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Martin Heidegger
A rich and evocative study of one of modern history’s most compelling and controversial philosophers by a literary and critical grand master In Martin Heidegger, George Steiner delves into the life and work of the prolific German philosopher. His deft analysis lays bare the intricacies of Heidegger’s work and his influence on modern society, offering a clear and accessible analysis of the philosopher’s more difficult ideas, from the human condition and language to being and the meaning of time. Written with Steiner’s trademark eloquence and precision, Martin Heidegger is the seminal look at the man and his groundbreaking ideas—the perfect study for scholars, Heidegger fanatics, and curious readers alike.
212 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1978
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About the author
George Steiner
188 books568 followersSee also: George A. Steiner, author on Management and Planning.
Dr. Francis George Steiner was an essayist, novelist, philosopher, literary critic, and educator. He wrote for The New Yorker for over thirty years, contributing over two hundred reviews. Among his many awards, he received The Truman Capote Lifetime Achievement Award from Stanford University 1998. He lived in Cambridge, England, with his wife, historian Zara Shakow Steiner.
In 1950 he earned an M.A. from Harvard University, where he won the Bell Prize in American Literature, and received his Ph.D. from Oxford University (Balliol College) on a Rhodes Scholarship in 1955. He was then a scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, for two years. He became a founding fellow of Churchill College at the University of Cambridge in 1961, and has been an Extraordinary Fellow there since 1969. Additionally, Steiner accepted the post of Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of Geneva in 1974, which he held for 20 years, teaching in four languages. He became Professor Emeritus at Geneva University on his retirement in 1994, and an Honorary Fellow at Balliol College at Oxford University in 1995. He later held the positions of the first Lord Weidenfeld Professor of Comparative Literature and Fellow of St. Anne's College at Oxford University from 1994 to 1995, and Norton Professor of Poetry at Harvard University from 2001 to 2002.
Dr. Francis George Steiner was an essayist, novelist, philosopher, literary critic, and educator. He wrote for The New Yorker for over thirty years, contributing over two hundred reviews. Among his many awards, he received The Truman Capote Lifetime Achievement Award from Stanford University 1998. He lived in Cambridge, England, with his wife, historian Zara Shakow Steiner.
In 1950 he earned an M.A. from Harvard University, where he won the Bell Prize in American Literature, and received his Ph.D. from Oxford University (Balliol College) on a Rhodes Scholarship in 1955. He was then a scholar at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, for two years. He became a founding fellow of Churchill College at the University of Cambridge in 1961, and has been an Extraordinary Fellow there since 1969. Additionally, Steiner accepted the post of Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of Geneva in 1974, which he held for 20 years, teaching in four languages. He became Professor Emeritus at Geneva University on his retirement in 1994, and an Honorary Fellow at Balliol College at Oxford University in 1995. He later held the positions of the first Lord Weidenfeld Professor of Comparative Literature and Fellow of St. Anne's College at Oxford University from 1994 to 1995, and Norton Professor of Poetry at Harvard University from 2001 to 2002.
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April 18, 2012
I am not convinced that Martin Heidegger wanted to be "understood" in the customary sense of that word; that he wanted an understanding which would entail the possibility of restating his views by means of a more or less close paraphrase. An ancient epigram on Heraclitus, in so many respects Heidegger's model, admonishes the reader: "Do not be in too great a hurry to get to the end of Heraclitus the Ephesian's book; the path is hard to travel. Gloom is there, and darkness devoid of light. But if an initiate be your guide, the path shines brighter than sunlight". Initiation is not understanding in the ordinary sense. Heidegger conceives of his ontology, of his poetics of thought, to be such that they cannot, finally, be reconciled to the manner of ratiocination and linear argument that has governed Western official consciousness after Plato. To "understand" Heidegger is to accept entry into an alternative order or space of meaning and of being. If we grasped him readily or were able to communicate his intent in other words than his own, we would already have made the leap out of Western metaphysics. We would, in a very strong sense, no longer have any need of Heidegger. It is not "understanding" that Heidegger's discourse solicits primarily. It is an "experiencing", an acceptance of felt strangeness. We are asked to suspend in ourselves the conventions of common logic and unexamined grammar in order to "hear", to "stand in the light of"—all of these are radical Heideggerian notions—the nearing of elemental truths and possibilities, of apprehension long buried under the frozen crust of habitual, analytically credible saying.
I find Martin Heidegger to be inescapably fascinating. Whatever level of understanding I possess of the man I've only managed through exposure to the interpretation of others—Graham Harman and William Barrett and George Steiner have pride of place here—and from whom, in especial the latter two, I've come to accept that my own impatience with Heidegger's maddeningly mirrorlike etymological root-uprooting, his stickily encircling and prickly precise structural manipulation of language—and the fact of the latter being provided through the medium of translation offering but a further impediment—is the major and perhaps insurmountable obstacle to my ever entering into experiencing his prose-bound thought to the degree required to extend that fascination into the realm of enlightenment. By the latter, I do not mean knowledge, in the objective sense. At this moment in my Heideggerian noviciate, I maintain, with perhaps insufficient reason, that Heidegger's ultimate value may be revealed in the poetic truths, the inner intuitions of a deeper, more attuned awareness that his thought—straining mightily but subtly to reach beyond existential tautology, banality, ineffability, into the very void it(un)self to draw forth the essence of Essence—may open to the reader's own avenues of mental percipience. But are we then merely in the realm of examining how a pattern-detecting and -configuring species works such as triggers for other deeply-layered fractals or forms or filaments deposited in otherwise inaccessible areas of our brain during the sensory bombardment we endlessly undergo whilst actively conscious of but a minute portion of the entirety? Are Heidegger's excavations of an interior architecture waiting a more formal exploration by a more focussed, more nano-technologically-enhanced science? There are more things in our memory and brain cells, Manling, than are dreamt of in your philosophy and in your science.
I just don't know. There is a part of me—glib perhaps, self-righteous possibly, humane hopefully—that looks at how this man, austere and disciplined and all-consumed by his pursuit of the being of Being, came to capitalize, at the moment when he might have been positioned to make a substantive difference, upon the smaller, the meaner, the unflatteringly vainglorious side of his own personal being and the apocalyptic tenor of his political essence. It calls to my mind the immortal words of Anton Chigurh, via Cormac McCarthy: If the rule you followed led you to this of what use was the rule? Does that extend to the entirety of his thought? Is the man, if we contemplate, drill down into his own being, but a philologist building vast and abstractly-shaped sand castles with his back arrogantly turned to the philosophical tides rushing in? A theologist veiling his Absolute with esoteric linguistic constructs but for whose Being the word God could be substituted and, more or less, enhance the comprehensibility of his thought? The other part of me does not believe so—and I wish to delve further into his work to buttress that half of my own still relatively ignorant take. It strikes me that Heidegger's concept of time lies in the Kantian provision of it being a form of inner sense, of which the latter, together with its outer sibling of spatiality, really grabbed me and stuck with me in my reading of Scruton's VSI to Kant a few weeks ago. I continue to be highly intrigued by what Heidegger has to say—it remains for me to configure myself, steel myself, bring myself such that I can partake of his voluminous output with the mindset and patience requisite for channeling that intrigue into apprehension.
