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Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe
Suppose there is no God. This might imply that human life is meaningless, that there are no moral obligations and hence people can do whatever they want, and that the notions of virtue and vice and good and evil have no place. Erik J. Wielenberg believes this view to be mistaken and in this book he explains why. He argues that even if God does not exist, human life can have meaning, we do have moral obligations, and virtue is possible. Naturally, the author sees virtue in a Godless universe as different from virtue in a Christian universe, and he develops naturalistic accounts of humility, charity, and hope. The moral landscape in a Godless universe is different from the moral landscape in a Christian universe, but it does indeed exist. Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe is a tour of some of the central landmarks of this under-explored territory.
204 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2005
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206 people want to read
About the author
Erik J. Wielenberg
8 books4 followersErik J. Wielenberg is an American author and professor of philosophy at DePauw University in Greencastle, Indiana.
As an atheist, Wielenberg defends nontheistic moral realism.
As an atheist, Wielenberg defends nontheistic moral realism.
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September 9, 2025
Naturalistic Ethics
In Dostoevsky's "The Brothers Karamazov" one of the characters offers the famous observation that "if God does not exist, all things are permitted." One of the goals of Erik Wielenberg's study "Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe" (2005) is to rebut this claim. Professor Wielenberg is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at DePauw University.
Professor Wielenberg tries to do two things: first he wants to rebut claims that, without a supernatural basis, life has no meaning or purpose and that notions of right and wrong, good and bad, are untenable. The opponents he tries to rebut are for the most part contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians. Second, Professor Wielenberg tries to develop a basis and a content for a naturalistic ethics.
Professor Wielenberg adopts an analytical approach. Appropriate allusions to philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Plato, Aristotle, and Hume,to writers such as Conrad, and to modern movies and video games help enliven his text. I was reminded at various places of Spinoza and the Buddha in reading Wielenberg's study, and his work would benefit by explicit consideration of these great figures.
In successive chapters, Professor Wielenberg tries to argue that human life may have an internal meaning based on intrinsically good activities (such as falling in love, study, helping others, creativity, or -- an activity dear to my heart -- playing the piano) even if it doesn't have theological, supernatural meaning -- such as conforming one's life to a divine plan. Similarly, he argues that a theological warrant is not required for ethical behavior or to answer Plato's question "why be good". Interestingly, he argues that the answer to that question "because it is good" or "because it is the right thing to do" requires no further justification -- just as the statement "I am doing x because it is in my interest" requires, in its proper context, no further justification. Professor Wielenberg proceeds to develop some naturalistic standards for behavior drawing largely on the work of another contemporary philosopher, John Kekes. Kekes and Wielenberg identify three basic features of the human condition: contingency, the indifference of the order of nature to human effort, and the presence of destructiveness in human motivation" that are basic to the development of a human ethics. Professor Wielenberg recommends meditation, among other things, and increased attention to the teachings of science as useful to the development of a naturalistic ethics.
Professor Wielenberg doesn't fully develop what he understands by "naturalism" and I think this detracts from his study. His concept of naturalism excludes God, Cartesian immaterial souls, and miracles. But his concept is broader than mere bodies interacting in space under scientific, physical laws. He relies, as is apparent from my above short discussion, on an ontology broad enough to include intrinsic meaning and intrinsic goodness. I happen to agree, but I think he needs to show how and why he rejects a naturalism based upon scientism. Professor Wielenberg's naturalism, in other words, is so broad that it does some of the work otherwise done by religion (and for all his criticism of it, Professor Wielenberg seems to me deeply influenced by religion) and he needs to explain how. That is why I find Spinoza a relevant figure in his analysis. Spinoza to me is the naturalistic philosopher par excellence, but he packs a great deal of content into his naturalism that more hard-headed thinkers will, perhaps, resist and reject. Similarly, it would be interesting to know what Professor Wielenberg makes of a non-theistic religion such as Buddhism. I find his account close to Buddhism on many points, different from it on others.
Professor Wielenberg has written a challenging book that helped rekindle my love of thought and of the philosophic life.
Robin Friedman
In Dostoevsky's "The Brothers Karamazov" one of the characters offers the famous observation that "if God does not exist, all things are permitted." One of the goals of Erik Wielenberg's study "Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe" (2005) is to rebut this claim. Professor Wielenberg is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at DePauw University.
Professor Wielenberg tries to do two things: first he wants to rebut claims that, without a supernatural basis, life has no meaning or purpose and that notions of right and wrong, good and bad, are untenable. The opponents he tries to rebut are for the most part contemporary Christian philosophers and theologians. Second, Professor Wielenberg tries to develop a basis and a content for a naturalistic ethics.
