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The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940
On 16 May 1940 an emergency meeting of the French High Command was called at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. The German army had broken through the French lines on the River Meuse at Sedan and elsewhere, only five days after launching their attack. Churchill, who had been telephoned by Prime Minister Reynaud the previous evening to be told that the French were beaten, rushed to Paris to meet the French leaders. The mood in the meeting was one of panic and despair; therewas talk of evacuating Paris. Churchill asked Gamelin, the French Commander in Chief, 'Where is the strategic reserve?' 'There is none,' replied Gamelin.This exciting book by Julian Jackson, a leading historian of twentieth-century France, charts the breathtakingly rapid events that led to the defeat and surrender of one of the greatest bastions of the Western Allies, and thus to a dramatic new phase of the Second World War. The search for scapegoats for the most humiliating military disaster in French history began almost at were miscalculations by military leaders to blame, or was this an indictment of an entire nation?Using eyewitness accounts, memoirs, and diaries, Julian Jackson recreates, in gripping detail, the intense atmosphere and dramatic events of these six weeks in 1940, unravelling the historical evidence to produce a fresh answer to the perennial question of whether the fall of France was inevitable.
292 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2003
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About the author
Julian T. Jackson
21 books90 followersOne of the leading authorities on twentieth-century France, Julian Timothy Jackson is Professor of History at Queen Mary, University of London. He was educated at the University of Cambridge where he obtained his doctorate in 1982, having been supervised by Professor Christopher Andrew. After many years spent at the University of Wales, Swansea, he joined Queen Mary History Department in 2003. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and of the Royal Historical Society.
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November 17, 2023
I have been interested in the Battle of France for over forty years, since I first read the history of that event in my military history class at West Point. After reading multiple books on the subject, including Marc Bloch's Strange Defeat, William Shirer's The Collapse of the Third Republic, Fieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend, and others, I felt I was moving closer to an understanding of how the Germans defeated the French Army so quickly, but none of the aforementioned books gave a comprehensive answer. Julian Jackson does. The Fall of France explains the somewhat mysterious collapse of the French Army in 1940 more completely and believably than any other account I have read. Julian Jackson uses his deep and broad knowledge of France in the 1930's and 1940's to provide an account that gets to the heart of the political, and most helpfully, the military failures that led to the debacle.
He starts with a detailed comparison of the tank, artillery, infantry, and air forces of the Allies and the Germans, and he goes into sufficient detail to explain how the French, though nominally equal to the Germans in tanks and other forces, were nonetheless severely handicapped by lack of radios, small fuel capacity for the tanks, and a complete lack of fighter aircraft to match the Germans' Bf-109's or even attack aircraft like the Stuka. France, like Britain, had been "seduced by the ideas of Italian theorist Giulio Douhet, who believed [in the value of] strategic bombing" and like Britain, France had wasted precious resources building bombers that contributed almost nothing to their defense in 1940. He discusses the lack of the Dewoitine d.520 which could have been a match for the German fighters, but was delayed in production, and he also discusses the lag in tactical doctrine development in the use of tanks to match what the Germans had pioneered; massed Panzer formations. Yet he concludes that while all of these things played a part, they were not the critical factor.
He then describes the planning of the Allies, and the deployment of forces. General Gamelin, the French Army chief, made a fateful gamble that the Germans would repeat the sweep through Belgium as in 1914, and he sent his best forces north to be ready to defend there, leaving his weakest forces in front of Sedan on the Meuse River. Even worse, Sedan was roughly the boundary between the 9th French Army and the 2nd Army, and since communications were bad to start with, communications between units of two different Army HQs was especially difficult. On top of all else, in order to reinforce the defense of the Belgian plain, Gamelin hollowed out his strategic reserve.
When the Germans attacked it was through the Ardennes, and Rommel and Guderian punched through the weak, mostly reservist units near Sedan. Even so, Gamelin might have crushed this breakthrough if he had had a real mobile strategic reserve, and / or if he had been a more forceful and energetic commander. But Guderian was bold to a fault, and once he had breached the French line, he drove toward the coast, and, in effect, dragged the rest of the German Army with him. Jackson makes the point that the Germans were very fortunate to have commanders like Guderian and Rommel at that particular spot in the German line, and if not for the combination of those dynamic commanders up against some of the weakest French divisions, the breakthrough might not have occurred. It is notable that no such breakthrough occurred elsewhere, and in general the French Army executed a hard-fought retreat to attempt to "straighten the line". The problem was that once the Germans did break out, the Belgian Army surrendered within days, the British Army headed for Dunkirk to be evacuated, and the best French forces (mostly the French First Army) were cut off from the rest of the Army because they were north of the German forces streaming toward the coast.
Jackson spends a good deal of time dispensing with oft-repeated myths about the collapse of the French Army. He makes the point that despite the incredible initial shock of the Panzer forces splitting the French Army at Sedan, the French forces retreated in good order and fought hard until Petain became head of state and declared he would seek an armistice. The idea that the French Army just melted away in the face of the German assault is just factually incorrect, and Jackson has plenty of detail to prove that. That said, there were many deficiencies in the French conduct of the war, such as generals whose command posts were well to the rear, terrible communications (almost no radios), and a tactical doctrine unsuited to the rapid conduct of maneuver warfare. Yet despite these defects, Jackson argues that France could have stabilized the line as they did in 1914, if there had been an effective strategic reserve, or if Gamelin had not committed so much of his force to the Belgian plain. For those who don't know, it is a rule of thumb in military planning that the attacker must outnumber the defender three to one to be successful. The Germans did not have that advantage overall, but they achieved it locally, as at Sedan.
There were many larger trends working against France, and perhaps the greatest of these was demographics. The population of Germany in 1940 was more than 50% greater than France's, and one of the reasons the French Army's units around Sedan were so poor is that France had to mobilize many older reservists to fill the ranks; most of the members of the divisions in the Sedan area had last done active military service in the early 1920's. Then there was the famous instability of French governments in the 1930's, which meant that priorities for armament procurement and military policy were continually shifting. When one looks at armament production, it appears that if France had had another six months to prepare, they would have had many more tanks, and overwhelmingly more fighter aircraft, but decisions made in 1938 and before meant that many of those weapons were not ready by May 1940.
Jackson looks at several what-if scenarios, and concludes it would have been entirely possible for Reynaud, the prime minister, to have relocated the government to French provinces in North Africa, and to have taken at least a part of the Army there as well. But Reynaud lost his nerve, and the move to Africa never happened. It is almost certainly true that the French Army could have defended the port of Marseille to allow transport of many divisions to Africa. The French Navy was the second largest in Europe and could easily have protected the sea-lanes. The government would have retained legitimacy and legal status in moving abroad to what was then a province of France, Algeria. But for this to have happened, Reynaud would have had to be much more ruthless and single-minded than he was. He would have had to fire General Weygand at the first episode of disobedience, and he would have needed to eject Petain from the government. Instead he folded, and Petain became head of state.
Jackson spends a good amount of time on the political side of things, and that was also interesting. French politics in the 1930's was as partisan and vicious as US politics is today, with reactionaries like Petain and Weygand pushing a social agenda that aligned with Hitler's.
The Fall of France is an excellent book and an engaging read. Highly recommended.
He starts with a detailed comparison of the tank, artillery, infantry, and air forces of the Allies and the Germans, and he goes into sufficient detail to explain how the French, though nominally equal to the Germans in tanks and other forces, were nonetheless severely handicapped by lack of radios, small fuel capacity for the tanks, and a complete lack of fighter aircraft to match the Germans' Bf-109's or even attack aircraft like the Stuka. France, like Britain, had been "seduced by the ideas of Italian theorist Giulio Douhet, who believed [in the value of] strategic bombing" and like Britain, France had wasted precious resources building bombers that contributed almost nothing to their defense in 1940. He discusses the lack of the Dewoitine d.520 which could have been a match for the German fighters, but was delayed in production, and he also discusses the lag in tactical doctrine development in the use of tanks to match what the Germans had pioneered; massed Panzer formations. Yet he concludes that while all of these things played a part, they were not the critical factor.
He then describes the planning of the Allies, and the deployment of forces. General Gamelin, the French Army chief, made a fateful gamble that the Germans would repeat the sweep through Belgium as in 1914, and he sent his best forces north to be ready to defend there, leaving his weakest forces in front of Sedan on the Meuse River. Even worse, Sedan was roughly the boundary between the 9th French Army and the 2nd Army, and since communications were bad to start with, communications between units of two different Army HQs was especially difficult. On top of all else, in order to reinforce the defense of the Belgian plain, Gamelin hollowed out his strategic reserve.
When the Germans attacked it was through the Ardennes, and Rommel and Guderian punched through the weak, mostly reservist units near Sedan. Even so, Gamelin might have crushed this breakthrough if he had had a real mobile strategic reserve, and / or if he had been a more forceful and energetic commander. But Guderian was bold to a fault, and once he had breached the French line, he drove toward the coast, and, in effect, dragged the rest of the German Army with him. Jackson makes the point that the Germans were very fortunate to have commanders like Guderian and Rommel at that particular spot in the German line, and if not for the combination of those dynamic commanders up against some of the weakest French divisions, the breakthrough might not have occurred. It is notable that no such breakthrough occurred elsewhere, and in general the French Army executed a hard-fought retreat to attempt to "straighten the line". The problem was that once the Germans did break out, the Belgian Army surrendered within days, the British Army headed for Dunkirk to be evacuated, and the best French forces (mostly the French First Army) were cut off from the rest of the Army because they were north of the German forces streaming toward the coast.
Jackson spends a good deal of time dispensing with oft-repeated myths about the collapse of the French Army. He makes the point that despite the incredible initial shock of the Panzer forces splitting the French Army at Sedan, the French forces retreated in good order and fought hard until Petain became head of state and declared he would seek an armistice. The idea that the French Army just melted away in the face of the German assault is just factually incorrect, and Jackson has plenty of detail to prove that. That said, there were many deficiencies in the French conduct of the war, such as generals whose command posts were well to the rear, terrible communications (almost no radios), and a tactical doctrine unsuited to the rapid conduct of maneuver warfare. Yet despite these defects, Jackson argues that France could have stabilized the line as they did in 1914, if there had been an effective strategic reserve, or if Gamelin had not committed so much of his force to the Belgian plain. For those who don't know, it is a rule of thumb in military planning that the attacker must outnumber the defender three to one to be successful. The Germans did not have that advantage overall, but they achieved it locally, as at Sedan.
There were many larger trends working against France, and perhaps the greatest of these was demographics. The population of Germany in 1940 was more than 50% greater than France's, and one of the reasons the French Army's units around Sedan were so poor is that France had to mobilize many older reservists to fill the ranks; most of the members of the divisions in the Sedan area had last done active military service in the early 1920's. Then there was the famous instability of French governments in the 1930's, which meant that priorities for armament procurement and military policy were continually shifting. When one looks at armament production, it appears that if France had had another six months to prepare, they would have had many more tanks, and overwhelmingly more fighter aircraft, but decisions made in 1938 and before meant that many of those weapons were not ready by May 1940.
