Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East

by David Stahel

In just four weeks in the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht wrought unprecedented destruction on four Soviet armies, conquering central Ukraine and killing or capturing three quarters of a million men. This was the Battle of Kiev - one of the largest and most decisive battles of World War II and, for Hitler and Stalin, a battle of crucial importance. In this book, David Stahel charts the battle's dramatic course and aftermath, uncovering the irreplaceable losses suffered by Germany's 'panzer groups' despite their battlefield gains, and the implications of these losses for the German war effort. He illuminates the inner workings of the German army as well as the experiences of ordinary soldiers, showing that with the Russian winter looming and Soviet resistance still unbroken, victory came at huge cost and confirmed the turning point in Germany's war in the East.

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History, Russia, Military Fiction, Germany

488 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 5, 2011

About the author

David Stahel was born in Wellington, New Zealand in 1975, but grew up in Melbourne, Australia. He completed an honours degree in history at Monash University (1998), an MA in War Studies at King's College London (2000) and a PhD at the Humboldt University in Berlin (2007). His research focus has centered primarily on the German military in World War II and particularly Hitler's war against the Soviet Union. Dr. Stahel's latest book Operation Typhoon was released by Cambridge University Press in March 2013 and will be followed by another book focusing on German operations on the eastern front in November and early December 1941.

David Stahel completed his undergraduate studies at Monash University and Boston College. He has an MA in War Studies from King's College London and a PhD in 2007 from the Humboldt University in Berlin. His dissertation has been published by Cambridge Military Histories as Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East. He joined the University of New South Wales Canberra in 2012.

Books:

Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge, 2009).

Kiev 1941. Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East (Cambridge, 2012).

(Together with Alex J. Kay and Jeff Rutherford) Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front, 1941. Total War, Genocide and Radicalization (Rochester, 2012).

Operation Typhoon. Hitler's March on Moscow (Cambridge, 2013).

Moscow 1941. Hitler's Battle for the Soviet Capital (forthcoming).

Reviews

[Stefania Dzhanamova · Rating 5 out of 5]

David Stahel’s Kiev 1941 picks up where Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East left and examines the often overlooked, according to him, by historians battle of Kiev, fought in August-September, 1941.

On July 3, Chief of the Army, Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, noted in his diary that the war “has been won in 14 days.” After Operation Barbarossa was launched on June 22 1941, three million German troops, together with half a million soldiers from allied countries, crossed into the Soviet Union. While the Luftwaffe relentlessly bombed Soviet towns and airfields, the Germans advanced up to 90 kilometers a day, capturing and killing great numbers of Soviet men. By July 11, German tanks had broken through the outskirts of Ukraine’s capital, and Hitler’s field headquarters rejoiced – the Führer had long dreamed of occupying agricultural Ukraine, which would provide the necessary food for German soldiers and civilians. However, he also planned to exterminate its 45-million population, and a start of this plan was made with the willful mass killing of POWs.
One of the Nazi’s false assumptions about the USSR was that it would be enough to break down the door and the whole construction would collapse, that the Soviet Union was fragile and its own people would turn against it. Instead, immediately informed by Soviet propaganda about the fate that awaits them in the hands of the brutal Nazi men and aware that they would be shot by NKVD or send to GULAG if they showed even the slightest sign of hesitation, Soviet troops soon rallied behind Stalin to fight the Great Patriotic War. Furthermore, the fact that Germans – often seeking vengeance for killed German POWs – mercilessly murdered Soviet POWs and looted and destroyed Soviet towns and villages effectively reminded Soviet men what they were fighting for. Well before the end of July, German officers and soldiers complained in their letters and diaries that the Russian’s will to resist didn’t show signs of breaking, and the Red Army only seemed to grow. (Aside from the initial five million mobilized, Stalin had additional ten millions ready to fight.)

Stahel argues that the Kiev Campaign shouldn’t be thought of simply in terms of the vast number of prisoners taken and the ineptitude of the Soviet forces marshaled against Gen. Guderian.
One crucial factor, he asserts, was the gradual degradation of German equipment readiness. The Nazi advance began to slow, hindered by poor roads, intolerably long distances, and the lack of a railway network dense enough to transport sufficient quantities of men, equipment, and fuel; the Germans were forced to rely on horses, which however, required a lot of food and weren’t suited for Russian conditions. The vast distances demanded the division of Wehrmacht forces into three Army Groups, but this strategy, combined with the heavy losses and the constant increase of the Soviet Army, made the possibility of destroying the enemy with a single blow less and less likely.

On July 30 the Army’s advance was halted due to the need to recover, regroup, and resupply. Meanwhile, Hitler and his generals discussed their future course of action. While the generals favored a rapid advance on Moscow, Hitler, still fixed on the idea of obtaining victuals from Ukraine, was convinced that capturing Kiev was much more important. As usually, his generals didn’t dare to gainsay him, and soon German forces began to encircle the capital of Ukraine.

Stahel brings in a new analysis of the Soviet efforts in the battle. He refutes the argument that Soviet forces had been passive until Stalin realized that the Germans had fully encircled the city. In fact, Soviet troops met the attack with fierce resistance and many counterattacks. “The Russians’ behavior is simply incomprehensible. They are incredibly stubborn, and refuse to budge even under the most powerful gunfire,” wrote a German soldier. Another German described how the dead bodies of Soviet soldiers stretched like a “carpet” for miles – Russian troops threw themselves at the advancing enemy with such recklessness and suffered such enormous losses that, as a third German account reported, “one wonders how they can find the courage and the men to keep on.”

When the Nazi forces finally took the city on September 19, the extent of their victory was unparalleled. They calculated that they had taken 665,000 prisoners, as well as enormous quantities of guns, tanks, and equipment. In his meticulous assessment of the campaign, Stahel regards this as a propagandistic exaggeration, but acknowledges that the defeat of the Red Army was beyond doubt.

As Stahel narrates, both Hitler and Stalin drew conclusions from the battle’s outcome. Stalin admitted to himself that it would be more rational to leave matters to his generals, while Hitler, assured Kiev was captured only thanks to his military genius, began to regard his generals with even larger contempt. Yet, as Stahel notes, the triumph in Kiev was illusory.

