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Cold War Trilogy #1
Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman--from World War to Cold War
When Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin met in Yalta in February 1945, Hitler’s armies were on the run, and victory was imminent. The Big Three wanted to draft a blueprint for a lasting peace—but instead they set the stage for a forty-four year division of Europe into Soviet and Western spheres of influence. After fighting side by side for nearly four years, their political alliance was beginning to fracture. Although the most dramatic Cold War confrontations such as the Berlin airlift were still to come, a new struggle for global hegemony had got underway by August 1945 when Truman used the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Six Months in 1945 brilliantly captures this momentous historical turning point while illuminating the aims and personalities of larger-than-life political giants.
450 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2012
73 people are currently reading
1957 people want to read
About the author
Michael Dobbs
7 books215 followersTo distinguish myself from all the "presidential historians" out there, I have invented a new area of expertise: "presidential crisis historian." How a president confronts the gravest challenges of modern times, and how his decisions affect the rest of us, has been a recurring theme of my seven books.
One Minute to Midnight focused on possibly the gravest crisis ever, in October 1962, when John F. Kennedy stepped back from the nuclear brink at the last possible moment. The Unwanted looked at Franklin Roosevelt's handling of the Jewish refugee crisis that preceded the Holocaust. Six Months in 1945 examined how FDR and Truman negotiated the perilous transition from World War to Cold War. My latest book, King Richard: An American Tragedy, relates the Shakespearean tale of the self-made man who scrambled his way to the top only to see his dreams turn to nightmares because of tragic character flaws.
Before becoming an author, I was a journalist and foreign correspondent. After a stint in Rome as a correspondent for Reuters, and a tour of Africa, I lived in Yugoslavia during the twilight years of Marshal Tito. I moved to Poland for The Washington Post just in time to witness the extraordinary spectacle of workers rebelling against the "workers' state." I was the first western reporter to visit the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980. As The Post's bureau chief in Moscow, I was standing in front of Boris Yeltsin in August 1991 when he climbed on a tank to face down Communist hardliners. In between these two events, I covered the imposition of martial law in Poland, the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe, Gorbachev-Reagan summits, the Tiananmen uprising in China, and the 1989 revolution in Romania.
In addition to my work as a journalist and a historian, I have taught courses at the universities of Princeton, Michigan, and Georgetown, as well as American University. I also spent seven years at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum where I organized conferences on the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, and researched and wrote The Unwanted. King Richard is my seventh book.
One Minute to Midnight focused on possibly the gravest crisis ever, in October 1962, when John F. Kennedy stepped back from the nuclear brink at the last possible moment. The Unwanted looked at Franklin Roosevelt's handling of the Jewish refugee crisis that preceded the Holocaust. Six Months in 1945 examined how FDR and Truman negotiated the perilous transition from World War to Cold War. My latest book, King Richard: An American Tragedy, relates the Shakespearean tale of the self-made man who scrambled his way to the top only to see his dreams turn to nightmares because of tragic character flaws.
Before becoming an author, I was a journalist and foreign correspondent. After a stint in Rome as a correspondent for Reuters, and a tour of Africa, I lived in Yugoslavia during the twilight years of Marshal Tito. I moved to Poland for The Washington Post just in time to witness the extraordinary spectacle of workers rebelling against the "workers' state." I was the first western reporter to visit the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk in August 1980. As The Post's bureau chief in Moscow, I was standing in front of Boris Yeltsin in August 1991 when he climbed on a tank to face down Communist hardliners. In between these two events, I covered the imposition of martial law in Poland, the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe, Gorbachev-Reagan summits, the Tiananmen uprising in China, and the 1989 revolution in Romania.
In addition to my work as a journalist and a historian, I have taught courses at the universities of Princeton, Michigan, and Georgetown, as well as American University. I also spent seven years at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum where I organized conferences on the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia, and researched and wrote The Unwanted. King Richard is my seventh book.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 127 reviews
December 31, 2018
Ok. This was good. REALLY good. definitely deserved its 5 stars.
'Few historical turning points are as rich as in drama as the six months between february and august 1945, a period including the big three (Stalin,FDR,Churchill) conference in yalta and the bombing of Hiroshima. America and Russia emerged as the two most powerful nations in the world; Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were vanquished: the British empire teetered on the verge of collapse. A president died; a fuhrer committed suicide; a prime minister who'd rallied his people through the darkest days of their history was defeated in a free election. Coups and revolutions became common; millions of people were buried in unmarked graves; ancient cities were destroyed. A red tsar redrew the map of Europe, erecting an "Iron curtain" between East and West. The end of world war 2 led to the start of the cold war.'
I think that passage summarises at least a portion of the incidents that shook and rewrote the history of the world. So much happened in those six months that laid the foundation for the post war power struggles and nuclear warfare of the current world. It left me with a better understanding of how the current political and geopolitical state of the world came about. The author has meticulously researched and has delved into the main events that took place and the roles of the main players of world power-US,Russia,Britain- at the time.
I loved how the author structured the events, by dividing the book into three parts with each chapter, citing the main events that took place in that particular month. It flowed like a story and did not bore me even once. I LOVED the authors writing style and his ability to put together a comprehensive account of a situation via many view points. His interpretation of the main characters that were involved and the atmosphere during that period was very well done.
I think this is a MUST read for many of us. There are many things that we should not forget about how simple decisions and hunger for power and control can propel the world into near chaos and destruction and how we can try to avoid it in the future.
'Few historical turning points are as rich as in drama as the six months between february and august 1945, a period including the big three (Stalin,FDR,Churchill) conference in yalta and the bombing of Hiroshima. America and Russia emerged as the two most powerful nations in the world; Nazi Germany and imperial Japan were vanquished: the British empire teetered on the verge of collapse. A president died; a fuhrer committed suicide; a prime minister who'd rallied his people through the darkest days of their history was defeated in a free election. Coups and revolutions became common; millions of people were buried in unmarked graves; ancient cities were destroyed. A red tsar redrew the map of Europe, erecting an "Iron curtain" between East and West. The end of world war 2 led to the start of the cold war.'
I think that passage summarises at least a portion of the incidents that shook and rewrote the history of the world. So much happened in those six months that laid the foundation for the post war power struggles and nuclear warfare of the current world. It left me with a better understanding of how the current political and geopolitical state of the world came about. The author has meticulously researched and has delved into the main events that took place and the roles of the main players of world power-US,Russia,Britain- at the time.
I loved how the author structured the events, by dividing the book into three parts with each chapter, citing the main events that took place in that particular month. It flowed like a story and did not bore me even once. I LOVED the authors writing style and his ability to put together a comprehensive account of a situation via many view points. His interpretation of the main characters that were involved and the atmosphere during that period was very well done.
I think this is a MUST read for many of us. There are many things that we should not forget about how simple decisions and hunger for power and control can propel the world into near chaos and destruction and how we can try to avoid it in the future.
July 2, 2017
Author Michael Dobbs discusses the six month period in 1945 from the Yalta Conference to the Potsdam Conference to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It shows the personalities of the main negotiators, and the important issues for the Big Three countries of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. In addition to the great loss of lives, the European countries were all devastated economically from the war. The postwar status of Poland and other Eastern European countries, as well as reparations from Germany, were major areas of contention at the two conferences. The book also told about Stalin's race to get involved in the war with Japan, grabbing territory in Asia, four days after the first atomic bomb was dropped. The Allies of World War II became Cold War rivals, a situation that would last far into the future.
I liked Michael Dobbs' writing style. He kept the book lively and interesting, showing the colorful personalities and the reasons behind the demands of each negotiator.
I liked Michael Dobbs' writing style. He kept the book lively and interesting, showing the colorful personalities and the reasons behind the demands of each negotiator.
June 2, 2013
3.5 stars. As a history and politics lover, the end of World War II has always been very fascinating to me. So many of the institutions and policies that we find ourselves surrounded with today still have roots in what happened during WWII. If you need any proof, just look at how the United Nations and the U.N. Security Council are set up. Both are very much rooted in the outcomes of WWII. This is astounding to me. Talk about staying power!
As the title suggests, "Six Months in 1945" is about six months in 1945 (the last six months of WWII really). It is a fascinating look at the political interplay between the allied forces. It covers a lot of the big conferences where FDR, Stalin, and Churchill work together to hash out what a post war world will look like and who will get what. These three men were very different from each other and their success with working with each other varied greatly depending on what time period or particular meeting you're talking about. It's amazing how much they were actually able to get done during all of their various talks. Unfortunately not everything always goes to plan as we later find out in this book.
Dobbs did a fantastic job with the details. Drawing on personal letters, conversations, etc. between the major players, the minor players, and those just along for the ride, you get a really good sense of what it must have felt like to be at some of these meetings.
Overall: A very detailed look at some world changing events!
As the title suggests, "Six Months in 1945" is about six months in 1945 (the last six months of WWII really). It is a fascinating look at the political interplay between the allied forces. It covers a lot of the big conferences where FDR, Stalin, and Churchill work together to hash out what a post war world will look like and who will get what. These three men were very different from each other and their success with working with each other varied greatly depending on what time period or particular meeting you're talking about. It's amazing how much they were actually able to get done during all of their various talks. Unfortunately not everything always goes to plan as we later find out in this book.
Dobbs did a fantastic job with the details. Drawing on personal letters, conversations, etc. between the major players, the minor players, and those just along for the ride, you get a really good sense of what it must have felt like to be at some of these meetings.
Overall: A very detailed look at some world changing events!
November 11, 2023
Easy to follow and lays the cornerstones for the break up of the allied alliance that ultimately defeated the Nazi regime. The cornerstones that led to the Cold War.
November 20, 2020
Summary: An account of the six months from Yalta to Hiroshima and how the decisions and events of those months shaped the post-war world.
