When I picture a theistic evolutionist, I envision someone who defends/celebrates Darwinism, who is committed to methodological naturalism in science, and who of course views their religious faith as compatible with evolutionary science. The Runes of Evolution is the first Simon Conway Morris book I have read, and I have to say that this evolutionary biologist and Christian doesn’t quite fit my preconceived notions of a theistic evolutionist.
For instance, though he certainly accepts a darwinian account of evolution, and though his monumental study of evolutionary convergence certainly helps demonstrate the power of adaptationism, he doesn’t so much defend and celebrate Darwinism as take it for granted. In fact, he thinks that biology needs to advance beyond Darwinism, and that convergence helps point the way: “A central theme of this book is, of course, how evolution rediscovers the inevitable, thus hinting at lawlike features that confer predictability, a central goal for all scientists.” (p. 19) “Biological form transcends phylogeny,” argues the author, who also contends that “evolution is unlikely to be thwarted it its exploration of all potentialities, including as it happens even the emergence of intelligence.” (p.26) Intelligence is central to Conway Morris’s project of revising the study of biology. As he states: “For Darwin the mystery of mysteries was the origin of species, but for us it is the nature of mind.” (p.7)
Like Alfred Wallace, Conway Morris does not think that Darwinism provides a convincing account of mind. However, he thinks convergent evolution helps give us some clues regarding this topic. On the one hand, convergence indicates that the “differences that separate us from the cognitive competence of corvids, New World monkeys, and perhaps even octopus are paper thin.” (p.294) On the other hand, the distinction between humans and other animals represents in a very real sense a profound gulf. How does one account for our simultaneously being so close to yet so far from various other animals? Conway Morris speculates that “mind is not so much self-realized as brains increase in size and complexity but rather the brain serves as conduit. In this way it encounters the abstract realms of mathematics, music, and language, all of infinite potentiality. Such realms are familiar, but they also hint at the existence of orthogonal worlds.” (p.8) Does this view of human distinctiveness imply that the processes that account for human cognition are fundamentally different than those that account for animal cognition? Not at all. “That animal cognition has begun to tap these Platonic worlds is consistent with such a view, but there seems to be limits to their intellectual capacities.” (p. 295) In other words, mind does not naturalistically emerge but rather is discovered during the evolutionary process, with humans simply having experienced the fullest, richest access to the pre-existing Mind.
Unlike my preconceived notion of a theistic evolutionist, Conway Morris does not defend/valorize methodological naturalism in science. As I have indicated, he seeks to reform biological science by bringing together Darwin and Plato. Speaking of this prospect, Conway Morris says “There will be no ‘End of Science,’ indeed very much the reverse,” as new paths open up for exploration.
Despite the move beyond methodological naturalism, Conway Morris distances himself from the Intelligent Design movement, which he implies rejects evolution, and which he claims is perpetrating “theological mischief.” (I assume he means by this the notion of repeated acts of special creation.) What I find more interesting than Conway Morris’s take on the ID crowd is his criticism of the “ultra-Darwinists” on the other side of the isle. Unlike the standard theistic evolutionist complaint about “new atheists” like Richard Dawkins overstepping the bounds of methodological naturalism by using their valid evolutionary science as a weapon to make illegitimate metaphysical claims against theism, Conway Morris argues that the often unexamined metaphysical assumptions of many darwinists skew their scientific views. With Stephen J. Gould in mind, who famously denied that evolution was predictable and that re-running the tape of life would produce vastly different outcomes, Conway Morris says “if we choose to live in a world wedded to relativism, then there is little surprise if counterfactual evolutionary stories find a resonance. Correspondingly, if we can demonstrate a deep structure to evolution, unsurprisingly other metaphysics will be more fruitful.” (p.22) The staggering amount of evidence related to evolutionary convergence in this book is thus essential as part of an effort to prepare the ground for a rejection of the contemporary zeitgeist. Gould’s “worldview made no sense unless humans were utter flukes of circumstance,” so Conway Morris seeks to demonstrate how profoundly wrong Gould was concerning evolutionary unpredictability.
I am not in a position to properly evaluate many of the scientific arguments regarding convergence Conway Morris makes in the text. Perhaps he provides an overly deterministic version of adaptationism; certainly his reliance on inherency (which is supposed to help overcome the contingency of evolution by accounting for seemingly improbable transitions) leaves a lot of unanswered questions regarding processes and details; I do not know enough yet about deep homology to know for sure to what extent (if any) it weakens Conway Morris’s thesis; such thoughts come immediately to mind. I do intend to read some scholarly reactions to this book and Conway Morris’s responses to get a better grasp on convergent evolution.