Immediately after the Kiev Campaign, the German army drove on to Moscow. As David Stahel shows, however, it was already too late. The early Autumn rains turned the already bad Russian roads into rasputitsa a.k.a “dust, mud, dust, mud.” The German lorries and tanks struggled. The dust clogged their engines, making it very difficult for the infantry to breathe. Soon, the advance was halted again.
When in November the ground became hard enough again and the German forces were able to press on, it began to snow. The Germans were ill equipped for the severe Russian winter because Hitler had expected the campaign to end long before it would come. Soldiers began to succumb to frostbite, while the better equipped Red Army launched counterattacks, again slowing the Germans’ advance.
As Stahel argues, the weather wasn’t the only problem. Albeit victorious, the Kiev Campaign had bled the German army white – it had suffered over 50,000 fatalities in the battle. As one German panzer commander wrote, “[the relentless onward march into the Soviet Union and its associated casualties held the potential for Germany] to be destroyed by winning.” Stahel also describes the strain the battle of Kiev placed on German supplies, another fatal blow for the already battle-weary army. The German economy could not keep pace with such losses; the Soviet economy, by contrast, produced twice the German number of combat aircraft and trice the number of tanks.

Stahel’s narrative often jumps back and forth in time, so we are able to find out that while the year 1942 would see further German victories, they would be short lived. As the author argued in his previous book too, in fact, the German army was doomed as early as Operation Barbarossa’s first halt because the whole campaign had been designed for a quick victory.

Kiev 1941 is a very well researched history of the Kiev Campaign. While Stahel continues to rely mainly on German sources, he also draws upon a large number of war diaries, private field-post letters and diaries of soldiers and officers that further embellish his detailed, compelling narrative. He traces all aspects of the battle with remarkable clarity. The many maps, albeit not always easily graspable, contribute to the overall understanding. Recommendable.

[Perato · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not as great as Stahel's previous book, but only because the former was really great.

Stahel's Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East quickly became one of my favorites and ever since quite many of the books I've read have been compared to that. As a separate book, I would probably rate this 5 star, but as a part of a "series" this isn't quite as polished. They aren't actually a part of a series, but probably should be considering how they follow each other. Quite many of the pros of the previous book also apply to this one too.
My review of the previous book: https://www.goodreads.com/review/show...

The main point of this book is to continue Stahel's argument that Ostheer was spending it's resources a lot faster than it could recuperate and was already quite depleted force before even Typhoon. This book dives in to the Battle of Kiev(1941), from the German perspective. It's mostly strategy and logistics, with added quotes from both ordinary soldiers and generals. The Soviet side isn't neglected, but it's not the focus. The book continues where the previous left and continues to the Typhoon that is the next part. And that is mainly my main gripe about this book. The book feels somewhat disjointed. Quite a lot is spent reiterating the arguments from the first book, mainly the supply problems and wear and tear of the equipment. Another subject that is constantly visited is the battles in Army Group Centers front and the upcoming Typhoon. This doesn't leave much to cover the actual subject that is the battle of Kiev. It's not necessary a flaw in the content, but on the heading. Maybe with a totally different title, the book would've felt more on point.

While it's not inherently wrong to cover other very much related topics, I feel that when reading the Typhoon book, I'm again going to read same stuff again and again. As I mentioned, as a separate book this quite nicely covers his previous arguments and the effects of the battle of Kiev to the upcoming operation of Typhoon. But reading this with Stahel's other books, one might become too familiar with some themes.

Great book with minor flaws in it that aren't that big for most readers.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Having described the progress of Barbarossa until the end of August 1941 and the battle of Smolensk in his previous book, this work narrates the course of the famous turn away from Moscow by the Wehrmacht in September, southwards towards the encirclement of 4 Soviet armies in the enormous Battle of Kiev. Well over half a million Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner, along with commiserate casualties and material loss, to say nothing of the capture of the ancient Ukrainian capital and central Ukraine. Amongst the dead was Colonel-General Kirponos, the commander of the South-Western Front. The central controversy was (and is) over whether Army Group Center should have continued its advance on Moscow or, if Hitler was correct in ordering Guderian's Panzers southwards, understanding that the war in the Soviet Union was going to be a long one, in spite of what his generals were telling him, and so the Ukrainian minerals and grain regions captured in the battle would be vital to Germany in the long haul it faced. It should be pointed out that Stalin himself played a not-insignificant role in all this by refusing to evacuate Kiev both before and during the battle (and sacking Zhukov as CGS for suggesting it). The German offensive was carried out with their usual professionalism and the results were spectacular. And yet, their attacks were slowed by the increasing autumn rains (an ominous portent) and there always seemed to be more Russia and Russian Army units still ahead. Dr. Stahel places all aspects of this vast campaign in it's strategic context. The narrative flows nicely and the maps (taken from David Glantz's atlas of the battle) are helpful.

[Creighton · Rating 5 out of 5]