Jackson looks at several what-if scenarios, and concludes it would have been entirely possible for Reynaud, the prime minister, to have relocated the government to French provinces in North Africa, and to have taken at least a part of the Army there as well. But Reynaud lost his nerve, and the move to Africa never happened. It is almost certainly true that the French Army could have defended the port of Marseille to allow transport of many divisions to Africa. The French Navy was the second largest in Europe and could easily have protected the sea-lanes. The government would have retained legitimacy and legal status in moving abroad to what was then a province of France, Algeria. But for this to have happened, Reynaud would have had to be much more ruthless and single-minded than he was. He would have had to fire General Weygand at the first episode of disobedience, and he would have needed to eject Petain from the government. Instead he folded, and Petain became head of state.
Jackson spends a good amount of time on the political side of things, and that was also interesting. French politics in the 1930's was as partisan and vicious as US politics is today, with reactionaries like Petain and Weygand pushing a social agenda that aligned with Hitler's.
The Fall of France is an excellent book and an engaging read. Highly recommended.
September 3, 2024
This is a serious narrative by a credible historian that seeks to answer the question: How did the French army lose in six weeks in 1940? Or, how did the German army win in six weeks? Rather than more catastrophic narratives that have seen the cause as French decadence, a split between the civilian government and the army, or a lack of will to fight, Jackson shows that the defeat was really the result of excellent German generalship and French mistakes from which they were unable to recover.
To make his point, Jackson writes about French politics of the 1930s, emphasizing that rearmament proceeded for the French much better than has commonly been thought. He recounts the problems of French alliance-making, particularly with the British, but also in Eastern Europe and with the Belgians. He looks at French public opinion. And he gets into some interesting counter-history, what-ifs, that show how much historians have read history backward about this event, creating teleologies that seemed plausible but cannot stand up to detailed analysis.
The main problem was that the French did not believe that the Germans were going to come through the Ardennes Forest. Had they known, they could have bombed the troops as they were crossing the forest. Also, facing the German onslaught the French had third-rate, poorly-armed troops, scattered, poorly led, and no reinforcements. A counterattack was never properly mounted for reasons of bad communication and the chaos of the retreat. And great German generalship by Guderian and Rommel took advantage of the French weakness even as they ignored their superiors telling them to slow down. By the time Churchill met with French leaders five days after the Germans broke though, they were in a state of panicked defeat because they knew there was no force in place to stop the Germans from taking Paris.
The reason I am giving this 3 stars is because it wasn’t as exciting as I wanted it to be. This was one of the most monumental events of the twentieth century. I wanted to book to pop, to sizzle. It didn’t. I give Jackson credit. When he was writing about the movements of the armies, he supplied maps that showed you the movements to make everything easier to understand. But still I felt deflated. This led to the invasion of Russia, to the making of a European war into a World War. It led to Gaulism. And so much more. The book is comprehensive but not epic. It could have been both.
To make his point, Jackson writes about French politics of the 1930s, emphasizing that rearmament proceeded for the French much better than has commonly been thought. He recounts the problems of French alliance-making, particularly with the British, but also in Eastern Europe and with the Belgians. He looks at French public opinion. And he gets into some interesting counter-history, what-ifs, that show how much historians have read history backward about this event, creating teleologies that seemed plausible but cannot stand up to detailed analysis.
The main problem was that the French did not believe that the Germans were going to come through the Ardennes Forest. Had they known, they could have bombed the troops as they were crossing the forest. Also, facing the German onslaught the French had third-rate, poorly-armed troops, scattered, poorly led, and no reinforcements. A counterattack was never properly mounted for reasons of bad communication and the chaos of the retreat. And great German generalship by Guderian and Rommel took advantage of the French weakness even as they ignored their superiors telling them to slow down. By the time Churchill met with French leaders five days after the Germans broke though, they were in a state of panicked defeat because they knew there was no force in place to stop the Germans from taking Paris.
The reason I am giving this 3 stars is because it wasn’t as exciting as I wanted it to be. This was one of the most monumental events of the twentieth century. I wanted to book to pop, to sizzle. It didn’t. I give Jackson credit. When he was writing about the movements of the armies, he supplied maps that showed you the movements to make everything easier to understand. But still I felt deflated. This led to the invasion of Russia, to the making of a European war into a World War. It led to Gaulism. And so much more. The book is comprehensive but not epic. It could have been both.
August 3, 2022
以前，國編版的歷史課本，講到二戰，雖然敘述不長，但肯定會著重描述法國在六週戰敗，然後順便宣揚一下國軍如何英勇撐過八年。這放到現代網路用語上，就某種程度的「辱法」吧。
但法國的失敗確實是這場大戰的一個重要的關鍵轉折。高盧人一倒下，整個歐洲幾乎都納入了納粹的魔爪之中，然後希特勒得以快速轉頭對付還沒做好戰備的蘇聯 (據說史達林聽聞法國投降，震驚之後破口大罵)；在亞洲，日本立刻侵占法國在越南的殖民地，並以此為跳板開始覬覦東南亞的資源，引發英、美、荷、澳的警戒與包圍，最後朝向太平洋戰爭。種種的蝴蝶效應，把戰火真正的擴大到世界範圍。
然而，關於法國戰敗的作品，在華語圈屈指可數。夏伊勒的《第三共和的淪陷》算是之前最拿的出手的代表作，但它廉頗老矣。貓頭鷹最近出了一本《維琪政府症候群》(2022) ，令人驚豔，不過它比較偏社會政治的討論。五南曾出過著名史家布洛赫的《奇怪的戰敗》，這本是他的親身體驗，感覺反而比較偏向是史料證言而非分析。至於簡體書市，著名的出版社指文的《紅色方案：法國的崩潰》以純軍事討論為主；最後就剩下這本由英國著名近代法國史研究者朱利安‧傑克遜(Julian Jackson)撰寫的《法蘭西的陷落》。