Professor Wielenberg adopts an analytical approach. Appropriate allusions to philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Plato, Aristotle, and Hume,to writers such as Conrad, and to modern movies and video games help enliven his text. I was reminded at various places of Spinoza and the Buddha in reading Wielenberg's study, and his work would benefit by explicit consideration of these great figures.
In successive chapters, Professor Wielenberg tries to argue that human life may have an internal meaning based on intrinsically good activities (such as falling in love, study, helping others, creativity, or -- an activity dear to my heart -- playing the piano) even if it doesn't have theological, supernatural meaning -- such as conforming one's life to a divine plan. Similarly, he argues that a theological warrant is not required for ethical behavior or to answer Plato's question "why be good". Interestingly, he argues that the answer to that question "because it is good" or "because it is the right thing to do" requires no further justification -- just as the statement "I am doing x because it is in my interest" requires, in its proper context, no further justification. Professor Wielenberg proceeds to develop some naturalistic standards for behavior drawing largely on the work of another contemporary philosopher, John Kekes. Kekes and Wielenberg identify three basic features of the human condition: contingency, the indifference of the order of nature to human effort, and the presence of destructiveness in human motivation" that are basic to the development of a human ethics. Professor Wielenberg recommends meditation, among other things, and increased attention to the teachings of science as useful to the development of a naturalistic ethics.
Professor Wielenberg doesn't fully develop what he understands by "naturalism" and I think this detracts from his study. His concept of naturalism excludes God, Cartesian immaterial souls, and miracles. But his concept is broader than mere bodies interacting in space under scientific, physical laws. He relies, as is apparent from my above short discussion, on an ontology broad enough to include intrinsic meaning and intrinsic goodness. I happen to agree, but I think he needs to show how and why he rejects a naturalism based upon scientism. Professor Wielenberg's naturalism, in other words, is so broad that it does some of the work otherwise done by religion (and for all his criticism of it, Professor Wielenberg seems to me deeply influenced by religion) and he needs to explain how. That is why I find Spinoza a relevant figure in his analysis. Spinoza to me is the naturalistic philosopher par excellence, but he packs a great deal of content into his naturalism that more hard-headed thinkers will, perhaps, resist and reject. Similarly, it would be interesting to know what Professor Wielenberg makes of a non-theistic religion such as Buddhism. I find his account close to Buddhism on many points, different from it on others.
Professor Wielenberg has written a challenging book that helped rekindle my love of thought and of the philosophic life.
Robin Friedman
January 23, 2013
The first half of the book is a rather well rounded discussion of moral arguments for the existence of God, as well as arguments against the possibility of atheistic moral realism. The author concludes that these arguments are defective in some sense or other. The first half is successful in its goal, as far as I'm concerned.
The second half of the book goes into what the author believes is a suitable picture of the moral landscape in a naturalistic worldview. However, I do not find the second half as convincing and engaging as the first; however, my own biases against the author's ethical inclinations may be coming into play.
The second half of the book goes into what the author believes is a suitable picture of the moral landscape in a naturalistic worldview. However, I do not find the second half as convincing and engaging as the first; however, my own biases against the author's ethical inclinations may be coming into play.
January 28, 2018
ترجمش یکم ضعیف بود
بیشتر از نظریه های افلاطون و هیوم و راسل استفاده کرده بود
بیشتر از نظریه های افلاطون و هیوم و راسل استفاده کرده بود
June 16, 2022
“The central project of this book is an examination of the ethical implications of naturalism.“
“… Naturalism leaves open the possibility that there are ethical facts that are not reducible to physical or scientific facts. “
“Is there such a thing as virtue in a naturalistic universe, and if so, what is it? “
“… It is perfectly rational for me to reject the Christian Supernatural claims about Jesus without having a detailed alternative explanation.”
Wielenberg’s foils in this book are: CS Lewis, William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga.
Chapter 1
It is often maintained that if God does not exist human life is meaningless. For human life to have meaning it is sometimes said is “for it to have a purpose that is assigned by a supernatural being.” “Under another interpretation for human life to have meaning is for it to bring goodness into the universe.” “Under a third interpretation for a human life to have meaning is for it to be good for the person who lives it and for it to include activity that is worthwhile.“
Wielenberg does a good job of going through the history of argumentation about the nature of meaning and ethics in the history of philosophy. While he is highly critical of the nature and source of ethical claims in the religious tradition when he gets around to offering his own positive content he doesn’t stray very far.
