑ κάκτο δεν προτιμώ, η μετάφραση του Μπούσουλα ήταν δυσεύρετη και δύσκολη, στην τελική θα καταλήξετε κι εσείς εκεί που κατέληξα κι εγώ, στην Ταναγραία, που θα έλεγε και ο Κωστής μου ♥).
***
Είναι φανερό πλέον σε όλους οτι έχω ένα love-hate relationship με τον Πλάτωνα - υπάρχουν διάλογοι του που ΑΓΑΠΩ και διάλογοι του που σιχαίνομαι. Τώρα απέκτησα και την κατηγορία "διάλογοι-που-με-κούρασαν-αλλά-δεν-ήταν-άσχημοι" και ποδαρικό κάνει ο Φίληβος, με την υποψία οτι και άλλοι όψιμοι διάλογοι θα ενταχθούν σε αυτή την κατηγορία. Ο Φίληβος μας μιλάει για την ηδονή, ζητήματα ηθικής και για το πως πρέπει να ζει ο άνθρωπος. Είναι ο βίος της σοφίας προτιμότερος απο τον βίο της ηδονής, ή κάτι ενδιάμεσο είναι προτιμότερο;
Με μια διαίρεση όρων που εκνευρίζει και τον πιο ήρεμο άνθρωπο, στον Φίληβο υιοθετείται μια σχεδόν αριστοτελική μεσότητα ανάμεσα στην ηδονή και τη νόηση. Στο σεμινάριο είπαμε οτι ομοιάζει πολύ με τον Schiller, αλλά επειδή εγώ δεν ξέρω απο δαύτα, φοβάμαι πλέον να διαβάσω τον κύριο. Διαβάζοντας τον διάλογο κατάλαβα γιατί δεν είναι τόσο γνωστός όσο οι υπόλοιποι - πέρα απο το γεγονός οτι είναι κουραστικός, είναι και απο τους τελευταίους διαλόγους και κατατάσσεται σε μια σχετικά δυσανάγνωστη περίοδο του Πλάτωνα, η οποία έχει ενδιαφέρον όμως για τα θέματα που πραγματεύεται.
Θα πρότεινα τον Φίληβο, αλλά μαζί με αυτόν θα σας έγραφα και τρία κουτιά λεξοτανίλ για τα νεύρα.
Γιατί κουραστικός είναι, εκνευριστικός είναι, αλλά σε κάθε περίπτωση είναι ένας πολύ όμορφος διάλογος που δεν πρέπει να πάει αδιάβαστος.
ΥΓ. το διάβασα απο Ζαχαρόπουλο, αυτή την έκδοση θα σας πρότεινα (όχι πως υπάρχουν πολλές ΑΛΛΑ κάκτο δεν προτιμώ, η μετάφραση του Μπούσουλα ήταν δυσεύρετη και δύσκολη, στην τελική θα καταλήξετε κι εσείς εκεί που κατέληξα κι εγώ, στην Ταναγραία, που θα έλεγε και ο Κωστής μου ♥).
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 8, 2021
What is the relation, if any, between pursuing pleasure and pursuing wisdom? Can you really pursue pleasure without a balance of wisdom? Both Philebus/Protarchus and Socrates agree there must be “some state and disposition of the soul which has the property of making all men happy.”
Socrates’s first challenge is for Protarchus to identify that quality that exists in all pleasures, both helpful or harmful, that makes a pleasure good. This hinges on the larger argument of finding a universal unity.
They go through several options. “Infinity” as such can’t be that element Socrates then shifts the argument to ask whether there can be “true pleasures” and “false pleasures.” I’m not so sure a modern reader would grant him that point. It could be a category confusion.
Socrates: “The soul is sometimes like a book.” Memory and perception meet in the soul.
“Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.”
Conclusion: False pleasures originate from false knowledge, or opinions.
Socrates’s first challenge is for Protarchus to identify that quality that exists in all pleasures, both helpful or harmful, that makes a pleasure good. This hinges on the larger argument of finding a universal unity.
