What ties the demand of muslim female students in Karnataka to don the Hijab with what Shah Walliullah said nearly 200 years ago. It’s the ‘theory of distance’ as per which Walliullah urged muslims to stress the difference with hindus by giving importance to action over intellect and promoting the visible over the invisible attributes of Islam. The demand for wearing hijab in classrooms is to this effect only.
The ‘theory of distance’ was revelatory to me. M.J Akbar explains that said theory was propounded by Shah Walliullah, a sunni muslim, in the aftermath of the waning power of mughal empire, and a highly destructive invasion of delhi by the shia muslim, Nadir Shah which decimated the city - both of which together produced a ground for muslim anxieties.
Back then, Akhand Bharat, or undivided India (today’s India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar) was also a hindu majority region, albeit ruled by a muslim minority. The Islamic rulers and invaders (comprising Turks, Afghans, Persians) were known for deviating from the systems and norms established by previous hindu rulers, particularly on the rates of taxation, hatred against indigenous ethnicities and scriptures, enforcing religious taxes, viz., jizya, and destruction of hindu temples. The muslim lay class, especially its religious leaders enjoyed comfortable existence during the heydays of muslim rulers. However, during Aurganzeb’s rule, when it became apparent that muslim rulership is now in terminal decline, perhaps the muslim lay class started anticipating popular revolt by hindu majority, against their inhuman and barbaric rule, which caused anxieties regarding their future.
Akbar pithily comments that muslims’ memory of a glorious past mixed with anxieties of the future came together in the form of ‘theory of distance’ propounded by Walliullah - who feared that without influence of muslim rulers, the lay muslim might get diluted out of their Islamic identity amidst an overwhelming hindu majority population.
As per the said ‘theory’ propounded in Waliullah’s Hujjat Allah al-Baligah (Allah’s conclusive argument) - ‘Faith had to be pure , and separation was the antidote to pollution’ (from so called ‘kaafirs)(Akbar, 2011, p.51). Emphasis added in bracket is mine. Akbar explains it further that, ‘the difference between believer and infidel had been blurred in India, and could be corrected only through forms of alienation. Waliullah had told muslims to live at such a distance from hindus that they would not be able to see the light of the fires in hindu homes’ (Ibid).
The ‘theory of distance’ is capable of explaining a lot of the actions of Islamist leaders and muslims generally as practiced in the Indian sub-continent, leading upto the vivisection of India into two countries divided along religious lines. The very name of the new country that emerged from said vivisection, viz., Pakistan, is a salient give away as the literal meaning is, ‘Land of the Pure’ - i.e., a land free from pollution - an important aspect of the same idea of maintaining distance, that was propounded by Waliullah.
Akbar takes us through a journey of two centuries, starting from the decline of the muslim rule by the weakening of the last of the Great Mughals, viz Aurangzeb, until today’s Pakistan. Akbar gives us a ring-side view of the narrative development of the ‘two nation theory’, starting from the idea of ‘theory of distance’ which ultimately engulfed the Indian sub-continent in communal violence and bloody riots, after that idea acquired a more global scale in the form of ‘two-nation theory’. Akbar peppered the story with some side-stories that give new perspectives into the narratives of the role of INC and the Britishers during the British era and until independence, which I am not dwelling upon.
The reasons why muslim clergy became anxious in the post-Mughal decades is because they otherwise enjoyed a free run during Islamic rule. While it’s true that the bigness of the Indian civilization forced the muslim kingship to split from the clergy, which resulted in two different strains, viz., one practical Islam followed by rulers and the other clergical Islam followed by the clergy. However the Islam followed by rulers never waned the influence of the clergy otherwise, who continued to command a stronghold over muslim mindsets.