He claims that there are in fact intrinsic goods in a small list to us that includes: falling in love, engaging and intellectually stimulating activity, being creative in various ways, experiencing pleasure of various kinds, and teaching.“ Later he claims “the foundation of morality is a set of axiomatic necessary ethical truths.“
There is no place for God.
He concludes chapter 2 by saying “if there are ethical truths at all, then some of them lie at the very bedrock of reality, created by no one, under no one’s control, passing judgment on the actions and character of God and man alike.“
In chapter 3 he takes up the question: why be moral In a world without God?
Wielenberg is very comfortable talking about moral obligation in a naturalistic world. Just exactly how are such obligations created or binding?
In chapter 4, Wielenberg takes on the issue of whether or not a naturalistic perspective would support the notion of several key Christian virtues including humility, charity and hope.
“Being an ethically good person is, in part, a matter of being properly oriented toward the universe.”
His argument in favor of humility and a naturalistic world is basically that we did not create the world a combination of genetic determinism, material determinism, environmentalist determinism, social determinism, he takes much of the position that John Rawls does in A Theory of Justice: “You didn’t build that.“. We should consider ourselves to be very lucky if we live good lives and for that reason, we should be humble.
Then, Wielenberg severely criticizes the Old Testament, specifically the call to obedience to God. And he believes that he Crusades were initiated because of Christian beliefs. He does not take any position on the 450 years of Muslim advances throughout Africa and Spain and the Middle East.
“But one does not have to be a theist, much less a Christian, to recognize that the tendency towards selfishness is at the same time one of the most entrenched as well as the most pernicious features of human nature. Naturalist and theist alike should acknowledge that one of the greatest challenges we face is the dark heart within ourselves.
Egads!
He does a rather poor job of examining the ethical implications of naturalism.
“… Naturalism leaves open the possibility that there are ethical facts that are not reducible to physical or scientific facts. “
“Is there such a thing as virtue in a naturalistic universe, and if so, what is it? “
“… It is perfectly rational for me to reject the Christian Supernatural claims about Jesus without having a detailed alternative explanation.”
Wielenberg’s foils in this book are: CS Lewis, William Lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga.
Chapter 1
It is often maintained that if God does not exist human life is meaningless. For human life to have meaning it is sometimes said is “for it to have a purpose that is assigned by a supernatural being.” “Under another interpretation for human life to have meaning is for it to bring goodness into the universe.” “Under a third interpretation for a human life to have meaning is for it to be good for the person who lives it and for it to include activity that is worthwhile.“
Wielenberg does a good job of going through the history of argumentation about the nature of meaning and ethics in the history of philosophy. While he is highly critical of the nature and source of ethical claims in the religious tradition when he gets around to offering his own positive content he doesn’t stray very far.
He claims that there are in fact intrinsic goods in a small list to us that includes: falling in love, engaging and intellectually stimulating activity, being creative in various ways, experiencing pleasure of various kinds, and teaching.“ Later he claims “the foundation of morality is a set of axiomatic necessary ethical truths.“
There is no place for God.
He concludes chapter 2 by saying “if there are ethical truths at all, then some of them lie at the very bedrock of reality, created by no one, under no one’s control, passing judgment on the actions and character of God and man alike.“
In chapter 3 he takes up the question: why be moral In a world without God?
Wielenberg is very comfortable talking about moral obligation in a naturalistic world. Just exactly how are such obligations created or binding?
In chapter 4, Wielenberg takes on the issue of whether or not a naturalistic perspective would support the notion of several key Christian virtues including humility, charity and hope.
“Being an ethically good person is, in part, a matter of being properly oriented toward the universe.”
His argument in favor of humility and a naturalistic world is basically that we did not create the world a combination of genetic determinism, material determinism, environmentalist determinism, social determinism, he takes much of the position that John Rawls does in A Theory of Justice: “You didn’t build that.“. We should consider ourselves to be very lucky if we live good lives and for that reason, we should be humble.
Then, Wielenberg severely criticizes the Old Testament, specifically the call to obedience to God. And he believes that he Crusades were initiated because of Christian beliefs. He does not take any position on the 450 years of Muslim advances throughout Africa and Spain and the Middle East.
“But one does not have to be a theist, much less a Christian, to recognize that the tendency towards selfishness is at the same time one of the most entrenched as well as the most pernicious features of human nature. Naturalist and theist alike should acknowledge that one of the greatest challenges we face is the dark heart within ourselves.