Ah, right—what about the book under review? I thoroughly enjoyed it. Steiner is an elegant writer, well capable of rendering Heidegger's more occluded and tangled constructs into clear, but lovely, English. This edition includes an invaluable opening essay on Heidegger in 1992, which sets the table perfectly for the ruminative progression to follow. Steiner's work actually combines quite well with Graham Harman's Heidegger Explained , for while both cover the entirety of Heidegger's output, the latter dwells deeper upon Heidegger's concepts of Tools and Things, while Steiner prefers to decant more upon Caring and Thrownness and Fallenness and Dasein's relationship with Death and Finitude. Steiner is careful to include cautionary and critical interjections, both of his own and from the opinions of other thinkers, as well as endeavoring—quite impartially considering that, when he first penned the book in 1978, he did not have access to all of the details and incidents in Heidegger's personal life that were subsequently made available to the likes of Harman and Rüdiger Safranksi—to address the connexion between Heidegger's philosophy and his embrace of National Socialism. In particular, a brief but moving assessment of Heidegger's relationship with, and influence upon, Paul Celan reveals quite starkly what the stakes were, and how loudly the former's silence resounds in the light of them.
What I especially appreciated about Steiner is that he allows Heidegger's thought to be described in a way that, whilst remaining true to the formulator's rigorous word dynamics, reveals itself more readily to our means of linguistic apperception as currently constructed—ie, enmeshed within the Western Metaphysics that Heidegger would wish us to overcome. What I particularly desire to get behind, through better understanding (and direct from the source), is Heidegger's intention to erase the dualities—mind/body, body/soul, God/Devil, inner/outer, right/left, subject/object, rational/irrational—that have riven our mental constructs from time immemorial and sundered us from Being, together with that inherent sense of decay, of existing in a fallen state from some primordial, Edenic purity. There is potent imagery in the way that Steiner brings this to the surface: just as Heidegger does not conceive of Being as something outside of us, beyond us, a hierarchical order over us, but rather as how, in the darkness, we might be revealed as aglow with light of perceptible hue, though the source be candent—so Dasein, in its current modern temporal permutation, does not possess itself of a being that is corrupted or in a state of Original Sin; it has but changed its ontological hue to reflect the existential progression of ourselves along a path made inevitable by ontic and epistemic alterations in our language. Our being is not a decayed being—it is a modified being of which we must seek to effect—in asking questions about, caring about, thinking about, opening ourselves to Being—a reconfiguration such that our lambent chromaticity returns to its original, pre-Dialectic and -Western Metaphysical colouration and its resultant tonal properties as set against the horizontal shading of Nothingness.
I find Martin Heidegger to be inescapably fascinating. Whatever level of understanding I possess of the man I've only managed through exposure to the interpretation of others—Graham Harman and William Barrett and George Steiner have pride of place here—and from whom, in especial the latter two, I've come to accept that my own impatience with Heidegger's maddeningly mirrorlike etymological root-uprooting, his stickily encircling and prickly precise structural manipulation of language—and the fact of the latter being provided through the medium of translation offering but a further impediment—is the major and perhaps insurmountable obstacle to my ever entering into experiencing his prose-bound thought to the degree required to extend that fascination into the realm of enlightenment. By the latter, I do not mean knowledge, in the objective sense. At this moment in my Heideggerian noviciate, I maintain, with perhaps insufficient reason, that Heidegger's ultimate value may be revealed in the poetic truths, the inner intuitions of a deeper, more attuned awareness that his thought—straining mightily but subtly to reach beyond existential tautology, banality, ineffability, into the very void it(un)self to draw forth the essence of Essence—may open to the reader's own avenues of mental percipience. But are we then merely in the realm of examining how a pattern-detecting and -configuring species works such as triggers for other deeply-layered fractals or forms or filaments deposited in otherwise inaccessible areas of our brain during the sensory bombardment we endlessly undergo whilst actively conscious of but a minute portion of the entirety? Are Heidegger's excavations of an interior architecture waiting a more formal exploration by a more focussed, more nano-technologically-enhanced science? There are more things in our memory and brain cells, Manling, than are dreamt of in your philosophy and in your science.
I just don't know. There is a part of me—glib perhaps, self-righteous possibly, humane hopefully—that looks at how this man, austere and disciplined and all-consumed by his pursuit of the being of Being, came to capitalize, at the moment when he might have been positioned to make a substantive difference, upon the smaller, the meaner, the unflatteringly vainglorious side of his own personal being and the apocalyptic tenor of his political essence. It calls to my mind the immortal words of Anton Chigurh, via Cormac McCarthy: If the rule you followed led you to this of what use was the rule? Does that extend to the entirety of his thought? Is the man, if we contemplate, drill down into his own being, but a philologist building vast and abstractly-shaped sand castles with his back arrogantly turned to the philosophical tides rushing in? A theologist veiling his Absolute with esoteric linguistic constructs but for whose Being the word God could be substituted and, more or less, enhance the comprehensibility of his thought? The other part of me does not believe so—and I wish to delve further into his work to buttress that half of my own still relatively ignorant take. It strikes me that Heidegger's concept of time lies in the Kantian provision of it being a form of inner sense, of which the latter, together with its outer sibling of spatiality, really grabbed me and stuck with me in my reading of Scruton's VSI to Kant a few weeks ago. I continue to be highly intrigued by what Heidegger has to say—it remains for me to configure myself, steel myself, bring myself such that I can partake of his voluminous output with the mindset and patience requisite for channeling that intrigue into apprehension.
Ah, right—what about the book under review? I thoroughly enjoyed it. Steiner is an elegant writer, well capable of rendering Heidegger's more occluded and tangled constructs into clear, but lovely, English. This edition includes an invaluable opening essay on Heidegger in 1992, which sets the table perfectly for the ruminative progression to follow. Steiner's work actually combines quite well with Graham Harman's Heidegger Explained , for while both cover the entirety of Heidegger's output, the latter dwells deeper upon Heidegger's concepts of Tools and Things, while Steiner prefers to decant more upon Caring and Thrownness and Fallenness and Dasein's relationship with Death and Finitude. Steiner is careful to include cautionary and critical interjections, both of his own and from the opinions of other thinkers, as well as endeavoring—quite impartially considering that, when he first penned the book in 1978, he did not have access to all of the details and incidents in Heidegger's personal life that were subsequently made available to the likes of Harman and Rüdiger Safranksi—to address the connexion between Heidegger's philosophy and his embrace of National Socialism. In particular, a brief but moving assessment of Heidegger's relationship with, and influence upon, Paul Celan reveals quite starkly what the stakes were, and how loudly the former's silence resounds in the light of them.
