This book explores changes in Thomas Kuhn's thoughts about the progress of scientific development since he wrote The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962. It consists of three parts:
1. Reconceiving Scientific Revolutions
2. Comments and Replies
3. A discussion with Thomas S. Kuhn
Part 1 contains five essays. The first, What Are Scientific Revolutions, contrasts normal and revolutionary scientific development. One example of normal science given in this essay is Boyles law because it merely clarified the relationship between the pressure and volume of a gas at a constant temperature. Examples of revolutionary science were the shift from Aristotelian physics to Newton's second law of motion, the electrostatics of a battery and the origins of quantum theory. I particularly enjoyed Kuhn's explanation of the Aristotelian definition of motion. It was quite enlightening. The next three essays deal with linguistics and lexical theory and point out that a change in a scientific paradigm causes a corresponding change in the scientific lexicon such that new words are added, some words fall out of use and others experience a change in meaning. Although I find linguistics interesting, I nonetheless found these essays tedious reading. The fifth essay, The Trouble with the Historical Philosophy of Science, contrasts the historical record of science with the actual practice of science. The traditional pillars for the authority of scientific knowledge are the priority and independence of facts relative to theory and the production of truths, probable truths or approximations to truth by the practice of science. Kuhn points out that "solid" facts of observation can be pliable, often dependent on the observer or his choice of instrumentation. He also notes that individual scientists committed to one interpretation or another sometimes defend their viewpoint inappropriately and allow their beliefs to reign supreme over evidence. Although he acknowledges that such practices sometimes damage the credibility of science, he considers them necessary characteristics of any developmental or evolutionary process.
Part 2 contains six essays. The first, Reflections on My Critics, is a reply to seven essays critical to Kuhn's ideas outlined in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that were published together in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. The second essay, Theory Change as Structure Change: Comments on the Sneed Formalism, is a commentary on The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, by J.D. Sneed, that also compares it to The Structure and Dynamics of Theories, by Wofgang Stegmüller. The third essay, Metaphor in Science, This essay is a commentary on Richard Boyd’s essay “Metaphor and Theory Change: What is ‘Metaphor’ a Metaphor For?” The fourth essay, Rationality and Theory Choice, returns to the relationship of a theory to its lexicon, and the fifth essay, The Natural and the Human Sciences, contrasts and compares the natural sciences with the social sciences. The final essay, Afterwords, is a response to nine essays presented at a 1990 conference in honor of Kuhn and published together in World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, edited by Paul Horwich.
Part 3 is the transcript of a 1995 interview in Athens of Thomas Kuhn by interviewers Aristides Baltas, Kostas Gavroglu and Vassiliki Kindi. This interview revealed tidbits about Kuhn's family background, early education, university education during World War II and his academic career. Personally, I found this section to be one of the more interesting parts of the book.