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Armor and Blood: The Battle of Kursk: The Turning Point of World War II
One of America’s most distinguished military historians offers the definitive account of the greatest tank battle of World War II—an epic clash of machines and men that matched the indomitable will of the Soviet Red Army against the awesome might of the Nazi Wehrmacht. While the Battle of Kursk has long captivated World War II aficionados, it has been unjustly overlooked by historians. Drawing on the masses of new information made available by the opening of the Russian military archives, Dennis Showalter at last corrects that error. This battle was the critical turning point on World War II’s Eastern Front. In the aftermath of the Red Army’s brutal repulse of the Germans at Stalingrad, the stakes could not have been higher. More than three million men and eight thousand tanks met in the heart of the Soviet Union, some four hundred miles south of Moscow, in an encounter that both sides knew would reshape the war. The adversaries were at the peak of their respective powers. On both sides, the generals and the dictators they served were in agreement on where, why, and how to fight. The result was a furious death grapple between two of history’s most formidable fighting forces—a battle that might possibly have been the greatest of all time. In Armor and Blood, Showalter re-creates every aspect of this dramatic struggle. He offers expert perspective on strategy and tactics at the highest levels, from the halls of power in Moscow and Berlin to the battlefield command posts on both sides. But it is the author’s exploration of the human dimension of armored combat that truly distinguishes this book. In the classic tradition of John Keegan’s The Face of Battle, Showalter’s narrative crackles with insight into the unique dynamics of tank warfare—its effect on men’s minds as well as their bodies. Scrupulously researched, exhaustively documented, and vividly illustrated, this book is a chilling testament to man’s ability to build and to destroy. When the dust settled, the field at Kursk was nothing more than a wasteland of steel carcasses, dead soldiers, and smoking debris. The Soviet victory ended German hopes of restoring their position on the Eastern Front, and put the Red Army on the road to Berlin. Armor and Blood presents readers with what will likely be the authoritative study of Kursk for decades to come.Advance praise for Armor and Blood “The size and the brutality of the vast tank battle at Kursk appalls, this struggle that gives an especially dark meaning to that shopworn phrase ‘last full measure.’ Prepare yourself for a wild and feverish ride over the steppes of Russia. You can have no better guide than Dennis E. Showalter, who speaks with an authority equaled by few military historians.”—Robert Cowley, founding editor of The Quarterly Journal of Military History “A fresh, skillful, and complete synthesis of recent revelations about this famous battle . . . As a myth buster, Armor and Blood is a must-read for those interested in general and military history.”—David M. Glantz, editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies“Refreshingly crisp, pointed prose . . . Throughout, [Showalter] demonstrates his adeptness at interweaving discussions of big-picture strategy with interesting revelations and anecdotes. . . .
439 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2013
132 people are currently reading
593 people want to read
About the author
Dennis E. Showalter
41 books28 followersA specialist in German military history, Dennis E. Showalter was professor emeritus of history at Colorado College. He was president of the American Society for Military History from 1997 to 2001 and an advising fellow of the Barsanti Military History Center at the University of North Texas.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 93 reviews
March 26, 2021
Winston Churchill described the battle Kursk as" heralding the downfall of the German Army on the Eastern Front". When we read of the battles in Russia. Stalingrad usually is the first major battle that comes to mind but the battle of Kursk was the watershed.
Although the Russian and German armies were not what they were during Barbarossa, their meeting at Kursk had given the powers that be the opportunity and time to understand the nature of the proposed encounter and prepare for it in their own way. The author called it "a dueling ground" as errors could not be compensated for by changing the parameters in the restricted size of the battleground. It became a matter of who could last the longest and it soon became obvious that the Germans could not hold since Stalin was willing to pay the price of taking it or breaking it.. Germany's war became defensive rather than offensive and the die was cast. To quote the author....War takes two basic forms......matching of superiorities and inferiorities at decisive moments. The other is a test of strengths and wills, a crisis of attrition.