What I especially appreciated about Steiner is that he allows Heidegger's thought to be described in a way that, whilst remaining true to the formulator's rigorous word dynamics, reveals itself more readily to our means of linguistic apperception as currently constructed—ie, enmeshed within the Western Metaphysics that Heidegger would wish us to overcome. What I particularly desire to get behind, through better understanding (and direct from the source), is Heidegger's intention to erase the dualities—mind/body, body/soul, God/Devil, inner/outer, right/left, subject/object, rational/irrational—that have riven our mental constructs from time immemorial and sundered us from Being, together with that inherent sense of decay, of existing in a fallen state from some primordial, Edenic purity. There is potent imagery in the way that Steiner brings this to the surface: just as Heidegger does not conceive of Being as something outside of us, beyond us, a hierarchical order over us, but rather as how, in the darkness, we might be revealed as aglow with light of perceptible hue, though the source be candent—so Dasein, in its current modern temporal permutation, does not possess itself of a being that is corrupted or in a state of Original Sin; it has but changed its ontological hue to reflect the existential progression of ourselves along a path made inevitable by ontic and epistemic alterations in our language. Our being is not a decayed being—it is a modified being of which we must seek to effect—in asking questions about, caring about, thinking about, opening ourselves to Being—a reconfiguration such that our lambent chromaticity returns to its original, pre-Dialectic and -Western Metaphysical colouration and its resultant tonal properties as set against the horizontal shading of Nothingness.
December 5, 2015
steiner is a pseud, imho.
November 27, 2020
A brief overview:
A well-written introduction to Martin Heidegger, in particular to his landmark Being and Time, though I don't believe the philosophical novice will find it particularly congenial. Perhaps best read as an accompaniment to reading Being and Time.
The opening section, In Place of a Foreword, places Heidegger in the context of a history of philosophical thought, his views on traditional metaphysics – Plato, Aristotle, Kant, his influence on the existentialism of Sartre, a bit of biographical information, his proponents and detractors, and a glimpse of his unique conventions of logic and grammar. Some Basic Terms section is just that, a necessary examination, over fifty pages, of Heidegger's 'meditation on etymology' where Greek is the 'wellspring' , the source, the origin, of our notion of Philosophie and Being itself.
The section on Being and Time, fifty-three pages, the longest section in the book, is exceptionally well done, though again as I said really needs to be read in conjunction with Being and Time to fully understand what Steiner is talking about.
The final section, The Presence of Heidegger, presents some of his post-Being-and-Time philosophy, discusses implications of his philosophy for technology, art, literature, morality, and everyday living, as well as confronts Heidegger's political involvements.
Overall, Steiner accomplishes a Herculean task in giving us a foundation for entering into Heidegger's philosophy in such slim 158 pages (plus 14 pages of biographical notes, bibliography and index). The key here is 'introduction.'
A well-written introduction to Martin Heidegger, in particular to his landmark Being and Time, though I don't believe the philosophical novice will find it particularly congenial. Perhaps best read as an accompaniment to reading Being and Time.
The opening section, In Place of a Foreword, places Heidegger in the context of a history of philosophical thought, his views on traditional metaphysics – Plato, Aristotle, Kant, his influence on the existentialism of Sartre, a bit of biographical information, his proponents and detractors, and a glimpse of his unique conventions of logic and grammar. Some Basic Terms section is just that, a necessary examination, over fifty pages, of Heidegger's 'meditation on etymology' where Greek is the 'wellspring' , the source, the origin, of our notion of Philosophie and Being itself.
The section on Being and Time, fifty-three pages, the longest section in the book, is exceptionally well done, though again as I said really needs to be read in conjunction with Being and Time to fully understand what Steiner is talking about.
The final section, The Presence of Heidegger, presents some of his post-Being-and-Time philosophy, discusses implications of his philosophy for technology, art, literature, morality, and everyday living, as well as confronts Heidegger's political involvements.
Overall, Steiner accomplishes a Herculean task in giving us a foundation for entering into Heidegger's philosophy in such slim 158 pages (plus 14 pages of biographical notes, bibliography and index). The key here is 'introduction.'
November 11, 2015
In this introduction to Heidegger, George Steiner starts out by acknowledging that many philosophers regard Heidegger’s philosophy as nonsense, as literally not making sense, let alone false. Indeed nothing is so emblematic of the cleavage between Anglo-American analytic philosophy and European phenomenological-existential philosophy as the reaction of Rudolph Carnap or A.J. Ayer to the statement that “The negation of nothingness is Being."
Heidegger undertook to ask the question, “What is Being?”, not in a scientific or religious way, not even in the sense of “What do all beings have in common?” but rather in the primal sense of someone thrust into the world and wondering, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Heidegger uses a distinctive term to get at this sense of being, “Dasein,” literally “being there,” as in “You had to be there.” To my mind this evokes the idea of having been thrust into a particular existence on earth (as you might have been thrust into existence on another planet), and wondering, “What in the world is this?” To explain that this is how the earth formed, or that this is your genetic descent, is beside the point, because the amazing thing is that there is anything at all.
Heidegger does some interesting things with this approach. He examines the etymological roots of the word (and its variants) to get at ways that Being was initially experienced. In one instance he comes up with, “to live, to emerge, to linger or endure,” which illustrate the variety of ways that things can be. He brings death into the equation, in the sense that the human knowledge that one is going to die casts one’s Being in an entirely different light. He also comes up with the Marxist-like conclusion that the modern, technological conception of Being consists of a manipulation or a coercion into giving us something like an answer or a product, whereas we have lost the ability simply to be with Being in a caring way.
Steiner suggests that Heidegger’s philosophy might be regarded as akin to poetry or theology. As with poetry, Heidegger tries to get us to look at Being in a fresh way, or in a way of fundamental recognition. Heidegger denied that his work was religious, saying that it was neutral to any theological position. Contemporary theologians, however, such as Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich, have found fertile ground in his philosophy, because, I think, in examining one’s global attitude toward Being, there is room to examine other global attitudes, such as faith and compassion. Of course, Heidegger wouldn’t think he was talking about an “attitude,” but, even so, it’s all part of Being. And the awe and the wonder with which Heidegger questions Being are what, in earlier ages, would have been addressed to the divine.
Heidegger undertook to ask the question, “What is Being?”, not in a scientific or religious way, not even in the sense of “What do all beings have in common?” but rather in the primal sense of someone thrust into the world and wondering, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Heidegger uses a distinctive term to get at this sense of being, “Dasein,” literally “being there,” as in “You had to be there.” To my mind this evokes the idea of having been thrust into a particular existence on earth (as you might have been thrust into existence on another planet), and wondering, “What in the world is this?” To explain that this is how the earth formed, or that this is your genetic descent, is beside the point, because the amazing thing is that there is anything at all.
Heidegger does some interesting things with this approach. He examines the etymological roots of the word (and its variants) to get at ways that Being was initially experienced. In one instance he comes up with, “to live, to emerge, to linger or endure,” which illustrate the variety of ways that things can be. He brings death into the equation, in the sense that the human knowledge that one is going to die casts one’s Being in an entirely different light. He also comes up with the Marxist-like conclusion that the modern, technological conception of Being consists of a manipulation or a coercion into giving us something like an answer or a product, whereas we have lost the ability simply to be with Being in a caring way.
Steiner suggests that Heidegger’s philosophy might be regarded as akin to poetry or theology. As with poetry, Heidegger tries to get us to look at Being in a fresh way, or in a way of fundamental recognition. Heidegger denied that his work was religious, saying that it was neutral to any theological position. Contemporary theologians, however, such as Rudolf Bultmann and Paul Tillich, have found fertile ground in his philosophy, because, I think, in examining one’s global attitude toward Being, there is room to examine other global attitudes, such as faith and compassion. Of course, Heidegger wouldn’t think he was talking about an “attitude,” but, even so, it’s all part of Being. And the awe and the wonder with which Heidegger questions Being are what, in earlier ages, would have been addressed to the divine.