本書作者撰寫過《戴高樂傳》、《黑暗時代：1940-1945》等二十世紀法國史，而《法蘭西的陷落》則是幫助他贏得2001年沃爾夫森歷史獎的傑作。傑克遜在這本書中，用了並不算長的篇幅，精煉的描述了法蘭西第三共和是如何在贏得了大戰之後，又不到二十年內潰敗於強敵之手，並從軍事、外交、內政、社會狀態等多方面分析了其成因與結果，還有產生了什麼影響。個人在翻閱了數頁之後，便決定購買，然後，果然沒讓我失望。
開卷，作者寫到：「我們必須謹記，軍事史上那些流暢而簡單的敘述與混亂而複雜的戰爭現實是多麼不同。」
許多歷史初學者最容易犯下的錯誤，就是以後見之明推論。就像今日我們看待烏俄戰爭也是各種迷霧重重，但半個世紀後的人們，相信就能用較超然的眼光去面對。這種必然產生的時間差距，是放諸四海皆準的。之所以必須不斷強調這點，就是作者發現，在討論1940年法國的戰敗，這種後見之明的現象特別的多。
法軍只想死守馬其諾防線以拖待變？
法國人其實早也多少知道巴黎和會不過是個“短暫的休戰期”，為了防範與德國有可能再次發生的大戰，他們在最直接的邊境建構了號稱史上最強的馬奇諾要塞。然而，在1940年，它對於整個戰局確實毫無作用可言，然後被眾多史家詬病成鋪張浪費之物，也被指責是造成法軍戰敗的原因之一。
然而，這其實是個謬誤。法國國防部最早的作戰計畫是基於一戰的經驗，他們清楚知道德法邊境不會是主要戰場，於是盤算建構要塞以最少的兵力防守，然後把動態防禦的力量集中到北部的比利時。二零年代初期，巴黎跟布魯塞爾在軍事上合作，擬定了多種防禦計劃，法軍將打算在比利時境內跟德軍一決死戰，甚至積極反擊。然而這種盤算隨著進入三零年代的國際局勢變化--比利時人以為宣布中立就可以免受攻擊--而失效了，法國人必須匆忙地在北境重建陣地來面對挑戰。但尷尬的是，等到戰事一起，比利時人被捲入戰爭之後，又向法軍求救，結果甘莫林不得不匆忙又拾起舊計劃，此時已然為時晚矣。而在後人的研究看來，也顯得法軍毫無什麼長久盤算，其實，他們也有無奈之處。
至於沒有防範來自阿登山區的奇襲的指責，這個就又更加馬後炮了。要知道德軍原本的黃色方案，是差不多如同法軍所預料的作戰，要不是那個意外洩漏，讓曼斯坦因有機會秀自己的新計劃，德軍能打出什麼樣的戰果，實在難料。
但話說回來，作者也無意替法軍「洗白」，他們在全面的戰備上確實不如德軍。例如空軍，在飛機數量上處於劣勢；現地指揮上，甘莫林等高級將領還是老派的在後方，而德軍的將帥則常常都在第一線奔走，臨機應變，還有情報失準，更不要提最著名的裝甲戰術的運用上。很多地方，法軍還是輸的不冤枉的。
靠不住的盟友
大戰剛結束，法國人也曾嘗試從中歐建立同盟，反過來包圍德國，這個在二零年代早期也頗有成效。但在時間與局勢的變化中，成效逐漸淡化，特別是慕尼黑會議，捷克斯洛伐克被英法聯手出賣之後，法國人想在那邊找到盟友，已經是癡人說夢。
到頭來，似乎一路到底的盟友是英國佬。然而，倫敦卻也不是什麼可信賴的，至少不是百分百。說到底，他們還是以自己的利益為優先，常常對巴黎的呼籲置若罔聞，西班牙內戰、制裁義大利等等，要嘛不是不同調，不然就是法國一直被忽視到最後只好尷尬的屈從英國。甚至在最後時刻，達拉第希望力主取得蘇聯的友誼好在波蘭危機上能更發揮出力量，張伯倫等英國高層卻出於自己對莫斯科的偏見始終冷淡以對，結果德蘇互不侵犯條約簽訂之後，才來震驚與目瞪口呆。
至於戰爭期間，英法兩國的軍人互相歧視與對立就不多說了，更別提不被信任的比利時人了。後來英軍轟炸法國艦隊，更是一筆難以計算的糊塗帳。
寧要希特勒，不要布魯姆
法國第三共和後期給人最深的印象，莫過於他們的左右鬥爭嚴重，撕裂之深，到了難以彌合的地步。而這不但影響了政策的連貫性，甚至變得朝令夕改，不斷的浪費資源與時間。軍方與文人政府也彼此互不信任，這都在戰爭時產生了深遠的影響。
這是民主國家難免的弊病，它需要一點教訓來產生共識，在面對強敵與危機時，懂得放下成見來面對，否則就是共同走上不歸路。
高盧人只想投降不想打仗？
其實，經歷過一次世界大戰之後，幾個主要參戰國的人民都普遍厭戰的。即便是德國人，在開戰初期的反應也是讓希特勒覺得「朽木不可雕也」，非常的「失望」，一點都感受不到熱情。英、法兩國人民的反應也是可想而知。
但如果以此批判法國人毫無保家衛國的決心，又顯得有失公允了。事實上，德軍在整個作戰中，也是在許多戰線上遭遇到各種堅強的抵抗而損失慘重。作者舉出了幾個師團的作戰紀錄，論證了法軍英勇捍衛國土的經歷。
其實，真正消磨法國軍民士氣的，是一開始的假戰爭。漫長的時間動員起來，卻無所事事，作者翻了許多當時的相關紀錄，都發現了很多士兵一開始精神抖擻，到了前線卻發現沒有戰爭，除了偶爾無聊的演習之外就是打雜，很快就士氣全消，變的厭戰。而與此同時，德軍卻在波蘭戰場練出了一批精兵。
此外，法軍動員了不少後備役，卻沒能給予足夠的訓練，以至於在實戰中表現不佳，他們的潰敗，給了民眾的不佳的觀感，造成了恐慌，更拖累了專業部隊的士氣。
上面都是作者指出的法軍戰敗背後的潛在不利因素。他痛心的說，法軍不是不能打，而是沒有良好的指揮跟領導。
危機就是轉機？
其實，就結果論來說，法國的戰敗對某些人而言，或許是一種重整體制的機會。就像當年普法戰爭兵敗帶來了第三共和，儘管痛苦與黑暗，但記取了失敗的教訓而浴火重生，可以讓國家走出新路。戴高樂與戴高樂主義即是產生於這樣經驗中的產物。這位強人體認到了法國必須在國防與外交上更加獨立自主，不能再把國運賭在不可靠的外人手上，他重新打造出的新生體制到底該如何評價，還不好說。但在他死後，法國人也學會了面對自己已經承擔不起列強稱號，必須要重新尋找國際定位的現實，他們企圖從軟實力等方面來加強影響力，重拾另外一種輝煌與尊嚴。
作者說，他想駁斥的是一些關於1940年戰役的迷思，例如法國必然戰敗等等說法。但他認為這段過去究竟在法國史甚至歐陸史上留下什麼樣的影響，目前還不能過度下斷言。
至於我個人，則認為這段過去是個相當值得研究的教訓。我在第三共和戰敗的經驗中，看到許多現行台灣的弊病。法國人運氣好，還能在戰敗後翻身，有一位戴高樂領導他們走出去，但並不是每個民族都有這樣的機會的。
本書翻譯流暢，篇幅簡潔，敘事清晰，能夠得獎當之無愧，是本非常有教益的佳作。
但法國的失敗確實是這場大戰的一個重要的關鍵轉折。高盧人一倒下，整個歐洲幾乎都納入了納粹的魔爪之中，然後希特勒得以快速轉頭對付還沒做好戰備的蘇聯 (據說史達林聽聞法國投降，震驚之後破口大罵)；在亞洲，日本立刻侵占法國在越南的殖民地，並以此為跳板開始覬覦東南亞的資源，引發英、美、荷、澳的警戒與包圍，最後朝向太平洋戰爭。種種的蝴蝶效應，把戰火真正的擴大到世界範圍。
然而，關於法國戰敗的作品，在華語圈屈指可數。夏伊勒的《第三共和的淪陷》算是之前最拿的出手的代表作，但它廉頗老矣。貓頭鷹最近出了一本《維琪政府症候群》(2022) ，令人驚豔，不過它比較偏社會政治的討論。五南曾出過著名史家布洛赫的《奇怪的戰敗》，這本是他的親身體驗，感覺反而比較偏向是史料證言而非分析。至於簡體書市，著名的出版社指文的《紅色方案：法國的崩潰》以純軍事討論為主；最後就剩下這本由英國著名近代法國史研究者朱利安‧傑克遜(Julian Jackson)撰寫的《法蘭西的陷落》。
本書作者撰寫過《戴高樂傳》、《黑暗時代：1940-1945》等二十世紀法國史，而《法蘭西的陷落》則是幫助他贏得2001年沃爾夫森歷史獎的傑作。傑克遜在這本書中，用了並不算長的篇幅，精煉的描述了法蘭西第三共和是如何在贏得了大戰之後，又不到二十年內潰敗於強敵之手，並從軍事、外交、內政、社會狀態等多方面分析了其成因與結果，還有產生了什麼影響。個人在翻閱了數頁之後，便決定購買，然後，果然沒讓我失望。
開卷，作者寫到：「我們必須謹記，軍事史上那些流暢而簡單的敘述與混亂而複雜的戰爭現實是多麼不同。」
許多歷史初學者最容易犯下的錯誤，就是以後見之明推論。就像今日我們看待烏俄戰爭也是各種迷霧重重，但半個世紀後的人們，相信就能用較超然的眼光去面對。這種必然產生的時間差距，是放諸四海皆準的。之所以必須不斷強調這點，就是作者發現，在討論1940年法國的戰敗，這種後見之明的現象特別的多。
法軍只想死守馬其諾防線以拖待變？
法國人其實早也多少知道巴黎和會不過是個“短暫的休戰期”，為了防範與德國有可能再次發生的大戰，他們在最直接的邊境建構了號稱史上最強的馬奇諾要塞。然而，在1940年，它對於整個戰局確實毫無作用可言，然後被眾多史家詬病成鋪張浪費之物，也被指責是造成法軍戰敗的原因之一。
然而，這其實是個謬誤。法國國防部最早的作戰計畫是基於一戰的經驗，他們清楚知道德法邊境不會是主要戰場，於是盤算建構要塞以最少的兵力防守，然後把動態防禦的力量集中到北部的比利時。二零年代初期，巴黎跟布魯塞爾在軍事上合作，擬定了多種防禦計劃，法軍將打算在比利時境內跟德軍一決死戰，甚至積極反擊。然而這種盤算隨著進入三零年代的國際局勢變化--比利時人以為宣布中立就可以免受攻擊--而失效了，法國人必須匆忙地在北境重建陣地來面對挑戰。但尷尬的是，等到戰事一起，比利時人被捲入戰爭之後，又向法軍求救，結果甘莫林不得不匆忙又拾起舊計劃，此時已然為時晚矣。而在後人的研究看來，也顯得法軍毫無什麼長久盤算，其實，他們也有無奈之處。
至於沒有防範來自阿登山區的奇襲的指責，這個就又更加馬後炮了。要知道德軍原本的黃色方案，是差不多如同法軍所預料的作戰，要不是那個意外洩漏，讓曼斯坦因有機會秀自己的新計劃，德軍能打出什麼樣的戰果，實在難料。
但話說回來，作者也無意替法軍「洗白」，他們在全面的戰備上確實不如德軍。例如空軍，在飛機數量上處於劣勢；現地指揮上，甘莫林等高級將領還是老派的在後方，而德軍的將帥則常常都在第一線奔走，臨機應變，還有情報失準，更不要提最著名的裝甲戰術的運用上。很多地方，法軍還是輸的不冤枉的。
靠不住的盟友
大戰剛結束，法國人也曾嘗試從中歐建立同盟，反過來包圍德國，這個在二零年代早期也頗有成效。但在時間與局勢的變化中，成效逐漸淡化，特別是慕尼黑會議，捷克斯洛伐克被英法聯手出賣之後，法國人想在那邊找到盟友，已經是癡人說夢。
到頭來，似乎一路到底的盟友是英國佬。然而，倫敦卻也不是什麼可信賴的，至少不是百分百。說到底，他們還是以自己的利益為優先，常常對巴黎的呼籲置若罔聞，西班牙內戰、制裁義大利等等，要嘛不是不同調，不然就是法國一直被忽視到最後只好尷尬的屈從英國。甚至在最後時刻，達拉第希望力主取得蘇聯的友誼好在波蘭危機上能更發揮出力量，張伯倫等英國高層卻出於自己對莫斯科的偏見始終冷淡以對，結果德蘇互不侵犯條約簽訂之後，才來震驚與目瞪口呆。
至於戰爭期間，英法兩國的軍人互相歧視與對立就不多說了，更別提不被信任的比利時人了。後來英軍轟炸法國艦隊，更是一筆難以計算的糊塗帳。
寧要希特勒，不要布魯姆
法國第三共和後期給人最深的印象，莫過於他們的左右鬥爭嚴重，撕裂之深，到了難以彌合的地步。而這不但影響了政策的連貫性，甚至變得朝令夕改，不斷的浪費資源與時間。軍方與文人政府也彼此互不信任，這都在戰爭時產生了深遠的影響。
這是民主國家難免的弊病，它需要一點教訓來產生共識，在面對強敵與危機時，懂得放下成見來面對，否則就是共同走上不歸路。
高盧人只想投降不想打仗？
其實，經歷過一次世界大戰之後，幾個主要參戰國的人民都普遍厭戰的。即便是德國人，在開戰初期的反應也是讓希特勒覺得「朽木不可雕也」，非常的「失望」，一點都感受不到熱情。英、法兩國人民的反應也是可想而知。
但如果以此批判法國人毫無保家衛國的決心，又顯得有失公允了。事實上，德軍在整個作戰中，也是在許多戰線上遭遇到各種堅強的抵抗而損失慘重。作者舉出了幾個師團的作戰紀錄，論證了法軍英勇捍衛國土的經歷。
其實，真正消磨法國軍民士氣的，是一開始的假戰爭。漫長的時間動員起來，卻無所事事，作者翻了許多當時的相關紀錄，都發現了很多士兵一開始精神抖擻，到了前線卻發現沒有戰爭，除了偶爾無聊的演習之外就是打雜，很快就士氣全消，變的厭戰。而與此同時，德軍卻在波蘭戰場練出了一批精兵。
此外，法軍動員了不少後備役，卻沒能給予足夠的訓練，以至於在實戰中表現不佳，他們的潰敗，給了民眾的不佳的觀感，造成了恐慌，更拖累了專業部隊的士氣。
上面都是作者指出的法軍戰敗背後的潛在不利因素。他痛心的說，法軍不是不能打，而是沒有良好的指揮跟領導。
危機就是轉機？
其實，就結果論來說，法國的戰敗對某些人而言，或許是一種重整體制的機會。就像當年普法戰爭兵敗帶來了第三共和，儘管痛苦與黑暗，但記取了失敗的教訓而浴火重生，可以讓國家走出新路。戴高樂與戴高樂主義即是產生於這樣經驗中的產物。這位強人體認到了法國必須在國防與外交上更加獨立自主，不能再把國運賭在不可靠的外人手上，他重新打造出的新生體制到底該如何評價，還不好說。但在他死後，法國人也學會了面對自己已經承擔不起列強稱號，必須要重新尋找國際定位的現實，他們企圖從軟實力等方面來加強影響力，重拾另外一種輝煌與尊嚴。
作者說，他想駁斥的是一些關於1940年戰役的迷思，例如法國必然戰敗等等說法。但他認為這段過去究竟在法國史甚至歐陸史上留下什麼樣的影響，目前還不能過度下斷言。
至於我個人，則認為這段過去是個相當值得研究的教訓。我在第三共和戰敗的經驗中，看到許多現行台灣的弊病。法國人運氣好，還能在戰敗後翻身，有一位戴高樂領導他們走出去，但並不是每個民族都有這樣的機會的。
本書翻譯流暢，篇幅簡潔，敘事清晰，能夠得獎當之無愧，是本非常有教益的佳作。
April 2, 2013
I must admit that I struggled with the first 100 pages finding it very dense and dry but, recognizing that it was necessary ground to cover, I slogged through it. It got easier after that and by the last 100 pages, I could not get enough. I found it to be only as judgmental as was necessary in context and always balanced. This was a book I needed to read as I had serious questions after reading Antony Beevor’s “Second World War”. I especially liked the discussion of other books on the subject by other historians and I loved the follow-up through to Vichy and the deGaulle era.