The author provides complete details and analysis of the battle and the decisions made by both sides. It is not a fast read but is a fascinating book which I would recommend to all those interested in the Russian front
Although the Russian and German armies were not what they were during Barbarossa, their meeting at Kursk had given the powers that be the opportunity and time to understand the nature of the proposed encounter and prepare for it in their own way. The author called it "a dueling ground" as errors could not be compensated for by changing the parameters in the restricted size of the battleground. It became a matter of who could last the longest and it soon became obvious that the Germans could not hold since Stalin was willing to pay the price of taking it or breaking it.. Germany's war became defensive rather than offensive and the die was cast. To quote the author....War takes two basic forms......matching of superiorities and inferiorities at decisive moments. The other is a test of strengths and wills, a crisis of attrition.
The author provides complete details and analysis of the battle and the decisions made by both sides. It is not a fast read but is a fascinating book which I would recommend to all those interested in the Russian front
June 5, 2021
Detailed account of all the dogged fighting that went on during the offensive. Germany's traditional strenghts such as dispersion, mobility and flexibility all were denied and the Soviet gunners would make them pay. Militarily, the strength of the Russian defensive system meant the German offensive had to depend on mass and momentum—which resulted in a battle of attrition, the one type of combat the German way of war was structured to avoid and could not be sustained.
For the Red Army, Kursk was one of its bloodiest and least sophisticated battles, one that drew in corps and armies originally part of Stavka’s grand offensive design and arguably set back the projected Russian victory for a year. Whether as a function of the Soviet system, of Stalin’s ruthless culling of the senior officer corps in the years of defeat, or of German tactical and operational skill, Kursk showed what the Red Army would become—not what it was.
For me the eye for detail actually got me lost sometimes - after reading another German SS-unit storming yet another hill, only to be repulsed hours later was a bit too much for me. Or reading about the creation of yet an another salient needing protection. But for the WWII geek, who has read multiple books already, this might offer a good insight and a good supplement to his literature.
For the Red Army, Kursk was one of its bloodiest and least sophisticated battles, one that drew in corps and armies originally part of Stavka’s grand offensive design and arguably set back the projected Russian victory for a year. Whether as a function of the Soviet system, of Stalin’s ruthless culling of the senior officer corps in the years of defeat, or of German tactical and operational skill, Kursk showed what the Red Army would become—not what it was.
For me the eye for detail actually got me lost sometimes - after reading another German SS-unit storming yet another hill, only to be repulsed hours later was a bit too much for me. Or reading about the creation of yet an another salient needing protection. But for the WWII geek, who has read multiple books already, this might offer a good insight and a good supplement to his literature.
May 4, 2014
Could have been quite good, but a lack of reference maps severely restricts the enjoyment. He talks about Russian sites as if everyone knows them. The book goes into impressive detail on units and capabilities, but there is always a balance between amount of detail and enjoyable reading. This book has a bit too much detail and, in combination with the lack of maps, it makes reading laborious.
I learned a lot I didn't know, but was not sorry when the book was over.
I learned a lot I didn't know, but was not sorry when the book was over.
November 12, 2017
A detailed look at the series of battles played out on the Eastern Front in July of 1943 between Germany and the Soviet Union. The author does a fine job explaining how both sides fought the battles, and how politics influenced some of the decisions made. He also points out that the landings in the Mediterranean resulted in a naval pincer (Britain/U.S.) and a land pincer (USSR) against Germany at this crucial time. The well-known battle of Provkhorovka is not as extensively covered as in some books, but you still get some feeling for the horrific battle it was.
54,000 Germans killed, missing or wounded while the Russians lost a staggering 320,000 at Kursk. Both sides paid a price, but for the Germans, it was not one they could continue to pay.
54,000 Germans killed, missing or wounded while the Russians lost a staggering 320,000 at Kursk. Both sides paid a price, but for the Germans, it was not one they could continue to pay.