March 9, 2016
Great treatise on Heidegger, and the best introduction to his thought that I have yet encountered. It goes beyond a dry summary of Heidegger; it is not just Heidegger-made-worldly, so to speak. It is simple, lucid, easy to follow, and all this is achieved while keeping Heidegger "alive and pulsing" in the text. Many "summaries" or "introductions" on great thinkers fail to achieve this, as we often end up with a summary in which the thinker himself is no longer, whereby he is "reduced" to a series of easy to understand statements and observations: As a result, meaning is lost. Steiner avoids such a trap beautifully, by virtue of the fact that he truly cares for what Heidegger says and what his presence means for the human condition. Thus, he can go beyond a mere academic presentation.
I cannot claim that I understand Heidegger by any means, but I know that Steiner made Heidegger possible for me, provided a point of entry into Sein und Zeit and later writings. This is an invaluable feat regardless of whether or not I end up rejecting Steiner's vision and understanding of Heidegger during the journey.
In short, this is a highly advised read for anyone who is interested in the philosophy of Heidegger.
I cannot claim that I understand Heidegger by any means, but I know that Steiner made Heidegger possible for me, provided a point of entry into Sein und Zeit and later writings. This is an invaluable feat regardless of whether or not I end up rejecting Steiner's vision and understanding of Heidegger during the journey.
In short, this is a highly advised read for anyone who is interested in the philosophy of Heidegger.
November 5, 2023
This is a really good book with very clearly delineated objectives. It explains Heidegger's main concepts from "Sein und Zeit" and other writings as well. I liked that fact that Steiner focused mainly in Heidegger's ontology, but also found a good balance and mentioned Heidegger's historical context, and his behaviour towards nazism.
It was a true pleasure to remember the things I learned while I was at university in a clear and concise text.
Towards the end of the book George Steiner saves a couple of paragraphs to present his own subjective interpretation of what he thinks Heidegger's work means, which I found extremely interesting.
It was a true pleasure to remember the things I learned while I was at university in a clear and concise text.
Towards the end of the book George Steiner saves a couple of paragraphs to present his own subjective interpretation of what he thinks Heidegger's work means, which I found extremely interesting.
June 22, 2010
This introduction to Heidegger's thought is well-written and short - a fast read. I like this work because Steiner tries to show, against blistering criticisms by the Frankfurt School's Herbert Marcuse and Theodor Adorno, the latter of whom devoted an entire book ('The Jargon of Authenticity') to condemning Heidegger's thought as inherently fascist, that Heidegger is not only a great philosopher but a philosopher whose thought does have importance for social issues. Steiner wants to make Heidegger LIVE, then: he argues that Heidegger allows us to think a way out of the individualist side of (Nietzschean, Kierkegaardian, Sartrean, whatever) existential freedom; that Heidegger's explanation of the possibility of forgetting the nature of being pre-figures and is the possibility of reification. And, Steiner's explanation of Heidegger's thought on language - "language speaks before man," "language is the house of being," "man is in his essence inasmuch as he speaks the truth of being" - would be of use for anyone studying Derrida or Lacan - not because they were inspired by it (which they were) but because it opens up new ways of reading their text.
June 20, 2010
This was recommended as an introduction to Heidegger, but I don't think it works very well that way. It is as much a critique as it is an introduction, which presupposes a familiarity with the material. I don't have much confidence in my understanding of Heidegger, but it was enough to understand Steiner's approach.
Steiner writes with great clarity and is able to provide a meaningful context for Heidegger's work, from Being and Time through the later works on art and technology. He also puts Heidegger himself in context, and doesn't spare him from questions about his involvement in the Nazi party. This is an enduring puzzle, and Steiner is rightfully disturbed by it.
More than anything I was impressed by Steiner's writing -- it is extremely precise, and while I am not competent enough to judge his interpretation of Heidegger, I am fairly certain about what Steiner thinks about him. And his opinion makes me only more curious about Heidegger, which is I think what the book intends to do.
Steiner writes with great clarity and is able to provide a meaningful context for Heidegger's work, from Being and Time through the later works on art and technology. He also puts Heidegger himself in context, and doesn't spare him from questions about his involvement in the Nazi party. This is an enduring puzzle, and Steiner is rightfully disturbed by it.
More than anything I was impressed by Steiner's writing -- it is extremely precise, and while I am not competent enough to judge his interpretation of Heidegger, I am fairly certain about what Steiner thinks about him. And his opinion makes me only more curious about Heidegger, which is I think what the book intends to do.
October 21, 2023
"Ο Χάιντεγκερ ήταν ένας απαίσιος άνθρωπος και την ίδια στιγμή ένας από τους μεγαλύτερους στοχαστές του 20ού αιώνα. Αυτή η αντίφαση, όπως ξέρετε, βρίσκεται στο επίκεντρο της προσωπικής μου αναζήτησης απ’ την αρχή της διαδρομής μου. Πώς γίνεται το πρωί να παίζεις λίντερ του Σούμπερτ στο πιάνο και το βράδυ να δουλεύεις στο Άουσβιτς; Είναι κάτι στο οποίο ούτε οι αποδομιστές ούτε οι λακανιστές μπόρεσαν ποτέ να δώσουν μια απάντηση. Από μία άποψη, ο Χάιντεγκερ ήταν ναζί πριν καν εμφανιστούν οι ναζί. Για να σώσει την καριέρα του είπε ένα τεράστιο ψέμα. Ήξερε τι συνέβαινε στη Γερμανία, αν και όχι μέχρι την τελευταία λεπτομέρεια. αλλά όλα αυτάδεν έχουν καμιά σημασία για τη φιλοσοφία. Μαζί με τον Βιτγκενστάιν και τον Χούσερλ είναι οι φιλοσοφικοί πυλώνες του 20ού αιώνα. ΤοΕίναι και ο χρόνος είναι το Finnegans Wake της μεταφυσικής." - George Steiner, Books Journal, τεύχ.3
Όπως παρατηρεί ο George Steiner, το όνομα και το έργο του Heidegger είναι ικανά να προκαλούν ακραίες και βίαια αντίθετες αντιδράσεις. Σε κάποιους εμφανίζεται ως ένας στοχαστής μοναδικού βάθους και δύναμης που δείχνει το δρόμο προς το μόνο είδος σωτηρίας που μπορούμε να ελπίζουμε σε μια μεταθεολογική εποχή. Άλλοι, και ιδιαίτερα εκείνοι που έχουν ανατραφεί διανοητικά στην παράδοση της αγγλοαμερικανικής αναλυτικής φιλοσοφίας, τον βλέπουν ως την ενσάρκωση ενός τευτονικού ψευδούς υψηλού νοήματος, έναν τσαρλατάνο που διακινεί, σε ένα ρηχό και ελάχιστα διεισδυτικό ιδίωμα, ένα αποκρουστικό μείγμα ανοησίας και λαϊκότητας.Και οι δύο αντιδράσεις είναι κατανοητές και και οι δύο είναι, σε διαφορετικό βαθμό, υπερβολικές. Ο Χάιντεγκερ είναι και φιλόσοφος και ιεροκήρυκας, μεταφυσικός και προφήτης. Σε κάθε ρόλο είναι, μέχρι ένα σημείο, ένας γνήσιος ερμηνευτής.