August 20, 2020
After two reads, I can say that this is a mediocre effort. The narrative weaves back and forth in time; the first chapter, for example, covers the breakthrough at Sedan, while the second goes backwards to inter-war diplomacy, the Phoney War, and Norway. Meanwhile, Jackson attempts to put forth a fairly descriptive outline of events, without really coming to terms with the key question of why France failed.
This is the critical question in any book on this topic, although Jackson spends a lot of prose covering other topics, like the decision to surrender and a bottom-up chapter that looks at the war through the eyes of ordinary French citizens and soldiers. Jackson attempts an explanation to this question in the first chapter. He relies heavily on Robert A. Doughty's analysis in The Seeds of Disaster, which is good for the most part but wrong (I think) in its final conclusions. While France had tanks and may not have been fighting WWI in a strictly technical sense, it was in a way; it was aiming for a controlled battle that relied heavily on firepower and fortifications.
Jackson sums up this confusion in this paragraph, which I cite in full to save you the time and money of reading this book, if you wish. In its two-mindedness, it ironically reads like something that one of Jackson's subjects, General Gamelin, could have written:
Thus, Jackson repeats the same problem that I found in Doughty: the French Army may not have been fighting exactly as they did in WWI. However, with only incremental changes based on the doctrine that won them that prior war, they fundamentally were re-fighting the last war, albeit with small evolutions in method.
In any case, if it is true that France really wasn't fighting the last war, the same could be said for the Germans, certainly. So, if historians are really going to get to the bottom of these doctrinal differences in June 1940, it's critical to understand why one doctrine prevailed over the other.
More S-35s aren't the answer, or maybe they could have been, if they had been properly organized. While Jackson doesn't say so, the French could have benefited from a defense-in-depth. The fragility of French defenses is underscored by their leaders' own mental collapse (which Jackson frequently notes) as the Germans crossed the Meuse. Not only that, but the French had few reserves to react to these German successes; most of the best French units were in Belgium, as Jackson notes. Such counterattacks that did occur were haphazard and not concentrated; similarly, an attempt for a coordinated British and French attack to break the German encirclement never really got going, which Jackson relates.
That some French units fought well at places like the Gembloux gap, Stonne, or around Dunkirk does point out that the entire French army wasn't bad to a man, especially when well led. Nevertheless, in attempting to provide us with this balanced view, Jackson misses the point when he writes of Stonne: "Hard fighting was still going on here when the Germans had reached the Channel." French heroism and combat efficiency was more the exception than the rule, and when they occurred, they occurred in the wrong places. As much as these are held up here and elsewhere as examples that the French could (and did, no doubt, at times) fight well, contrary to myth, these also do nothing to explain why the Germans succeeded in spite of such resistance.
To that end, Jackson does summarize well the fates of the 55DI and 71DI at Sedan, the corrosive effect of ennui during the Phoney War, and the pervasively poor leadership down to even the platoon and squad level in many units. He observes that the spirit of such soldiers had less to do with the politicians at the top--which may break another myth, but it also raises questions about why Jackson devoted an entire chapter to those very same politicians.
Maybe the answer to understanding France in 1940 lies outside of France. The French did not have either the time nor space in which to rapidly change course, to learn their lessons and adapt. The Soviets, for example, did, and they fought a brilliant defensive battle at Kursk that benefited from a defense in depth, ample and well-located armored reserves, and--perhaps the most critical failing for France--advance intelligence of where the Germans would attack. In any event, the Soviets had 2 years to learn these lessons and defeat German armored operational methods by 1943; the French did not in 1940. Jackson does acknowledge this, in a way, when he describes the improved hedgehog tactics adopted by Weygand in June. If so, France learned this lesson too late, as the battle had largely already been decided.
It's also hard to see how France's allies, or lack thereof, could have helped more. Jackson establishes in the first chapter that Sedan (and the Meuse crossings) were the critical oversight and turning point in the campaign. This was France's problem; not Britain's, surely, as the BEF was deployed to the north. Even so, that doesn't stop Jackson from devoting most of the chapter on alliances to the downward spiral of French and English relations. (All of which seems superfluous, in a way, not only because of the entirely French failure at Sedan, but also because many French troops escaped via the "British evacuation" at Dunkirk, and because British forces later fought and died to liberate France).
And after the chapter reviewing France's attempts at alliances, it's hard to see how Romania (for example) could have helped France very much militarily. The USSR may have helped but, as Jackson notes, Poland would never allow Soviet troops on its soil, even to attack Germany. Of course, the Soviets invaded Poland anyway, to no benefit to Poland or France. Jackson makes tenuous counterfactuals to WWI, but France was allied to Great Britain in that war; America joined later in both; and Russia was an ally early in WWI but not WWII--a crucial distinction that Jackson overlooks.
Indeed, as France's own behavior during the Sudetenland crisis and invasion of Poland, it wasn't France's allies that were the problem, but rather France herself. Poland and Czechoslovakia only proved to other countries that France was, after all, an unreliable partner. And so, if France had no allies, this was France's fault--none of which would have helped the French forces at Sedan, or helped correct its fundamental failures in doctrine, force composition, or strategy.
In the end, French diplomacy and security-building was so bad that they were left castigating the unfortunate Belgians, a scapegoat for all of France's failures. And while Jackson discusses how French and British leaders loathed Belgium, he overlooks the fact that Doyle Plan wasn't going to stop the Germans from crossing the Meuse.
Perhaps it goes without saying--because Jackson does not--that France's problems with Germany in 1940 go back to the punitive Versailles Treaty after WWI. This seems like a critical oversight, as the origins of the Nazi regime and France's problems with Germany can be traced back to this starting point (among others). The irony, of course, is that France set up the conditions for its defeat in 1940 in 1919, and so it's difficult to to forgive Jackson for overlooking this. Moreover, remarkably absent in Jackson's review of French foreign policy between the wars is any substantive discussion of France's relations with Germany itself between the wars.
Having established the military failure at Sedan, it's difficult to make anything of Jackson's chapter on political leadership. He doesn't have a thesis in this section, and instead it tends to ramble on as we follow the changes from Blum to Daladier to Reynaud. There was much bickering and in-fighting, but it's hard to know whether this contributed to the defeat or resulted from them; the Third Reich, when facing similar pressures, comes to mind in this regard.
A chapter on the mindset on the populace is somewhat better, because Jackson attempts to offer conclusions, though these are undercut by his confusion and ambiguity. For example, on French pacifism, he concludes: "France in 1939 was still a pacifist society, but one which had accepted, reluctantly, the necessity of war." While France may not have been purely pacifist, it also didn't seem to have a do-or-die mindset either, and the net effect of this reluctant attitude as far as the outcome in 1940 seems the same.
It's a parallel point to the mindset of the French military, mentioned above: when Jackson seems to be carefully taking a balanced view but, in doing so, really proves the thing he set out to disprove. Or maybe he strikes a viewpoint so finely balanced that it could just as well be argued one way or the other. It would be better if he could synthesize the two poles into something new, singular, and coherent. In any event, confusingly and somewhat contradictorily to his earlier assessment, Jackson notes that "It should be remembered also that the military were operating within the context of a thoroughly pacifist--or at least peace-loving--society." Was that what he was trying to say earlier, or did I just misunderstand him?
At times like these, I was struck by the absence of any discussion of the other side, even if only as a counterpoint or parallel to the French experience. In failing to do so, he misses some essential observations. For example, the central irony of 1940 is that while France was a victor in WWI and at the same time deeply scarred by it, the same was not true for Germany (which lost, but wanted to re-fight it--this time with more tanks). This dichotomy sums up the two tracks the countries took: France's military was rooted in its past success, while contrarily its populace and landscapes were haunted by the negative aspects of the war. Germany, the opposite was true: having lost, it could pursue a blitzkrieg operational method, and the desire to undo Versailles was strong (even if public support for another world war was muted). In any case, the general lack of coverage of the German side is striking, given that is about the German attack on France. He does only briefly, relying heavily on Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend, as well as Ernest R. May's Strange Victory.
Not having firmly established (or, perhaps more fairly, clearly communicated) that he has a firm and incisive grasp on any aspect of his subject, Jackson's chapters on counterfactuals about, and post-war reactions to, 1940 seem all the more out of place. If anything, these two chapters would have been nice-to-haves in a longer work; instead, they cover roughly 65 of 250 pages (about 25%) of the main narrative. As a result, I was left reading this book both times without any clearer understanding of this subject than when I started it.
So, while Jackson provides ample maps and photographs in his review of events, the lack of thoughtful and critical analysis makes it a lackluster addition to the body of work on this topic. It seems that he attempted to write a history of the fall of France for a general audience; his haphazard footnoting and general bibliography are hallmarks of such a less-than-thoroughly-academic approach. (This is odd given that he devotes a significant section to the historiography of the war, which would be more interesting to historians and history nerds like myself than general readers). But as the narrative is hard to follow (going back and forth in time), and the analysis not that strong or probing, the book doesn't provide a straightforward chronology or any meaningful takeaways for the reader. Thus, as a general history of France in 1940, Jackson's work is one of the least edifying that I've read--despite two attempts, I regret to say.
This is the critical question in any book on this topic, although Jackson spends a lot of prose covering other topics, like the decision to surrender and a bottom-up chapter that looks at the war through the eyes of ordinary French citizens and soldiers. Jackson attempts an explanation to this question in the first chapter. He relies heavily on Robert A. Doughty's analysis in The Seeds of Disaster, which is good for the most part but wrong (I think) in its final conclusions. While France had tanks and may not have been fighting WWI in a strictly technical sense, it was in a way; it was aiming for a controlled battle that relied heavily on firepower and fortifications.
Jackson sums up this confusion in this paragraph, which I cite in full to save you the time and money of reading this book, if you wish. In its two-mindedness, it ironically reads like something that one of Jackson's subjects, General Gamelin, could have written:
In the end, then, while it would not be true to say that the French army in 1940 had learnt nothing and was planning to fight the last war again--the French army of 1940 was very different from that of 1918--or that the military were not engaged in intensive discussions about the most appropriate ways of modernizing the army, the changes which had occurred were basically incremental adjustments, albeit important ones, of a corpus of doctrine that had not fundamentally altered.