Michael Dobbs contends that the six months from February to August of 1945 profoundly shaped the post-war world dashing the hopes for world peace, replacing it with a “cold” war between the two major superpowers to emerge from the world. How did Allies against Germany become adversaries?
The account begins with the conference at Yalta in the Crimea. Planned to accommodate Stalin, it represented an arduous journey via ship, air, rail, and auto for a dying president and a recently ill prime minister. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill arrived at the top of their game. What they found at the conference was a Stalin who was. Given that his country had borne the brunt of the war against Germany (and the casualties), he came with terms on which he would not yield about the borders and government of Poland and his influence in Eastern Europe. Dobbs shows how Roosevelt and Churchill, sometimes with vagueness of wording, tried to reach agreements about the shape of the post-war world that preserved self-autonomy for these countries and preservation of the unity of Germany. Roosevelt described their efforts as “the best I could do.” For Churchill, the handwriting was on the wall for his influence and the British empire. He recognized that he now was junior to the two great powers.
The second part traces the conclusion of the war, the race for Berlin, the death of Roosevelt, the linkup and the zones of occupation. The new president, Harry Truman almost immediately had to stand up to Molotov on the matter of Poland and honoring the agreements of Yalta. But as the old saying goes, possession is nine-tenths of the law, and the Russians were in possession of most of what they wanted. Amid all this, Dobbs captures the momentary joy of the meet-up of forces.
Part Three covers the conference in Potsdam, the tenuous balance of standing up to Stalin as an “iron curtain” descends on Eastern Europe and Poland’s government is dominated by pro-Communist leaders., even while Stalin’s help is still sought to deal with Japan. During the conference, Churchill learns that the elections he called turned him out of office. And Truman learned that the test of atomic weapons was devastatingly successful. Japan would be warned, resist, be bombed twice, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and capitulate, even as Russia was turning back forces in Manchuria but was still short of all the prizes sought in the East.
A foreign service officer from the U.S. in Russia sent his famous “long telegram” with his analysis of Russian intent and recommendation of an American policy of containment, which became our foreign policy until 1989 (and may be once more). Reading this made me wonder if the combination of weariness and perhaps naivete of Roosevelt, and the divorce of military strategy and geopolitical assessment led to this outcome. Churchill saw this coming. But he was also the one so cautious about a cross-channel invasion. Great Britain and America’s late engagement, after the Russians’ years of fighting and dying and turning back the German threat left them in a place where all they could do was say “pretty please” to a country who held most of the cards.
For those whose knowledge of this history is a few vaguely remembered paragraphs in a history book, this is a detailed plunge into these six defining months exploring the personalities, the changing power dynamics, the events and the geopolitics that shaped the post-war world. The account balances depth and pace in a way that always fascinates and never plods. It demonstrates that nothing may be so dangerous as a charming vision of world peace between ideological and geopolitical adversaries. Yalta was the wake-up call, and Potsdam the effort to contain the damages. But the amity of a wartime alliance would be no more.
Michael Dobbs contends that the six months from February to August of 1945 profoundly shaped the post-war world dashing the hopes for world peace, replacing it with a “cold” war between the two major superpowers to emerge from the world. How did Allies against Germany become adversaries?
The account begins with the conference at Yalta in the Crimea. Planned to accommodate Stalin, it represented an arduous journey via ship, air, rail, and auto for a dying president and a recently ill prime minister. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill arrived at the top of their game. What they found at the conference was a Stalin who was. Given that his country had borne the brunt of the war against Germany (and the casualties), he came with terms on which he would not yield about the borders and government of Poland and his influence in Eastern Europe. Dobbs shows how Roosevelt and Churchill, sometimes with vagueness of wording, tried to reach agreements about the shape of the post-war world that preserved self-autonomy for these countries and preservation of the unity of Germany. Roosevelt described their efforts as “the best I could do.” For Churchill, the handwriting was on the wall for his influence and the British empire. He recognized that he now was junior to the two great powers.
The second part traces the conclusion of the war, the race for Berlin, the death of Roosevelt, the linkup and the zones of occupation. The new president, Harry Truman almost immediately had to stand up to Molotov on the matter of Poland and honoring the agreements of Yalta. But as the old saying goes, possession is nine-tenths of the law, and the Russians were in possession of most of what they wanted. Amid all this, Dobbs captures the momentary joy of the meet-up of forces.
Part Three covers the conference in Potsdam, the tenuous balance of standing up to Stalin as an “iron curtain” descends on Eastern Europe and Poland’s government is dominated by pro-Communist leaders., even while Stalin’s help is still sought to deal with Japan. During the conference, Churchill learns that the elections he called turned him out of office. And Truman learned that the test of atomic weapons was devastatingly successful. Japan would be warned, resist, be bombed twice, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and capitulate, even as Russia was turning back forces in Manchuria but was still short of all the prizes sought in the East.
A foreign service officer from the U.S. in Russia sent his famous “long telegram” with his analysis of Russian intent and recommendation of an American policy of containment, which became our foreign policy until 1989 (and may be once more). Reading this made me wonder if the combination of weariness and perhaps naivete of Roosevelt, and the divorce of military strategy and geopolitical assessment led to this outcome. Churchill saw this coming. But he was also the one so cautious about a cross-channel invasion. Great Britain and America’s late engagement, after the Russians’ years of fighting and dying and turning back the German threat left them in a place where all they could do was say “pretty please” to a country who held most of the cards.
For those whose knowledge of this history is a few vaguely remembered paragraphs in a history book, this is a detailed plunge into these six defining months exploring the personalities, the changing power dynamics, the events and the geopolitics that shaped the post-war world. The account balances depth and pace in a way that always fascinates and never plods. It demonstrates that nothing may be so dangerous as a charming vision of world peace between ideological and geopolitical adversaries. Yalta was the wake-up call, and Potsdam the effort to contain the damages. But the amity of a wartime alliance would be no more.
February 2, 2023
Fascinating focus on such a consequential time. Well written and well balanced and brimming with perspective.
November 1, 2016
This is a good, clear, readable history of six months which changed the world.
That half-year saw the death of the old European idea that victors in a war had the right to put in place their own governments and ideas (as victors), something which had been taken for granted for hundreds of years. It saw the beginning of the Atomic Age; the end of Britain´s role in world affairs. It saw the USA become the main player on the world stage, with its self-designated role as a beacon of light and hope for the world. It saw peace become a (cold) war.
There are many vivid scenes: Stalin incredulous that Churchill had lost the 1945 election and had been voted out of office - why hadn´t he rigged it? Truman shouting, "This is the greatest thing in history!" when he was told of the Hiroshima bombing. Stalin, when asked if he was proud to be in Berlin, negotiating peace and power terms at Potsdam, noting: "Tsar Alexander got to Paris".
A book for students of history; for those interested in the roots of modern Europe and the world, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union, Churchill, FDR, Stalin and Truman.
How ironic is it that it was a certain A. Hitler, who, when contemplating the defeat of the Third Reich would leave, "only two great Powers capable of confronting each other - the United States and Soviet Russia...the laws of both history and geography will compel these two powers to a trial of strength, either military or in the fields of economics and ideology...It is equally certain that both those Powers will sooner or later find it desirable to seek the support of the sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people."
"
That half-year saw the death of the old European idea that victors in a war had the right to put in place their own governments and ideas (as victors), something which had been taken for granted for hundreds of years. It saw the beginning of the Atomic Age; the end of Britain´s role in world affairs. It saw the USA become the main player on the world stage, with its self-designated role as a beacon of light and hope for the world. It saw peace become a (cold) war.
There are many vivid scenes: Stalin incredulous that Churchill had lost the 1945 election and had been voted out of office - why hadn´t he rigged it? Truman shouting, "This is the greatest thing in history!" when he was told of the Hiroshima bombing. Stalin, when asked if he was proud to be in Berlin, negotiating peace and power terms at Potsdam, noting: "Tsar Alexander got to Paris".
A book for students of history; for those interested in the roots of modern Europe and the world, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Soviet Union, Churchill, FDR, Stalin and Truman.
How ironic is it that it was a certain A. Hitler, who, when contemplating the defeat of the Third Reich would leave, "only two great Powers capable of confronting each other - the United States and Soviet Russia...the laws of both history and geography will compel these two powers to a trial of strength, either military or in the fields of economics and ideology...It is equally certain that both those Powers will sooner or later find it desirable to seek the support of the sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people."
"
January 29, 2013
One of the most fascinating books I've read in a long, long time. Thanks to the declassification of thousands, if not millions, of documents from the WWII era, we now know what actually went on at Yalta. We also read the truth about the bomb, from the early days of discovering to the dropping on Japan. Truman is revealed as he never has been. He was instrumental in the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan, although he was also swepted away by an enormous machine that worked for its development.
Another very captivating part of the book introduces us to the founders of the OSS. Bucharest is explored as one of the most exciting cities in the world with agents from every country dining and dancing night after night into one intrigue after another. Many of these agents are the Americans who will build the formidable CIA after the transformation of the OSS.
A book as well written and spellbinding only seems to come around once or twice a year for me. The writing is good, clear and it keeps you turning page after page. If you are a student of history, then I'd put this one in the must read pile.
Another very captivating part of the book introduces us to the founders of the OSS. Bucharest is explored as one of the most exciting cities in the world with agents from every country dining and dancing night after night into one intrigue after another. Many of these agents are the Americans who will build the formidable CIA after the transformation of the OSS.
A book as well written and spellbinding only seems to come around once or twice a year for me. The writing is good, clear and it keeps you turning page after page. If you are a student of history, then I'd put this one in the must read pile.
December 25, 2016
Wow! What a read.
I love History, but sometimes Historians have a way of presenting facts in a rather, well - boring fashion.
Dobbs is the EXACT opposite. I felt like a fly in the wall during some of the most important events of the modern world.