There is an incident of Jalaluddin Akbar being hit once by Shaikh Nabi, an Islamic scholar mystic who desperately tried to entrance Jalaluddin Akbar to Islam. Shaikh Sirhindi - the most respected Islamic scholar even described Jalaluddin Akbar as a traitor to Islam. In their friday papers, instead of taking name of Akbar, being the ruler, they took the name of Akbar’s brother Mirza Hakim, governor of Kabul, thus denying Akbar due recognition for his deviations. However, with the decline of Mughal era, the clergy saw potential for loosening of their hold over the lay muslim. In a remarkable observation, M J Akbar states that “Akbar’s rule was an aberration in march of Islam than its high note.”
While ruler’s Islam underwent change in practices owing to the pressures of pragmatism, the clergical Islam continued to remain enveloped in hard boiled fundamentalism with the clergy deriving inspiration from scriptural doctrines without any answerability to the rulers of the day. This parallel strain reached its epitome during the rule of Jalaluddin Akbar who professed deviation from Islamist practices, in the interest of acquiring legitimacy for his minority led muslim rule over the majority hindu population. However, Jalaluddin Akbar’s actions were not free from inviting the Islamist clergy’s opprobium on himself.
The anxieties of the muslim clergy that emerged in the waning phase of Aurangzeb’s era were intensified at the successive military defeats handed out by the Britishers in India. What was once propounded as an idea, in the form of ‘theory of distance’ soon started manifesting itself in the attitudes and aspirations of the muslim elites and religious scholars as they doubled down on the efforts in the post-Mugha era, to create a ‘muslim space’ to conserve the practices and behaviour of the hindus who had converted into Islam. This helps provide an explanation of Pakistan - as a successor of the Mughal empire in India. It is pertinent to note that Akbar claims that Deoband rooted in local history, which also sought muslim space, but within a shared hindu-muslim India (Ibid, p.76).
The idea of ‘theory of distance’ and growing muslim anxieties soon gave way to calls for military jihad, whose leadership was acquired by Sayyid Ahmed Barelvi, a talib (student) of the madarsa started by Waliullah’s father, Shah Abdur Rahim.
Barelvi established the Indian Wahhabi Movement of the 1820, then went on to establish Balakot, which has now become a training centre for modern day Talibanis, and also the same place which was bombed by the Indian Air Force in 2019 after a terror attack carried out by Pakistan at an Indian army camp. Akbar reports Mullah Mahmud, a Talibani leader, who said in an interview to the Chinese daily, “Global Times” that ‘...We were not born today. We were born in the days of colonisation of India by Britain (Ibid, p.48).
The Islamists were thus developing their doctrines for military jihad in India so as to throw out the Britishers, not with the objective of achieving ‘azaadi’, but for capturing India to create their ‘muslim space’ (Ibid, p.150). The Indian Wahhabi movement gained increasing control over the muslim mindspace as they were bent on acquiring the steering wheel of muslim anxieties. After the failure of the 1857 mutiny of British soldiers, Jama Tafseer, a newspaper printed in Delhi in 1867 insisted that Indian muslims had only 2 options - it is incumbent on mussalmans to join together and wage war upon the infidels. Those who are unable to take part in the fight should emigrate to a country of the true faith. This laid the foundation for a diplomatic route to get their own muslim space.
Muslim anxieties were growing especially because the muslim communities’ fortunes started going down as they kept away from learning English or acquiring education as they felt that the Britishers were the ones who dispossessed their position of royalty. On the other hand, the hindus who were hitherto deprived of opportunities in the muslim administrative setup, were eager to learn English and acquire a colonial education so that they could find kinship with the britishers in order to get jobs in the administration - which further increased muslim anxieties. This continues to this day in the anti-western attitudes of the average muslim who is expected to be familiar more with urdu and arabic than with English. Perhaps this explains an anti-west and an anti-colonial sentiment amongst the muslims (which explains why they are good friends with the leftists who are anti-west because of capitalism).
The Britishers wanted to wrest control of the muslim mind from the Indian wahhabist puritans because of their open espousal of violence and doctrinal view of islam - which posed a military and ideological opposition to sustenance of British rule. Therefore, the Britishers channelized the anxieties for a muslim space through ‘Sir Syed Ahmed Khan’.