Thus, Jackson repeats the same problem that I found in Doughty: the French Army may not have been fighting exactly as they did in WWI. However, with only incremental changes based on the doctrine that won them that prior war, they fundamentally were re-fighting the last war, albeit with small evolutions in method.
In any case, if it is true that France really wasn't fighting the last war, the same could be said for the Germans, certainly. So, if historians are really going to get to the bottom of these doctrinal differences in June 1940, it's critical to understand why one doctrine prevailed over the other.
More S-35s aren't the answer, or maybe they could have been, if they had been properly organized. While Jackson doesn't say so, the French could have benefited from a defense-in-depth. The fragility of French defenses is underscored by their leaders' own mental collapse (which Jackson frequently notes) as the Germans crossed the Meuse. Not only that, but the French had few reserves to react to these German successes; most of the best French units were in Belgium, as Jackson notes. Such counterattacks that did occur were haphazard and not concentrated; similarly, an attempt for a coordinated British and French attack to break the German encirclement never really got going, which Jackson relates.
That some French units fought well at places like the Gembloux gap, Stonne, or around Dunkirk does point out that the entire French army wasn't bad to a man, especially when well led. Nevertheless, in attempting to provide us with this balanced view, Jackson misses the point when he writes of Stonne: "Hard fighting was still going on here when the Germans had reached the Channel." French heroism and combat efficiency was more the exception than the rule, and when they occurred, they occurred in the wrong places. As much as these are held up here and elsewhere as examples that the French could (and did, no doubt, at times) fight well, contrary to myth, these also do nothing to explain why the Germans succeeded in spite of such resistance.
To that end, Jackson does summarize well the fates of the 55DI and 71DI at Sedan, the corrosive effect of ennui during the Phoney War, and the pervasively poor leadership down to even the platoon and squad level in many units. He observes that the spirit of such soldiers had less to do with the politicians at the top--which may break another myth, but it also raises questions about why Jackson devoted an entire chapter to those very same politicians.
Maybe the answer to understanding France in 1940 lies outside of France. The French did not have either the time nor space in which to rapidly change course, to learn their lessons and adapt. The Soviets, for example, did, and they fought a brilliant defensive battle at Kursk that benefited from a defense in depth, ample and well-located armored reserves, and--perhaps the most critical failing for France--advance intelligence of where the Germans would attack. In any event, the Soviets had 2 years to learn these lessons and defeat German armored operational methods by 1943; the French did not in 1940. Jackson does acknowledge this, in a way, when he describes the improved hedgehog tactics adopted by Weygand in June. If so, France learned this lesson too late, as the battle had largely already been decided.
It's also hard to see how France's allies, or lack thereof, could have helped more. Jackson establishes in the first chapter that Sedan (and the Meuse crossings) were the critical oversight and turning point in the campaign. This was France's problem; not Britain's, surely, as the BEF was deployed to the north. Even so, that doesn't stop Jackson from devoting most of the chapter on alliances to the downward spiral of French and English relations. (All of which seems superfluous, in a way, not only because of the entirely French failure at Sedan, but also because many French troops escaped via the "British evacuation" at Dunkirk, and because British forces later fought and died to liberate France).
And after the chapter reviewing France's attempts at alliances, it's hard to see how Romania (for example) could have helped France very much militarily. The USSR may have helped but, as Jackson notes, Poland would never allow Soviet troops on its soil, even to attack Germany. Of course, the Soviets invaded Poland anyway, to no benefit to Poland or France. Jackson makes tenuous counterfactuals to WWI, but France was allied to Great Britain in that war; America joined later in both; and Russia was an ally early in WWI but not WWII--a crucial distinction that Jackson overlooks.
Indeed, as France's own behavior during the Sudetenland crisis and invasion of Poland, it wasn't France's allies that were the problem, but rather France herself. Poland and Czechoslovakia only proved to other countries that France was, after all, an unreliable partner. And so, if France had no allies, this was France's fault--none of which would have helped the French forces at Sedan, or helped correct its fundamental failures in doctrine, force composition, or strategy.
In the end, French diplomacy and security-building was so bad that they were left castigating the unfortunate Belgians, a scapegoat for all of France's failures. And while Jackson discusses how French and British leaders loathed Belgium, he overlooks the fact that Doyle Plan wasn't going to stop the Germans from crossing the Meuse.
Perhaps it goes without saying--because Jackson does not--that France's problems with Germany in 1940 go back to the punitive Versailles Treaty after WWI. This seems like a critical oversight, as the origins of the Nazi regime and France's problems with Germany can be traced back to this starting point (among others). The irony, of course, is that France set up the conditions for its defeat in 1940 in 1919, and so it's difficult to to forgive Jackson for overlooking this. Moreover, remarkably absent in Jackson's review of French foreign policy between the wars is any substantive discussion of France's relations with Germany itself between the wars.
Having established the military failure at Sedan, it's difficult to make anything of Jackson's chapter on political leadership. He doesn't have a thesis in this section, and instead it tends to ramble on as we follow the changes from Blum to Daladier to Reynaud. There was much bickering and in-fighting, but it's hard to know whether this contributed to the defeat or resulted from them; the Third Reich, when facing similar pressures, comes to mind in this regard.
A chapter on the mindset on the populace is somewhat better, because Jackson attempts to offer conclusions, though these are undercut by his confusion and ambiguity. For example, on French pacifism, he concludes: "France in 1939 was still a pacifist society, but one which had accepted, reluctantly, the necessity of war." While France may not have been purely pacifist, it also didn't seem to have a do-or-die mindset either, and the net effect of this reluctant attitude as far as the outcome in 1940 seems the same.
It's a parallel point to the mindset of the French military, mentioned above: when Jackson seems to be carefully taking a balanced view but, in doing so, really proves the thing he set out to disprove. Or maybe he strikes a viewpoint so finely balanced that it could just as well be argued one way or the other. It would be better if he could synthesize the two poles into something new, singular, and coherent. In any event, confusingly and somewhat contradictorily to his earlier assessment, Jackson notes that "It should be remembered also that the military were operating within the context of a thoroughly pacifist--or at least peace-loving--society." Was that what he was trying to say earlier, or did I just misunderstand him?
At times like these, I was struck by the absence of any discussion of the other side, even if only as a counterpoint or parallel to the French experience. In failing to do so, he misses some essential observations. For example, the central irony of 1940 is that while France was a victor in WWI and at the same time deeply scarred by it, the same was not true for Germany (which lost, but wanted to re-fight it--this time with more tanks). This dichotomy sums up the two tracks the countries took: France's military was rooted in its past success, while contrarily its populace and landscapes were haunted by the negative aspects of the war. Germany, the opposite was true: having lost, it could pursue a blitzkrieg operational method, and the desire to undo Versailles was strong (even if public support for another world war was muted). In any case, the general lack of coverage of the German side is striking, given that is about the German attack on France. He does only briefly, relying heavily on Karl-Heinz Frieser's The Blitzkrieg Legend, as well as Ernest R. May's Strange Victory.
Not having firmly established (or, perhaps more fairly, clearly communicated) that he has a firm and incisive grasp on any aspect of his subject, Jackson's chapters on counterfactuals about, and post-war reactions to, 1940 seem all the more out of place. If anything, these two chapters would have been nice-to-haves in a longer work; instead, they cover roughly 65 of 250 pages (about 25%) of the main narrative. As a result, I was left reading this book both times without any clearer understanding of this subject than when I started it.
So, while Jackson provides ample maps and photographs in his review of events, the lack of thoughtful and critical analysis makes it a lackluster addition to the body of work on this topic. It seems that he attempted to write a history of the fall of France for a general audience; his haphazard footnoting and general bibliography are hallmarks of such a less-than-thoroughly-academic approach. (This is odd given that he devotes a significant section to the historiography of the war, which would be more interesting to historians and history nerds like myself than general readers). But as the narrative is hard to follow (going back and forth in time), and the analysis not that strong or probing, the book doesn't provide a straightforward chronology or any meaningful takeaways for the reader. Thus, as a general history of France in 1940, Jackson's work is one of the least edifying that I've read--despite two attempts, I regret to say.
August 11, 2016
A fine attempt by historian Julian Jackson to explain the failure of France's politicians and military in the years leading up to and during Nazi Germany's invasion and the subsequent collapse of the French army in 1940. Jackson is a leading authority on 20th Century France and - in less than 300 pages - manages to gives the reader a fascinating insight into the machinations of French politicians and military leaders, desperately trying to form alliances throughout Europe while trying to avoid all out war with Nazi Germany. He shows that Germany was far from being militarily superior to the French Army, which - despite popular myth - battled valiantly to prevent defeat against a German invader which had the advantage of major surprise (attacking the weakest sector in France's defences through the forests of The Ardennes) and even a good deal of luck. French military leaders were partly to blame for the defeat but, given a little more luck and good judgement, they could have ended the 2nd World War before it really began.
April 3, 2023
Detailed analysis of why France fell so quickly to the Nazis, starting with years before when the country didn’t build up capacity to preserve their country while Germany was arming itself against the pact they signed. This book is not riveting, nor does it bring characters to life in an interesting manner but does answer some questions the reader might have if they have read many books of WWII. While most of the book gives a step-by-step review of the events that lead to the downfall of this proud country, the latter portion of the book provides more details in a logical, fact-filled basis.
The author spells out details on how Germany was ahead of France. The German factories were newer – 7 years old versus 20 – and strikes in France slowed the production. More importantly, France was based on an economic meter that didn’t allow for constant production of military goods while Germany was on a war-building economy. Technology was also on the side of Germans. Their tanks were lighter and consumed less energy, allowing them to move quicker and further – and with less men. The air force was even more mismatched.
Backdrop of the French decisions was that France lost 1.3 million in WWI and another one million were left with horrible disabilities. Memorials were built to honor the death but also reminded France that they paid a big price for the last war. Pacifists controlled the country. Even after France declared war, most Frenchmen were hoping for peace.
Yet, when the Germans attacked, the two sides were about evenly matched. Yet, the French made faulty assumptions on where they were going to attack – and the early losses were a killer to the morale of the French troops. It was the surprise nature of the German attack that helped them lead to success. The French were not prepared and reacted slowly, possibly costing them any opportunity to win. The French lacked effective communications systems. The French were totally unprepared for a new type of warfare.
The fundamentals of the French were faulty, based on this author. France had signed treaties with newly created countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Belgium. This “patchwork” of treaties did not equate to the agreement they had before 1914 by having an single agreement with Russia. Slowly, this approach unraveled, starting with the Polish government reaching a “non-aggression” pact with Germany in 1934. France reached out to Brittan to build a stronger relationship but it was too late. In cinemas, the French played “God Save the Queen” and in English schools, they taught children about French food. But time was not on the side of the two nations to overtake the hostility between the two nations that had taken place during the last couple of centuries. And, the French lacked the economic and military resources to back up their needs. The author stated, “The French had no faith in the Soviets as an ally, but feared them as an enemy.”
The fall of France was quick. On June 3rd, Paris was bombed for the first day. Five days later, gunfire could be heard in the capital. By June 10th 1940, the government decided to leave the capital. It was interesting that the author said that Paul Reynaud, conservative political leader, knew for the rest of his lift that he removed the last obstacle to protecting France by giving up.