Warning, this is a long review, but a passionate one.
World War Two has a lot of hotly debated subjects; one of them is when did Germany lose World War Two on the Eastern Front? Some say Stalingrad, some say Kursk, and some say Germany lost when it failed to take Moscow in 1941. The argument pushed is that Germany failed to take Moscow, and thus lost the war, because Hitler foolishly decided to use Guderian’s Panzer Army to encircle The Four Soviet armies in the Kiev pocket. This argument was pushed for years after the war by German generals, and has become a dogmatic belief for many. Behind this argument is a mythical belief that the Ostheer was a strong, motorized, and well-equipped army that was able to accomplish all of its objectives, and could’ve done so without any significant problems; it only failed because of Hitler’s meddling. It is only recently, after the Cold War, that a new truth has come to light: Germany lost its war against the Soviet Union in the first 6 weeks or so of Barbarossa, when the Ostheer failed in it’s objectives and hopes to defeat the Red Army west of the Dvina. Disparaging to the myth of the invincible Ostheer, The Wehrmacht did not have the logistical resources, materiel, or manpower to conduct a long war against the Soviet Union; they failed to grasp the industrial might, and massive amounts of Manpower the Soviet Union had at it’s disposal. Barbarossa was a gamble that failed. The Soviet Union managed to outproduce the Germans and managed to field new armies for every one the German’s destroyed. Yes, the Ostheer managed to encircle and destroy large Soviet forces, but this was due to Soviet incompetence early in the war. The Ostheer was reliant on Soviet complicity for it’s victories. This thesis is the premise of David Stahel’s book on Kiev, or should I say, his series of book’s covering Germany’s Eastern Front campaigns in 1941.
Stahel’s book is the first real modern and balanced study of the Kiev campaign, which draws on wide arrays of sources from both sides of the conflict. Stahel starts the book by writing about Lend Lease, America’s growing involvement, and then proceeds to examine the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The Soviet Union had an economy that was prepared for war; Stalin was far sighted; he knew the Soviet Union had to industrialize and prepare for war, so that’s why he implemented his five-year plans. Stahel makes an interesting case about the Red Army purges; yes, they were wrong, and yes, they eliminated lots of leadership, but because they occurred, many younger, more talented and better generals rose to the forefront in the Great Patriotic war. Stahel then explains why the Red Army didn’t disintegrate with the German invasion and dispels a myth commonly held about why Soviet soldiers fought: the Red Army didn’t disintegrate in the first few weeks of Barbarossa because Soviet soldiers were tenacious, bold fighters, who were filled with either a patriotic spirit, a desire to defend their homes, or were zealous communists. The Soviet state emphasized heavy nationalistic propaganda during the war, and this led to millions volunteering to fight, even some emigrants returning to serve. So, this myth of Soviet soldiers fighting because of their fear of the Stalinist state can be largely discarded. Another myth dispelled by Stahel is this idea that when the Germans invaded the Ukraine, a region that was anti-communist and anti-Soviet, that they were greeted in large numbers as liberators. The truth is that most Ukrainians ended up siding with the Soviet state. When Stahel examines Nazi Germany; he explains how the Nazi state was economically, and logistically unprepared for a long-term war with the Soviet Union. Hitler and the high command were so buoyed by their success in France, that they didn’t prepare either the economy or armaments production for a long-term war with the Soviet Union. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in the hope of securing the economic materials he needed to fight a long-term material war with Britain and America, while also securing his treasured Lebensraum.
Stahel then briefly goes through Barbarossa, following Army Group south, in the weeks leading up to the Kiev campaign. Stahel discusses the unnamed and overlooked battles occurring in the front around Army Group Center, post-Smolensk; these battles were attritional and static, but wore down the Army Group considerably and thus are worthy of mention. Another thing that Stahel discusses is the feuding between German generals and/or their feuding with Hitler, which could be a book in itself, and also discusses the situation on the Soviet side. Before Barbarossa, Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the OKH, believed Germany needed to take Moscow to defeat the Soviet Union, as did many other generals; Hitler however, placed a lot more energy in seizing the vital resources of the Ukraine. This led to a long feud, which was enflamed after the battle of Smolensk. What’s interesting is how much the German generals hated each other, especially the case of Heinz Guderian. When Fedor Von Bock and Franz Halder wanted Guderian to meet with Hitler to convince him to focus on taking Moscow, instead of shifting to Kiev, he went into the meeting doing just that, but came out of it agreeing with Hitler; this angered Bock and Halder immensely. We don’t see this much feuding on the Soviet side. Stahel does point out how Zhukov did argue with Stalin about how Kiev was the prime target for German attack in August, not Moscow, and Stalin ended up sacking him. No matter how much these two men disagreed, Stalin always relied on Zhukov and did so during the Kiev campaign.
An interesting thing that Stahel points out is the performance of the Panzer divisions on the Eastern front. During the Barbarossa campaign, as has been talked about numerously, the Germans encountered dusty Russian roads that were unpaved; this dust would infiltrate the Panzer tanks and overwhelm the air filters, increasing oil consumption and destroying the engines. So, not only did the Red Army wear down the armored units, but so did the terrain itself. The transport fleet was also unprepared for the long distances for which it had to travel. The German army was a sword which had a sharp point in its panzer and motorized divisions, but had a brittle blade in its unmotorized infantry divisions.
Going through the Kiev campaign, it’s painful to read how brittle the German forces had become at this point. Guderian’s and Kleist’s panzers were breaking down or being ruined by the immense tracts they had to travel, on top of the fierce resistance they faced. Eremenko tried to launch a counter-attack against Guderian’s push to Ukraine, and although it failed, he did do damage to his forces. It wasn’t just resistance on the ground they faced, but as Stahel explains, the Red Airforce began to have a resurgence in this period. As German forces spread out, the priorities of the Luftwaffe became more numerous, and therefore Air fleets were spread thin, and often times had to make a choice as to which units they would give priority to in terms of air support. So, the Panzer divisions on their drive to encircle Kiev faced Soviet aerial attacks by the IL-2 Sturmovik. The Germans did seal the Kiev pocket by mid-September, but it took time for them to destroy the units trapped in it, and often times, as in earlier pockets, Soviet troops could break through, escape, or make their way into the forests and become partisans. Ultimately, 4 Soviet armies were destroyed, 600,000 men lost, and Kiev taken.
The battle of Kiev definitely had an impact on the war. For the German Homefront, it gave the people a sense that victory was around the corner, a belief that was sagging for quite some time. Goebbels capitalized on Kiev; his propaganda ministry had been successful in propping up the Ostheer and making it seem like the defeat of the Red Army was soon to come. With each encirclement, the German people began to question if there would be a quick victory or a long war, but with Kiev, they thought it was soon to come. Kiev was Hitler’s victory; Hitler had pushed for this operation, he had disregarded the OKH’s (Halder) and Von Bock’s arguments for an immediate push on Moscow, and instead wanted to secure his flank in the Ukraine. This had caused bitter disputes between Hitler and Halder, but now that Kiev was secure, Hitler, Halder and Von Bock gambled on Operation Typhoon, in the hopes that it would be the final battle that would succeed where Barbarossa failed. While they agreed on this, Kiev also deepened Hitler’s distrust and disregard for his general’s advice. The high command and many in the Axis were in the clouds when it came to this idea that victory was around the corner. Examining what the individual soldiers thought, Stahel shows us that they had a more realistic view of the war. Individual soldiers realized the war was going to be long, doubted the war would end by Christmas, and were in awe at the tenacity of the Red Army. What they experienced was contrary to the racist Nazi teachings they had learned about the Red Army being weak and filled with Subhumans. As Hitler began to take away autonomy from his generals, we see Stalin do the opposite, relying on Zhukov and others; letting them have more control over conduct of the war. As winter approached, and the Wehrmacht was preparing for Operation Typhoon, the idea of victory began to sink, and the prospects of quick war diminished. As Stahel explains, the Wehrmacht and German people began to put their faith into the Nazi concept of Will. To them, the will power of the German soldiers would triumph over all material advantages the Red Army possessed.
This book deserves it’s 5-star rating; I am an Eastern Front aficionado, and took a long break from reading about it, but lately I’ve been reading about it, re-jogging my mind again, and this book definitely gave my brain some good nutrition. I would recommend that everyone read Stahel’s first book on Barbarossa, it is scholarly, and deserving of being read. It’s not dry like David Glantz, it’s informative and narrative and well-written.