July 15, 2023
Wow. I may not like the fact that Showalter seems to disdain footnotes and showing his sources, even so I have to say that this is a very impressive look at a battle that may be one of the most written about on the Eastern Front of the war. Often times when reading histories of battles they tend to lean to one side or the other in the outlook. This is not that surprising considering that often times there is limited information pertaining to one side of the battle as opposed to the other. This book does a great (if not perfect) job of showing a great balance in what it puts forward in regards to the actions of the battle and the outcome. It is interesting that in the end he points out that both views of the battle were wrong. The Germans he concludes had no chance of turning the battle into a victory. The lack of an in depth push in the North and the inability of the Southern arm of the battle to be able to push any deeper than the Prokorova line made victory an impossibility. He also points out that Manistien's favored backhand response to Russian penetrations was also losing much of it's ability to recover situations due to a lack of ability on the German side to control the battle and an increase of ability on the side of the Russians to protect against such an action.
On the other side he points out that while the Russians were getting better they still hadn't reach the point where they were able to allow lower unit commanders, even up to the level of Army and Army Group command, to improvise on the fly the way the Germans excelled at. Thus meaning that while the battle of Kursk was an overall victory for the Russians it wasn't nearly the overwhelming victory as portrayed in Russian views of the battle. In short the Russians were learning but they weren't quite there yet.
All in all this is a great addition to any other works you have read on the Battle of Kursk.
On the other side he points out that while the Russians were getting better they still hadn't reach the point where they were able to allow lower unit commanders, even up to the level of Army and Army Group command, to improvise on the fly the way the Germans excelled at. Thus meaning that while the battle of Kursk was an overall victory for the Russians it wasn't nearly the overwhelming victory as portrayed in Russian views of the battle. In short the Russians were learning but they weren't quite there yet.
All in all this is a great addition to any other works you have read on the Battle of Kursk.
August 19, 2016
Both sides of the battle are given equal attention and the story relates clearly how they affect eachother mutually. The writing is clear, sometimes even playful, with the confidence of a man who has read up on his subject in French and German...
The German plan to eliminate the salient seems straightforward, but was in reality a pre-emptive strike. Unfortunately, it desintegrated into a series of miniature salients that were never secure. Showalter wisely employs the metaphor of fingers that don't close into a fist.
The Soviet plan seems a logic response, but was originally envisaged as the first strike of a series of concerted offensives along the whole of the Eastern Front. Stalin & Stavka were not won over immediately to the idea of a defensive posture and throughout the battle the spirit of the counteroffensive weighed heavily upon Soviet tactics.
There is a fair amount of demythologizing, most notably concerning the armour joust at Prokhorovka. The nomination for Kursk as a turning point of WWII is argued through the comparison of each belligerent's learning curve, which shows again that Dennis Showalter benefits from the work of David Glantz. What stands out also is the analysis of the air war, particularly important for the German side since tactical air power had to make up for artillery shortages.
The maps would've been easier to follow by adding a series of consecutive overviews of the Kursk theater at a uniform scale.
Overall, clean n' lean. A perfect answer to my guiding question "If I buy 1 up-to-date piece of scholarship on..."
The German plan to eliminate the salient seems straightforward, but was in reality a pre-emptive strike. Unfortunately, it desintegrated into a series of miniature salients that were never secure. Showalter wisely employs the metaphor of fingers that don't close into a fist.
The Soviet plan seems a logic response, but was originally envisaged as the first strike of a series of concerted offensives along the whole of the Eastern Front. Stalin & Stavka were not won over immediately to the idea of a defensive posture and throughout the battle the spirit of the counteroffensive weighed heavily upon Soviet tactics.
There is a fair amount of demythologizing, most notably concerning the armour joust at Prokhorovka. The nomination for Kursk as a turning point of WWII is argued through the comparison of each belligerent's learning curve, which shows again that Dennis Showalter benefits from the work of David Glantz. What stands out also is the analysis of the air war, particularly important for the German side since tactical air power had to make up for artillery shortages.
The maps would've been easier to follow by adding a series of consecutive overviews of the Kursk theater at a uniform scale.
Overall, clean n' lean. A perfect answer to my guiding question "If I buy 1 up-to-date piece of scholarship on..."
June 19, 2021
A ten hour unabridged audiobook.