April 18, 2016
For a variety of reasons, this summary of Heidegger's work does not work. A part of the reasons lie in the inherent incoherence in Heidegger's own work and the other in the way it is presented. The author, or the essayist as he would possibly like being called, is unbiased. He provides a highly balanced view on one of Philosophical World's most controversial characters. The essayist has an excellent grasp of Heidegger's own work as well as many others who came before and after. Most importantly, the essayist does well in explaining Heidegger's basic concepts. But these positives are limited compared to the negatives, at least in the eyes of this reviewer.
Let's start with the negatives of the book before turning to the problems of Heidegger's views. For an essayist who finds one of Heidegger's biggest shortcomings as the complexity of the language or phrases he uses, it is ironic that he suffers from a similar syndrome. If one is generous, it is possible to claim that at least for the philosopher, there was no easy way out because of the issues he was addressing, including the structure of the language itself. The essayist, on the other hand, seems to go out of his way to replace the simplest of English terms with their more complex variety in each statement through the short book including when he is describing Heidegger's personal life. If the essayist did not use Thesaurus all the way while writing the piece to make everything sound scholarly, he is qualified to write one from scratch given the words used all through.
This use of complex words could certainly excite many readers for their "poetry". This is something Heidegger himself might have approved. May be the enthusiasts who follow Heidegger are prone to relish such language, just like the French or German statements that are scattered throughout. However, this is something that is not for the neophytes or those without long training in the field.
It is quite likely that Heidegger was as unclear in his philosophical musings as in the real life; the essayist himself wonders whether Heidegger ever wanted to be fully comprehended (which also presupposes Heidegger himself clear in his own mind). He never reached any framework or conclusions except some like "questions that are worth pondering are questions that can never be answered"! This is being facetious but the main point is that Heidegger is far better at posing some deep questions including the queries around why there is something rather than nothing or what is our being. He is also good at showing what could be wrong with the ideas presented by other renowned philosophers. However, he abjectly fails, basing on what is summarized in this book, in providing any clear presentation of his views, most likely because he did not have one.
Heidegger loves to start upside down: We don't speak. Language speaks. Or the Beings are defined not by the self but by the world around and within the Language they have or use. This bit, assuming I got it right and something he painstakingly arrives at using the most complex of arguments and phrases, are still fine. What happens afterwards flirts with the limits of absurdity.
Husserl, Wittgenstein and many other phenomenologists tried to separate the problems caused by the vagueness of the languages we use, including different meanings they confer in different minds/at different times as one of the biggest things holding back good philosophical discourses or at the root of many confusions/disagreements. These philosophers worked on creating something better for the kind of world we live in now and for the future. Their inherent premise was that we cannot solve some of the problems with the Language tools we have (like trying to do web page design with French) and hence the need to build better, proper languages or structures suitable for problems at hand.
Heidegger in particular, although there must be many, emphasized that the entire construct of existence for a Being is because of the Language it has (reality shaped by the Language). While not explicitly ruling out the need to expand or modify the Language as a result to expand our knowledge horizons, Heidegger turns prehistoric and justified by the most elementary of reasons.
While it is easy to understand for any followers of any twentieth century philosophers the need for precise language terms before delving into any major philosophical issues, Heidegger's strange etymological quest - to decipher answers from the studies of roots of words (Greek roots primarily!) not as they have evolved but as they may have been before Socrates - is quirky at best and ridiculous if not. Heidegger gets needlessly embroiled in whatever language flaws he may have spotted and even more needlessly in seeking answers in some historic versions rather than propose fresh ones.
The followers of Heidegger contend that the master's methods are like those of consummate artists: the real insights are available who study the writings again and again and cogitate. The revelations will accrue to those from between the lines, so to say, who patiently ponder over what is not said! This will be similar to Heidegger's own views on true works of literature- in getting to the meanings not conceived by their creators. This might be quite right in arts but not in sciences including good philosophical discussions. Definitely not right for those who are writing summary books.
Let's start with the negatives of the book before turning to the problems of Heidegger's views. For an essayist who finds one of Heidegger's biggest shortcomings as the complexity of the language or phrases he uses, it is ironic that he suffers from a similar syndrome. If one is generous, it is possible to claim that at least for the philosopher, there was no easy way out because of the issues he was addressing, including the structure of the language itself. The essayist, on the other hand, seems to go out of his way to replace the simplest of English terms with their more complex variety in each statement through the short book including when he is describing Heidegger's personal life. If the essayist did not use Thesaurus all the way while writing the piece to make everything sound scholarly, he is qualified to write one from scratch given the words used all through.
This use of complex words could certainly excite many readers for their "poetry". This is something Heidegger himself might have approved. May be the enthusiasts who follow Heidegger are prone to relish such language, just like the French or German statements that are scattered throughout. However, this is something that is not for the neophytes or those without long training in the field.
It is quite likely that Heidegger was as unclear in his philosophical musings as in the real life; the essayist himself wonders whether Heidegger ever wanted to be fully comprehended (which also presupposes Heidegger himself clear in his own mind). He never reached any framework or conclusions except some like "questions that are worth pondering are questions that can never be answered"! This is being facetious but the main point is that Heidegger is far better at posing some deep questions including the queries around why there is something rather than nothing or what is our being. He is also good at showing what could be wrong with the ideas presented by other renowned philosophers. However, he abjectly fails, basing on what is summarized in this book, in providing any clear presentation of his views, most likely because he did not have one.
Heidegger loves to start upside down: We don't speak. Language speaks. Or the Beings are defined not by the self but by the world around and within the Language they have or use. This bit, assuming I got it right and something he painstakingly arrives at using the most complex of arguments and phrases, are still fine. What happens afterwards flirts with the limits of absurdity.
Husserl, Wittgenstein and many other phenomenologists tried to separate the problems caused by the vagueness of the languages we use, including different meanings they confer in different minds/at different times as one of the biggest things holding back good philosophical discourses or at the root of many confusions/disagreements. These philosophers worked on creating something better for the kind of world we live in now and for the future. Their inherent premise was that we cannot solve some of the problems with the Language tools we have (like trying to do web page design with French) and hence the need to build better, proper languages or structures suitable for problems at hand.
Heidegger in particular, although there must be many, emphasized that the entire construct of existence for a Being is because of the Language it has (reality shaped by the Language). While not explicitly ruling out the need to expand or modify the Language as a result to expand our knowledge horizons, Heidegger turns prehistoric and justified by the most elementary of reasons.
While it is easy to understand for any followers of any twentieth century philosophers the need for precise language terms before delving into any major philosophical issues, Heidegger's strange etymological quest - to decipher answers from the studies of roots of words (Greek roots primarily!) not as they have evolved but as they may have been before Socrates - is quirky at best and ridiculous if not. Heidegger gets needlessly embroiled in whatever language flaws he may have spotted and even more needlessly in seeking answers in some historic versions rather than propose fresh ones.