[Joe · Rating 5 out of 5]

When asked, "What was the most decisive battle of World War II?," most historians answer Stalingrad, Kursk, or even Normandy. David Stahl answers Kiev. He does so not for the outcome of the battle on the field ( the Germans won) but because of the outcome of the struggle between the respective dictators and their General Staffs. Hitler was warned that the diversion from the attempt to capture Moscow would not only jeopardize that city's conquest but would also be a doubtful proposition as the German Army would to drive hundreds of kilometers over bad roads and then engage a million man army. Stalin ignored a prediction from his top general, Field Marshall Georgy Zhukov, that the Germans would divert to Kiev. He then ignored the advice of his General Staff to abandon the city. The result was that Stalin lost an army and Kiev. He was to forced to admit he was not the military genius he thought himself (at least privately). Hitler and on the other gloried in a victory his generals doubted could be won. His genius confirmed in his own mind and also in some of his doubting generals. The rest of war would be govern by the fact that Stalin now listen to his Generals and Hitler would not. An excellent history of this forgotten battle of World War II.

[Steven Mercatante · Rating 2 out of 5]

Book review by Steven Douglas Mercatante, author of Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in Europe and editor in chief of the military history website "The Globe at War".

David Stahel's Kiev 1941 follows his 2009 work Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East as the second book in a trilogy ostensibly taking a fresh look at the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. Had Stahel conducted a comprehensive analysis of the military operations near Kiev during the summer of 1941 this reviewer would have much to recommend. Regrettably however Stahel's Kiev 1941, much as its predecessor, all too often rehashes stale Cold War era ideas deterministically advancing the theory that the German invasion was doomed if for no other reason than the Soviet Union's sheer brute force strength and numerical advantages over Axis forces. Even worse, Stahel's effort is no mere doubling down on what is becoming a discredited conventional wisdom. The book's primary arguments revolve around the truly outlying idea that the Red Army had essentially defeated the Wehrmacht within six weeks of the beginning of what would become the greatest land war in human history.

The fact that Stahel advances such a theory completely contrary to what the historical record evinces is part and parcel of a researcher who though well versed in German sources seems to have not taken more than a passing glance at the Russian archives. Unfortunately, and perhaps understandably so given the same theories are advanced in his previous book, this omission seems to be a feature rather than a bug. That said, Kiev 1941 is well-written and, for general readers, it commendably portrays the state of the German eastern army (Ostheer) during the summer of 1941. Regardless, the reader is frequently distracted by digressions into aspects of the war outside the purview of what the book's title suggests. This is however only part of the larger problems afflicting not only this work, but also his previous volume.

For instance, given the author's attempt to address larger strategic issues there are some shockingly big holes in the defense of his thesis that the Soviet Union had effectively defeated the German invasion as early as August of 1941. Instead, and all too often, Stahel meanders through a somewhat convoluted strategic discussion of the war that fails to prove his points. For instance, and in rejoinder, the historical record amply demonstrates that near Kiev Germany not only engineered perhaps the greatest victory in the history of land warfare, but thereafter its overextended and rapidly weakening armies nevertheless still almost took Moscow. The following year the Wehrmacht nearly seized the primary sources of Soviet economic strength and just about took Stalingrad - doing all of this in spite of the fact that the 1942 era Ostheer lacked the fearsome power projection capabilities it wielded in 1941. We also know that to defeat Germany it cost the Soviet Union well over 20 million dead and immense material losses that, for example, included well over three of every four tanks Soviet factories churned out during the war. Moreover, the Red Army needed the economic backing provided by the world's greatest industrial powers working in concert to bolster a Soviet war effort that still took nearly four years to grind out a final victory. What's more, Germany waged war in far from an ideal manner; with a civilian and military leadership that made some of the Second World War's worst mistakes and yet still drove the Soviet Union to the brink of defeat. Stahel never adequately responds to any of these facts. What he does is to treat the summer of 1941 in isolation, substituting a snapshot in time for a measured look at the enormously complex variables impacting the outcome of a war fought between two of the world's first military superpowers. To his credit he provides us with a detailed look at the state of the Ostheer late in the summer of 1941. But in isolation this hardly supports his apparent belief that a war as big and multifaceted as the German-Soviet war can be reduced to a balance sheet exercise finding that the side possessing the greatest resources was of course the winner.

Examples demonstrating the falsity of such ideas are replete through not just history, but abound within the Second World War itself. One need look no further than the relatively weak German navy's lead role in conquering Norway early in 1940 in spite of having to fight against two of the greatest naval powers in the world. One could also look to the 1940 German defeat of France against combined Allied armies outnumbering German forces in most every category, and also able to draw on vast global economic resources provided by two of the world's largest empires. Conversely, during the 1940 Battle of Britain the outnumbered British Royal Air Force defeated the Luftwaffe's attempt to forge air supremacy over England. In 1942 the Red Army successfully defended Stalingrad even though the city's under resourced defenders fought for over two months against a more well-equipped and supported foe. In the spring of 1944 the Red Army's massive invasion of Romania quickly turned into a colossal failure. In this final example of a by no means all-inclusive list weak Axis armies defeated two entire Soviet Fronts. One of these, Ivan Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front, featured half of the Red Army's Tank Armies along with numerous other powerful armored formations. In spite of its imposing order of battle Konev's Front still couldn't best the worn down German 8th Army and Romanian 4th Army. One could reel off numerous other examples from the war, no less than from the entirety of military history. Regardless, and as this reviewer has shown in his own work quantitative strength is far from the determinative factor in producing military success. And yet here we have Kiev 1941 not only arguing the contrary, but doing so almost in spite of the historical record.

