The Sources of Normativity

by Christine M. Korsgaard, Onora O'Neill

Ethical concepts are, or purport to be, normative. They make claims on they command, oblige, recommend, or guide. Or at least when we invoke them, we make claims on one another; but where does their authority over us - or ours over one another - come from? Christine Korsgaard identifies four accounts of the source of normativity that have been advocated by modern moral voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the appeal to autonomy. She traces their history, showing how each developed in response to the prior one and comparing their early versions with those on the contemporary philosophical scene. Kant's theory that normativity springs from our own autonomy emerges as a synthesis of the other three, and Korsgaard concludes with her own version of the Kantian account. Her discussion is followed by commentary from G. A. Cohen, Raymond Geuss, Thomas Nagel, and Bernard Williams, and a reply by Korsgaard.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Theory, Law, Female Authors, 20th Century

292 pages, Kindle Edition

First published June 28, 1996

About the author

Christine M. Korsgaard is an American philosopher whose main academic interests are in moral philosophy and its history; the relation of issues in moral philosophy to issues in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and the theory of personal identity; the theory of personal relationships; and in normativity in general. She has taught at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago; since 1991 she has been a professor at Harvard University.

Korsgaard received a B.A. from the University of Illinois and a Ph.D from Harvard where she was a student of John Rawls.

Reviews

[Anthony · Rating 5 out of 5]

Somewhere in the middle of this book you get the feeling that you may, in fact, be a Kantian. Thankfully, that goes away by the end, but at that point you've been overwhelmed by the excellent commentaries by Cohen, Guess, and Williams (and to a less extent Nagel, although he mostly just confused me). Philosophy should always be in lecture form and always be this exciting.

[Richard Newton · Rating 4 out of 5]

I try to judge books on whether I find the reading experience good, rather than whether I agree with what the author has written. This is a good example. Korsgaard has written a very good and relatively accessible case of her views of why we ought to be moral - what are the sources of normativity? Her arguments are based on a Kantian perspective, with her own twist. Given the Kantian perspective she takes, a side benefit of this book is that I found it to be insightful about Kant's own moral philosophy which is, (rightly in my view), regarded as hard to interpret from his own writings. The first three chapters are really good, unfortunately the fourth chapter, which to me is critical to Korsgaard's argument, was less convincing - but then I'm probably never going to be a Kantian. But I still found it to be a very worthwhile read.

[C · Rating 2 out of 5]

Korsgaard is attempting to develop a neo-kantian ethic. Interestingly enough she does this both analytically and dialectically. Analytically in the sense that all her arguments are logical, and always attempting to contain a valid form. Dialectically, in that she is trying to take the good side out of voluntarism, emotivism, realism, etc., and develop them in a Kantian direction. Unfortunately the book largely fails, in my opinion.

Korsgaard makes one too many logical leaps, in the traditional callous Kantian sense, of thinking just because someone does reason X, they will and must do X. Not they ought to do X, they must and will. This is a categorically different claim then the standard normative claim of one ought to do X, and it is one that is demonstrable false. But let's start at the beginning and watch the failure unfold.

First of all, Korsgaard wants to ask "the normative question," that is, what justifies the claims morality makes on us. Because this question is found in reflective thought, the conclusion must be found there too. That's a non-sequitur. Because our reflection distances us from the emotional and desirable route of action, this means we must act for reasons. Again a non-sequitur. I can rationally deliberate about X, and still choose to take the purely emotional route I would have taken, even if I had not deliberated.

For Korsgaard, our universal human nature is what allows us to all act reflectively. “Since you cannot act without reasons and your humanity is the source of your reasons, you must value your own humanity if you are to act at all.” This argument is valid, but completely unsound; of course people can act without reasons. Like a psychological egoist, she is reading back into the action a mental framework that fits her theory, but at the moment of action X, it is not absolutely certain that the action was performed out of reason, and not emotion (moments of love, and anxiety, attest to this).

There are more reasons to criticize this work, but I might as well end here.