The followers of Heidegger contend that the master's methods are like those of consummate artists: the real insights are available who study the writings again and again and cogitate. The revelations will accrue to those from between the lines, so to say, who patiently ponder over what is not said! This will be similar to Heidegger's own views on true works of literature- in getting to the meanings not conceived by their creators. This might be quite right in arts but not in sciences including good philosophical discussions. Definitely not right for those who are writing summary books.
March 14, 2024
Nice accessible introduction to Heidegger. A little outdated in some ways but not the author’s fault. Overall it was really informative and fun to read. Would Recommend
July 1, 2011
I've been reading this short book on-and-off for a while now, and just managed to finish it. Certainly not because it was boring, but because I had so much else on my place.
Overall, the book gets 5 stars because it does something that I didn't used to think possible: makes Heidegger understandable and enjoyable. Steiner's enthusiam for the subject is clear, which is even more remarkable given that he's not a professional philosopher (I'm not entirely sure what he is, I think from what he says in the text he might be some sort of Classicist or literary scholar).
This is an excellent survey of Heidegger's writings and works that doesn't get bogged down in German or difficult terms. I don't know how "orthodox" the interpretation of Heidegger here is, but it's certainly an interesting and enjoyable read.
Overall, the book gets 5 stars because it does something that I didn't used to think possible: makes Heidegger understandable and enjoyable. Steiner's enthusiam for the subject is clear, which is even more remarkable given that he's not a professional philosopher (I'm not entirely sure what he is, I think from what he says in the text he might be some sort of Classicist or literary scholar).
This is an excellent survey of Heidegger's writings and works that doesn't get bogged down in German or difficult terms. I don't know how "orthodox" the interpretation of Heidegger here is, but it's certainly an interesting and enjoyable read.
August 27, 2016
George Steiner is a formidable writer (though I don't much care for his penchant for forming complicated abstract nouns such as "paradoxicality") and you can trust his sprachgefühl, his masterful grasp of German and English to guide us through the linguistic labyrinth that is Martin Heidegger. But I can't say I've gained much of a clear understanding of Heidegger's philosophy. Yes Steiner is a great intellectual, a complex writer, and yes he illumines many of crucial Heideggerian concepts (Sein, Sorge, Verfall, Schuld, etc.) but he is no explicator. At times, his erudite prose gets in the way of clarity and makes it hard to see the big picture (though your mileage may vary, of course). Will read Dreyfus (for the first time in like 12 years) and see how he compares.
April 18, 2011
This is one of the best short studies of Heidegger ever written.
Read
October 17, 2024This little book (158 small pages of large print) manages to abbreviate Heidegger like no other source I have come across. If a reader comes naively to Heidegger, she could leave with a sense of everything from his neologisms to his place in the history of philosophy. In fact, I am sure I am able to abbreviate even further, in a way not possible for me before: Heidegger sees the accepted originators of Western Philosophy-Plato and Aristotle with a big bump from Descartes-as bringing a need for analysis and conceptualization to our thinking about the world. In other words, they brought a need to segmentize our perceptions into graspable units that allowed scrutiny, categorization and documentation. That led to great advances in dealing with the world-what are the units that make up a stone, how to categorize different trees-but it left behind the IS. It left behind the more basic question of what is BEING; not the question of what makes up the units we see and manipulate, but what does it mean to BE. The pre-Socratics seemed to show some concern and awe before BEING, but by the time the language of thought reaches Heidegger, it has become an instrument for use in grasping the world-science as the ideal-with no path for even questioning the status of BEING. Heidegger therefore feels the need to bend the language that has come down to him in a way that at least hints at the fundamental question of what it means to BE. Thus we find the strange-hyphenated wordings of 'Being and Time', attempting to recapture some very primitive meaning before the metaphysicians solidified words into hard, usable concepts. As Heidegger moves on from this early attempt to awaken our acknowledgement of BEING, human language seems too frail to combat the increasing instrumentalization of our time-the dominance of science and technology-and only certain forms of poetry deforms language adequately to even hint at the question of BEING. What my contraction leaves out are the quickly sketched details which leaves a reader with a sense and perhaps an appreciation of Heidegger's endeavor.
Steiner mentions certain similarities to Wittgenstein and this is patently the case. If for Heidegger, metaphysics, and it's sedimentation into our worldview, has left us with no way to ask the basic questions, for early Wittgenstein the logical basis of language, whose description he brought to ultimate realization in the Tractatus, is incapable of doing anything but sizing up the world. It can ask no questions about value or meaning, about what makes the world worthwhile. It can only get the job done, allow propositions that allow us to dig into the world, move the bricks, build our house, do science. What is left for Wittgenstein, if one reads the biographies I have-see Ray Monk-a lot of muted anguish, and, more importantly, a recourse to the ordinary. Follow the words of everyday language and see the company they keep. After the logician, he becomes the ordinary language philosopher. He, like Heidegger, saw poetry as a kind of last resort-he famously read poetry to a conference of astonished logical positivists, who thought they were bringing in the master logician. Instead he was attempting to show all they could not manage, and, most of all, what was important to him. However, he could never have thought, like Heidegger increasingly came to do, that Being somehow dwelt within language. Language for later Wittgenstein is the backbone of social interaction, providing traditions for meeting up and deciding on a method of action. Nothing very holy in language, but perhaps poetry is the most comforting.
Like Wittgenstein, Heidegger fell back onto the ordinary as a way to escape the metaphysicians. The German peasant tending his fields and animals had a respectful attachment to the earth that the alienated, inauthentic city folk lacked. Wittgenstein would have had some respect for this form of living the ordinary, and, in fact, attempted it in a small way that failed, but he could never have views it in any way as'authentic'. That was beyond the scope of language to proclaim. The theme of his later years was to look and describe; somewhat like Becket, what else is there to do.
Addendum: Almost as soon as I finished this bit of writing a few weeks ago, I realized I would need to return to it to correct, or at least adjust, the summary. For I ended with a comparison of Heidegger and Wittgenstein in their relationship to the ordinary (and I will return to this term later), and failed to make the point that the basic Heideggerian premise is a submersion in the ordinary. Mankind is thrown into the world to such an extent that it is impossible to separate them. In fact, the meaning of Dasein, Heidegger's main terminological contribution, means in some way both 'human' and 'world'. If for the Western metaphysical tradition, there is an opposition between body and mind, that becomes irrelevant for Heidegger, and perhaps 'hand' becomes the appropriate anatomical feature The human hand and the tools it uses to construct his world are indissolubly bonded. Humankind can become more abstract at its peril-the peril of becoming a metaphysician. Steiner, while not ignoring this aspect of Heidegger, makes not enough of it for my taste: it just isn't what awes him about Heidegger.
I did not lay much foundation for my use of the phrase 'the ordinary' in my initial statements. That is because it is just what it sounds like: the regular, old everyday way we relate to the world, or more precisely, the language we use to describe the world in everyday situations. The ordinary language philosophers came to see language usage as the only arbitral of the real, their finding no other construct that could take its place. Many people believe that Wittgenstein fits this description, even if not officially in this camp. The philosopher who most obviously put the the terminology 'the ordinary' in discussion was Stanley Cavell in "In Quest of the Ordinary" and "The Claims of Reason". So if Wittgenstein fell back into the ordinary at the end of his discourses, Heidegger started out from there with absolute conviction.