Kiev 1941 follows the all too brief discussion of events near Kiev, and the author's inadequate defense of the thesis motivating both of his books to date, by devoting a significant amount of time to the set-up for Operation Typhoon; all while again somewhat randomly ranging across the entirety of the German Eastern Front. As such, Kiev 1941 lamentably finishes by leaving the reader with a sinking feeling regarding how much of Stahel's soon to be released third book, supposedly about Operation Typhoon, will actually cover what the title implies. More importantly, in committing the same sins as its otherwise superior antecedent, Kiev 1941 once again leaves the reader to wonder when we will see the more muscular and reasoned defense of the author's ideas that his primary thesis demands. Why Germany Nearly Won: A New History of the Second World War in EuropeSteven D. Mercatante

[Shawn Gordon · Rating 4 out of 5]

You really have to be a WWII history enthusiast, and possibly an Eastern Front enthusiast, to enjoy this book. Fortunately, I am both. This could be called a logistical (or sustainment, in current Army parlance) perspective of the first few months of the war between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The book goes into great detail about the cost of the early successes of the Nazi war machine. Hitler and his Generals (or at least many of his Generals) assumed that the Soviet Union would collapse like a "house of cards" once the Wehrmacht drove into the Soviet Union. Despite spectacular losses by the Red Army, the Soviet Union was remarkably resilient. Although the early battles in the summer of 1941 appeared one-sided in favor of the Germans, the fact was that the Germans were suffering losses, and they simply did not have the means to make up those losses, while the Soviets did. German logistics could not keep up with the rapid advances of the German army, and there was simply not enough trains and trucks to keep the Army supplied. The Germans were unprepared in almost every way for a prolonged war, and failed to recognize that the war they were in would become a war of attrition.

The author tries to dispel many myths associated with many other histories of the early stages of the campaign. He shows that Soviet success was not only due to the early intervention of "General Winter." (In any case, the winter of 1941/42 was not particularly harsh, and failure to account for a Russian winter seems kind of stupid if you're invading Russia.)

If you enjoy detailed operational/strategic level history, you should enjoy this. If all you are looking for is a re-hash of battles, this is not the book for you.

[T. Fowler · Rating 3 out of 5]

I had eagerly awaited reading this book but, on its arrival, was disappointed. I had wanted to know more details about the 1941 battles in the Ukraine for a long time, but didn't really find it here. The book seems to lack sufficient focus for me, spending far too much time on the strategic situation in 1941 and broader command issues facing both sides. In this way, he reminded me of historian David Glantz, whose books on the Eastern Front provide detail that you can't find elsewhere but become a chore to read. David Stahel does provide a lot of maps to support the narrative but, here agian, they are too detailed and cluttered to be followed easily. I just want a good operational study of the battle for Kiev, by itself, and so will have to wait.

[Jesse Callaghan · Rating 5 out of 5]

It only took a chapter or two for Stahel to work his way to the top of my favourite historians. His analysis is both original and convincing. He depicts the German army as delicate sword operating on a shoe string. He also argues that the sword was effectively blunted much earlier than most other historians.

[Chuck · Rating 4 out of 5]

I like this book. Stahel’s writing style and attention to statistics is probably more suited to serious fans of military history rather than casual history readers looking for a general overview.

This well researched study of an important part of the 1941 campaign emphasizes two points. First, Germany never had sufficient resources to defeat the Soviet Union in a swift lightning bolt of victory much less a war of attrition. German generals blamed the weather for their problems and failures at the end of 1941. Heavy rains in the fall and the cold winter were indeed significant barriers to German success. Here’s the problem with that argument; rain in the fall and cold winters are not unusual in Russia! The professed surprise about difficulties from rain and then winter are the equivalent of being surprised that the Sahara Desert is hot and dry.

Secondly, Stalin’s idiotic strategic decisions made German attacks more successful than they should have been. The huge encirclements were caused as much by Stalin’s insistence that unmechanized infantry “hold their ground” while German mechanized units literally drove circles around the Soviet foot soldiers.

Although Germany’s best generals and blitzkrieg strategies were, in some respects, brilliant, and instructive, the German’s inexcusable failures to recognize the importance and difficulties of adequate supplies, support, and reinforcement are equally instructive. Assuming that the Soviet Union could be crushed and entirely defeated in three to four months was arrogant lunacy. The initial phases of Operation Barbarossa were successful in large part due to Stalin’s refusal to listen to all the Soviet generals telling Stalin that “GERMANY IS MASSING ON OUR BORDER AND ABOUT TO INVADE!!!!”

The Battle of Kiev was indeed a tremendous tactical victory. By investigating the battle in more detail, however, David Stahel reveals that the victory was not decisive and came at a great cost of casualties and equipment to Germany.

Another interesting point is the reactions of Stalin & Hitler to the result. Hitler insisted on the Kiev offensive instead of pushing ahead to Moscow immediately. The final push in Moscow was made after the capture of Kiev. In addition to capturing Kiev, the encirclement of Soviet forces resulted in 600,000 Soviet soldiers being killed or captured with another 84,000 wounded. The Soviets had 600,000 soldiers on the front when the battle started and, including the prisoners, suffered nearly 700,000 casualties! This encirclement and destruction of that Soviet army group compares favorably to Hannibal’s legendary victory at Cannae where an entire Roman army was destroyed. Kiev also compares to Cannae in that Cannae did not end in the Second Punic War. Oh, and the Romans eventually both won that war and destroyed Carthage.

Because Kiev was a decisive tactical victory, Hitler concluded that his decision to take Kiev first was vindicated. Kiev gave Hitler another reason to believe that he knew better than his generals! Hitler more and more ignored his generals in the belief that he was a military genius. In fact, he was a retired corporal with no officer training.

Stalin, on the other hand, began giving more respect and deference to his generals after Kiev. Once the Soviet Union survived the 1941 offensive, their victory was inevitable. The lessons taken by Stalin and Hitler from Kiev had a large impact on the rest of the war.

[Chris Toppi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Five Stars. Kiev 1941 is the third book I have read by David Stahel. I have found it equal to the other two, Retreat from Moscow (Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2019 and Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge University Press, 2009). His extensive use of primary sources separates Stahel from others who have tackled this topic. He was able to pull new literature material mainly from the Bundesarchiv-Militararchive, Freiburg im Breisgau (The German Military Archives). He also goes out of his way to weave a broader narrative around social, political, and economic factors and the equal footing he gives to matters of supply and logistics. These last two factors played an essential role in Germany’s difficulties, foreshadowing their ultimate defeat.

In his closing comments, the author notes that others have questioned how it was possible that a victory of such scale could be won if Germany’s armored forces were so severely depleted. Indeed, reading this book, one can appreciate the critique. That the Wehrmacht achieved victory in Kiev was nothing short of a miracle. Hitler's abrupt turn toward the northeast immediately following the battle would hasten disaster. With Rasputitsa underway and winter looming, Moscow would eventually become their version of a bridge too far.