I think any objective student of history will tell you that ww2 in Europe was mainly fought, and won, on the Eastern front. The masses of troops and equipment expended there by the Soviets and Nazis makes all other fronts pale in comparison. It's about time I get an in depth look at the Kursk, rather than a few pages broadly devoted to it.
One of the interesting tidbits were how quickly the Germans could repair their damaged tanks, in some instances the same tank, having already been taken out of action three times in one day, was back in the fight after being quickly repaired a fourth time. This quick resurrection of damaged tanks under those conditions was an impressive feat.
Perhaps the most interesting part is how mythical the battle has become. It surely was a brutal slugfest, but the German offensive (Operation Citadel) only sustained about 50,000 casualties on their side. That surprised me considering the Russians suffered thrice as many whilst on the defensive in prepared positions and successive lines of defense.
The Russian counter offensive was much bloodier for both sides, but the vast majority of the book focuses on the German offensive portion. I liked the book.
I think any objective student of history will tell you that ww2 in Europe was mainly fought, and won, on the Eastern front. The masses of troops and equipment expended there by the Soviets and Nazis makes all other fronts pale in comparison. It's about time I get an in depth look at the Kursk, rather than a few pages broadly devoted to it.
One of the interesting tidbits were how quickly the Germans could repair their damaged tanks, in some instances the same tank, having already been taken out of action three times in one day, was back in the fight after being quickly repaired a fourth time. This quick resurrection of damaged tanks under those conditions was an impressive feat.
Perhaps the most interesting part is how mythical the battle has become. It surely was a brutal slugfest, but the German offensive (Operation Citadel) only sustained about 50,000 casualties on their side. That surprised me considering the Russians suffered thrice as many whilst on the defensive in prepared positions and successive lines of defense.
The Russian counter offensive was much bloodier for both sides, but the vast majority of the book focuses on the German offensive portion. I liked the book.
July 23, 2014
using the current state of the art research after the opening of Soviet archives and showing clearly why Kursk was the final turning point of the war in the East (Moscow showed that USSR would not be beaten in a blitzkrieg, Stalingrad stopped the possible collapse of the state if it would have lost the rich South, while Kursk established the material domination of the Red Army as decisive)
very gripping and absorbing and a must for anyone interested in WW II
very gripping and absorbing and a must for anyone interested in WW II
October 2, 2018
The event that signaled the end for the German war machine's offensive capability of WW2, after being halted and then turned around at Stalingrad. Impossible to imagine the scale of the destruction.
October 21, 2019
This review is for the audiobook. The non-chronological style of the book does not lend itself well to audio, since it's virtually impossible to follow who is doing what, and where. There's nothing wrong with the performance, it's fine, and this also isn't the author's fault, since includes maps with an audiobook isn't currently possible.
As for the content, it's clear, well defined and otherwise easy to follow. That's why I gave it four stars. Showalter is an accomplished historian and shows it here.
As for the content, it's clear, well defined and otherwise easy to follow. That's why I gave it four stars. Showalter is an accomplished historian and shows it here.
April 3, 2023
The Wehrmacht Myth grew up in the postwar period. It was crafted by both the Anglophone nations and former German generals to ease German rearmament after 1945. The myth separated the so-called “Good” Germans who were allegedly blameless for the crimes of the Third Reich and who nobly fought the Soviet hordes while outnumbered, and undersupplied. However, to illustrate just how cynical a view this was postwar historians didn’t stop with the Wehrmacht. Pretty soon the Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, and even Waffen-SS were roped in. The list of “bad” Germans became a truncated list of Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels, and Mengele. Adolf Eichmann was quickly defanged by Hannah Arendt to being just a dopey ‘yes-man.’ An American company even offers tours retracing Joachim Peiper’s route during the Ardennes Offensive (I asked if the site of the Malmedy Massacre would figure in to no response). It’s pretty apparent however, even without a thorough investigation that the “Good-German” was scarce. Sophie Scholl and The White Rose group would qualify. Oskar Schindler would be another. But, to quote, Hans Landa “I digress.” The points I am trying to make are that historians both then, and now should know better. That “Nazi” is not a synonym for Hitler alone, and that most importantly, once you become aware of the Wehrmacht Myth- you can’t unsee it.