It was especially neat to read about the Yalta conference - Having visited Crimea earlier this year it was fascinating to read about the different palaces, rooms and the events that took place there.
Would highly recommend!
I love History, but sometimes Historians have a way of presenting facts in a rather, well - boring fashion.
Dobbs is the EXACT opposite. I felt like a fly in the wall during some of the most important events of the modern world.
It was especially neat to read about the Yalta conference - Having visited Crimea earlier this year it was fascinating to read about the different palaces, rooms and the events that took place there.
Would highly recommend!
March 23, 2017
This was well written and entertaining. My only problem is the nature of this brand of popular history (that looks at a very specific time, e.g. David McCullough's 1776). They must either end abruptly or leak over. Neither exactly works. All in all, though, worth the read.
July 4, 2021
The story of the evolving relationship between the three major allied powers as WWII drew to a close. While ultimately victorious in their victory over Fascism, Russia, The US, and Britain are forced to deal with the realities of a world ravaged by years of war and destruction. To make things even more dramatic, each country slowly realizes the complexities in transitioning from wartime to peacetime allies with seemingly incompatible ideologies. Is it possible for the communist Soviet Union, a socialist dictatorship with little tolerance for individual liberty or popular sovereignty, to ever fully align itself with the US and UK, states run through democratic processes and structured with capitalist economic systems?
Michael Dobbs chews on these questions while offering insightful tid-bits on the leaders themselves. From Churchill's battles with depression, to Roosevelt's rapidly and secretly declining health, to Stalin's hardening disposition after his wife's suicide, the reader starts to see the most important leaders of the 20th century on a personal basis.
This was a fascinating story to learn, and offered a fresh analysis on the events and factors that led to the outbreak of the cold war.
Michael Dobbs chews on these questions while offering insightful tid-bits on the leaders themselves. From Churchill's battles with depression, to Roosevelt's rapidly and secretly declining health, to Stalin's hardening disposition after his wife's suicide, the reader starts to see the most important leaders of the 20th century on a personal basis.
This was a fascinating story to learn, and offered a fresh analysis on the events and factors that led to the outbreak of the cold war.
April 22, 2017
This is a detailed, and usually engaging, take on the end of WWII and the conflicts that lead to the cold war, focusing on Yalta, Pottsdam, etc. and the personalities involved.
The thing I took way most from this book was twofold: One, the constraints and still uncertain outcome of WWII drove the U.S.'s concerns far more than the USSR, who accepted victory as inevitable and was unconcerned with the lives of their soldiers or the enemy, and two, that personalities have a LOT to do with the eventual outcome of such negotiations. It is impossible to understand what happened without having some idea of who FDR, Truman, Stalin, Churchill, Stimson, Stettinius and Byrnes were, and what they were about. The book does a pretty good job of discussing that, but it could have done more. Having read biographies of Truman and FDR helped, and reading Harry and Arthur about Truman's relationship with Sen. Arthur Vandenberg right after certainly helped.
I liked the descriptions it gave of the grounds of the conferences, how it described the conditions that lead to them happening, what it was like being there for the people involved, etc. And it definitely left you with the sense that what happened was not inevitable, these were real men working under real tensions, making decisions the best they knew how according to their understanding of the world. Since the conclusions of World War II and the Cold War often seem inevitable to those who came out the other side, that is no small accomplishment.
The thing I took way most from this book was twofold: One, the constraints and still uncertain outcome of WWII drove the U.S.'s concerns far more than the USSR, who accepted victory as inevitable and was unconcerned with the lives of their soldiers or the enemy, and two, that personalities have a LOT to do with the eventual outcome of such negotiations. It is impossible to understand what happened without having some idea of who FDR, Truman, Stalin, Churchill, Stimson, Stettinius and Byrnes were, and what they were about. The book does a pretty good job of discussing that, but it could have done more. Having read biographies of Truman and FDR helped, and reading Harry and Arthur about Truman's relationship with Sen. Arthur Vandenberg right after certainly helped.
I liked the descriptions it gave of the grounds of the conferences, how it described the conditions that lead to them happening, what it was like being there for the people involved, etc. And it definitely left you with the sense that what happened was not inevitable, these were real men working under real tensions, making decisions the best they knew how according to their understanding of the world. Since the conclusions of World War II and the Cold War often seem inevitable to those who came out the other side, that is no small accomplishment.
August 24, 2015
A magnificent book to end the summer!
FDR, Stalin, Churchill and Truman are on display at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
Want to be in the room with those guys? Get this.
The different perspectives they brought to the table reflect not just their personalities but what their nations experienced.
This is one of those books where I'm awed at the research and the authors writing skill.
FDR, Stalin, Churchill and Truman are on display at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
Want to be in the room with those guys? Get this.
The different perspectives they brought to the table reflect not just their personalities but what their nations experienced.
This is one of those books where I'm awed at the research and the authors writing skill.
March 7, 2023
Уводно четиво за интересуващите се от заключителния период на ВСВ и респективно началото на Студената война. Книгата на Добс обхваща месеците, делящи Ялтенската конференция от тази в Потсдам, в рамките на които изграденият през 1941 г. "Велик съюз" срещу Хитлер и нацизма първо се разклаща, а после и рухва. Това обаче не е дипломатическа история, която проследява детайлно и стъпка по стъпка процеса на разпад в съюзническите отношения. Целите и подходът на Добс са други. В обхвата на наратива попадат отделни възлови епизоди от въпросните шест месеца, които авторът описва сравнително по-подробно и увлекателно. Като опитен журналист, Добс знае как да хване читателския интерес - книгата изобилства от интересни факти (с които читателят по-късно може да се направи на запознат пред приятели), както и с различни любопитни истории и анекдоти, подходящи след прочита им за разказ на маса (напр. къде са ходили по различните му там нужди участниците в Ялтенската конференция и пиянски прояви на дипломати, генерали и държавни ръководители по време на банкети и гала вечери). Всичко това прави книгата атрактивна, а преминаването през нея - леко. Покрай многото забава обаче на моменти се губи сериозното. Липсва структурираност - ако човек не знае какво са решили и договорили Тримата големи в Ялта и Потсдам, трудно ще го научи тук. За целта има по-подробни и систематични трудове, които обаче може би няма да бъдат толкова привлекателни за всеки читател. "Шест месеца през 1945" при все това провокира интерес към темата и вероятно ще накара мнозина да задълбаят в нейното проучване.
November 14, 2020
Very informative and interesting although includes some irrelevant details
September 20, 2021
A detailed look at the end of WWII. The political maneuvering that led to 45 years of Cold War.
February 22, 2024
great research, can’t get past choices in military strategy descriptors.
June 14, 2021
This book offers a fairly gripping account of a riveting, terrifying time.
December 21, 2014
I stumbled onto this book while I was browsing the remainder shelves at the Harvard Book Store. It is an excellent exploration of the time marking the end of World War II and the unofficial start of the Cold War.
There are ample profiles of all the major world leaders and the supporting personalities that were involved in the Yalta Conference. It was fascinating to read about all the preparations that Stalin took to make sure he could dominate the proceedings and solidify his hold on Eastern Europe. The portrait of the diminished stature of Churchill facing an uncertain future with the elections in Britain, especially when compared to the super powers of Russia and the United States were quite illuminating. FDR is shown as frail and barely able to function as a negotiator after 12 long years in office.
Many of the background stories are also sure to please anyone interested in the history of this period. One quote that stands out asserts that the Russians lost as many men in six weeks of fighting the Germans as the Americans did in the entire European war. Additional statistics and first hand accounts show just how brutal the war was in the East and how Stalin was utterly ruthless in his treatment of ethnic groups or others that could threaten his leadership.
One failing of the author was in his cursory examination of Alger Hiss. Accused of espionage, it would have been helpful to have done more to explain what the accusations were and how they were eventually dealt with.
The book ends with the Potsdam conference which the author concludes marked the start of the Cold War. Truman was President and the administration was unaware of just how much Stalin knew about the Manhattan Project. Efforts to keep the Russians from making their own nuclear weapons by finding scientists or destroying Nazi scientific efforts also provided some fascinating insights into the political maneuvers of the time. There is some fascinating descriptions of the division of Berlin and greater Germany into parts being controlled by the various allies. It was clear that the Russians and the Americans had very different goals for Europe after the war and the conflicts that followed between them starting in 1945 still go on today.
The author wrote this as part of a trilogy. He also has written books about the fall of the USSR and the Cuban Missile Crisis. It should be mentioned that those efforts were done many years apart and not in sequence to the historical timeline.
Overall, this is one of the better books I have read on this subject. The wealth of information and excellent writing would make this a great addition to your reading list.
There are ample profiles of all the major world leaders and the supporting personalities that were involved in the Yalta Conference. It was fascinating to read about all the preparations that Stalin took to make sure he could dominate the proceedings and solidify his hold on Eastern Europe. The portrait of the diminished stature of Churchill facing an uncertain future with the elections in Britain, especially when compared to the super powers of Russia and the United States were quite illuminating. FDR is shown as frail and barely able to function as a negotiator after 12 long years in office.
Many of the background stories are also sure to please anyone interested in the history of this period. One quote that stands out asserts that the Russians lost as many men in six weeks of fighting the Germans as the Americans did in the entire European war. Additional statistics and first hand accounts show just how brutal the war was in the East and how Stalin was utterly ruthless in his treatment of ethnic groups or others that could threaten his leadership.
One failing of the author was in his cursory examination of Alger Hiss. Accused of espionage, it would have been helpful to have done more to explain what the accusations were and how they were eventually dealt with.
The book ends with the Potsdam conference which the author concludes marked the start of the Cold War. Truman was President and the administration was unaware of just how much Stalin knew about the Manhattan Project. Efforts to keep the Russians from making their own nuclear weapons by finding scientists or destroying Nazi scientific efforts also provided some fascinating insights into the political maneuvers of the time. There is some fascinating descriptions of the division of Berlin and greater Germany into parts being controlled by the various allies. It was clear that the Russians and the Americans had very different goals for Europe after the war and the conflicts that followed between them starting in 1945 still go on today.