While Stahel’s contribution is academic and thus usually found in a different stack than the more trafficked popular history stack, this book, nonetheless, deserves to be read. If you do read it, I hope you will end up doing what I did and get his whole series (additionally Operation Typhoon (2013) and The Battle for Moscow (2015) and draw your conclusion about how, when, and why Germany failed on the Eastern Front.

[Mac · Rating 3 out of 5]

Borrow.

For a book named after a specific battle, this was surprisingly light on the description of operational and tactical engagements. For a matter of fact, it is also surprisingly sparse on Kiev... In fact, reading Kiev 1941 just feels like being thrown into the middle of Barbarossa - which when consulting the titles of his other works, is exactly what this is.

The author's strength resides in statistical analysis and a very careful and meticulous study of the decision making process and interplay between various German military leaders. This provides valuable insight. Stahel's own views repeatedly spring forth and it is clear he believes the German offensive was doomed from the start.

Stahel is undoubtedly a talented researcher and his views are some of the most convincing I've read, however, this book never quite feels like it knows what it is.

[Raime · Rating 3 out of 5]

Brutal narrative told with more balance between Panzer operations and human suffering than the first book.

"Hitler's macabre intentions for Leningrad reached Army Group North. It read:

After the defeat of the Soviet Union, no one will be interested in the continued existence of this population centre... It is intended to encircle the city tightly and to level it to the ground with artillery fire of all calibres and continuous air raids. Requests for a surrender resulting from the situation of the city will be declined, since the problems of housing and feeding the population cannot and should not be solved by us. We are not interested in sustaining in existence even a part of the population of this metropolis in this war.

Not a word of protest was raised by the army command; indeed they dutifully implemented Hitler's orders to the best of their ability and in the months ahead Leningrad did indeed starve. The only concern expressed at Army Group North was whether the troops would be able to gun down masses of women and children in the event of a mass breakout by starving civilians. The matter was ultimately resolved by determining that the artillery would be employed, 'preferably by opening fire on the civilians at an early stage [of their departure from the city] so that the infantry is spared the task of having to shoot the civilians themselves'."

[Tim Lawless · Rating 4 out of 5]

In his second book, David Stahel tackles the decisive Wermacht drive to surround Kiev in September 1941, which eliminated the Soviet South-Western Front and its four constituent armies, one of the largest encirclements in military history. It was also likely the greatest victory of the Third Reich, and a battle normally glossed over in histories as simply another triumphant march forward of the Wermacht during Operation Barbarossa.

Few monographs--in English, anyway--have been written on the subject, and as a result, the prevailing view of an astounding and effortless Wermacht victory has prevailed to this day. Clearly, the ineptitude of Stalin and the Stavka at this phase of the war contributed greatly to this defeat, as they refused to react to their exposed flanks on either side being penetrated by two Panzer Groups, leading to the encirclement and elimination of the Kiev pocket. That the Soviets suffered a devastating defeat, losing several hundred thousand troops, thousands of heavy weapons and hundreds of armored vehicles is indisputable.

However, Stahel looks below the surface narrative of the battle and examines the state of the Heer (German Army) during this period, from the communications of the highest level officers, to the dairies and letters of front line soldiers, to manpower and equipment levels as the battle unfolded, and the increasingly strained logistics network. The picture that emerges is one of a declining Heer, an army taking losses in men and material they had no ability to fully replace, especially in panzers and motorized transport, making the Panzer Groups less mobile and therefore less effective. The writings of the front line soldiers are illuminating, as they struggle to adapt to weariness, frustration and danger.

Stahel also presents a picture of frequent bickering and recriminations between the German high command and the Army Group and Army commanders, a picture which makes it clear the Germans had no clear strategy, with every man seemingly making a grab of what he could for himself. Guderian, normally portrayed as an honest, almost saint-like figure, here looks to be nothing short of a self-interested if not self-deluded egomaniac, bypassing the chain of command, resenting assignments, and demanding impossible-to-provide reinforcements from dangerously threatened sectors. Interestingly, Stahel points out something about the battle of Smolensk I'd not known before, that Guderian, rather than wheeling his Panzer Group north to seal off the encirclement of that town, instead drove further east, creating the Yel'nya salient. This created two problems for the Heer: Not only did the encirclement around Smolensk not close quickly, missing an opportunity to pocket three Soviet armies, the resulting Yel'nya salient became a target for Soviet counterattacks that eventually led to its abandonment. The self-serving behavior of the German generals and field marshalls becomes more comprehensible when one understands they still at this date expected a quick victory over the Soviet Union, and that they were looking to become governors over the territory they had conquered. Everyone wanted to grab more, because it meant greater fame and riches for them.

In addition, most divisions were experiencing significant losses, being down 1000 or more men from their initial strength, and panzer totals for most divisions running at a fraction of their strength at the start of Operation Barbarossa. Germany neither had the replacements to return divisions to full strength, nor the transport to deliver them to the front line, were they available.

While the magnitude of the German victory at Kiev is uncontroversial, what one recognizes when looking at the state of the Heer during this period is an army in irrecoverable strategic decline. In this sense, Stahel sheds a fresh light on a well-known battle, further chipping away at persistent Third Reich propaganda trumpeting the greatness of the Nazi war machine.

However, the book is not without its flaws. It's less a book about the battle of Kiev than a high-level evaluation of the state of the Wermacht before, during and after the battle, so those looking for detailed descriptions of the battle itself will be disappointed. In addition, the maps were not as helpful as they could have been, showing more the disposition around Smolensk more than needed, while shortchanging maps on the approach to Kiev. And as with his first book, his focus is significantly more on the Wermacht than on the Soviets. But overall, this is an important contribution to the understanding of why the Wermacht invasion of the Soviet Union was doomed from the start.

[Ellis · Rating 2 out of 5]

I finished reading David Stahel’s first book about Operation Barbarossa. It is impressively well researched and persuasively argues his general thesis that the summer months of the invasion of the soviet union were the turning point of the second world war because it was ill planned, lacked strategic direction and so thoroughly ground down the strength of the wehrmacht. whilst hardly destined to lose the war in its immediate future, the german land army was no longer capable of winning the war in the way and method it desired over the short summer months.