I do not believe that Dennis Showalter is sympathetic to Nazi Germany- but he does them favors in this book whether intentionally or not. In simple organization ALL of the contained photographs are German-centric. The closest any of them get to depicting any images of the Soviet side of the battle is one picture captioned “Tiger on target!” where a Tiger tank has presumably just destroyed a Soviet vehicle, and the picture directly underneath which shows a German wagon team captioned “It was a horse powered war for both armies on the Eastern Front.” There are otherwise no pictures of anything related to the Soviet side. There are not even pictures of the Soviet commanders which is bizarre considering that there’s no shortage of pictures of Georgy Zhukov or Konstantin Rokossovsky. An examination of the principle sources of the book list far fewer sources on the Soviet generals, or even Soviet histories. The maps within are few and not entirely helpful. The author uses variants of the phrase “It was no bagatelle” enough in short order to make me roll my eyes. The anecdotes decidedly favor the German side and then there’s this passage which caused me to mutter ‘The fuck?’:
“It [a previously included anecdote] also evokes the part of the Waffen SS ethos that appealed, and continues to appeal, to males brought up in societies equating the progress of civilization with the elimination of challenge.” (122)
Typing it out now, I have to wonder who was the dumb son-of-a-bitch who thought that that sentence should get published?
Later on he compares Manstein’s dispute with Hitler as being comparable with the Truman-MacArthur confrontation during the Korean War which it was, decidedly not. Manstein’s career as a war criminal is also never mentioned.
I was not just disappointed with this book so much as disgusted. Again, I don’t believe that Showalter is sympathetic to the Nazis, but, he’s definitely got the whitewash handy.
I do not believe that Dennis Showalter is sympathetic to Nazi Germany- but he does them favors in this book whether intentionally or not. In simple organization ALL of the contained photographs are German-centric. The closest any of them get to depicting any images of the Soviet side of the battle is one picture captioned “Tiger on target!” where a Tiger tank has presumably just destroyed a Soviet vehicle, and the picture directly underneath which shows a German wagon team captioned “It was a horse powered war for both armies on the Eastern Front.” There are otherwise no pictures of anything related to the Soviet side. There are not even pictures of the Soviet commanders which is bizarre considering that there’s no shortage of pictures of Georgy Zhukov or Konstantin Rokossovsky. An examination of the principle sources of the book list far fewer sources on the Soviet generals, or even Soviet histories. The maps within are few and not entirely helpful. The author uses variants of the phrase “It was no bagatelle” enough in short order to make me roll my eyes. The anecdotes decidedly favor the German side and then there’s this passage which caused me to mutter ‘The fuck?’:
“It [a previously included anecdote] also evokes the part of the Waffen SS ethos that appealed, and continues to appeal, to males brought up in societies equating the progress of civilization with the elimination of challenge.” (122)
Typing it out now, I have to wonder who was the dumb son-of-a-bitch who thought that that sentence should get published?
Later on he compares Manstein’s dispute with Hitler as being comparable with the Truman-MacArthur confrontation during the Korean War which it was, decidedly not. Manstein’s career as a war criminal is also never mentioned.
I was not just disappointed with this book so much as disgusted. Again, I don’t believe that Showalter is sympathetic to the Nazis, but, he’s definitely got the whitewash handy.
September 3, 2017
This book is badly written. Not intrusively badly written, but more a realization as you go along, constantly having to go back, wondering where exactly in the timeline the event being described fits and so on, that this is written under the influence of something, perhaps an extra strong cough medicine.
A much larger sin for a historian, the author fails to question and contextualize the official narratives, particularly (or rather exclusively) when discussing the Nazis. At this point I think it's unforgivable for a writer discussing a WW2 battle to fail to acknowledge that the Nazis undercounted their tank losses by only counting tanks that could never be repaired as "lost" (as discussed in various books by Zaloga etc.) while the Soviets (and everyone else, really) counted pretty much everything that couldn't immediately be put back into action. I mean this has become common knowledge in specialist pop history - why would a historian ignore this? Is it intentional, perhaps in the pursuit of pushing a certain narrative?