The author wrote this as part of a trilogy. He also has written books about the fall of the USSR and the Cuban Missile Crisis. It should be mentioned that those efforts were done many years apart and not in sequence to the historical timeline.
Overall, this is one of the better books I have read on this subject. The wealth of information and excellent writing would make this a great addition to your reading list.
September 13, 2013
This is a fascinating, highly readable history of the complex negotiations between the "Big Three" at the end of WWII and start of the Cold War. Our memory of 1945 is often a skeletal framework and a caricature; Michael Dobbs put some flesh back on the bones of history and does it best to correct post-war distortions. His ample citation from letters and documents written at the time creates a convincing impression.
The structure of the work is interesting, as we get to see history through a kind of prism, rotating from one viewpoint to another every time when the author introduces a new character one stage and gives us a portrait of the person as well as a sketch of his views and role. A side effect of this approach is that it focuses on a limited number of people and their role, while omitting others. But it is an interesting and illuminating approach.
There are few statements in the book that raise eyebrows and that a good editor should not have allowed to pass. For example, the battle of Stalingrad did not involve "fleets of fighter jets" (page 308), because at the time only a handful of jet-powered aircraft were in existence, and that existence was a closely guarded secret. This kind of technical error does not necessarily harm the political story that Dobbs is telling, but of course the absurdity of the anachronism does damage his credibility.
But then, how many people today know that at the end of 1945, Stalin tried to hold on the Northern Iran as "Southern Azerbaijan"?
The structure of the work is interesting, as we get to see history through a kind of prism, rotating from one viewpoint to another every time when the author introduces a new character one stage and gives us a portrait of the person as well as a sketch of his views and role. A side effect of this approach is that it focuses on a limited number of people and their role, while omitting others. But it is an interesting and illuminating approach.
There are few statements in the book that raise eyebrows and that a good editor should not have allowed to pass. For example, the battle of Stalingrad did not involve "fleets of fighter jets" (page 308), because at the time only a handful of jet-powered aircraft were in existence, and that existence was a closely guarded secret. This kind of technical error does not necessarily harm the political story that Dobbs is telling, but of course the absurdity of the anachronism does damage his credibility.
But then, how many people today know that at the end of 1945, Stalin tried to hold on the Northern Iran as "Southern Azerbaijan"?
December 3, 2024
The book provides an overview of the main events between the Yalta conference and the dropping of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. As a description of the negotiations at Potsdam, the book by Charles Mee (The Deal: Churchill, Truman, and Stalin Remake the World) is more detailed. The thesis of the Michael Dobbs is that the Cold War was to a large extent inevitable, given how the war was fought and victory achieved. But a missing point is that this peace also took a lesson from what happened after the First World War. The author also shows successfully that, as happened many times in history, FDR was in poor shape to negotiate to Stalin, and his naivety / unpreparedness gave birth to many of the issues that would shape the Cold War. It is possible that a early demonstration of force by the Americans would frighten the USSR, but once again American politicians were hesitant on spending more American lives.
May 29, 2016
Les six mois qui ont fait changer l´Europe entre Février - Août 1945 ne doivent être sousestimés et ont marqué (et marque toujours) l´Europe de nos jours. Merveilleusement bien décrit (surtout la conference de Jalta) cet histoirien éclaircit devant ses lecteurs les facteurs determinant qui ont fait que l´Europe est encore divisé. C´est la premiere partie de son trilogie de la guerre froide, et j´ai hâte de lire les deux autres.
December 1, 2016
The Yalta conference; the death of Roosevelt; the fall of Berlin, the suicide of Hitler, the surrender of Germany; the Potsdam conference; the first atomic bomb; the surrender of Japan and the beginning of the Cold War - all in six months! The history is well researched and well told. Highly fascinating and highly recommended.
May 2, 2016
Stunning to think how quickly the world changed in one year...
November 22, 2015
Na prawdę dobra książka. Warta przeczytania: parę cytatów na zachętę:
FDR sądził, że zrobił, co trzeba, aby uzyskać zgodę Stalina na powołanie nowej Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych, nawet jeśli oznaczało to uznanie sowieckich roszczeń terytorialnych do wschodniej Polski. Uważał Stalina za takiego samego polityka jak on, za człowieka, z którym można się dogadać. Nie miał oczywiście złudzeń co do tego, że reżim sowiecki jest tyranią.
Paranoja Stalina szła w parze z chłodnym pragmatyzmem. Jego córka Swietłana pisała, że Stalin „nie był porywczy ani wylewny, uczuciowy ani sentymentalny; innymi słowy, brakowało mu wszystkich cech typowych dla Gruzinów. Gruzini są popędliwi, sympatyczni, łatwo ronią łzy, gdy ogarnie ich współczucie lub radość, albo gdy wpadną w zachwyt nad jakąś piękną rzeczą... U niego wszystko było na odwrót, a zimne wyrachowanie, udawanie, trzeźwy, cyniczny realizm stawały się z latami coraz silniejsze”.
Sowieckim fotografom kazano robić Stalinowi zdjęcia od dołu, żeby wyglądał bardziej imponująco. W rzeczywistości mierzył zaledwie 168 centymetrów, miał wypukły tors, chude nogi i niedowład lewej ręki. Głowę obracał sztywno, wyciągając szyję, aby nie widziano jego podwójnego podbródka. Żółtawa, ciastowata cera i nastroszone, zaczesane do tyłu ciemne włosy kojarzyły się jednemu z brytyjskich delegatów ze „zdziwionym jeżozwierzem”[32]. Gości z Zachodu uderzyła dziobata twarz Stalina, skutek przebytej w dzieciństwie ospy, częściowo tylko zamaskowana kilkoma warstwami pudru. Sumiaste wąsy przycięte po bokach zasłaniały nierówne, sczerniałe zęby. Najbardziej wyrazistą cechą tej twarzy były żółte oczy
Bolszewizm był dla Stalina ideologicznym ideałem: dostarczył mu historycznego uzasadnienia dla zdobycia nieograniczonej władzy. Bolszewicy uważali, że są wybraną przez historię elitą, która wciela w życie wolę mas ludowych. Tylko świadoma politycznie awangarda umie rozpoznać prawdziwy interes ludu, zgodnie z teorią Karola Marksa: prości ludzie tego nie potrafią, gdyż mają „fałszywą świadomość”, pełną przesądów religijnych i narodowych.
Los zrządził, że kaleki prezydent i ospowaty rewolucjonista spotkali się nad Morzem Czarnym, by razem z angielskim arystokratą położyć podwaliny pod nowy porządek świata. Krym, z jego zrujnowanymi miastami i zimnymi pałacami, zniszczoną przyrodą i wyludnionymi wsiami, stanowił dobrą metaforę spustoszonego wojną kontynentu, o którego przyszłości trzej przywódcy mieli teraz zdecydować.
Polska przysparza kłopotów od ponad pięciuset lat – westchnął zmęczony Roosevelt, kończąc wreszcie dyskusję.
Stalin uważał, tak jak kiedyś carowie, że Polska ciągle knuje przeciwko Rosji. Oprócz tego, że była korytarzem dla wrogów państwa rosyjskiego, ułatwiała przenikanie niepożądanych wpływów zachodnich.
W rosyjskich operach, na przykład Borysie Godunowie, władcy polscy są tradycyjnie otoczeni przez chytrych księży katolickich, którzy chcą rozciągnąć na wschód zasięg swojej religii.
Polska wiecznie przysparzała Rosji kłopotów. Według Mołotowa „Polacy zawsze robią szum i nigdy się nie uspokoją. Brak im rozumu. Ciągle włażą na kark”.
Zbrodnia katyńska była znakomitym przykładem, jak Stalin potrafił obracać trudne, a nawet beznadziejne sprawy na swoją korzyść. Na początku marca 1940 roku dyktator zatwierdził przygotowaną przez Berię tajną notatkę, w której przewidywano „zastosowanie najwyższego wymiaru kary, rozstrzelania” wobec polskich jeńców wojennych, „będących zawziętymi wrogami władzy sowieckiej, przepełnionych nienawiścią do ustroju sowieckiego”. W rezultacie tej decyzji rozstrzelano w sumie 21 857 obywateli polskich, głównie oficerów, którzy dostali się do sowieckiej niewoli podczas inwazji Armii Czerwonej na wschodnie ziemie Polski.
Stalin starannie przygotował się do spotkania z prezydentem. Od Berii codziennie otrzymywał zapisy podsłuchanych rozmów z udziałem Roosevelta, Churchilla i ich doradców. Oprócz zainstalowania aparatury podsłuchowej w gabinetach i prywatnych pokojach, NKWD dysponował mikrofonami kierunkowymi dalekiego zasięgu do podsłuchiwania rozmów prowadzonych poza budynkami. Całą operacją kierował syn Berii, Sergo, który pełnił podobną rolę podczas konferencji w Teheranie przed czternastoma miesiącami. Rosjanie nie mogli wyjść ze zdziwienia, że Amerykanie poświęcają tak mało uwagi elektronicznej aparaturze podsłuchowej, choć codziennie przeszukiwali pałac w Liwadii, sprawdzając, czy nikt ich nie podsłuchuje. „Niesamowite – myślał Stalin w Teheranie, przeglądając stenogramy rozmów Roosevelta. – Mówią wszystko z najdrobniejszymi szczegółami”. Amerykanie zakładali, że wszystkie pokoje w pałacu w Liwadii są „na podsłuchu”, unikali więc rozmów o największych tajemnicach, takich jak bomba atomowa.