Shah Waliullah’s theory of distance reached what might be described as an intermediate stage under the leadership of Sir Syed. He was not hostile to hindus but did not believe that it was his responsibility to worry about their welfare (Ibid, p.91). He wanted a muslim deal with the British and while he recognized an intimacy between Islamic and hindu cultures - he could not bother himself with the upliftment of all in a secular fashion. At Siddons club - he likened Indians to monkeys (p.91). In 1885 - he condemned the Indian National Congress and made all attempts to keep muslims away from joining the INC through political scaremongering, and firmly believed that hindus and muslims were separate as two nations. He dwelt on the concept of “one country, two nations” at a speech he delivered on 16th March, 1888, at the invitation of the mussalmans of meerut. In fact, in a petition submitted by Aligarh alumni in 1906, to Viceroy Lord Minto referred to muslims exclusively as a nation (pg. 98).
Later on, the idea of two nations was made part, as an underlying theme, in the demand for separate electorates by Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Muslim separatism was sought to be protected through the demand for ‘separate electorates’ as it was said that hindu muslim union was possible only through commitment on constitutional practicalities (Ibid, p. 115). Jinnah’s demand for ‘separate electorates’ as part of such ‘constitutional practicalities’ was not a united national goal that was being prepared by the INC, rather his demand was projected as a common goal for all of Indians. However said idea, with its underlying theme of ‘theory of distance’ was itself broken to start with.
Even through the khilafat bonhomie, the subtext was quite clear. If the muslims did not protect their right to live by the Qur’an, Islam would be in danger in India (Ibid, p.150). Gandhi courted the khilafat movement and tied it with the non co-operation movement to ensure mass mobilisation. After the chauri chaura incident, when Gandhi called the movement off, the muslims were quick to lose faith in the non-violent movement of Gandhi, and perhaps as a way to signal coming out of the grey of non-violence, Islamists planned and executed the Moplah rebellion (Ibid, p.152). It was an invocation of the doctrine of military jihad amidst the perceived threat of dilution of Islamic identity in hindu presence and Gandhian calls for non-violence. Although a section of muslims felt otherwise and argued that it would be sinful to turn against hindus who had stood by the khilafat cause, and that they should now work for an honourable place for muslims in a free India. Nirad Chaudhuri writes that muslims had completely abandoned Gandhi. In East Bengal, they had even sacked and looted hindu homes in towns and villages. In Gandhi’s agitation for abolition of salt tax - only 2 muslims had joined his band of 78 trekkers (Ibid, p. 186).
These are clear evidences that pre-Independence, a section of muslims sought unity with hindus more as an instrument to be used against the Britishers than as a belief in the value and the spirit of the idea of unity, while seeking to maintain distance in order to conserve and avoid reversion.
Post-1947, Akbar outlines Pakistan’s revisionism and descent into Islamism, anti-hindu bigotry and hindumisia. In Pakistan, hindus were recast as cowards and devious people who burnt their idols, were backward, superstitious and given the chance would deprive muslims and lower castes of education. That revisionism also included eulogising past Islamic invaders like Qasim, Ghazni, Ghori and Aurangzeb. The value of a muslim icon was seen in direct proportion to the anger they aroused among hindus. Therefore, Jalaluddin Akbar is made as an apostate while Aurangzeb whose cycle had started beginning of the end of muslim rule in the country, is still eulogized simply because he introduced jizya tax on hindus.
The value of the book lies in building a coherent narrative that traces a common theme running through muslim rule, through Jalaluddin Akbar’s reign, through Aurangzeb’s decline, through rise of Barelvi and the Indian Wahhabi movement, the British’ need to prop up Sir Syed, the rise of the INC, Sir Syed’s hatred for the INC, establishment of the Aligarh muslim University, Jinnah’s demand for separate electorates, Moplah rebellion, and creation of Pakistan and modern day Taliban. The culprit is and has always been, ‘the theory of distance’.