Judge for yourself.
"Materially, the German army introduced a “platoon technology” that reshaped the battlefield. The MG-42, with its high cyclic rate of fire; the MP-43 and Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifles; and the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck portable antitank rockets lifted the German infantryman to a level the rest of the world’s foot soldiers would not reach for decades."
That's not even close to being true. USA and Britain fielded man-portable antitank weapons (bazooka, PIAT) before the Nazis ever did, the Soviets had belt-fed squad automatics by the end of the war and adopted an assault rifle soon after, the BREN light machine gun survived in British service into the 90's - which wouldn't have happened if the Nazi guns had been so far superior 50 years before that. The German infantry did have some advantages in some areas (neatly counterbalanced by other armies' advantages in other areas) which their opponents generally caught up on a few years after the end of the war - certainly not a general advantage, and very certainly not "decades" ahead.
A much larger sin for a historian, the author fails to question and contextualize the official narratives, particularly (or rather exclusively) when discussing the Nazis. At this point I think it's unforgivable for a writer discussing a WW2 battle to fail to acknowledge that the Nazis undercounted their tank losses by only counting tanks that could never be repaired as "lost" (as discussed in various books by Zaloga etc.) while the Soviets (and everyone else, really) counted pretty much everything that couldn't immediately be put back into action. I mean this has become common knowledge in specialist pop history - why would a historian ignore this? Is it intentional, perhaps in the pursuit of pushing a certain narrative?
Judge for yourself.
"Materially, the German army introduced a “platoon technology” that reshaped the battlefield. The MG-42, with its high cyclic rate of fire; the MP-43 and Sturmgewehr 44 assault rifles; and the Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck portable antitank rockets lifted the German infantryman to a level the rest of the world’s foot soldiers would not reach for decades."
That's not even close to being true. USA and Britain fielded man-portable antitank weapons (bazooka, PIAT) before the Nazis ever did, the Soviets had belt-fed squad automatics by the end of the war and adopted an assault rifle soon after, the BREN light machine gun survived in British service into the 90's - which wouldn't have happened if the Nazi guns had been so far superior 50 years before that. The German infantry did have some advantages in some areas (neatly counterbalanced by other armies' advantages in other areas) which their opponents generally caught up on a few years after the end of the war - certainly not a general advantage, and very certainly not "decades" ahead.
February 13, 2019
I wasn’t too familiar with the Battle of Kursk besides hearing about it being the biggest tank battle in history. This book was a great overview and gave views from Army, Corps, Division all the way down to battalion and company level. I’d like to read the Glantz book on Kursk, which the author mentions and references in this book. But overall a good read with a lot of information that wouldn’t be overwhelming to someone unfamiliar with military history.
December 20, 2018
A good operational review of the battle that gives a fair balanced account of the actions by both sides and at least a plausible reason why the actions were done.
August 28, 2019
I've read a few books on kursk, this is probably the best one, but that may not be saying much. It's a tough subject due to lack of resources and info. I think it's worth the read
January 8, 2017
A very solid, engaging, and informative history of the battle of Kursk. Showalter’s best work is in the beginning and the end of the book. He does great work in putting the battle into context, both before and after, and paints a strong picture of Kursk as the turning point in the East. The story is told at the Corps, Army, and Division levels, but Showalter does not neglect the experience of the individual soldiers, both behind the lines and in battle.
The core of the book covers the week of July 5-12. The detail of the cut-and-thrust between the armies (told mostly at the division and army level) is solid, and Showalter goes to great lengths to dissect the thoughts and plans of the opposing generals — not just what they did, but why. Where the book suffers a bit is in clarifying the context of what was admittedly a messy meatgrinder of a battle. Here Showalter is let down by the quality of the maps, which are quite poor. Maps are inconsistent at what units they show — sometimes omitting one sides’ units entirely — and are less than minimal at showing context, terrain, infrastructure, and fortification. While Showalter does great work to explain the difficulty and heroic effort in an advance or defense, the cartography is useless at putting this into a geographic context. That aside, the book is a great read — articulate, cogent, and entertaining.