Egads!
He does a rather poor job of examining the ethical implications of naturalism.
June 3, 2024
WHAT ARE THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF A NATURALISTIC WORLD VIEW?
Author (and professor of Philosophy at DePauw University) Erik Weilenberg wrote in the Introduction to this 2005 book, “The central project of this book is an examination of the ethical implications of naturalism… The central component of naturalism is the claim that no supernatural entities exist, nor have such entities existed in the past, nor will them in the future… our intuitive grasp of the sorts of entities that might reasonably be characterized as supernatural … includes the God of each of the three major monotheistic religions… as well as nonphysical souls of the sort posited by Descartes and others. Naturalism entails that none of these things exists… naturalism also implies that death marks the permanent end of conscious experience for the one who dies: there is no afterlife or reincarnation in a naturalistic universe… [Naturalism] does not… include the claim that all facts are scientific facts, or that all truths can be stated in the language of science.” (Pg. 2)
He continues, “In this book I will not argue for the truth of naturalism. My project instead will be a conditional one: Let us suppose that naturalism is true. What are the ethical implications of such a view? Does it imply, for instance, that human life has no meaning, or that nothing is right or wrong?... Is there such a thing as virtue in a naturalistic universe, and if so, what is it?... I focus on Christianity primarily because it is the religious outlook with which I am most familiar. This book is, in part, a response to arguments made by certain Christian philosophers who sometimes seek to refute naturalism by claiming that it has all sorts of nasty ethical implications. Naturalism has been variously accused of implying nihilism, relativism, hedonism, or egoism. I will rebut these arguments.” (Pg. 3-4) He adds, “The overarching goal of this book is to say something interesting about what ethics might look like without God.” (Pg. 13)
He acknowledges, “how can I justify my list of intrinsically worthwhile activities? I am afraid that I have no philosophical proof for, say, the proposition that falling in love is intrinsically good… many of the things we know are such that we cannot give an adequate philosophical proof for their truth. The method I recommend… [is to] consider whether you would find it worthwhile even if it had absolutely no consequences… Claims about what is intrinsically good are the axioms of ethical theory; they are the starting points, the first principles. As such, they are unlikely to be the sorts of things that can be PROVED. Nevertheless, it is perfectly consistent to say that some activities are intrinsically valuable---and that we KNOW what some of these are.” (Pg. 35)
He argues, “If God is to impose moral obligations on humans by way of His divine commands, He must get his intended audience to recognize that the commands are coming from Him… it is not enough merely for God to have the right credentials; those whom He would command must RECOGNIZE that the commands in question are coming from an appropriately credentialed God. But it seems clear that there are plenty of people who do not believe that God has issues any commands to anyone---naturalists, for example.” (Pg. 61)
He adds, “We can conclude… that the presence of naturalists in the world---whether they are reasonable or unreasonable---teaches us that there are some moral obligations that are not derived from divine commands. God may impose SOME moral obligations on human beings by way of His divine commands, but not all of our moral obligations are so imposed… My goal instead has been to show that the idea that God is the complete source of all… our moral obligations, leads to problematic consequences and hence should be rejected.” (Pg. 63-65) Later, he summarizes, “The reason we should care about our obligations is just that THEY ARE our obligations.” (Pg. 97)
He admits in the opening of chapter four, “For the purposes of this chapter it will be useful to introduce a new assumption…: We know that naturalism is true. It is important to see that this claim is introduced only as an ASSUMPTION. My purpose here is ... [to] examine some of the consequences for ethics of naturalism being true---and not just BEING true but being KNOWN to be true.” (Pg. 98)
He suggests, “My own sense is that naturalism is a creed that some can live by and some cannot. What a person can believe varies depending on external circumstances, constitutional makeup, and a host of other factors. It seems clear that at least some people have been able to live out their entire lives as naturalists.” (Pg. 157)
He summarizes, “the goal of this book is not to determine whether naturalism is true or false, and so I will not attempt to settle the question of whether the person who finds religion has moved closer to or farther away from the truth. What I have tried to do in this book is to show that naturalism does not have some of the ethically repugnant implications that are often ascribed to it. Naturalism is not the same as, nor does it imply, nihilism, relativism, hedonism, or egoism. The naturalist can and should recognize at least some human lives have internal meaning and that there are various moral obligations in virtue of an individual’s position in the universe… naturalism may never gain wide acceptance. But if naturalism is to be rejected, it should not be rejected on the basis of bad philosophy. Those who reject naturalism because they think it implies any of the ethical hobgoblins just listed do precisely that.” (Pg. 158-159)
He concludes, “one does not have to be a theist, much less a Christian, to recognize that the tendency toward selfishness is at the same time one of the most entrenched as well as the most pernicious features of human nature. Naturalist and theist alike should acknowledge that one of the greatest challenges we face is the dark heart within ourselves…. I have recommended putting science to use in the Platonic quest for a reliable way of making people virtuous. These are all forms of a common struggle---the struggle against the selfishness inherent in human nature. Perhaps, then, this is one struggle in which we are all on the same side. Long live the ethical revolution.” (Pg. 160)
This book will be of great interest to those looking for philosophical analyses of naturalistic ethics.