The last portion of the book gave a historical view of the loss – and why the government covered it the way they did. The author points out that the resistance movement was highlighted and romanticized due to the truth was so horrible. The author points out various studies and books that reviewed this critical time. It’s pointed out that Jean-Baptiste Duroselle said the assignation of Louis Barhour in 1934 was the last French politician with the guts to stand up to Nazi Germany.
Another author points out that France won in WWI due to her allies; she lacked that support at the start of WWII. But, it is also pointed out that Germany’s fight against France helped Brittan since Germany had less airplanes and forces to fight London.
It is interesting that the author mentioned that the large number of French troops who were captured and an apparently equal number who surrendered with their leader giving up were humiliated by their predicament. The author points out that de Gaulle had been sympathetic to those who were captured and held since he was a prison for three years during WWI. His five escapes were unsuccessful – and he never served in the Great War. The Vichy leaders assumed that Britain would have to surrender to Germany to end the war. The Vichy regime came close to re-entering the war, but time on the side of Nazi Germany.
Instead, England, with the massive support of the United States, forced Germany into an unconditional surrender and de Gaulle took command of France in 1944 as the Head of the Provisional Government. He worked through a country that was strong and the Fourth Republic which was formed in 1947 was similar to their government before WWII. The author just gave a hint of how difficult de Gaulle was to deal with due to his personality and grudge holding. The author points out that de Gaulle prevented France from having a civil war, allowed it to pull out from Algeria, and provided unprecedented political stability – then came back again and moved the nation forward again.
This book reads like a mixture of report and text book, lacking the ability to capture one’s imagination and character development but gives the reader a better understanding of the role of France losing out on leadership during WWII.
The author spells out details on how Germany was ahead of France. The German factories were newer – 7 years old versus 20 – and strikes in France slowed the production. More importantly, France was based on an economic meter that didn’t allow for constant production of military goods while Germany was on a war-building economy. Technology was also on the side of Germans. Their tanks were lighter and consumed less energy, allowing them to move quicker and further – and with less men. The air force was even more mismatched.
Backdrop of the French decisions was that France lost 1.3 million in WWI and another one million were left with horrible disabilities. Memorials were built to honor the death but also reminded France that they paid a big price for the last war. Pacifists controlled the country. Even after France declared war, most Frenchmen were hoping for peace.
Yet, when the Germans attacked, the two sides were about evenly matched. Yet, the French made faulty assumptions on where they were going to attack – and the early losses were a killer to the morale of the French troops. It was the surprise nature of the German attack that helped them lead to success. The French were not prepared and reacted slowly, possibly costing them any opportunity to win. The French lacked effective communications systems. The French were totally unprepared for a new type of warfare.
The fundamentals of the French were faulty, based on this author. France had signed treaties with newly created countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Belgium. This “patchwork” of treaties did not equate to the agreement they had before 1914 by having an single agreement with Russia. Slowly, this approach unraveled, starting with the Polish government reaching a “non-aggression” pact with Germany in 1934. France reached out to Brittan to build a stronger relationship but it was too late. In cinemas, the French played “God Save the Queen” and in English schools, they taught children about French food. But time was not on the side of the two nations to overtake the hostility between the two nations that had taken place during the last couple of centuries. And, the French lacked the economic and military resources to back up their needs. The author stated, “The French had no faith in the Soviets as an ally, but feared them as an enemy.”
The fall of France was quick. On June 3rd, Paris was bombed for the first day. Five days later, gunfire could be heard in the capital. By June 10th 1940, the government decided to leave the capital. It was interesting that the author said that Paul Reynaud, conservative political leader, knew for the rest of his lift that he removed the last obstacle to protecting France by giving up.
The last portion of the book gave a historical view of the loss – and why the government covered it the way they did. The author points out that the resistance movement was highlighted and romanticized due to the truth was so horrible. The author points out various studies and books that reviewed this critical time. It’s pointed out that Jean-Baptiste Duroselle said the assignation of Louis Barhour in 1934 was the last French politician with the guts to stand up to Nazi Germany.
Another author points out that France won in WWI due to her allies; she lacked that support at the start of WWII. But, it is also pointed out that Germany’s fight against France helped Brittan since Germany had less airplanes and forces to fight London.
It is interesting that the author mentioned that the large number of French troops who were captured and an apparently equal number who surrendered with their leader giving up were humiliated by their predicament. The author points out that de Gaulle had been sympathetic to those who were captured and held since he was a prison for three years during WWI. His five escapes were unsuccessful – and he never served in the Great War. The Vichy leaders assumed that Britain would have to surrender to Germany to end the war. The Vichy regime came close to re-entering the war, but time on the side of Nazi Germany.
Instead, England, with the massive support of the United States, forced Germany into an unconditional surrender and de Gaulle took command of France in 1944 as the Head of the Provisional Government. He worked through a country that was strong and the Fourth Republic which was formed in 1947 was similar to their government before WWII. The author just gave a hint of how difficult de Gaulle was to deal with due to his personality and grudge holding. The author points out that de Gaulle prevented France from having a civil war, allowed it to pull out from Algeria, and provided unprecedented political stability – then came back again and moved the nation forward again.
This book reads like a mixture of report and text book, lacking the ability to capture one’s imagination and character development but gives the reader a better understanding of the role of France losing out on leadership during WWII.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
April 19, 2017
Review to follow
February 17, 2023
Once again, I read a book about France in World War Two - this time, about the campaigns which led to the fall of France in 1940. Jackson tells the tale of the campaigns and digs into what went wrong - why France fell.
Militarily, the blame is primarily on the lack of a strategic reserve (which had been reallocated to aid in the push north to Belgium) and the poor communications which prevented the existing French armies from quickly responding to the German breakthrough. There're many arguments about why these two things happened. It's clear that Belgium's declaration of neutrality in the 1930's contributed by disrupting the previous plans for moving French armies into Belgium. It's not clear (at least to me) why the communications were so poor and the response so slow, though we must be careful not to read in modern assumptions - at what level did other 1940 armies have radios? But at the least, something should have been done to not let so many generals get so dangerously out of touch.
Jackson holds this strategic failure was the sole cause of the fall of France. Other problems - like warweariness and pacifism and political struggles - definitely existed, but Jackson argues they were also present in other countries. If Britain or Germany or some other country had been quickly defeated, he argues, we could attribute their defeats to the warweariness and pacifism and political struggles that were historically present there too. They weren't, which let their popular mood turn to carry on. But France was strategically defeated, which left those problems visible.
I don't think I fully agree with this. Definitely, the strategic problem was sufficient for a military defeat - but the complete failure to fight after the major defeat, and the avid collaboration of Vichy, makes me think there were other problems in France which I can't see in (say) Britain. Or at least, it would take more evidence than the one short chapter Jackson gives it to make me think otherwise.
Militarily, the blame is primarily on the lack of a strategic reserve (which had been reallocated to aid in the push north to Belgium) and the poor communications which prevented the existing French armies from quickly responding to the German breakthrough. There're many arguments about why these two things happened. It's clear that Belgium's declaration of neutrality in the 1930's contributed by disrupting the previous plans for moving French armies into Belgium. It's not clear (at least to me) why the communications were so poor and the response so slow, though we must be careful not to read in modern assumptions - at what level did other 1940 armies have radios? But at the least, something should have been done to not let so many generals get so dangerously out of touch.
Jackson holds this strategic failure was the sole cause of the fall of France. Other problems - like warweariness and pacifism and political struggles - definitely existed, but Jackson argues they were also present in other countries. If Britain or Germany or some other country had been quickly defeated, he argues, we could attribute their defeats to the warweariness and pacifism and political struggles that were historically present there too. They weren't, which let their popular mood turn to carry on. But France was strategically defeated, which left those problems visible.
I don't think I fully agree with this. Definitely, the strategic problem was sufficient for a military defeat - but the complete failure to fight after the major defeat, and the avid collaboration of Vichy, makes me think there were other problems in France which I can't see in (say) Britain. Or at least, it would take more evidence than the one short chapter Jackson gives it to make me think otherwise.
December 23, 2024
The Fall of France is one of the most important events in our modern history. This is easy to see as one imagines the counter-factual scenario where Hitler’s gamble doesn’t pay off and the obvious allied superiority in industrial production and manpower leads to an almost inevitable German defeat within a few years. World history would be transformed.
Why then, did France fall? Jackson looks at the question on many levels: military strategy, tactics, doctrine, allied communication, domestic French politics of the 30s, and the French foreign policy arrangements. What I end up seeing is that mainly this was a tactical military blunder enabled by erroneous doctrine and failed strategic decisions. Political elements contribute in some ways, of course, but this was mainly just an unffortunate military issue. These sorts of critical failures can happen in any large organisation. Hitler decided to once again gamble with an attack that should by all rights have failed miserably and disastreously, but failures in French startegy and tactics as well as further mistakes allowed it to work succeed the wildest dreams. So much so that the Fall of France has become a foregone conclusion in common thought even though it was a wild stroke of luck. In fact, nazis are not übermensch super soldiers.
Why then, did France fall? Jackson looks at the question on many levels: military strategy, tactics, doctrine, allied communication, domestic French politics of the 30s, and the French foreign policy arrangements. What I end up seeing is that mainly this was a tactical military blunder enabled by erroneous doctrine and failed strategic decisions. Political elements contribute in some ways, of course, but this was mainly just an unffortunate military issue. These sorts of critical failures can happen in any large organisation. Hitler decided to once again gamble with an attack that should by all rights have failed miserably and disastreously, but failures in French startegy and tactics as well as further mistakes allowed it to work succeed the wildest dreams. So much so that the Fall of France has become a foregone conclusion in common thought even though it was a wild stroke of luck. In fact, nazis are not übermensch super soldiers.
May 16, 2020
An interesting book about the battle of France because it focuses on France and the French strategy and military system rather than the German. The first part is a good, but rather schematic, overview of the battle. However although the actual battle is covered the narrative focuses more on the French deliberations and preparations, than on the actual battle itself. The battle is more of a dons to the story about the political systems and the persons operating it. Stand alone this part of the book has three stars.
The first section of the second part of the book is truly great. The myths and explanations for the defeat is discussed individually and placed in a greater context (to bad that an extra 100 pages were not written here). The final part is good, but not great and lapses into broader implications of the post 1945 implications of the 1940 defeat and the 1944 liberation. This section was to brief to add any real value to the reading experience.
Still this was, for such a short book, an interesting read especially since it focuses on France and French deliberations, Rather than German.
The first section of the second part of the book is truly great. The myths and explanations for the defeat is discussed individually and placed in a greater context (to bad that an extra 100 pages were not written here). The final part is good, but not great and lapses into broader implications of the post 1945 implications of the 1940 defeat and the 1944 liberation. This section was to brief to add any real value to the reading experience.
Still this was, for such a short book, an interesting read especially since it focuses on France and French deliberations, Rather than German.