The core of the book covers the week of July 5-12. The detail of the cut-and-thrust between the armies (told mostly at the division and army level) is solid, and Showalter goes to great lengths to dissect the thoughts and plans of the opposing generals — not just what they did, but why. Where the book suffers a bit is in clarifying the context of what was admittedly a messy meatgrinder of a battle. Here Showalter is let down by the quality of the maps, which are quite poor. Maps are inconsistent at what units they show — sometimes omitting one sides’ units entirely — and are less than minimal at showing context, terrain, infrastructure, and fortification. While Showalter does great work to explain the difficulty and heroic effort in an advance or defense, the cartography is useless at putting this into a geographic context. That aside, the book is a great read — articulate, cogent, and entertaining.
September 24, 2019
I picked this up on audible and I thought it might be a nice fill in for a pivotal battle for the eastern front in WW II. So I was surprised to find out that not only is the author a respected military historian but his outlook on the Germans in WW II was not one I had come across. The author Dennis Showalter takes a more of a big picture look at this battle that is drawn more from the cultural and political landscape of the Third Reich as well as the impact of the leaders on the military machine of the Wehrmacht. I think because of this outlook and the authors narrative skill the book was a gripping listen that had me riveted to the story. The battle itself is explained deftly with an emphasis on how the different generals in charge shaped there part of the battle both to the benefit and detriment of the Reich. This was such a good book that I am already considering a reread of it. I did not think someone would be able to write such a concise history of a complex battle while still adding depth and thought to the big picture of where this battle lays in the strategic outlook of WW II.
Pithy review - compelling narrative with brilliant history
Pithy review - compelling narrative with brilliant history
August 13, 2014
My first military historical book. Rather difficult at times but still very interesting. Understanding the sizes of army units is incredibly important, something for which I lacked enough knowledge. Either way it was good. Before I read my next selection I will certainly study unit sizes etc.
I thouroughly enjoyed the parts describing the head butting of the Commanders and the Fuhrer, Central command etc. Manstein, Model, Hoth, Vatutin, Rotmistrov etc are a fascinating figures! I believe the next book I will read will have to do more with their mentality and decision making as opposed to tactics.
One thing I wish more of was maps. Really who the hell knows where some of the obscure Russian cities are. Frame of reference for the casual reader is sorely needed.
I thouroughly enjoyed the parts describing the head butting of the Commanders and the Fuhrer, Central command etc. Manstein, Model, Hoth, Vatutin, Rotmistrov etc are a fascinating figures! I believe the next book I will read will have to do more with their mentality and decision making as opposed to tactics.
One thing I wish more of was maps. Really who the hell knows where some of the obscure Russian cities are. Frame of reference for the casual reader is sorely needed.
November 24, 2013
Professor Showalter's exciting and readable account of this pivotal battle on the Eastern Front is a fine addition to the corpus of work on Kursk. The text and the photos are somewhat German-centric, and the maps leave a lot to be desired, but the narrative gives the reader a real feel for the ebb and flow of the battle. Showalter is also assiduous at placing the campaign firmly in its strategic and historical context, as well as describing the strengths and weaknesses of the combatants. If you have an interest in the Second World War, this book is not to be missed.
November 5, 2014
Reading this book makes me realize how biased our education on World War II is. We have the mindset that D-Day happened and the war was won. We often forget it was the Russian army that really broke the back of the German army. An example is how the Battle of Kursk dwarfed many of the battles on the Western Front. An excellent book with terrific maps, my only complaint was with how quickly the author switched back and forth from units and his overuse of certain words like "bagatelle."
September 14, 2020
Sterile.
Too much of "army group X advanced against army group Y, finally breaking through by 5 PM". Tell us more, give us the view of the common soldier as well as that of the general: make us care. Interestingly, in those few sections where the author does stoop down from his operational-level overview down into the muck and mire of the soldier's everyday experience, his work really takes off and transforms into something fascinating, but such moments are too rare.