Author (and professor of Philosophy at DePauw University) Erik Weilenberg wrote in the Introduction to this 2005 book, “The central project of this book is an examination of the ethical implications of naturalism… The central component of naturalism is the claim that no supernatural entities exist, nor have such entities existed in the past, nor will them in the future… our intuitive grasp of the sorts of entities that might reasonably be characterized as supernatural … includes the God of each of the three major monotheistic religions… as well as nonphysical souls of the sort posited by Descartes and others. Naturalism entails that none of these things exists… naturalism also implies that death marks the permanent end of conscious experience for the one who dies: there is no afterlife or reincarnation in a naturalistic universe… [Naturalism] does not… include the claim that all facts are scientific facts, or that all truths can be stated in the language of science.” (Pg. 2)
He continues, “In this book I will not argue for the truth of naturalism. My project instead will be a conditional one: Let us suppose that naturalism is true. What are the ethical implications of such a view? Does it imply, for instance, that human life has no meaning, or that nothing is right or wrong?... Is there such a thing as virtue in a naturalistic universe, and if so, what is it?... I focus on Christianity primarily because it is the religious outlook with which I am most familiar. This book is, in part, a response to arguments made by certain Christian philosophers who sometimes seek to refute naturalism by claiming that it has all sorts of nasty ethical implications. Naturalism has been variously accused of implying nihilism, relativism, hedonism, or egoism. I will rebut these arguments.” (Pg. 3-4) He adds, “The overarching goal of this book is to say something interesting about what ethics might look like without God.” (Pg. 13)
He acknowledges, “how can I justify my list of intrinsically worthwhile activities? I am afraid that I have no philosophical proof for, say, the proposition that falling in love is intrinsically good… many of the things we know are such that we cannot give an adequate philosophical proof for their truth. The method I recommend… [is to] consider whether you would find it worthwhile even if it had absolutely no consequences… Claims about what is intrinsically good are the axioms of ethical theory; they are the starting points, the first principles. As such, they are unlikely to be the sorts of things that can be PROVED. Nevertheless, it is perfectly consistent to say that some activities are intrinsically valuable---and that we KNOW what some of these are.” (Pg. 35)
He argues, “If God is to impose moral obligations on humans by way of His divine commands, He must get his intended audience to recognize that the commands are coming from Him… it is not enough merely for God to have the right credentials; those whom He would command must RECOGNIZE that the commands in question are coming from an appropriately credentialed God. But it seems clear that there are plenty of people who do not believe that God has issues any commands to anyone---naturalists, for example.” (Pg. 61)
He adds, “We can conclude… that the presence of naturalists in the world---whether they are reasonable or unreasonable---teaches us that there are some moral obligations that are not derived from divine commands. God may impose SOME moral obligations on human beings by way of His divine commands, but not all of our moral obligations are so imposed… My goal instead has been to show that the idea that God is the complete source of all… our moral obligations, leads to problematic consequences and hence should be rejected.” (Pg. 63-65) Later, he summarizes, “The reason we should care about our obligations is just that THEY ARE our obligations.” (Pg. 97)
He admits in the opening of chapter four, “For the purposes of this chapter it will be useful to introduce a new assumption…: We know that naturalism is true. It is important to see that this claim is introduced only as an ASSUMPTION. My purpose here is ... [to] examine some of the consequences for ethics of naturalism being true---and not just BEING true but being KNOWN to be true.” (Pg. 98)
He suggests, “My own sense is that naturalism is a creed that some can live by and some cannot. What a person can believe varies depending on external circumstances, constitutional makeup, and a host of other factors. It seems clear that at least some people have been able to live out their entire lives as naturalists.” (Pg. 157)
He summarizes, “the goal of this book is not to determine whether naturalism is true or false, and so I will not attempt to settle the question of whether the person who finds religion has moved closer to or farther away from the truth. What I have tried to do in this book is to show that naturalism does not have some of the ethically repugnant implications that are often ascribed to it. Naturalism is not the same as, nor does it imply, nihilism, relativism, hedonism, or egoism. The naturalist can and should recognize at least some human lives have internal meaning and that there are various moral obligations in virtue of an individual’s position in the universe… naturalism may never gain wide acceptance. But if naturalism is to be rejected, it should not be rejected on the basis of bad philosophy. Those who reject naturalism because they think it implies any of the ethical hobgoblins just listed do precisely that.” (Pg. 158-159)
He concludes, “one does not have to be a theist, much less a Christian, to recognize that the tendency toward selfishness is at the same time one of the most entrenched as well as the most pernicious features of human nature. Naturalist and theist alike should acknowledge that one of the greatest challenges we face is the dark heart within ourselves…. I have recommended putting science to use in the Platonic quest for a reliable way of making people virtuous. These are all forms of a common struggle---the struggle against the selfishness inherent in human nature. Perhaps, then, this is one struggle in which we are all on the same side. Long live the ethical revolution.” (Pg. 160)
This book will be of great interest to those looking for philosophical analyses of naturalistic ethics.