I wanted more out out of his first publication. I simply wanted more out of it. I also feel that he somewhat overstates his evidence for the July-august crisis in strategic direction and subsequent clashes between halder and hitler that he presents and suggests at the beginning of the book. I have now read his next book ‘Kiev 1941’. Already in chapter 2, I had serious concerns. Where his first book was clear in direction and felt like a genuine academic contribution, this one feels very much more dumbed down. Its first 2 chapters dither around on context and background using entirely secondary sources. Those chapters also take up a considerable portion of the book (66/only 350 pages at least). This would not typically be an issue for me and ive discovered its the same In his subsequent publications. The text’s font is considerably larger than his first publication – the headings are also in a completely amatuerish typeface. The footnotes are also all irritatingly at the back of the book which further reveals just how much shorter this book is compared to its predecessors and how little effort was involved in its creation, despite being the same price. It is a complete fucking cynical cashgrab.

He devotes a considerable amount of time to the set-up for Operation Typhoon. Stahel also randomly jumps across the entirety of the German Eastern Front. As such, Kiev 1941 lamentably finishes by leaving the reader with a sinking feeling regarding how much of Stahel's third book, supposedly about Operation Typhoon, will actually cover what the title implies. The entire chapter on the siege of Leningrad shouldn’t be in this book as it is focussed entirely on army group centre and should be in next book about operation typhoon. We learn nothing about the start of the invasion of the Soviet Union up to battle of Kiev for army group south. There is certainly nothing in the same detail as Stahels first book on army group centre. It’s pathetic.

A surprise was that such a prestigious publisher as Cambridge University Press would have produce book of such poor editorial quality. There are typos and spelling errors in the chapter Iron Crosses and Wooden Crosses, chapter 2 - road to Kiev, in triumph in the Ukraine - hitters Pyrrhic victory chapter and in the final roll of the dice chapter. There is substantial repetition of information from previous chapters in order to pad this chapter out. It’s a mess. It’s truly embarrassing and wholly frustrating.

Stahel also talks about completely unintroduced characters and gives no indication of what they were supposed to be doing. The aims of army group south nor its composition are not said anywhere. Whilst interesting in parts, the book is a mess. It’s obvious he wants to talk about army group centre and has little research on army group south of anything comparable to centre. There also aren’t enough maps that directly relate to what he’s writing about. It’s alll very confusing. Sometimes places mentioned in text are not labelled on any maps. I could in part understand this issue as maps are provided with reference to glantz but surely stahel could have added them on himself?

This book is a mess.

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

David Stahel continues to de-mystify the Eastern Front of World War II for English readers with "Kiev 1941," shedding light on one of the largest battles of the Eastern Front (and indeed the entire war). Stahel picks up from his previous work on the commencing months of Operation Barbarossa, demonstrating that despite the vast statistics in Nazi Germany's favor - Soviet POWs captured; Soviet materiel taken; territory subsumed beneath the swastika - the German Wehrmacht had lost the ability to decisively win on the Eastern Front by the Fall of 1941.

For readers largely acquainted with a Anglo-American bias to World War II, this may come as a bit of a shock: the narrative, to the extent there is one about the Eastern Front in English literature, is that German blitzkrieg pounded into the Soviet Union and were but a few tank runs away from capturing Moscow, ending the war on the European Continent, and sending Stalin fleeing into the Urals. Stahel's take is the flip side of that strategic narrative: Germany was hopelessly under-manned and under-equipped once the Allies began forging their post-June 22, 1941 alliance. The Wehrmacht leadership admitted this implicitly, tying the achievement of Operation Barbarossa to not only Soviet armies destroyed or captured, but the near-complete decimation of the Soviet war effort. Despite large battles and decisive tactical victories at Smolensk and Kiev, the Soviets were not decimated, but rather weakened and ready to re-create their lines further east into the heart of Mother Russia.

The laurels of the Battle of Kiev, which netted Germany hundreds of thousands of Soviet casualties and prisoners and the ancient capital of Russian lore, are owed to Hitler. Despite his generals pressing for an advance to Moscow, Hitler decided to send forces south to capture Ukraine and deprive the Soviet Union of its agricultural and industrial fruits. Hitler's plan worked, though perhaps more due to Stalin's obstinacy to remain entrenched in Kiev and not give an inch of ground rather than to any strategic brilliance. The battlefield victory was surely outweighed by Hitler's growing sense of genius for military strategy, claiming the defeats of Poland, France, and Ukraine despite military advice to the contrary before each of these operations.

In the victory, there were signs of defeat. Nazi units continually outran vital supply lines, including the ever-decreasing stockpiles of gasoline and oil required to power the Nazi's mobile divisions. Even after the encirclement of Kiev, Soviet forces remained dangerous foes, counter-attacking German lines immediately and demonstrating that defeat of an army, or two, did not mean the end of the Soviet war effort.

Strategy, not battles, are the lodestar for Stahel's interpretation. The Nazi war machine in 1941 was formidable. However, Hitler and his generals lacked the strategic insights to win the war, and doomed Germany to a slow, painful descent into defeat and ruin.

[Aleksander · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is apparently an attempt to answer a very specific question: "How could Nazi Germany's invasion of Russia have been doomed already in the fall of 1941, when the Battle of Kiev was such a great success?" I've never pondered this question before, but it seems the author decided to write this book because of reactions to a previous work, where he argued that Hitler's invasion was essentially doomed to fail once the quick advance of Operation Barbarossa gradually turned into a prolonged war of attrition. I have the feeling that his stance is a little controversial, or at least a little more extreme than the mainstream view, but he argues convincingly.

The author covers more than just the Battle of Kiev (which, without a lot of background knowledge of mobile warfare and East-European geography is surprisingly boring), and explains the launch of Operation Barbarossa, the rapid advance, and the subsequent push towards Leningrad and Stalingrad. There is a consistent emphasis on supply lines and production capacity, which were apparently never good enough to sustain a prolonged war far into Russian territory. This sometimes gets a little dull, but the author did drive the point successfully through.

I found the writing style slightly annoying. Possibly because of the ultimately very narrow scope of the book (see the opening question), every other sentence starts with "indeed", "and yet", "however", and so on. In other words, the author is constantly trying to disprove something: "Yes, the Germans were seemingly doing well; however, the situation was untenable, because of the following production statistics..." This style prevents the narrative from flowing naturally. Rather than being captured by a developing story, I was constantly waiting for the next "...and yet!".

Ultimately, my main takeaway from this book was that the Russian theater was indeed the most important part of World War II. I've seen this claimed many times, but I never really understood it intuitively until now. The scope of the war, the size of the territory fought over, the quantity of equipment, the number of men involved, the lives lost... everything else just dwarfs in comparison. While the Allied invasion of Western Europe was indeed important for the future of Western Europe, it was still just a minor skirmish in comparison to Germany's war in Russia.