W moskiewskich kręgach Beria słynął z nocnych bachanalii, podczas których gwałcił młode kobiety, porywane z ulicy przez jego ludzi i dowożone do willi Berii na ulicy Kaczałowa. W piwnicy domu znaleziono później sterty ludzkich kości.
Dyktatora bawiła obłuda jego sojuszników, którzy zachowywali się tak, jakby zasady niepodległości i samostanowienia narodów miały się odnosić do wszystkich tylko nie do nich. Zgodnie z Kartą Atlantycką z 1941 roku zagwarantowali przecież „wszystkim narodom prawo do wyboru własnej formy rządów”. Amerykanie jednak robili wyjątek dla zachodniej półkuli, gdzie obowiązywała doktryna Monroego, Brytyjczycy zaś – dla swoich kolonii.
Rosjanom nie podobał się ton moralnej wyższości, jakim przemawiali do nich Anglosasi. Iwan Majski zauważył, że „Anglia i Stany Zjednoczone wyobrażają sobie, że są Bogiem Wszechmogącym, że mają prawo sądzić resztę grzesznego świata, w tym mój kraj”
Amerykanie podejrzewali Rosjan o chęć nawrócenia wszystkich na komunizm; z punktu widzenia Stalina było dokładnie odwrotnie. To Ameryka chciała narzucić swoją ideologię i swój system reszcie świata. W tym, co Amerykanie uważali za łagodny internacjonalizm, Rosjanie widzieli groźną postać imperializmu. „Roosevelt wierzył w dolary – wspominał później Mołotow.
Dwudziestego ósmego lutego postanowienia jałtańskie poddano pod głosowanie w Izbie Gmin. Grupa konserwatywnych członków parlamentu zaciekle sprzeciwiała się porozumieniu w sprawie Polski. Jeden z adwersarzy oskarżył Churchilla o wynegocjowanie układu, na którego mocy Polska „straci prawie połowę terytorium, trzecią część ludności” i dużą część zasobów naturalnych. Inny cytował słowa młodego brytyjskiego oficera: „Jest zupełnie oczywiste, że toczyliśmy tę wojnę na próżno; poświęciliśmy wszystkie zasady, w obronie których ją rozpoczęliśmy”.
Zbulwersowała go informacja, że Sowieci odmówili zgody na lądowanie samolotom alianckim, które przeprowadzały zrzuty dla walczącej Warszawy. Wskazywało to, że Stalin kieruje się przede wszystkim „bezlitosnymi względami politycznymi”. Według przypuszczenia Harrimana Sowieci uznali, że nic nie zyskają, a za to mogą wiele stracić na zwycięstwie powstańców wiernych antykomunistycznemu rządowi emigracyjnemu.
Przyszedł czas, „abyśmy całkowicie zrewidowali swoją koncepcję i metody pertraktowania z rządem sowieckim... chyba że chcemy pogodzić się z dwudziestowiecznym najazdem barbarzyńców na Europę”.
W porównaniu z Rosją, Niemcy wydawały się krajem bajecznie bogatym, nawet po pięciu latach wojny. Przed kwietniem 1945 roku większość sowieckich żołnierzy nigdy nie miała zegarka, nie jeździła na rowerze ani nie nosiła porządnych butów. Dla wiejskiego chłopaka z Kaukazu lub Azji Środkowej zwykły dom w Kreinitz albo Strehli wyglądał jak pałac, polna droga zdawała się autostradą, a dobrze odkarmione niemieckie krowy zupełnie nie przypominały zabiedzonych zwierząt gospodarskich z sowieckich kołchozów. Ten kłujący w oczy dostatek kazał im pytać: skoro Niemcy są tak zamożni, to po co najechali biedną, zaniedbaną Rosję? „Jak dobrze się żyło tym pasożytom! – pisał żonie z Niemiec sowiecki porucznik Boris Itenberg. – Widziałem zburzone domy, porzucone meble, chodniki pięknie wysadzane drzewami, biblioteki z nowymi, jeszcze nie czytanymi książkami i dziesiątki innych rzeczy, świadczących o niewiarygodnie dostatnim życiu. Zdziwiłabyś się, co można zobaczyć
Początkowo wielu Ukraińców witało Niemców jak wyzwolicieli, chlebem i solą. Niemcy zezwolili na zakładanie prywatnych firm i rozwiązali znienawidzone kołchozy, zdobywając sympatię mieszkańców, których potem zrazili do siebie nadmierną surowością i okrucieństwem.
Rosyjskie dążenie do ekspansji było według niego wyrazem „wielowiekowego poczucia zagrożenia narodu osiadłego, mieszkającego na odsłoniętej równinie w sąsiedztwie dzikich ludów koczowniczych”. Konieczność opanowania rozległego kontynentu eurazjatyckiego wymagała silnego, scentralizowanego państwa. To z kolei pociągało za sobą budowę potężnej armii, zdolnej do odpierania zagrożeń zewnętrznych, i wszechwładnej policji tłumiącej wewnętrzną opozycję. Wpływy zagraniczne musiały być bezlitośnie tępione. Władcy rosyjscy od Iwana Groźnego do Stalina woleli „trzymać swój naród w ciemnocie niż ryzykować jego oświecenie poprzez kontakt z obcą kulturą i obcymi ideami”[15]. Nawet reformatorzy, jak Piotr Wielki, starali się ograniczać i kontrolować kontakty swoich poddanych z resztą Europy; fascynowali się zachodnią nauką i techniką, a nie zachodnimi ideami politycznymi.
Mimo nieuchronnego zamętu, który 30 kwietnia towarzyszył śmierci Hitlera, przeprowadzona przez sowieckich lekarzy sekcja zwłok nie pozostawiła wątpliwości, że szczęka należała do Führera. Protokół oficjalnej sekcji przeprowadzonej przez Smiersz, stwierdzający „samobójstwo przez połknięcie związków cyjanowych”, trafił na biurko Stalina 27 maja. Dyktator jednak odrzucił wnioski swoich specjalistów i kazał rozpowszechniać alternatywną wersję wypadków. Sowiecki przywódca mógł też dobrze się bawić, zmuszając zachodnie wywiady do „niekończącego się szukania wiatru w polu”,
Podobnie jak w Jałcie, Stalin dokładnie znał stanowisko negocjacyjne Amerykanów i Brytyjczyków. Raporty z podsłuchów uzupełniano tekstami depesz Departamentu Stanu i Foreign Office, wykradzionymi przez sowieckich szpiegów w Londynie i Waszyngtonie. W niektórych wypadkach Stalin wiedział więcej o zachodniej polityce niż sami zachodni przywódcy, ośmieszając ich mężne próby zachowania tajemnicy.
Przywódcy amerykańscy, w nie mniejszym stopniu niż sowieccy, kierowali się ideologią. Byli przywiązani do wilsonowskiej idei, że świat należy uczynić „przyjaznym dla demokracji”. Ameryka miała być „błyszczącym miastem na wzgórzu”, którego światło opromienia resztę ludzkości. Jawnie lub skrycie Amerykanie postępowali tak, jakby ich recepta: wolne społeczeństwo, wolny rynek i wolność słowa powinna być zastosowana przez wszystkie kraje na świecie. Wiara w uniwersalność liberalnej demokracji, głęboko zakorzeniona w amerykańskiej psychice, była nie do przyjęcia dla Stalina, ponieważ godziła w podstawy jego władzy
FDR sądził, że zrobił, co trzeba, aby uzyskać zgodę Stalina na powołanie nowej Organizacji Narodów Zjednoczonych, nawet jeśli oznaczało to uznanie sowieckich roszczeń terytorialnych do wschodniej Polski. Uważał Stalina za takiego samego polityka jak on, za człowieka, z którym można się dogadać. Nie miał oczywiście złudzeń co do tego, że reżim sowiecki jest tyranią.
Paranoja Stalina szła w parze z chłodnym pragmatyzmem. Jego córka Swietłana pisała, że Stalin „nie był porywczy ani wylewny, uczuciowy ani sentymentalny; innymi słowy, brakowało mu wszystkich cech typowych dla Gruzinów. Gruzini są popędliwi, sympatyczni, łatwo ronią łzy, gdy ogarnie ich współczucie lub radość, albo gdy wpadną w zachwyt nad jakąś piękną rzeczą... U niego wszystko było na odwrót, a zimne wyrachowanie, udawanie, trzeźwy, cyniczny realizm stawały się z latami coraz silniejsze”.
Sowieckim fotografom kazano robić Stalinowi zdjęcia od dołu, żeby wyglądał bardziej imponująco. W rzeczywistości mierzył zaledwie 168 centymetrów, miał wypukły tors, chude nogi i niedowład lewej ręki. Głowę obracał sztywno, wyciągając szyję, aby nie widziano jego podwójnego podbródka. Żółtawa, ciastowata cera i nastroszone, zaczesane do tyłu ciemne włosy kojarzyły się jednemu z brytyjskich delegatów ze „zdziwionym jeżozwierzem”[32]. Gości z Zachodu uderzyła dziobata twarz Stalina, skutek przebytej w dzieciństwie ospy, częściowo tylko zamaskowana kilkoma warstwami pudru. Sumiaste wąsy przycięte po bokach zasłaniały nierówne, sczerniałe zęby. Najbardziej wyrazistą cechą tej twarzy były żółte oczy
Bolszewizm był dla Stalina ideologicznym ideałem: dostarczył mu historycznego uzasadnienia dla zdobycia nieograniczonej władzy. Bolszewicy uważali, że są wybraną przez historię elitą, która wciela w życie wolę mas ludowych. Tylko świadoma politycznie awangarda umie rozpoznać prawdziwy interes ludu, zgodnie z teorią Karola Marksa: prości ludzie tego nie potrafią, gdyż mają „fałszywą świadomość”, pełną przesądów religijnych i narodowych.