If you're interested in a neo-kantian argument, and one of the foremost neo-kantians, read her. If you're not, move along.

[John Lee · Rating 5 out of 5]

If I ever become a Kantian, it'll be because of this book. Above all, Korsgaard is a really really good writer, explaining moral concepts in a way that's not only easy to digest but fun to read through. Her first and second lectures in particular, respectively justifying procedural moral realism and ascribing moral value to reflective endorsement, are nothing short of masterful.

Where this book falters is when Korsgaard moves away from the dialectic discource between justifications for "sources of normativity" and approaches more straightforward Kantian morals. In other words, the book is stronger at discounting substantive moral realism than it is in actively explaining procedural moral realism. This, of course, doesn't neceessarily fault the reasoning behind ascribing to the modes of thought that Korsgaard does, but it does personally make the claims feel weaker in a way (this is an ironic commentary given the conclusions on intuition).

There's really no reason to read Kant over this book which accounts for more recent objections while being ten times easier to read. Get fucked David Hume. 4.5/5.

[Lisa]

my situationship was not worth reading this

[Zachary · Rating 5 out of 5]

In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard takes up what she terms the normative question: why should I be moral? What, in other words, justifies the claims that morality makes on us, such that our commitment to morality would survive reflection on its sources or foundations? A successful answer to the normative question must, she claims, meet three conditions. First, it must successfully address someone who finds herself faced with this question; the normative question is, after all, a first-person question that arises for one who asks whether she must do what morality says. Second, a successful answer must meet the condition of transparency—that is, it must be transparent to us when we act and still allow us to believe that our actions are justified; if we came to accept a normative theory and as a result abandoned our moral practices, such an account would lack transparency. Finally, a successful answer to the normative question must appeal to our sense of identity; if morality sometimes demands that we sacrifice our lives to act in accordance with its precepts, then any account of its basis must relate in a deep way to our sense of who we are (17-18).

With these conditions in place, Korsgaard turns to various responses to the normative question. She observes that “philosophers in the modern period have come up with four successive answers to the question of what makes morality normative,” and they are voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the Kantian appeal to autonomy (18-19). Ultimately, Korsgaard finds aspects in each of these accounts that are true, yet she clearly favors a modified form of reflective endorsement and the Kantian appeal to autonomy to defend her own view. With respect to voluntarism, Korsgaard importantly clarifies that for Hobbes and Pufendorf, both voluntarists, the content of morality is provided by natural reason. However, for both thinkers, an authoritative legislator is required to make it obligatory to act in accordance with morality, or in other words, to make morality normative (27). The major issue in the voluntarist account is that it fails to provide an adequate answer to what makes a legislator authoritative. Hobbes, for example, claims that the authority of the sovereign lies in his ability to punish us when we fail to act in accordance with his authoritative precepts. Yet this means that if I commit a crime that escapes notice and punishment, then the sovereign was not able to punish me, and if my moral obligation to obey the sovereign derived from his ability to punish me, then I had no moral duty not to commit the crime, which would be absurd (29). In short, if, as the voluntarists propose, we derive the authority of morality from some source of power, we are simply faced with a subsequent question about why that power is authoritative. The voluntarist answer to the normative question is therefore unsatisfactory.