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November 23, 2013This is a good read. But, I disagree with Wielenberg's critique on the Aristotelian quote: a "high minded person is justified in looking down upon others for he has the right opinion of them." Wielenberg disagrees with Aristotle's view in that he seems to think that Aristotle is not entitled to such a lofty sense of perceived haughtiness. While this may be true under certain circumstances, I have to object on the premise of the context of Aristotle's quote. I'm quite certain that Aristotle is speaking from a judicial standpoint. And, it's my observation that no judge will look up to someone who's been convicted of a crime. In contrast, he's going to look down on the stupidity of the crime that's been committed. And, a judge does posses the education, intelligence, and "proper opinion" of such an individual. Therefore, it follows that this judge is "justified in looking down upon [this individual] for he has the right opinion of [him/her]." So, this book is politically correct in that it does not argue directly against anyone's fundamental beliefs. Therefore, I recommend the work to anyone.
December 6, 2011
This is both an account of how value is possible given atheism as well as a more subtle defense of moral realism. wielenberg does an admirable job of dissembling divine command theory and questioning how the presence of God is even supposed to answer any moral question. I'd recommend this book for anyone interested in metaethics generally, and more specifically who question the ability for atheists to have not only an objective moral standard, but to claim a robust moral realism complete with necessarily true moral propositions. I'd especially recommend this as a serious alternative to Sam Harris' confused work.
August 21, 2008
I bought this on a whim, gently nudged by an Amazon e-mail recommendation. I was disappointed. Not very insightful and awkward writing style. ...though, maybe I expected too much from the the title. No paradigm shift here.
May 2, 2008
Great book if you think morality and meaning are only possible of God exists. Totally readable and lots of interesting things to think about.
March 31, 2025
careful and beautiful examination of naturalistic ethics
careful and beautiful examination of naturalistic ethics with as much as a historical analysis and the author own view. Highly recommended
careful and beautiful examination of naturalistic ethics with as much as a historical analysis and the author own view. Highly recommended
January 18, 2012
This book is just bad. It's not worthless (the people cited and the examples given in the book are useful to add to your world-view), but it is just plain badly argued. It's the kind of argument which is going to be adored by people who already believe what it is preaching and panned by people who come from an alternative tradition. Additionally, the style is academic and dry: I would bet dollars to donuts that it is a dissertation with the literature review chopped off the front. But that's not really the biggest problem. The biggest problem is that the book is badly argued.
The author effectively shows that if you want to retain Christian values without God, there are justifications from within the modernist worldview that can be leveraged to accomplish that goal. What the author fails to do is accomplish the book's explicit goal: to justify the existence of virtue and vice with a naturalistic presumption.
If you're looking to retain Christian ethics without all the mystical stuff, I'd suggest What I Believe, What is Christianity?, or The Essence of Christianity. This book might help you if you are looking to retain Christian ethics but have become allergic to the "Christian" label, although the content is effectively the same.
The problem is that once you encounter non-Christian/anti-Christian ethical systems (e.g. Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morality), and especially once you are aware of the modernistic presumptions of tradition with its focus on the productive individual, then you're suddenly having to work with a lot fewer presumptions. Statements like this author makes frequently—"Obviously this is better than that"—suddenly require justification.