Los zrządził, że kaleki prezydent i ospowaty rewolucjonista spotkali się nad Morzem Czarnym, by razem z angielskim arystokratą położyć podwaliny pod nowy porządek świata. Krym, z jego zrujnowanymi miastami i zimnymi pałacami, zniszczoną przyrodą i wyludnionymi wsiami, stanowił dobrą metaforę spustoszonego wojną kontynentu, o którego przyszłości trzej przywódcy mieli teraz zdecydować.
Polska przysparza kłopotów od ponad pięciuset lat – westchnął zmęczony Roosevelt, kończąc wreszcie dyskusję.
Stalin uważał, tak jak kiedyś carowie, że Polska ciągle knuje przeciwko Rosji. Oprócz tego, że była korytarzem dla wrogów państwa rosyjskiego, ułatwiała przenikanie niepożądanych wpływów zachodnich.
W rosyjskich operach, na przykład Borysie Godunowie, władcy polscy są tradycyjnie otoczeni przez chytrych księży katolickich, którzy chcą rozciągnąć na wschód zasięg swojej religii.
Polska wiecznie przysparzała Rosji kłopotów. Według Mołotowa „Polacy zawsze robią szum i nigdy się nie uspokoją. Brak im rozumu. Ciągle włażą na kark”.
Zbrodnia katyńska była znakomitym przykładem, jak Stalin potrafił obracać trudne, a nawet beznadziejne sprawy na swoją korzyść. Na początku marca 1940 roku dyktator zatwierdził przygotowaną przez Berię tajną notatkę, w której przewidywano „zastosowanie najwyższego wymiaru kary, rozstrzelania” wobec polskich jeńców wojennych, „będących zawziętymi wrogami władzy sowieckiej, przepełnionych nienawiścią do ustroju sowieckiego”. W rezultacie tej decyzji rozstrzelano w sumie 21 857 obywateli polskich, głównie oficerów, którzy dostali się do sowieckiej niewoli podczas inwazji Armii Czerwonej na wschodnie ziemie Polski.
Stalin starannie przygotował się do spotkania z prezydentem. Od Berii codziennie otrzymywał zapisy podsłuchanych rozmów z udziałem Roosevelta, Churchilla i ich doradców. Oprócz zainstalowania aparatury podsłuchowej w gabinetach i prywatnych pokojach, NKWD dysponował mikrofonami kierunkowymi dalekiego zasięgu do podsłuchiwania rozmów prowadzonych poza budynkami. Całą operacją kierował syn Berii, Sergo, który pełnił podobną rolę podczas konferencji w Teheranie przed czternastoma miesiącami. Rosjanie nie mogli wyjść ze zdziwienia, że Amerykanie poświęcają tak mało uwagi elektronicznej aparaturze podsłuchowej, choć codziennie przeszukiwali pałac w Liwadii, sprawdzając, czy nikt ich nie podsłuchuje. „Niesamowite – myślał Stalin w Teheranie, przeglądając stenogramy rozmów Roosevelta. – Mówią wszystko z najdrobniejszymi szczegółami”. Amerykanie zakładali, że wszystkie pokoje w pałacu w Liwadii są „na podsłuchu”, unikali więc rozmów o największych tajemnicach, takich jak bomba atomowa.
W moskiewskich kręgach Beria słynął z nocnych bachanalii, podczas których gwałcił młode kobiety, porywane z ulicy przez jego ludzi i dowożone do willi Berii na ulicy Kaczałowa. W piwnicy domu znaleziono później sterty ludzkich kości.
Dyktatora bawiła obłuda jego sojuszników, którzy zachowywali się tak, jakby zasady niepodległości i samostanowienia narodów miały się odnosić do wszystkich tylko nie do nich. Zgodnie z Kartą Atlantycką z 1941 roku zagwarantowali przecież „wszystkim narodom prawo do wyboru własnej formy rządów”. Amerykanie jednak robili wyjątek dla zachodniej półkuli, gdzie obowiązywała doktryna Monroego, Brytyjczycy zaś – dla swoich kolonii.
Rosjanom nie podobał się ton moralnej wyższości, jakim przemawiali do nich Anglosasi. Iwan Majski zauważył, że „Anglia i Stany Zjednoczone wyobrażają sobie, że są Bogiem Wszechmogącym, że mają prawo sądzić resztę grzesznego świata, w tym mój kraj”
Amerykanie podejrzewali Rosjan o chęć nawrócenia wszystkich na komunizm; z punktu widzenia Stalina było dokładnie odwrotnie. To Ameryka chciała narzucić swoją ideologię i swój system reszcie świata. W tym, co Amerykanie uważali za łagodny internacjonalizm, Rosjanie widzieli groźną postać imperializmu. „Roosevelt wierzył w dolary – wspominał później Mołotow.
Dwudziestego ósmego lutego postanowienia jałtańskie poddano pod głosowanie w Izbie Gmin. Grupa konserwatywnych członków parlamentu zaciekle sprzeciwiała się porozumieniu w sprawie Polski. Jeden z adwersarzy oskarżył Churchilla o wynegocjowanie układu, na którego mocy Polska „straci prawie połowę terytorium, trzecią część ludności” i dużą część zasobów naturalnych. Inny cytował słowa młodego brytyjskiego oficera: „Jest zupełnie oczywiste, że toczyliśmy tę wojnę na próżno; poświęciliśmy wszystkie zasady, w obronie których ją rozpoczęliśmy”.
Zbulwersowała go informacja, że Sowieci odmówili zgody na lądowanie samolotom alianckim, które przeprowadzały zrzuty dla walczącej Warszawy. Wskazywało to, że Stalin kieruje się przede wszystkim „bezlitosnymi względami politycznymi”. Według przypuszczenia Harrimana Sowieci uznali, że nic nie zyskają, a za to mogą wiele stracić na zwycięstwie powstańców wiernych antykomunistycznemu rządowi emigracyjnemu.
Przyszedł czas, „abyśmy całkowicie zrewidowali swoją koncepcję i metody pertraktowania z rządem sowieckim... chyba że chcemy pogodzić się z dwudziestowiecznym najazdem barbarzyńców na Europę”.
W porównaniu z Rosją, Niemcy wydawały się krajem bajecznie bogatym, nawet po pięciu latach wojny. Przed kwietniem 1945 roku większość sowieckich żołnierzy nigdy nie miała zegarka, nie jeździła na rowerze ani nie nosiła porządnych butów. Dla wiejskiego chłopaka z Kaukazu lub Azji Środkowej zwykły dom w Kreinitz albo Strehli wyglądał jak pałac, polna droga zdawała się autostradą, a dobrze odkarmione niemieckie krowy zupełnie nie przypominały zabiedzonych zwierząt gospodarskich z sowieckich kołchozów. Ten kłujący w oczy dostatek kazał im pytać: skoro Niemcy są tak zamożni, to po co najechali biedną, zaniedbaną Rosję? „Jak dobrze się żyło tym pasożytom! – pisał żonie z Niemiec sowiecki porucznik Boris Itenberg. – Widziałem zburzone domy, porzucone meble, chodniki pięknie wysadzane drzewami, biblioteki z nowymi, jeszcze nie czytanymi książkami i dziesiątki innych rzeczy, świadczących o niewiarygodnie dostatnim życiu. Zdziwiłabyś się, co można zobaczyć
Początkowo wielu Ukraińców witało Niemców jak wyzwolicieli, chlebem i solą. Niemcy zezwolili na zakładanie prywatnych firm i rozwiązali znienawidzone kołchozy, zdobywając sympatię mieszkańców, których potem zrazili do siebie nadmierną surowością i okrucieństwem.
Rosyjskie dążenie do ekspansji było według niego wyrazem „wielowiekowego poczucia zagrożenia narodu osiadłego, mieszkającego na odsłoniętej równinie w sąsiedztwie dzikich ludów koczowniczych”. Konieczność opanowania rozległego kontynentu eurazjatyckiego wymagała silnego, scentralizowanego państwa. To z kolei pociągało za sobą budowę potężnej armii, zdolnej do odpierania zagrożeń zewnętrznych, i wszechwładnej policji tłumiącej wewnętrzną opozycję. Wpływy zagraniczne musiały być bezlitośnie tępione. Władcy rosyjscy od Iwana Groźnego do Stalina woleli „trzymać swój naród w ciemnocie niż ryzykować jego oświecenie poprzez kontakt z obcą kulturą i obcymi ideami”[15]. Nawet reformatorzy, jak Piotr Wielki, starali się ograniczać i kontrolować kontakty swoich poddanych z resztą Europy; fascynowali się zachodnią nauką i techniką, a nie zachodnimi ideami politycznymi.
Mimo nieuchronnego zamętu, który 30 kwietnia towarzyszył śmierci Hitlera, przeprowadzona przez sowieckich lekarzy sekcja zwłok nie pozostawiła wątpliwości, że szczęka należała do Führera. Protokół oficjalnej sekcji przeprowadzonej przez Smiersz, stwierdzający „samobójstwo przez połknięcie związków cyjanowych”, trafił na biurko Stalina 27 maja. Dyktator jednak odrzucił wnioski swoich specjalistów i kazał rozpowszechniać alternatywną wersję wypadków. Sowiecki przywódca mógł też dobrze się bawić, zmuszając zachodnie wywiady do „niekończącego się szukania wiatru w polu”,
Podobnie jak w Jałcie, Stalin dokładnie znał stanowisko negocjacyjne Amerykanów i Brytyjczyków. Raporty z podsłuchów uzupełniano tekstami depesz Departamentu Stanu i Foreign Office, wykradzionymi przez sowieckich szpiegów w Londynie i Waszyngtonie. W niektórych wypadkach Stalin wiedział więcej o zachodniej polityce niż sami zachodni przywódcy, ośmieszając ich mężne próby zachowania tajemnicy.