Steiner mentions certain similarities to Wittgenstein and this is patently the case. If for Heidegger, metaphysics, and it's sedimentation into our worldview, has left us with no way to ask the basic questions, for early Wittgenstein the logical basis of language, whose description he brought to ultimate realization in the Tractatus, is incapable of doing anything but sizing up the world. It can ask no questions about value or meaning, about what makes the world worthwhile. It can only get the job done, allow propositions that allow us to dig into the world, move the bricks, build our house, do science. What is left for Wittgenstein, if one reads the biographies I have-see Ray Monk-a lot of muted anguish, and, more importantly, a recourse to the ordinary. Follow the words of everyday language and see the company they keep. After the logician, he becomes the ordinary language philosopher. He, like Heidegger, saw poetry as a kind of last resort-he famously read poetry to a conference of astonished logical positivists, who thought they were bringing in the master logician. Instead he was attempting to show all they could not manage, and, most of all, what was important to him. However, he could never have thought, like Heidegger increasingly came to do, that Being somehow dwelt within language. Language for later Wittgenstein is the backbone of social interaction, providing traditions for meeting up and deciding on a method of action. Nothing very holy in language, but perhaps poetry is the most comforting.
Like Wittgenstein, Heidegger fell back onto the ordinary as a way to escape the metaphysicians. The German peasant tending his fields and animals had a respectful attachment to the earth that the alienated, inauthentic city folk lacked. Wittgenstein would have had some respect for this form of living the ordinary, and, in fact, attempted it in a small way that failed, but he could never have views it in any way as'authentic'. That was beyond the scope of language to proclaim. The theme of his later years was to look and describe; somewhat like Becket, what else is there to do.
Addendum: Almost as soon as I finished this bit of writing a few weeks ago, I realized I would need to return to it to correct, or at least adjust, the summary. For I ended with a comparison of Heidegger and Wittgenstein in their relationship to the ordinary (and I will return to this term later), and failed to make the point that the basic Heideggerian premise is a submersion in the ordinary. Mankind is thrown into the world to such an extent that it is impossible to separate them. In fact, the meaning of Dasein, Heidegger's main terminological contribution, means in some way both 'human' and 'world'. If for the Western metaphysical tradition, there is an opposition between body and mind, that becomes irrelevant for Heidegger, and perhaps 'hand' becomes the appropriate anatomical feature The human hand and the tools it uses to construct his world are indissolubly bonded. Humankind can become more abstract at its peril-the peril of becoming a metaphysician. Steiner, while not ignoring this aspect of Heidegger, makes not enough of it for my taste: it just isn't what awes him about Heidegger.
I did not lay much foundation for my use of the phrase 'the ordinary' in my initial statements. That is because it is just what it sounds like: the regular, old everyday way we relate to the world, or more precisely, the language we use to describe the world in everyday situations. The ordinary language philosophers came to see language usage as the only arbitral of the real, their finding no other construct that could take its place. Many people believe that Wittgenstein fits this description, even if not officially in this camp. The philosopher who most obviously put the the terminology 'the ordinary' in discussion was Stanley Cavell in "In Quest of the Ordinary" and "The Claims of Reason". So if Wittgenstein fell back into the ordinary at the end of his discourses, Heidegger started out from there with absolute conviction.
March 10, 2020
"We do not live “in time,” as if the latter were some independent, abstract flow external to our being. We “live time”; the two terms are inseparable."
This George Steiner book was an excellent find and introduction of Martin Heidegger. I had read some essays of Heidegger in English translation before and it did not make much sense to me. It was very difficult to understand and I felt intellectually inadequate. Steiner's introduction to Heidegger's work explained the importance of the German language as a key to understanding this philosopher. He used the fundamental meaning of words in the German language to explain his thoughts. So, "Sein und Zeit" are on order in German right now.
This was my first exposure to metaphysics. It is a somewhat abstract journey, but I can sometimes glimpse the relation to "real life" or applicable life philosophy (my original journey). I expect this exploration to be painful, but Steiner's book gave hope to be rewarded.
Obviously, Heidegger never resolved his part as rector of a German university in Nazi Germany in 1933-34. One need to keep that in mind when exploring this philosopher. Steiner also provides some perspective on this aspect of Heidegger.
This George Steiner book was an excellent find and introduction of Martin Heidegger. I had read some essays of Heidegger in English translation before and it did not make much sense to me. It was very difficult to understand and I felt intellectually inadequate. Steiner's introduction to Heidegger's work explained the importance of the German language as a key to understanding this philosopher. He used the fundamental meaning of words in the German language to explain his thoughts. So, "Sein und Zeit" are on order in German right now.
This was my first exposure to metaphysics. It is a somewhat abstract journey, but I can sometimes glimpse the relation to "real life" or applicable life philosophy (my original journey). I expect this exploration to be painful, but Steiner's book gave hope to be rewarded.
Obviously, Heidegger never resolved his part as rector of a German university in Nazi Germany in 1933-34. One need to keep that in mind when exploring this philosopher. Steiner also provides some perspective on this aspect of Heidegger.
November 30, 2024
In general I am not reading secondary literature; and especially not on Heidegger. However, there were 3-4 exceptions, and this is one of them. As expected, all eventually disappoint regardless of the pro or against stance. First, there is the Nazi-issue and all of them need to say something quite extensive on the subject. Second, none of them gets Heidegger's concept of Being in any way. Thirdly, they all have some perspective that inevitably is not capable of getting at the core of Heidegger's project and consequently stays superficial and biased. Fourthly, trying to summarize a book like “Being and Time” is inevitably going to end in failure. And so on.
This book in particular starts with the political aspect at some length, and later returns to it again. Being here is nothing but a substitute for God. The professional perspective is that of a linguist and literary critic; while the philosophical understanding is from an existentialist, humanist, ecologist, and anthropological angle. The conviction that the readers understand in any way “Being and Time” at the end of this book – or similar books – is just an illusion.
This book in particular starts with the political aspect at some length, and later returns to it again. Being here is nothing but a substitute for God. The professional perspective is that of a linguist and literary critic; while the philosophical understanding is from an existentialist, humanist, ecologist, and anthropological angle. The conviction that the readers understand in any way “Being and Time” at the end of this book – or similar books – is just an illusion.
May 25, 2020
Good overview of Heidegger's philosophy and some of his life. The author spends extensive time (twice!) on the question whether Heidegger was a nazi (spoiler alert: he was), which is useful background, but distracts from the philosophy.
I realise that I am somehow blessed that my mothertongue is Dutch, which is close enough to German to understand the linguistic oddities in Heidegger - the English translations are insufficient to understand the etymological meaning of the words Heidegger uses.
The book really mostly focuses on Sein und Zeit, where the last chapter rambles around some of the later works.
I realise that I am somehow blessed that my mothertongue is Dutch, which is close enough to German to understand the linguistic oddities in Heidegger - the English translations are insufficient to understand the etymological meaning of the words Heidegger uses.
The book really mostly focuses on Sein und Zeit, where the last chapter rambles around some of the later works.