March 8, 2023
In nearly three-hundred pages, Julian Jackson recalls France’s demise to Nazi Germany in his book titled “The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940.” While his book only covers a brief six-week period in history, many events occurred between May and June of 1940 that led to a once powerful nation submitting to the Nazi regime. Jackson attempts to explain the reasoning behind the French defeat and questions if it could have been prevented or if was it inescapable. Jackson provides insight into France’s decline through memoirs, and journal entries, along with looking at the events that took place from multiple perspectives. Throughout his historical account, Jackson provides three main explanations as to how Germany was able to dismantle the French military and government. These include French military strategy, a nation still in fatigue from World War I, and conflict within French command.
September 4, 2023
This fine study chronicles the collapse of France in May and June of 1940. It covers military, political and social issues which led to the startlingly swift defeat.
Two aspects new to this reader were the animosity between British, French and Belgian commanders and the role of luck (and personal initiative) in Germany’s victory. The animosity was compounded by difficulties in communication, due both to generals believing they had better command of English or French than they actually did and the lack of phones.
Mr. Jackson also has some kind words to say about the role of Belgium. The Belgian soldiers and the King tried hard, but were overwhelmed both by the Germans and by the British/French high command treating them as afterthoughts.
The author is a major authority on the period and has real insight into events and personalities. My only caveat is a plethora of “neverthelesses “. It’s good to be balanced, but it can be overdone.
Two aspects new to this reader were the animosity between British, French and Belgian commanders and the role of luck (and personal initiative) in Germany’s victory. The animosity was compounded by difficulties in communication, due both to generals believing they had better command of English or French than they actually did and the lack of phones.
Mr. Jackson also has some kind words to say about the role of Belgium. The Belgian soldiers and the King tried hard, but were overwhelmed both by the Germans and by the British/French high command treating them as afterthoughts.
The author is a major authority on the period and has real insight into events and personalities. My only caveat is a plethora of “neverthelesses “. It’s good to be balanced, but it can be overdone.
December 10, 2025
This is an outstanding work of history. Julian Jackson is a leading British historian of twentieth century France, with arguably the best English language biography of Charles de Gaulle on the scene. This work is one of several covering the trauma of France's Second World War. Crisp, concise and authoritative, it tells the story of the disastrous defeat of France in 1940. But it also, crucially, goes behind the scenes to discuss the underlying political and social context, and then place the events in a broader context of the war and France's post-war recovery. There is an excellent historiographical section too. One key point, which is often overlooked in the other, plentiful accounts, is the way in which the "Phoney War" sapped French resolve and capability, such that the events of May/June 1940 seem perfectly understandable. Jackson is good too on the German experience and how much their success was contingent. All in all, a very good book which I heartily recommend.
December 18, 2024
Great read for anyone curious behind the fall of, what was considered at the time, the most powerful country in Europe. The same army that Winston Churchill had "invincible confidence" in, was defeated in weeks, and Jackson tries to discover why. He speaks of not just the tactics on the ground, but the build up to the war, the distrust between Britain and France, the state of the Third Republic, and everything in between. I never considered how the trauma this defeat left behind influences French society to this day.
"It is certainly true that once the French army had been defeated, some French conservatives, and many others who felt alienated from the Republic for different reasons, readily found explanations for the defeat and were ready to embrace it almost with a kind of self- sacrificial fervour, seeing it as a chance to remake the nation in their image."
"It is certainly true that once the French army had been defeated, some French conservatives, and many others who felt alienated from the Republic for different reasons, readily found explanations for the defeat and were ready to embrace it almost with a kind of self- sacrificial fervour, seeing it as a chance to remake the nation in their image."
January 17, 2025
The fall of France in 1940 really was one of the great military tragedies of the 20th century, and it really is a shame that France failed to stop the Nazis right then and there. I found this book a quick and pleasant read. The counterfactual sections were particularly good, especially as a reminder of how easy it is to view history solely through the lens of the eventually outcome. Frances' fall was anything but inevitable, and as Jackson shows, we need to avoid using the outcome to create the causes.
July 14, 2025
this is not a typical history book of quick German victory over French in May 1940. most people know the facts - this book tries to explain them by looking at few distinct aspects - military (no, French knew how to use facts), political (French leaders struggled but were up to the fight), diplomatic (Brits weren't the best allies) and social (French society was ready for a fight and some French units fought exemplary)
why did France fold? read the book - the author will both tell you his version and provide an overview of what other historians think.
why did France fold? read the book - the author will both tell you his version and provide an overview of what other historians think.
January 22, 2018
An interesting analysis of the fall of France in 1940. Jackson starts with 3 sections looking at the military, the politics and ordinary French people from 1930 to 1940. He then looks at some of the proposed explanations to see how they fit with the history (hint: most of them don't) and provides his own conclusion. The last section looks at the longer term consequences of the fall, both for the development of WWII and for the post-war world.
December 11, 2024
Frank McLynn is right in saying that this is, "an extremely lucid and absorbing account... this is history as it should be written."
Most of the book deals with the question of whether the defeat of France was the result of a military or political failure, and concisely articulates why the author thinks its the former. Part history of the 3rd French Republic, part military history, part political drama... overall an excellent book.
Most of the book deals with the question of whether the defeat of France was the result of a military or political failure, and concisely articulates why the author thinks its the former. Part history of the 3rd French Republic, part military history, part political drama... overall an excellent book.
August 30, 2023
A very balanced account of the divisive legacy of Marshall Petain.The account of his trial is through and the explanation of the judicial system of France was helpful to understand the trial.Petain and his legacy will continue to divide those who believe his Vichy government saved France of those who agreed with the judgement of treason
June 11, 2017
An excellent study of the political, social, industrial, and military reasons for the collapse of France in 1940, only let down - in my humble opinion - by the latter chapters detailing post-war France.
March 17, 2025
Although this book was published in 2003 and is explicitly about France in its defeat in 1940, the similarities with 2025 USA conditions are striking and terrifying. Our country’s polity is fragile and possibly poised to catastrophe.
September 25, 2018
Thorough but the writing is a little dry.
November 10, 2023
At times a little too much like a text book but glad I got through it; learned a lot.
February 2, 2023
There is nothing more satisfying then reading a history that looks at an event or period that many would say has been done to death and along with new research brings an open mind and new insights which open up a whole new vision of the past. That is the affect that Professor Jackson's wonderful book had on me. The second world war is a busy historical field and I am far from being anything like well or extensively read. There are no doubt other books - I think Alistair Horne's is splendid still but it really is a history of the military campaign - published at the same time and certainly since but while admitting my ignorance I still think this is a first rate history.
In particular I like that it is not confined to a limited time frame - it examines the position France was in within a broad canvas that looks at the failure of France to construct a reliable set of alliances as well as particular problems of 1940 itself. It is thankfully free of the legends and myths which covered what happened in 1940 with a moral message and became bogged down in the recriminations over the Third Republic and it's Vichy successor.
The truth is far more complex and less easily reducible to neat moral lessons then had been presented. The French state and army had many challenges and met the most obvious well. France did not fall through betrayal, cowardice or lack of moral fibre. It fell because of the complexity of challenges and developments facing democratic governments when faced with dictators who had no restraints on their lust for war.
I recommend this book because it is important to always know that governing is not simplistic and the easy answers are almost always wrong.
In particular I like that it is not confined to a limited time frame - it examines the position France was in within a broad canvas that looks at the failure of France to construct a reliable set of alliances as well as particular problems of 1940 itself. It is thankfully free of the legends and myths which covered what happened in 1940 with a moral message and became bogged down in the recriminations over the Third Republic and it's Vichy successor.
The truth is far more complex and less easily reducible to neat moral lessons then had been presented. The French state and army had many challenges and met the most obvious well. France did not fall through betrayal, cowardice or lack of moral fibre. It fell because of the complexity of challenges and developments facing democratic governments when faced with dictators who had no restraints on their lust for war.
I recommend this book because it is important to always know that governing is not simplistic and the easy answers are almost always wrong.
July 17, 2015
It's always been assumed that Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, was the pivotal moment of World War Two. Considering the losses in men, material, and prestige, suffered by the Wehrmacht, it's hard to argue against that...
And yet, Jackson does just that.
For Jackson, the pivotal moment of WW2 is not June 1941, but the fall of France in 1940. Widely considered to have the world's most powerful army, the defeat of France changed forever the strategic balance, transforming a European conflict, into a global one.
With France knocked out, Hitler could then fight the only war he ever wanted - one against the Soviet Union. With France still in the conflict, Hitler would never have made the mistake of fighting on two fronts, as the Germans did in the Great War.
France's defeat left Britain up the proverbial creek without a paddle. Emboldened, Mussolini launched a campaign against Britain's African empire, stretching Britain's resources thin, and pushing her into the arms of the USA, something Britain had taken pains to avoid.
On a more global scale, Japan was able to acquire France's Asian possessions (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) without a shot being fired, and emboldened the Japanese to push for more...all the way to Pearl Harbour
So why did France fall? Victims of hidebound defence strategy, or German brilliance.
The answer is neither. Various opportunities presented themselves to halt the Germans dead in their tracks, but whether through lethargy, reluctance, or poor communications, France failed to capitalise.
The mistrust between the French and the British forever simmered beneath the surface, and it's typical of relations at the time, that Britain pulled the plug and headed for Dunkirk, without even to consulate the French.
On the German side, we see a military machine that was far from being the slick, ruthless weapon of supposed German superiority.
Traffic jams in Luxembourg presented a massive opportunity for the Allies to inflict a crippling blow, but fortunately for the Germans, the Allies never capitalised. We see a nervous Hitler unwilling to push on and consolidate German gains, and finally, we see Guderian, disobeying orders, a move that was to have far-reaching consequences of splitting the Allied army in two, and winning the day for the Germans...
French society is analysed, and to his credit, Jackson doesn't search for easy answers, but instead provides a complex picture of a divided society.
Jackson concludes that no one factor was responsible for France's defeat, be it Germans, French society, or the weakness of the French army, or lack of fighting spirit.
Rather, it was a perfect storm of all these conditions, and the book is all the more better for it.
And yet, Jackson does just that.
For Jackson, the pivotal moment of WW2 is not June 1941, but the fall of France in 1940. Widely considered to have the world's most powerful army, the defeat of France changed forever the strategic balance, transforming a European conflict, into a global one.
With France knocked out, Hitler could then fight the only war he ever wanted - one against the Soviet Union. With France still in the conflict, Hitler would never have made the mistake of fighting on two fronts, as the Germans did in the Great War.
France's defeat left Britain up the proverbial creek without a paddle. Emboldened, Mussolini launched a campaign against Britain's African empire, stretching Britain's resources thin, and pushing her into the arms of the USA, something Britain had taken pains to avoid.
On a more global scale, Japan was able to acquire France's Asian possessions (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) without a shot being fired, and emboldened the Japanese to push for more...all the way to Pearl Harbour
So why did France fall? Victims of hidebound defence strategy, or German brilliance.