(The reason I bought this book was because of the current war in Ukraine. I did learn a little about Ukraininan geography, but otherwise the Soviet side is basically presented as one huge blob, which just happened to be fighting in 1941 in what is now Ukraine. It didn't really add much to my understanding of Ukraine.)

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Generally, it is accepted that the German army started off strongly during Operation Barbarossa and despite the setbacks at Moscow, did not really come undone until the great Soviet victory at Stalingrad in 1942-3.

However, as David Stahel convincingly shows (both in this volume and his previous one, which is already on my to-read list!), the Germans had lost the war on the Eastern Front the day they invaded Russia. The crux of Stahel's argument is that the Germans, even on planning for a short, sharp victory, completely failed to plan accordingly: poor logistics, poor planning, poor leadership, poor production on the homefront.

The Battle of Kiev, despite being a stunning victory for Hitler, merely prolonged the assualt on Moscow. He refused to listen to his generals' advice and although victorious, this would cement Hitler's faith in his own abilities causing greater problems later in the war. Stalin also did not listen to his generals - he lost Kiev and three armies. He would learn to trust his generals and gave them greater freedom during the latter years of the war, leading, ultimately, to victory in Berlin.

Stahel has written a engrossing and detailed account of the Battle of Kiev and the build-up to Operation Typhoon (covered in a later volume of his), with extraordinary attention to primary sources from German archives. His investigations and arguments will certainly help research on the Eastern Front and, above all, reinforce the importance of a well-supplied army, especially in Russia.

[Jason Whittle · Rating 3 out of 5]

The overall message of this book shows the difficult time the German army had in the two months after the opening fortnight of Operation Barbarossa and before the encirclement of Kiev. It shows how the supply problems; wearing down of troops and equipment; as well as rapid recovery of Russian counteroffensive abilities put enormous pressure on the invaders prior to the Kiev push. The reader sees clearly how, not only was Operation Typhoon thus doomed to failure, but that the invasion of Russia's ultimate failure was already written in the month of August 1941, if not on the planning tables of the Reich in the Spring before it started.

Not withstanding this, resources and perspective, are overwhelmingly from the German side and there is a great deal of repetition. The breakdown of these campaigns into smaller chunks allows the kernels of knowledge to be revealed, but the story remains half told and thus there are the usual possibilities that the wrong conclusions can be reached.

[Kate · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really appreciate Stahel's in-depth interrogation of the myths of the German offensives of 1941. Far too much of the prevailing public image of the campaign still rests upon the postwar ass-covering of the German generals - their outsized strategic ambitions accompanied by complete disregard for logistics show how thoroughly the fascist worldview had been absorbed at all levels of the military (as does, yknow, all of the war crimes they committed along the way). Stalin's equally myopic approach to the fighting (refusing against prolonged warning of the need to abandon Kyiv) was the only thing that allowed this pipe dream of an offensive to turn into a notable Germany victory (at far greater cost to the Wehrmacht than is ever acknowledged).

[FellowBibliophile KvK · Rating 5 out of 5]

The only two books anyone really needs to read about the Second World War this one and Stuart Goldman's Nomonhan .

Professor Stahel points out that , in 1941--despite the invasion and loss of land--the USSR still produced more than did Germany. Moreover, he points out that, as soon as he recovered from the shock of the news, Stalin set up the GKO to centralise production, whereas Hitler never had anything like the GKO to coordinate his industry, which was vulnerable to air attack while Stalin moved the bulk of his industry safe out of range behind the Urals within two weeks. .

In other words, Germany had lost the war by September 1941, not at Stalingrad, not at Kursk.

[Miguel Ángel Moreno · Rating 4 out of 5]

Un libro interesante porque muestra una nueva visión del Frente Oriental. Expone que ya en verano de 1941 los problemas logísticos (combustible, piezas de repuesto) y la inferioridad en producción y población de Alemania hacían imposible su victoria final, por más que fueran maestros en la guerra operacional. Las victorias iniciales son más deficiencias del Ejército Rojo y Stalin que superioridad alemana. El libro también menciona el genocidio de la población rusa y la responsabilidad no sólo de la cúpula nazi sino de todo el ejército alemán. En general el libro es ameno, pero para defender su tesis aporta muchos datos e información, y esto hace que por momentos resulte pesado.

[Zac Stojcevski · Rating 5 out of 5]

Won (?) the battle, lost (?) the war? An unglorified analysis of the precursors and results of this clash of forces and military leaders sabotaged by egos of politicians and ineptitude and fear from the military leadership which resulted in innumerable deaths and unfathomable devastation.

The author does an amazing job of analyses ranging from the broader cultural and political environment, down to oil consumption of trucks in the field! Just wow!

War is inglorious and I needed to read this in segments as the vicarious trauma and waste of life was palpable and adhering. Rarely are war books so equanimous.

[Derick Anderson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Maybe a bit technical for the casual reader, however this book does an amazing job at revealing the German misgivings during Barbarossa. The vast and unrelenting Russian landscape and the Red Army’s willingness to face certain death or capture thwarted the progress of the Panzer groups and the idea of “blitzkrieg”. It is revealed how the utterly inadequate German logistical system and the lack of cohesion amongst Hitler and the high command lead to a strategic crisis within the first six weeks of the campaign, ultimately dooming any prospects for victory.

[Mick Pletcher · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book was awesome. It went into in-depth detail on just how determined Russia was, no matter the losses, to beat Hitler. With casualties of 5:1 and more than 5,000,000 in just the Battle of Kiev, it gives you the idea of just how stubborn they were and the Germans learned that early on. This book is long but worth the read!

[Iida · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting, but not as good as the first one (Operation Barbarossa). Repetition of facts from the first book became slightly annoying. Still absolutely worth the read if you're interested in the subject, in-depth analysis continues.

Also, I don't like that the footnotes (in this edition) are at the back of the book and not at the bottom of the page.

[Rudy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Military history, perhaps somewhat too much so. Forms a narrative arc with Stahel's Barbarossa and Typhoon, and much of the book is dedicated to the period before and after the battle of Kiev itself. Makes the argument that the Ostheer was already in terminal decline by autumn 1941, although reads more of an argument on effect rather than cause.

[Valkyrie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hard to focus on this on apparently but I enjoyed it.

[Lyle Lawson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well written and historically accurate.

[Ulysese]

Highly recommended for all readers.