To give just one example: The author considers Sisyphus, who is condemned to roll a boulder up a hill, only to have it roll back down when it gets to the top—and this will repeat for eternity. Sisyphus's life is a bad one because it is one of frustration. But consider the case if Sisyphus loved rolling boulders up a hill. Maybe he got a "boulder roller's high", like runners and their "runner's high". In this case, Sisyphus would be getting to do what he loved for eternity. Is this a good life? The author says no...but why not? The presumptions creating into that "no" are massive—and none of which are addressed by the author!
The author is within a very particular tradition and does not break out from that tradition, despite the presumption of naturalism. This book is, ultimately, a very Christian text (what's more, it's actually extremely Protestant), even if it purports to be otherwise and presumes God does not exist. If you come from a Christian background and haven't analyzed your resulting formation critically—or if you have analyzed that formation and decided to go with your Christian formation anyway, even as a naturalist—then this book might speak to you. But as someone who is pretty hyper-critical of ethical presumptions, this book simply presumes too much.
The author effectively shows that if you want to retain Christian values without God, there are justifications from within the modernist worldview that can be leveraged to accomplish that goal. What the author fails to do is accomplish the book's explicit goal: to justify the existence of virtue and vice with a naturalistic presumption.
If you're looking to retain Christian ethics without all the mystical stuff, I'd suggest What I Believe, What is Christianity?, or The Essence of Christianity. This book might help you if you are looking to retain Christian ethics but have become allergic to the "Christian" label, although the content is effectively the same.
The problem is that once you encounter non-Christian/anti-Christian ethical systems (e.g. Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morality), and especially once you are aware of the modernistic presumptions of tradition with its focus on the productive individual, then you're suddenly having to work with a lot fewer presumptions. Statements like this author makes frequently—"Obviously this is better than that"—suddenly require justification.
To give just one example: The author considers Sisyphus, who is condemned to roll a boulder up a hill, only to have it roll back down when it gets to the top—and this will repeat for eternity. Sisyphus's life is a bad one because it is one of frustration. But consider the case if Sisyphus loved rolling boulders up a hill. Maybe he got a "boulder roller's high", like runners and their "runner's high". In this case, Sisyphus would be getting to do what he loved for eternity. Is this a good life? The author says no...but why not? The presumptions creating into that "no" are massive—and none of which are addressed by the author!
The author is within a very particular tradition and does not break out from that tradition, despite the presumption of naturalism. This book is, ultimately, a very Christian text (what's more, it's actually extremely Protestant), even if it purports to be otherwise and presumes God does not exist. If you come from a Christian background and haven't analyzed your resulting formation critically—or if you have analyzed that formation and decided to go with your Christian formation anyway, even as a naturalist—then this book might speak to you. But as someone who is pretty hyper-critical of ethical presumptions, this book simply presumes too much.
February 2, 2017
نجمتين ونص.
في البداية الكتاب كان عظيم لكن ابتدى يكرر نفسه ويعيد ويزيد في مواضيع، خصوصاً الفصل الثالث .. كان سيء من كثر الاقتباسات وتكرر الافكار و المواضيع من الفصل الثاني. في الفصل الرابع لما اتكلم عن التواضع وفق الرؤية المسيحية و المذهب الطبيعي كان رائع لحد ما ابتعد شوي عن موضوع الاساسي وجلس يتكلم أكثر عن المذهب الطبيعي.. كان بالنسبالي كلام متكرر ومُلل (لاي احد عنده خلفية حيقول نفس الكلام) شخصياً وبعيداً عن كلامه المتكرر عن المذهب أعجبني الفصل الرابع و لما ابتدى يتكلم عن جون كيكيس وسيسرو.. إضافة جميلة
الكتاب عبارة عن إسترجاع حجج قديمة ومناقشتها .. عنوان الكتاب مثير وكذلك عناوين الفصول لكن ماذا يحدث لقيمة والفضيلة في عدم وجود الله؟ سؤال الوحيد الذي لم يجيب عليه الكاتب (اللي المفروض يكون الكتاب عن إجابة هذا السؤال تحديداً)
لسه ما أعرف فين المشكلة من الكاتب او المترجم، الكتاب ممكن يكون أفضل من كذا
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الشكر موصل للمترجم لؤي عشري على إضافته للايات القرآنية في الهوامش حتى يتوافق مع مقارنات الكاتب (حيث الكاتب إستدال نصوص من الانجيل)
والشكر ثاني على فلسفته النحوية واللغوية في الهوامش كمان، يعني شخص بيقرأ كتاب فلسفة كيف متوقع منه انه مايعرف معنى كلمة " النشيجٍ" او حتى الافعال الناقصة!!