The answer is neither. Various opportunities presented themselves to halt the Germans dead in their tracks, but whether through lethargy, reluctance, or poor communications, France failed to capitalise.
The mistrust between the French and the British forever simmered beneath the surface, and it's typical of relations at the time, that Britain pulled the plug and headed for Dunkirk, without even to consulate the French.
On the German side, we see a military machine that was far from being the slick, ruthless weapon of supposed German superiority.
Traffic jams in Luxembourg presented a massive opportunity for the Allies to inflict a crippling blow, but fortunately for the Germans, the Allies never capitalised. We see a nervous Hitler unwilling to push on and consolidate German gains, and finally, we see Guderian, disobeying orders, a move that was to have far-reaching consequences of splitting the Allied army in two, and winning the day for the Germans...
French society is analysed, and to his credit, Jackson doesn't search for easy answers, but instead provides a complex picture of a divided society.
Jackson concludes that no one factor was responsible for France's defeat, be it Germans, French society, or the weakness of the French army, or lack of fighting spirit.
Rather, it was a perfect storm of all these conditions, and the book is all the more better for it.
December 27, 2021
The Fall of France 1940: Julian Jackson, having written an incomparable biography of De Gaulle, turns to the seismic event that launched the career of DeGaulle.
On 10th May 1940, Hitler's armies, operating under the inspired plan of Manstein, led by impetuous leaders like Guderian, Rommel, Balck smashed through France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Within 6 weeks all these had fallen to the Nazi war machine. In the annals of Military History it is a campaign that for mythic status compares only to Cannae.
Jackson revisits the well trodden ground of this campaign. The book is excellent as an introductory work. It covers the prewar political, diplomatic and military position of the belligerents. It does not provide any fresh insights but does provide a clear eyed view of the motivations, constraints and aims of each nation. To summarize in a decidedly flippant way:
GERMANY : They would prefer to not fight but will not do anything to reduce the chances that they might have to fight and if it is to be a war then it better be now than later
FRANCE: They will fight anywhere but in France. When the war breaks out 60% of their army is in Belgium and Norway
BRITAIN: Eager to fight the Germans so long as others (French and Belgians) have to die in the fighting.
BELGIUM: Curse their geography and hope that Hitler will behave like a gentleman.
The actual battle is not covered in great detail since better, more exhaustive works on that exist. Jackson does highlight the sclerotic decision making and implementation structure of the French vs the opportunistic improvisational battles fought by Germans. The contrast of Rommel crossing the Meuse in face of French artillery to Lafontaine running around 50 miles behind the front waiting for written orders dissects and lays bare the reason for German victory better than any detailed operational analysis.
The real strength of the book lies in its analysis of the immediate response and fissures in France and Britain once German victory was a foregone conclusion. The sketches of Reynaud, Weygand, much maligned Petain, Laval and Huntziger are exceedingly well done. The book is worth reading just for this part.
If one really wants to understand the German victory of 1940 I would recommend the following books:
To Lose a Battle: Alistair Horne (best on the overall military campaign and French German internal politics of interwar years)
The Blitzkrieg Legend : Karl Heinz Freisser (excellent on Sedan, Montherme, Houth crossings and tactical success of Germans)
The Fall of France : Julian Jackson
On 10th May 1940, Hitler's armies, operating under the inspired plan of Manstein, led by impetuous leaders like Guderian, Rommel, Balck smashed through France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Within 6 weeks all these had fallen to the Nazi war machine. In the annals of Military History it is a campaign that for mythic status compares only to Cannae.
Jackson revisits the well trodden ground of this campaign. The book is excellent as an introductory work. It covers the prewar political, diplomatic and military position of the belligerents. It does not provide any fresh insights but does provide a clear eyed view of the motivations, constraints and aims of each nation. To summarize in a decidedly flippant way:
GERMANY : They would prefer to not fight but will not do anything to reduce the chances that they might have to fight and if it is to be a war then it better be now than later
FRANCE: They will fight anywhere but in France. When the war breaks out 60% of their army is in Belgium and Norway
BRITAIN: Eager to fight the Germans so long as others (French and Belgians) have to die in the fighting.
BELGIUM: Curse their geography and hope that Hitler will behave like a gentleman.
The actual battle is not covered in great detail since better, more exhaustive works on that exist. Jackson does highlight the sclerotic decision making and implementation structure of the French vs the opportunistic improvisational battles fought by Germans. The contrast of Rommel crossing the Meuse in face of French artillery to Lafontaine running around 50 miles behind the front waiting for written orders dissects and lays bare the reason for German victory better than any detailed operational analysis.
The real strength of the book lies in its analysis of the immediate response and fissures in France and Britain once German victory was a foregone conclusion. The sketches of Reynaud, Weygand, much maligned Petain, Laval and Huntziger are exceedingly well done. The book is worth reading just for this part.
If one really wants to understand the German victory of 1940 I would recommend the following books:
To Lose a Battle: Alistair Horne (best on the overall military campaign and French German internal politics of interwar years)
The Blitzkrieg Legend : Karl Heinz Freisser (excellent on Sedan, Montherme, Houth crossings and tactical success of Germans)
The Fall of France : Julian Jackson
September 8, 2016
Not a detailed narrative of the Battle of France, but rather an analysis of one of the most shocking events of the 20th Century: the collapse and surrender of France after six weeks of combat in 1940.
As makes sense of such a complex event, there is no single cause, but Jackson boils it down to a few problems:
1. France was unprepared. Though war had been declared almost nine months previously, the French military and government estimated that the Republic would not be ready for sustained military operations before 1941. French mobilization and production was beginning to bear fruit (especially in warplanes) in May 1940, but that proved to be too late.
2. French plans were deficient. It's something of a cliche' to argue that French commanders were preparing to re-fight the First World War, but that is not exactly correct. French equipment was in some respects superior to the German (tanks, for example) and the French Army was less dependent upon horse transport (!) than the Germans.
The problem was, the French were determined not to re-fight World War I, but rather wanted to ensure that the battles did *not* take place on French soil--hence flinging its best forces to head off the Germans in Belgium. In the meantime, the Germans hurled their most mobile forces at France's weakest troops, with catastrophic results for the latter.
3. French command and control broke down. Mental paralysis set in as soon as the Germans reached Sedan, and the French were never able to their mental equilibrium back. Jackson offers multiple reports of French commanders suffering breakdowns as the enormity of the problem hit them. The French were not alone in that--the British under Lord Gort had similar problems.
The upshot is that the Allies were never able to offer timely or sufficient countermeasures, and the battle spun out of control quickly.
4. Lack of effective political leadership. France lacked a figure who could rally the people and command the military effectively. French politics prior to WWII was a polarized see-saw contest between left and right that made national unity difficult. France needed a Churchill, but did not have one.
A very worthwhile and thought provoking study.
As makes sense of such a complex event, there is no single cause, but Jackson boils it down to a few problems:
1. France was unprepared. Though war had been declared almost nine months previously, the French military and government estimated that the Republic would not be ready for sustained military operations before 1941. French mobilization and production was beginning to bear fruit (especially in warplanes) in May 1940, but that proved to be too late.
2. French plans were deficient. It's something of a cliche' to argue that French commanders were preparing to re-fight the First World War, but that is not exactly correct. French equipment was in some respects superior to the German (tanks, for example) and the French Army was less dependent upon horse transport (!) than the Germans.
The problem was, the French were determined not to re-fight World War I, but rather wanted to ensure that the battles did *not* take place on French soil--hence flinging its best forces to head off the Germans in Belgium. In the meantime, the Germans hurled their most mobile forces at France's weakest troops, with catastrophic results for the latter.
3. French command and control broke down. Mental paralysis set in as soon as the Germans reached Sedan, and the French were never able to their mental equilibrium back. Jackson offers multiple reports of French commanders suffering breakdowns as the enormity of the problem hit them. The French were not alone in that--the British under Lord Gort had similar problems.
The upshot is that the Allies were never able to offer timely or sufficient countermeasures, and the battle spun out of control quickly.
4. Lack of effective political leadership. France lacked a figure who could rally the people and command the military effectively. French politics prior to WWII was a polarized see-saw contest between left and right that made national unity difficult. France needed a Churchill, but did not have one.
A very worthwhile and thought provoking study.
April 22, 2014
Read this about ten years ago and there are several excellent reviews. Was the French army that bad, or were the Germans that good? The answer to both questions is "no."
Particular attention is paid here to the political environment in France between the wars. 'Toxic' is not an overstatement and you need only see political cartoons of the era for evidence.
France also suffered from a dearth of military leaders ready to take initiative. Professor Jackson points out the vulnerability of the German flanks and how very few commanders made an effort to engage. One of the few highlighted was Charles De Gaulle.
A particular point in the book I found compelling was how a relative few number of men, fairly well-organized, were able to hold the Germans up at Sedan. Had mobile forces been available to reinforce them (rather than in Belgium), Jackson gives you the sense that the German advance would have ended there.
All-in-all, this book provides a much better understanding of how French resistance collapsed so quickly. As Jackson relates in the book, the German officers, touring Paris, seemingly found it difficult to believe they were there. It was a worthy read.
Particular attention is paid here to the political environment in France between the wars. 'Toxic' is not an overstatement and you need only see political cartoons of the era for evidence.
France also suffered from a dearth of military leaders ready to take initiative. Professor Jackson points out the vulnerability of the German flanks and how very few commanders made an effort to engage. One of the few highlighted was Charles De Gaulle.
A particular point in the book I found compelling was how a relative few number of men, fairly well-organized, were able to hold the Germans up at Sedan. Had mobile forces been available to reinforce them (rather than in Belgium), Jackson gives you the sense that the German advance would have ended there.
All-in-all, this book provides a much better understanding of how French resistance collapsed so quickly. As Jackson relates in the book, the German officers, touring Paris, seemingly found it difficult to believe they were there. It was a worthy read.
August 28, 2019
Great book, covering the historiography of the French defeat in 1940 and the various explanations given for it.
Military: Jackson shows that the strategic plan and response of the French High Command were deeply flawed, but that many units gave good account of themselves.
Anglo-French Alliance: Very warm in 1940, but quickly deteriorated under the stress of defeat
French defeatism: overrated. Mostly an immediate excuse for the failings of generals which served the Vichy governments retrenchment of the old order.
French political division: the French right was slow in recognising that Hitler was a greater danger than the left. French governments from 1936 tried to catch up, but faced difficult balancing act.
The defeat immediately became very much politicised under Vichy and remained so after the war, serving different interests in the postwar revival.
Military: Jackson shows that the strategic plan and response of the French High Command were deeply flawed, but that many units gave good account of themselves.
Anglo-French Alliance: Very warm in 1940, but quickly deteriorated under the stress of defeat
French defeatism: overrated. Mostly an immediate excuse for the failings of generals which served the Vichy governments retrenchment of the old order.
French political division: the French right was slow in recognising that Hitler was a greater danger than the left. French governments from 1936 tried to catch up, but faced difficult balancing act.
The defeat immediately became very much politicised under Vichy and remained so after the war, serving different interests in the postwar revival.
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