They go through several options. “Infinity” as such can’t be that element Socrates then shifts the argument to ask whether there can be “true pleasures” and “false pleasures.” I’m not so sure a modern reader would grant him that point. It could be a category confusion.
Socrates: “The soul is sometimes like a book.” Memory and perception meet in the soul.
“Measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue the world over.”
Conclusion: False pleasures originate from false knowledge, or opinions.
November 11, 2019
"O halde gene ruha işlenen hayaller; öyle ki, çoğunlukla, pek çok altınımız olduğunu ve bu altınla bol bol zevk süreceğimizi hayal edip yaşarız. Dahası, kendi içimizde kendimizi görür ve bundan zevk duyarız."
November 26, 2023
4 Stars
Some things in this one went over my head a little, but a second readthrough later will make those parts clearer I think. Some very insightful things in this one and made me think quite a bit.
Some things in this one went over my head a little, but a second readthrough later will make those parts clearer I think. Some very insightful things in this one and made me think quite a bit.
May 31, 2022
The discussion was on True and false pleasure, whether this is an illusion or reality.
August 17, 2023
Boy was this one a long doozy. And to be honest with you Socrates, on the issue of mind over pleasure, I remain unconvinced (its good tho)
September 17, 2011
Plato is a read that makes you wish you could wade in with a cutting comment to Socrates, rather than the usually flimsy opposition. As Protarchus has the rhetoric skill of most of Plato's adversaries, which is generally minimal to non-existent, and Philebus basically sulks throughout the dialogue.
Plato's books are very good when there is a strong counter argument through the book, this does not have one. There are moments of interest concerning the nature of pleasure, but many arguments are rather misleading or just wrong. The constant misuse of analogy tends to get intensly irritating after the third wild statement made from the apparent faultless inductive method of comparing human virtues with different metals?!? I mean come on! Plato criticizes Sophists for word play, but seriously Plato is as guilty.
However, although I did not enjoy this book, it is mainly becaue I have very high expectations when reading Plato, as I do with many other classical Greek philisophers. As when he does have a serious debate, he is still relevant now.
Plato's books are very good when there is a strong counter argument through the book, this does not have one. There are moments of interest concerning the nature of pleasure, but many arguments are rather misleading or just wrong. The constant misuse of analogy tends to get intensly irritating after the third wild statement made from the apparent faultless inductive method of comparing human virtues with different metals?!? I mean come on! Plato criticizes Sophists for word play, but seriously Plato is as guilty.
However, although I did not enjoy this book, it is mainly becaue I have very high expectations when reading Plato, as I do with many other classical Greek philisophers. As when he does have a serious debate, he is still relevant now.
September 18, 2020
My favorite section of the dialog is when Socrates sets the context of the discussion by proposing to mix (1) the infinity of “more or less” estimations with (2) the finite numbers in order (3) to produce a proportional and harmonious combination by (4) some cause. Among the modern developments of this structure, Kant's theory of knowledge is a striking example in my opinion: (1) the infinity of experience and sensations are organized by (2) a limited reason and its categories in order (3) to produce valid knowledge by (4) rational creatures towards some practical purposes.
There is something quite interesting about the finite human being capable to organize an infinity of experiences into a specific amount of knowledge. At some point in this dialogue, Socrates warns against falling into either one or infinity in general (as a characteristic of the youth), and suggests arriving at a specific number in between the two.
There is something quite interesting about the finite human being capable to organize an infinity of experiences into a specific amount of knowledge. At some point in this dialogue, Socrates warns against falling into either one or infinity in general (as a characteristic of the youth), and suggests arriving at a specific number in between the two.
December 9, 2018
I believe that after over 3 years of studying Philosophy (thoroughly), I have acquired the capacity to (finally) comprehend these antique treasures! And YES, this book is worth each and every one of those 5 stars.
October 28, 2024
That was brutal, but still good. Benardete is as enigmatic and impenetrable as ever.
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