في البداية الكتاب كان عظيم لكن ابتدى يكرر نفسه ويعيد ويزيد في مواضيع، خصوصاً الفصل الثالث .. كان سيء من كثر الاقتباسات وتكرر الافكار و المواضيع من الفصل الثاني. في الفصل الرابع لما اتكلم عن التواضع وفق الرؤية المسيحية و المذهب الطبيعي كان رائع لحد ما ابتعد شوي عن موضوع الاساسي وجلس يتكلم أكثر عن المذهب الطبيعي.. كان بالنسبالي كلام متكرر ومُلل (لاي احد عنده خلفية حيقول نفس الكلام) شخصياً وبعيداً عن كلامه المتكرر عن المذهب أعجبني الفصل الرابع و لما ابتدى يتكلم عن جون كيكيس وسيسرو.. إضافة جميلة
الكتاب عبارة عن إسترجاع حجج قديمة ومناقشتها .. عنوان الكتاب مثير وكذلك عناوين الفصول لكن ماذا يحدث لقيمة والفضيلة في عدم وجود الله؟ سؤال الوحيد الذي لم يجيب عليه الكاتب (اللي المفروض يكون الكتاب عن إجابة هذا السؤال تحديداً)
لسه ما أعرف فين المشكلة من الكاتب او المترجم، الكتاب ممكن يكون أفضل من كذا
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الشكر موصل للمترجم لؤي عشري على إضافته للايات القرآنية في الهوامش حتى يتوافق مع مقارنات الكاتب (حيث الكاتب إستدال نصوص من الانجيل)
والشكر ثاني على فلسفته النحوية واللغوية في الهوامش كمان، يعني شخص بيقرأ كتاب فلسفة كيف متوقع منه انه مايعرف معنى كلمة " النشيجٍ" او حتى الافعال الناقصة!!
June 21, 2015
***1/2
A very thought-provoking book and a robust attempt to develop a framework for ethics on the assumption that God does not exist. The author presents some interesting, fresh arguments. In the first part of the book, the he critiques common arguments for the existence of God. In the second part of the book, arguments are presented for a moral framework from a naturalistic perspective. I wasn't entirely convinced by some of them but, as a whole, this book is worth reading for those who already have some background in philosophical thinking - it could be a difficult read for some as it is quite scholarly. It certainly demonstrates that it is possible for atheists to develop grounds for ethics without the need for a god as the foundational starting point. It is good to see rigorous thinking being done around this topic. A good contribution to the conversation around humanist ethics.
A very thought-provoking book and a robust attempt to develop a framework for ethics on the assumption that God does not exist. The author presents some interesting, fresh arguments. In the first part of the book, the he critiques common arguments for the existence of God. In the second part of the book, arguments are presented for a moral framework from a naturalistic perspective. I wasn't entirely convinced by some of them but, as a whole, this book is worth reading for those who already have some background in philosophical thinking - it could be a difficult read for some as it is quite scholarly. It certainly demonstrates that it is possible for atheists to develop grounds for ethics without the need for a god as the foundational starting point. It is good to see rigorous thinking being done around this topic. A good contribution to the conversation around humanist ethics.
January 29, 2011
I agree with another reviewer that, at times, his writing style is a bit awkward but this could be because it has been a long time since I've read anything that would qualify as "philosophy" and simply took getting accustomed to.
I think he makes a lot of really good arguments but I was unfamiliar with some of his references and some of the arguments so I did a lot of side reading to get other angles on his arguments and those he attempts to refute.
I have really enjoyed the book as a somewhat challenging (in the sense that it is a new "genre" for me and required some background reading) but quite accessible and a great look into some logical arguments that approach the issue of "naturalistic virtue" in a way that clearly develops the opposing arguments in order to support his own.
I think he makes a lot of really good arguments but I was unfamiliar with some of his references and some of the arguments so I did a lot of side reading to get other angles on his arguments and those he attempts to refute.
I have really enjoyed the book as a somewhat challenging (in the sense that it is a new "genre" for me and required some background reading) but quite accessible and a great look into some logical arguments that approach the issue of "naturalistic virtue" in a way that clearly develops the opposing arguments in order to support his own.
November 14, 2013
One of the better agnostic/atheist writings on meta-ethics - though it still has it's problems; namely, addressing Hume's ought/is point.
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