Przywódcy amerykańscy, w nie mniejszym stopniu niż sowieccy, kierowali się ideologią. Byli przywiązani do wilsonowskiej idei, że świat należy uczynić „przyjaznym dla demokracji”. Ameryka miała być „błyszczącym miastem na wzgórzu”, którego światło opromienia resztę ludzkości. Jawnie lub skrycie Amerykanie postępowali tak, jakby ich recepta: wolne społeczeństwo, wolny rynek i wolność słowa powinna być zastosowana przez wszystkie kraje na świecie. Wiara w uniwersalność liberalnej demokracji, głęboko zakorzeniona w amerykańskiej psychice, była nie do przyjęcia dla Stalina, ponieważ godziła w podstawy jego władzy
December 17, 2025
Michael Dobbs's Six Months in 1945 is a sobering look at the pivotal half-year that saw the end of World War II and the immediate dawn of the Cold War. It masterfully dissects how the "Grand Design" of the Big Three—Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill—collapsed from a euphoric alliance into deep suspicion.
Dobbs focuses on how the personal relationships and conflicting ideologies of these men shaped the modern world. It wasn't just geopolitics; it was a clash of personalities.
The Big Three: A Clash of Characters
The book paints vivid portraits of the leaders, highlighting the friction behind the smiles.
Stalin: The book illustrates him as the ultimate paranoid survivor. His philosophy was simple: the ends always justify the means. He used "blocking troops" to shoot retreating Red Army soldiers ("Not one step back") and removed entire ethnic groups like the Tatars (189,000 people) to the desert. His ruthlessness was personal, too; when the Germans captured his son Yakov and offered a swap, Stalin refused, coldly stating, "I have no son called Yakov." Yakov later died running into an electric fence.
Churchill: He saw the writing on the wall earlier than anyone. Describing himself as "a small lion walking between a huge Russian bear and great American elephant," he tried to secure British interests through secret deals—like the "naughty" document where he and Stalin carved up Europe (giving Russia 90% of Romania). He drank heavily—sherry at breakfast, scotch at lunch, champagne at night—perhaps to cope with the reality that Britain was running out of money while Russia and America dictated the future.
Roosevelt: FDR is portrayed as a dying man, physically depleting while trying to charm Stalin. Reflecting on this, FDR seemed to suffer a similar decline to what we saw with Joe Biden in the 2024 campaign. However, due to his immense legacy and the lack of modern media scrutiny, FDR held the coalition together until his death in April 1945.
The Cost of Victory: Soviet vs. American Reality
Dobbs emphasizes the disparity in sacrifice, which drove Soviet entitlement.
Casualties: The US lost fewer than 500,000 men. The Soviets lost over 20 million.
Battle of Berlin: In the final offensive, the US lost 11,000 men; the Russians lost 78,000 in Berlin alone.
Because of this blood toll, the Soviets felt entitled to "loot" Germany—dismantling factories and inflicting "primal violence" on the population. Dobbs notes that roughly 2 million German women were raped by Soviet soldiers. As one Soviet propagandist wrote, "There is nothing more amusing for us than a pile of German corpses."
The Flashpoints: Poland and The Bomb
The alliance truly fractured over Poland. It serves as a tragic caricature of the era: invaded by Nazis and Soviets in 1939, only to be "liberated" by the Soviets in 1945 who simply installed a puppet regime. Stalin wanted to move Poland’s borders 200 miles west, effectively swallowing the country. As I read this, I couldn't help but feel for the Poles—they were inevitably gobbled up by Soviet influence, and the Allies were powerless to stop it without starting World War III.
Then came the atom bomb. When Truman—the "neophyte" who replaced FDR—took over, he was initially in the dark. The bomb, which cost $2 billion ($24 billion today) and employed 100,000 people, changed the calculus. Truman exulted that it was "the greatest thing in history." Interestingly, Stalin likely knew about the bomb before Truman did, thanks to his spy network.
Conclusion
The book concludes with a chilling realization: The "Grand Design" of peace was impossible because the Allies were fighting two different wars. The Americans fought for a quick military victory and a return home; the Soviets fought for territory and ideological dominance.
Dobbs quotes George Kennan, who predicted the "Red Empire" would eventually fail due to imperial overstretch and economic incompetence. But in 1945, the die was cast. The transition from allies to rivals took just six months, replacing WWII with a conflict that would consume the "lives, energies, and ideological passions of an entire generation."
Dobbs focuses on how the personal relationships and conflicting ideologies of these men shaped the modern world. It wasn't just geopolitics; it was a clash of personalities.
The Big Three: A Clash of Characters
The book paints vivid portraits of the leaders, highlighting the friction behind the smiles.
Stalin: The book illustrates him as the ultimate paranoid survivor. His philosophy was simple: the ends always justify the means. He used "blocking troops" to shoot retreating Red Army soldiers ("Not one step back") and removed entire ethnic groups like the Tatars (189,000 people) to the desert. His ruthlessness was personal, too; when the Germans captured his son Yakov and offered a swap, Stalin refused, coldly stating, "I have no son called Yakov." Yakov later died running into an electric fence.
Churchill: He saw the writing on the wall earlier than anyone. Describing himself as "a small lion walking between a huge Russian bear and great American elephant," he tried to secure British interests through secret deals—like the "naughty" document where he and Stalin carved up Europe (giving Russia 90% of Romania). He drank heavily—sherry at breakfast, scotch at lunch, champagne at night—perhaps to cope with the reality that Britain was running out of money while Russia and America dictated the future.
Roosevelt: FDR is portrayed as a dying man, physically depleting while trying to charm Stalin. Reflecting on this, FDR seemed to suffer a similar decline to what we saw with Joe Biden in the 2024 campaign. However, due to his immense legacy and the lack of modern media scrutiny, FDR held the coalition together until his death in April 1945.
The Cost of Victory: Soviet vs. American Reality
Dobbs emphasizes the disparity in sacrifice, which drove Soviet entitlement.
Casualties: The US lost fewer than 500,000 men. The Soviets lost over 20 million.
Battle of Berlin: In the final offensive, the US lost 11,000 men; the Russians lost 78,000 in Berlin alone.
Because of this blood toll, the Soviets felt entitled to "loot" Germany—dismantling factories and inflicting "primal violence" on the population. Dobbs notes that roughly 2 million German women were raped by Soviet soldiers. As one Soviet propagandist wrote, "There is nothing more amusing for us than a pile of German corpses."
The Flashpoints: Poland and The Bomb
The alliance truly fractured over Poland. It serves as a tragic caricature of the era: invaded by Nazis and Soviets in 1939, only to be "liberated" by the Soviets in 1945 who simply installed a puppet regime. Stalin wanted to move Poland’s borders 200 miles west, effectively swallowing the country. As I read this, I couldn't help but feel for the Poles—they were inevitably gobbled up by Soviet influence, and the Allies were powerless to stop it without starting World War III.
Then came the atom bomb. When Truman—the "neophyte" who replaced FDR—took over, he was initially in the dark. The bomb, which cost $2 billion ($24 billion today) and employed 100,000 people, changed the calculus. Truman exulted that it was "the greatest thing in history." Interestingly, Stalin likely knew about the bomb before Truman did, thanks to his spy network.
Conclusion
The book concludes with a chilling realization: The "Grand Design" of peace was impossible because the Allies were fighting two different wars. The Americans fought for a quick military victory and a return home; the Soviets fought for territory and ideological dominance.
Dobbs quotes George Kennan, who predicted the "Red Empire" would eventually fail due to imperial overstretch and economic incompetence. But in 1945, the die was cast. The transition from allies to rivals took just six months, replacing WWII with a conflict that would consume the "lives, energies, and ideological passions of an entire generation."
February 17, 2020
The third book in Michael Dobbs's Cold War Trilogy was fun history. There aren't too many trilogies that go in reverse order chronologically speaking but I am not going to complain. You also don't have to buy into Dobbs's belief that there was a quick an easy transition from World War II to the Cold War in six months to enjoy it.
Not surprisingly we begin in Yalta where FDR's delegation limped onto the scene. Three members, including FDR, would be dead within a year of the conference. The fact that they were in Yalta as opposed to any other location better suited to dying President because Stalin was not about to go anywhere. Stalin had had enough of planes and so if the wartime leaders were going to get together they were going to have to come to him. Yalta gets brought up often by critics of FDR and Dobbs does more them here than for revisionists who defend FDR's actions at the conference. FDR was not really well prepared convinced he could sit down and speak with Uncle Joe. He had grown weary of Churchill. Details did not really concern FDR which basically meant lopping off a third of Poland and ceding to the Soviets and giving the Poles German land as compensation was fine. Towards the end Harry Hopkins even advises FDR to concede to the Soviets because they had given up so much. What Hopkins and FDR felt the Soviets had given them however were mere words that they had very little intention of fulfilling.
The facts on the ground is what mattered to Stalin and as it stood his forces were making their way through eastern Europe. What was important to Stalin was the security of the USSR and he was going to ensure that there were friends on its borders and beyond. The Soviets dallied during the Warsaw Uprising caring little for Poles not associated with them. They backed leaders that they could trust and marginalized groups that were viewed as too independent or had ties to the west.
By the time we get to Potsdam things had changed considerably. FDR is gone and by the end of the conference Churchill too, having lost his election Oddly enough Stalin was not pleased about the change. While the allies worked together some of the scales had fallen from their eyes. Perhaps they were not glaring at each other but there was not the same level of trust. There was hope that things could continue but there was also frustration that the words of Yalta had not been fulfilled as expected.
For anyone that loves this period in history Six Months in 1945 is great read. Even for those less interested it is a great introduction.