August 5, 2025
Steiner offers a clearly written introductory orientation of Heidegger. He argues that Heidegger's legacy is on par with such philosophers as Plato, especially due to his work on language. Steiner also argues that Steiner could be seen in line with such thinkers as Kierkegaard (e.g., his Either/Or) and his insights anticipated the work of such thinkers as Gadamer. Though some may question whether Steiner is a bit naive when denying Heidegger's antisemitism, overall this is a work worth consulting for anyone desiring to have a firm grasp of this (in)famous philosopher.
June 26, 2020
This a very good, short introduction to the thought and terminology of Heidegger. Steiner presents some of Heidegger’s major themes (such as the questioning of being) and intellectual engagements (such as those with Husserl) briefly and clearly. He also dedicated an appropriate amount of time and energy to the question of Heidegger’s nazism (which, contrary to the views of some other reviewers, is of major concern and interest to many philosophers).
June 1, 2022
A clear exposition of Being and Time with some interesting sections on other works. Steiner overdoes the personal culpability which read badly simply because later publications have not improved Heidegger's position but also because in the end it is not important when you are working on Heidegger. He was brilliant but nasty - what more can you say. On the works Steiner can be very perceptive. It is a very general introduction for the general reader but as far as it goes very useful.
March 28, 2024
Faire une présentation de 200 pages sur Heidegger aussi claire mérite un prix Nobel tant ça relève de l’impossible à mes yeux. Bien sûr c’est insuffisant mais ça donne envie de creuser et d’injecter un peu de métaphysique barbare dans son existence
January 21, 2025
Incredibly funny that this was written before the Black Notebooks were discovered. Steiner keeps saying "as we sift through all of his discovered writings, maybe we'll find out that Heidegger was secretly anti-nazi!" Lmao.
Heidegger was a brilliant and evil pestilence on humanity.
Heidegger was a brilliant and evil pestilence on humanity.
April 8, 2018
It’s probably better to read the physical book than listen to audio version, as I did, especially if you’re unfamiliar with Heidegger, as I am. No regrets though. And I plan to read the book soon.
June 26, 2019
Marvelous introduction to the thought of who, along with Wittgenstein, could be classified as the most intricate yet fascinating and influential thinker of the 20th century.
May 13, 2022
Great sympathetic summary of his thought
August 7, 2024
denken ist danken
November 2, 2025
great but get the 1991 updated editiob
November 10, 2025
Best commentary on Heidegger ever. Emphasizes his literary and post theogical aspects.
Read
May 29, 2023“The crisis of spirit suffered by Germany in 1918 was more profound than that of 1945.”
When you get to grad school in many humanities, you start to learn there’s a list of about 100,000 books you’re both expected to have read and know, and only later do you realize that not only is this an impossible task, no one, including your professors, except maybe that one person, has done so. Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time is one of those books, but so are, in lesser ways, his collection “Introduction to Metaphysics” and “Basic Writings” both of which contain various shorter essays of note like “The Question concerning Technology” and essays on language. Then you read him, and you squint. There’s a lot there that sort of begins to make sense, such as a rendering of the experience of being — that is being a conscientious presence in the world that is also observing and experiencing the world. And then there’s also the sentences that use and re-use the word being in three or four different ways wrapped up around itself. You get the impression you’re being trolled. But then you come across a cool idea and you continue to roll with it.
It turns out, according to this 1978 introduction (revised later) to Heidegger’s life and works by George Steiner, that this is more or less the consensus on Heidegger. Does Heidegger do anything? Does he say anything? Is his entire philosophy tautological? Is it even philosophy?
Part of the issue with Heidegger, according to Steiner, is that for one, Heidegger wraps up language into the essential category of being, meaning that language itself is part of being, not an expression of it or the expression of beings. And that partly comes from Heidegger’s reading of Greek and belief in Greek’s essentialness. But part of that is also the way German grammar often expresses ideas. For example, if you said “Ich gehe”, you are saying three distinct different possibilities that context and situation determine. In English, you would simply say “I am going” to mean “I am going” and “I go” to mean “I go”. So what this often means for Heidegger is that the construction of his own native language and then a language he chooses to work within allow for a kind a priori reading of language as a concept that doesn’t exist in every language. This leads to a circularity in a lot of his reasoning, or perhaps it doesn’t?
The other big question that Steiner spends a large amount of time with here is Heidegger’s connection to the Third Reich. Heidegger was not an active member of the Nazi regime, and there’s some suggestion that he was influential to their thinking, but the evidence for this is not clear. It doesn’t seem likely that his writing was particularly well-known. But what can’t be ruled in or out is that Heidegger was a teacher, and his teacher may well have been influential. What is not unclear is his total silence after the war, in which he basically said nothing at all about Nazism. And he was offered many chances and lived until 1976. Steiner does not have a lot of sympathy for this stance whether it’s statement (through silence) of support or one of cowardice.
This book would have helped me a lot in grad school to better what I was looking at, and more so, to make me feel less crazy about my reading. But I probably wouldn’t have read it, so who knows.
When you get to grad school in many humanities, you start to learn there’s a list of about 100,000 books you’re both expected to have read and know, and only later do you realize that not only is this an impossible task, no one, including your professors, except maybe that one person, has done so. Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time is one of those books, but so are, in lesser ways, his collection “Introduction to Metaphysics” and “Basic Writings” both of which contain various shorter essays of note like “The Question concerning Technology” and essays on language. Then you read him, and you squint. There’s a lot there that sort of begins to make sense, such as a rendering of the experience of being — that is being a conscientious presence in the world that is also observing and experiencing the world. And then there’s also the sentences that use and re-use the word being in three or four different ways wrapped up around itself. You get the impression you’re being trolled. But then you come across a cool idea and you continue to roll with it.
It turns out, according to this 1978 introduction (revised later) to Heidegger’s life and works by George Steiner, that this is more or less the consensus on Heidegger. Does Heidegger do anything? Does he say anything? Is his entire philosophy tautological? Is it even philosophy?
Part of the issue with Heidegger, according to Steiner, is that for one, Heidegger wraps up language into the essential category of being, meaning that language itself is part of being, not an expression of it or the expression of beings. And that partly comes from Heidegger’s reading of Greek and belief in Greek’s essentialness. But part of that is also the way German grammar often expresses ideas. For example, if you said “Ich gehe”, you are saying three distinct different possibilities that context and situation determine. In English, you would simply say “I am going” to mean “I am going” and “I go” to mean “I go”. So what this often means for Heidegger is that the construction of his own native language and then a language he chooses to work within allow for a kind a priori reading of language as a concept that doesn’t exist in every language. This leads to a circularity in a lot of his reasoning, or perhaps it doesn’t?
The other big question that Steiner spends a large amount of time with here is Heidegger’s connection to the Third Reich. Heidegger was not an active member of the Nazi regime, and there’s some suggestion that he was influential to their thinking, but the evidence for this is not clear. It doesn’t seem likely that his writing was particularly well-known. But what can’t be ruled in or out is that Heidegger was a teacher, and his teacher may well have been influential. What is not unclear is his total silence after the war, in which he basically said nothing at all about Nazism. And he was offered many chances and lived until 1976. Steiner does not have a lot of sympathy for this stance whether it’s statement (through silence) of support or one of cowardice.
This book would have helped me a lot in grad school to better what I was looking at, and more so, to make me feel less crazy about my reading. But I probably wouldn’t have read it, so who knows.
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