Too much of "army group X advanced against army group Y, finally breaking through by 5 PM". Tell us more, give us the view of the common soldier as well as that of the general: make us care. Interestingly, in those few sections where the author does stoop down from his operational-level overview down into the muck and mire of the soldier's everyday experience, his work really takes off and transforms into something fascinating, but such moments are too rare.
January 10, 2014
Very good book. Well written in a style that is surprisingly easy to read for a serious, detailed military history. The only failing is a lack of detailed maps. The majority of place-names and terrain features referenced in the text are not included on the few simple maps provided. Overall a pleasant, educational read.
April 25, 2018
Not very well written.... Reads a lot like the author would have liked a different outcome of that particular war. He is very unsympathetic with the Soviets, whom he brings out as laborious, clueless, hindered by bureaucracy and dictatorship, unimaginative, and outclassed time after time by the clever Nazis... One wonders how they won the war anyway.
February 7, 2017
Relative dearth of usefully detailed maps (exacerbated as always in a Kindle edition) is the only real blot on an otherwise excellent analysis of Kursk and the battles importance and impact on the rest of World War II.
March 15, 2018
One of the best histories on the battle of Kursk I've read so far. Very good overall account, that also addresses several of the myths surrounding this battle. A battle that Russia finally came into it's own as a fighting force, and when Germany lost the initiative in the East.
July 30, 2022
Esta bien escrito, pero me pareció excesivamente táctico.
Algunas partes me gustaron, especialmente al inicio, cuando exponía la situación socio-política de cada bando.
Pero cuando empezó con la descripción táctica metro a metro de la batalla me resulto insufrible.
Algunas partes me gustaron, especialmente al inicio, cuando exponía la situación socio-política de cada bando.
Pero cuando empezó con la descripción táctica metro a metro de la batalla me resulto insufrible.
January 14, 2014
An incise, well-detailed telling of the Battle of Kursk, the turning point of WWII.......with a lot of new info from soviet sources
December 27, 2018
An excellent Operational Look at the battle of Kursk that isn’t bogged down in minutiae.
February 20, 2021
Since I didn't know much about the Battle of Kursk, I did find this book to be useful, and I did learn a fair amount about the battle. However, from a writing style point of view, this book left a lot to be desired. I can't quite put my finger on it, but somehow the author manages to reduce one of the epic battles of World War II to something ..... kind of boring. Perhaps it's that he really gets down into the weeds with unit names and strengths and the names of Russian villages that no one ever heard of, but after awhile, all that detail just becomes numbing. Also, I never felt like I got a personal perspective of the battle - it just seemed like numbers and place names all jumbled up until I had a hart time keeping track of what was what. I understand the challenges of taking a battle of this size, spread out over 10 days, with a historical record on the Russian side that can be rather unreliable, while on the German side it can also be skewed, and writing something that is both comprehensive but also easy to grasp - not an easy task to pull off! So, I would only recommend this book if you really want to delve into the Battle of Kursk. If your interest is more casual, I think there are better books about this battle out there.
July 25, 2021
In Armor and Blood, Showalter re-creates every aspect of this dramatic struggle. He offers expert perspective on strategy and tactics at the highest levels, from the halls of power in Moscow and Berlin to the battlefield command posts on both sides. But it is the author’s exploration of the human dimension of armored combat that truly distinguishes this book. In the classic tradition of John Keegan’s The Face of Battle, Showalter’s narrative crackles with insight into the unique dynamics of tank warfare—its effect on men’s minds as well as their bodies. Scrupulously researched, exhaustively documented, and vividly illustrated, this book is a chilling testament to man’s ability to build and to destroy. The book itself is incredibly detailed, but to the point where it is hard to read. Although the lack of maps wasn't really like some how other people complaining, it was still mildly difficult to picture troop positions, groups, etc. Overall a solid book. Whether you're just bored or is interested in World War 2, this is the book.
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