Not surprisingly we begin in Yalta where FDR's delegation limped onto the scene. Three members, including FDR, would be dead within a year of the conference. The fact that they were in Yalta as opposed to any other location better suited to dying President because Stalin was not about to go anywhere. Stalin had had enough of planes and so if the wartime leaders were going to get together they were going to have to come to him. Yalta gets brought up often by critics of FDR and Dobbs does more them here than for revisionists who defend FDR's actions at the conference. FDR was not really well prepared convinced he could sit down and speak with Uncle Joe. He had grown weary of Churchill. Details did not really concern FDR which basically meant lopping off a third of Poland and ceding to the Soviets and giving the Poles German land as compensation was fine. Towards the end Harry Hopkins even advises FDR to concede to the Soviets because they had given up so much. What Hopkins and FDR felt the Soviets had given them however were mere words that they had very little intention of fulfilling.
The facts on the ground is what mattered to Stalin and as it stood his forces were making their way through eastern Europe. What was important to Stalin was the security of the USSR and he was going to ensure that there were friends on its borders and beyond. The Soviets dallied during the Warsaw Uprising caring little for Poles not associated with them. They backed leaders that they could trust and marginalized groups that were viewed as too independent or had ties to the west.
By the time we get to Potsdam things had changed considerably. FDR is gone and by the end of the conference Churchill too, having lost his election Oddly enough Stalin was not pleased about the change. While the allies worked together some of the scales had fallen from their eyes. Perhaps they were not glaring at each other but there was not the same level of trust. There was hope that things could continue but there was also frustration that the words of Yalta had not been fulfilled as expected.
For anyone that loves this period in history Six Months in 1945 is great read. Even for those less interested it is a great introduction.
June 30, 2017
I found it difficult to get into this book, due to a combination of unusually warm weather making it difficult to concentrate and the author's style. There is some interesting information in the book, but the long passages detailing bedroom accommodation and what everyone had to eat or drink at every meal sent me to sleep. Obviously the participants at the conference had to take breaks for meals, etc. and I'm sure Churchill would have been even more of a grouch and FDR would have been even more exhausted if they had not, but the book does not need such breaks.
The author is clearly much more concerned with the US delegations than the other participants in the conference; both Stalin and Churchill are reduced to ciphers and their entourage barely feature at all. He may have felt that this is what his readership wanted, or he may not have been able to access as many independent first hand accounts from Soviet and British sources. (It was difficult to get much reliable information about Stalin either during his life or after his death during the 'deStalinification period', while Churchill liked to think of himself as enigmatic and both men liked to control their public image.) The contrasting personalities of Roosevelt and Truman, how these affected the various negotiations and the mood at the two major conferences do add a human element to what might have been a dry account of the evolving political situation, but it makes the book unbalanced.
I would have liked a bit more background about such matters as US and USSR relations before 1945, we only got a few brief sentences. There was a decade of trade partnerships in the 1920s leading up to formal diplomatic recognition in 1933, which suggests the US was closer to the USSR under Stalin than under any other Russian or Soviet leader before or since, but this does not imply any closeness between Stalin and FDR. FDR thought he understood and could work with Stalin, and he recognised that there was some validity in his claims on pre-revolutionary Russian territory, but it is difficult to know from the information given in the book whether FDR was optimistically deluding himself or whether he could have negotiated a less acrimonious future for the two countries if he had lived longer, resolving the deliberate ambiguities of the Yalta declaration with diplomacy rather than instrasigence. There does not seem to have been much possibility of Truman and Churchill* managing it, so it may be a tragic lost opportunity, or perhaps the coldness would have happened anyway. The author concludes that none of the four leaders wanted a cold war, but perhaps the only one of them who could have prevented it had left the stage.
*Was Churchill's only contribution really finding synonyms for 'joint' until he fell asleep and was ignored?
The author is clearly much more concerned with the US delegations than the other participants in the conference; both Stalin and Churchill are reduced to ciphers and their entourage barely feature at all. He may have felt that this is what his readership wanted, or he may not have been able to access as many independent first hand accounts from Soviet and British sources. (It was difficult to get much reliable information about Stalin either during his life or after his death during the 'deStalinification period', while Churchill liked to think of himself as enigmatic and both men liked to control their public image.) The contrasting personalities of Roosevelt and Truman, how these affected the various negotiations and the mood at the two major conferences do add a human element to what might have been a dry account of the evolving political situation, but it makes the book unbalanced.
I would have liked a bit more background about such matters as US and USSR relations before 1945, we only got a few brief sentences. There was a decade of trade partnerships in the 1920s leading up to formal diplomatic recognition in 1933, which suggests the US was closer to the USSR under Stalin than under any other Russian or Soviet leader before or since, but this does not imply any closeness between Stalin and FDR. FDR thought he understood and could work with Stalin, and he recognised that there was some validity in his claims on pre-revolutionary Russian territory, but it is difficult to know from the information given in the book whether FDR was optimistically deluding himself or whether he could have negotiated a less acrimonious future for the two countries if he had lived longer, resolving the deliberate ambiguities of the Yalta declaration with diplomacy rather than instrasigence. There does not seem to have been much possibility of Truman and Churchill* managing it, so it may be a tragic lost opportunity, or perhaps the coldness would have happened anyway. The author concludes that none of the four leaders wanted a cold war, but perhaps the only one of them who could have prevented it had left the stage.
*Was Churchill's only contribution really finding synonyms for 'joint' until he fell asleep and was ignored?
October 25, 2024
If, like me, you always had a blind spot for how it was that we, the US and Britain, went from being allies with the Soviet Union in 1945 to being locked in a cold war with them by 1946, then this is a great book for filling that spot.
The author cites Alexis de Tocqueville as having predicted that the US would ultimately come into conflict with Russia. That staggering feat of foresight goes mostly unexplored, but is thrown in as a pre-emptive correction to a conclusion the unsophisticated history student might take from this book, namely that the Cold War was an accidental byproduct of the human personalities of FDR, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman.
The Yalta conference: a vague set of declarations where the principals, and particularly FDR, assumed that continued goodwill would prevail and allow the obvious clashes of values and interests to be papered over. FDR wasn’t big on policy preparation and preferred to view the whole thing as a big personality game, albeit one where the stakes were huge. “Feckless” is a word that comes to mind, unfairly. Stalin, meanwhile, was fully aware of how he could use the words of the Yalta declaration to mean whatever he wanted them to mean. Democracy, for instance: a rubber-band of a word that the Communists defined in practical terms best conveyed by George Orwell’s 1984.
George F Kennan – I got a better gestalt impression of this man than I gained from his biography, by coincidence just read by me this past month. “A tortured, introspective man capable of flashes of brilliant insight, George Frost Kennan had always been an outsider.” According to Kennan, “the United States had cast itself in the role of the ever-hopeful suitor,” seeking agreements for their own sake. Much better, Kennan thought, to agree to disagree, than to perform one act of ingratiation after another. “The idea of a Germany run jointly with the Russians is a chimera. We have no choice but to lead our section of Germany… to a form of independence so prosperous, so independent, so superior, that the East cannot threaten it.”
I appreciate that the book sticks to the promise of its title and doesn’t try to tell the whole story of WWII. This allows for super-detailed exploration of events and evolutions that typically get very short telling in broader narratives.
The author cites Alexis de Tocqueville as having predicted that the US would ultimately come into conflict with Russia. That staggering feat of foresight goes mostly unexplored, but is thrown in as a pre-emptive correction to a conclusion the unsophisticated history student might take from this book, namely that the Cold War was an accidental byproduct of the human personalities of FDR, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman.
The Yalta conference: a vague set of declarations where the principals, and particularly FDR, assumed that continued goodwill would prevail and allow the obvious clashes of values and interests to be papered over. FDR wasn’t big on policy preparation and preferred to view the whole thing as a big personality game, albeit one where the stakes were huge. “Feckless” is a word that comes to mind, unfairly. Stalin, meanwhile, was fully aware of how he could use the words of the Yalta declaration to mean whatever he wanted them to mean. Democracy, for instance: a rubber-band of a word that the Communists defined in practical terms best conveyed by George Orwell’s 1984.
George F Kennan – I got a better gestalt impression of this man than I gained from his biography, by coincidence just read by me this past month. “A tortured, introspective man capable of flashes of brilliant insight, George Frost Kennan had always been an outsider.” According to Kennan, “the United States had cast itself in the role of the ever-hopeful suitor,” seeking agreements for their own sake. Much better, Kennan thought, to agree to disagree, than to perform one act of ingratiation after another. “The idea of a Germany run jointly with the Russians is a chimera. We have no choice but to lead our section of Germany… to a form of independence so prosperous, so independent, so superior, that the East cannot threaten it.”
I appreciate that the book sticks to the promise of its title and doesn’t try to tell the whole story of WWII. This allows for super-detailed exploration of events and evolutions that typically get very short telling in broader narratives.
March 17, 2022
With Putin invading the Ukraine, I wondered what the back history to this all was, and I picked up this book to shed some light on where some of it had maybe begun. This is maybe a "popular history", but it's all the better for it, as Michael Dobbs eases us through some of the complex negotiations that Britain, the USA and Russia embarked on to split the spoils of the Second World War (if there were spoils worth having). It's a multi-layered story, full of personalities and "events" that marked the end of an era and the beginning of a new one. It seemed to me that Stalin exacted a big price in territory at the end of the war, but then arguably it was Russia that defeated Germany at a massive cost to themselves, so maybe they rightfully had the upper hand in the negotiation? Unfortunately, Stalin was such a brute that the countries which fell on the Russian side of the Iron Curtain lived to regret it. You felt that Churchill saw the danger in winning the war but losing the peace, but was too exhausted to fight against the tide. FDR was too ill, and his successor, Truman, had less interest in Europe and rebuilding it at America's expense. Stalin knew what he wanted and was the most determined to get it and, I thought, the Allies allowed it. We're still dealing with fall out literally on the day I write this. This book was easy to read and might be classed as a "Cold War for Dummies" text, but that would do a massive disservice to what is actually a really scholarly work and analysis. Well done to the author for writing it, both educating and entertaining me at the same time.
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