Regarding his willingness to jettison methodological naturalism in science, a step that convergent evolution does not necessarily entail, I do not think Conway Morris is likely to make much headway, and I am not entirely sure it would be a good thing were he able to. For many theistic evolutionist types, and for philosophers like Antony Flew, methodological naturalism in science can be thought of as a protective doctrine in that it not only legitimates but also delimits science’s proper sphere of authority, thereby giving space for other forms of intellectual inquiry. De-valorizing the doctrine of methodological naturalism thus might as a practical matter serve the interests of the powerful contingent of aggressively anti-theistic scientists who do not care to scrupulously distinguish methodological naturalism from their philosophical naturalism in the first place.
On the other hand, when Conway Morris says through the mouth of a fictitious scientific friend Mortimer that “if anybody thinks mind is entirely material they are barking up the wrong tree” (p.10), I find this a very plausible point of view, yet it is one precluded from consideration by methodological naturalism. Only if we had strong reasons to believe philosophical naturalism true could one plausibly claim that a commitment to methodological naturalism in science had no distorting effects on some of science’s topics of inquiry. Conway Morris’s considered opinion that the study of mind from a naturalistic perspective seems to lead to intractable philosophical difficulties is thus a defensible reason for him to argue that we should move beyond methodological naturalism. In addition, it must be said that methodological naturalism is hardly functioning as a very effective protective doctrine. Theistic evolutionists who carefully distinguish their BioLogos worldview from scientific theory are granted no intellectual legitimacy by the Dawkins crowd, which proceeds as if evolution and theism were irreconcilable. That Richard Dawkins is a celebrated establishment figure who makes the assumption that science can pronounce judgment on God’s existence (or lack thereof), while Discovery Institute types are intellectually marginalized-often with theistic evolutionists being among the loudest critics-for basically affirming the same assumption, seems troubling. Yes, the theistic evolutionists criticize Dawkins as well as the Discovery Institute, but where are the prominent non-religious academic critics of Dawkins’s breach of methodological naturalism? Though some surely do exist, they hardly seem very effective or zealous. So, theistic evolutionists who think that by defending methodological naturalism they are promoting good science and sheltering religion from illegitimate attacks might conceivably be mistaken on both counts. In any case, it is not clear to me that Conway Morris’s move beyond methodological naturalism is definitely misguided.
Another potentially problematic aspect of Conway Morris’s argument concerns the origin of life, a topic he is reticent about. A mainstream scientific point of view (shared by typical theistic evolutionists) insists that life is ultimately reducible to chemistry and physics, and that though we currently have no good explanation for how life emerged, a naturalistic explanation exists and might even be discovered in time. A different perspective comes from the late philosopher Antony Flew, who remarked: “The philosophical question that has not been answered in origin-of-life studies is this: How can a universe of mindless matter produce beings with intrinsic ends, self-replication capabilities, and ‘coded chemistry’?” Flew’s self-styled “pilgrimage of reason” led him to the conclusion that this question never could be satisfactorily answered, and this was crucial for his turn to Intelligent Design in the form of deism. Conway Morris, like Flew, thinks “Life is much more than just a sort of souped-up chemistry and physics.” However, given his distaste for the ID movement, I cannot imagine that he would ever advocate for a Designer’s touch at the origin of life, even though this could be intellectually reconciled with darwinian evolutionary mechanisms. (In addition, his articulation of evolutionary convergence has been seen as an extension of the so called “fine tuning” argument into the realm of biology; as this alleged process unfolds my hunch is he would view the postulation of special intervention from God at the origin of life like a scratch in the middle of a symphonic record.) If Conway Morris does not reduce life to physics and chemistry, yet if he does not employ the notion of special creation, what generalizations might he make regarding the emergence of life? Even if evolution serves as a search engine for the discovery of Platonic worlds, does he propose that somehow it just naturalistically comes about that life emerged to evolve to find these worlds? Now, mainstream scientific thinking itself seems at this point to do no better than to say “somehow it just naturalistically comes about that life emerges. Details hopefully to follow.” However, because Conway Morris, unlike mainstream scientists, considers life to transcend physics and chemistry, in some sense he seems to have set himself an even bigger challenge with regards to explaining the origin of life than the one facing the mainstream scientists. Perhaps he will argue that some other process besides evolution allowed a pre-life world access into the faintest, outermost level of Platonic existence, thereby inaugurating life in its initial, simplest form? Who knows for sure, but I would definitely be interested in hearing Conway Morris elaborate on the topic of life’s origins, and more generally in having him produce a book that elaborates on and extends the positions he stakes out in The Runes of Evolution, which I find very distinctive and very interesting.