Korsgaard next turns to the realist response to the normative question. The realist identifies the problem at the heart of the voluntarist account and, to resolve it, posits the existence of intrinsically moral entities, facts, or truths. Realism of this sort is useful because, if such facts or truths exist, then they provide morality with universal and objective content. One need not worry about the specter of moral relativism if realism is true. On the one hand, Korsgaard affirms a thin kind of realism called procedural moral realism, which is simply the view that there are correct answers to moral questions. Yet on the other hand, she contrasts procedural moral realism with substantive moral realism, which is the view that “there are answers to moral questions because there are moral facts or truths, which those questions ask about” (35). Korsgaard rejects substantive moral realism, less so because, as John Mackie maintains, we have no reason to believe in intrinsically normative entities or objective values, and more so because it simply refuses to answer the normative question. That is, to the question, “Why should I be moral?” substantive moral realism answers, “Because there are intrinsically moral facts or truths that we know must exist.” Yet such an answer, Korsgaard observes, is not really an answer at all, for it merely reflects the philosopher’s confidence that certain actions are morally required, on account of which she believes that those actions are intrinsically normative or objectively valuable. In other words, substantive moral realism puts the cart before the horse in response to the normative question. Or as Korsgaard explains, “the metaphysical view that intrinsically normative entities or properties exist must be supported by our confidence that we really do have obligations. It is because we are confident that obligation is real that we are prepared to believe in the existence of some sort of objective values. But for that very reason the appeal to the existence of objective values cannot be used to support our confidence,” since the normative question “arises when our confidence has been shaken” (40). The realist answer to the normative question is therefore also unsatisfactory.

Korsgaard then examines a view that she terms reflective endorsement. Most basically, reflective endorsement theories, like those offered by David Hume, John Stuart Mill, and Bernard Williams, attempt to locate moral normativity within rather than beyond human nature. The core idea for each of these thinkers, which Korsgaard commends, is that human consciousness is reflective—i.e. that we reflect on our beliefs, desires, roles, and traditions as sources of moral norms. More specifically, for reflective endorsement theorists like Hume, Mill, and Williams, when we reflect on the content of morality, we endorse morality insofar as we conclude that it is good for us in one way or another, or even in several ways. For example, for Hume, morality is good because it corresponds with our self-interest, whereas for Williams, the moral life is a good life because it promotes human flourishing; in both cases, that morality is good for us as humans on account of our nature justifies the demands it makes on us. Nevertheless, Korsgaard insists, the reflective endorsement theories she canvasses still fail to vindicate why those aspects of our human nature in which moral norms are rooted are themselves normative, since these theories presuppose rather than justify the inherent normativity of human nature (Korsgaard, for her part, also thinks human nature is normative, but insists that one must demonstrate this, not merely presuppose it). Consider, for example, a Humean version of reflective endorsement that is based on sentiments of approbation and disapprobation indexed to our natural sympathy. Faced with a moral decision, we examine our dispositions and note that we disapprove of injustice, since injustice is as a rule counterproductive to social welfare, in which we take pleasure due to our natural sociability. Yet why should we endorse this sentiment of disapproval, or even our pleasure in social utility? Why, in other words, are these sentiments, which are the basis for moral norms, normative in the first place? “The fact that we disapprove of injustice . . . can hardly be offered as a reason for endorsing our own disapproval of injustice,” Korsgaard claims in relation to just this issue (59). Reflective endorsement therefore makes an advance over voluntarism and realism, yet still fails to adequately answer the normative question. What we need, Korsgaard maintains, is a type of reflective endorsement that reflects more deeply on whether our particular desires and inclinations—or even our very nature—should be endorsed, a type of reflection that allows us to “accept or reject the authority those inclinations claim over our conduct” (89). And Immanuel Kant provides us with just this type of reflection in his appeal to the categorical imperative.

Kant advocates a type of reflective scrutiny in which one critically evaluates one’s motives for action in view of whether one’s maxim, or principle of action, can be willed as a universal law applicable to everyone irrespective of their particular roles, desires, or inclinations. If one’s maxim can be willed as a universal law, then one is permitted to act in accordance with it, and if one’s maxim cannot be willed as a universal law because, if it were, it would lead to a state of affairs in which one could not will that maxim without contradiction, then one is not permitted to act on it. When one performs this Kantian test and endorses a maxim that can be universally adopted, one’s maxim takes the form of a law, and hence one obeys the categorical imperative, which “merely tells us to choose a law” as the principle of one’s action (98). And a maxim that takes the form of a law, in that its internal structure is universally applicable, is an intrinsically normative entity—i.e. its value is final (we value it for its own sake, not for the sake of some further end) and intrinsic (the source of its value is itself). Thus in some sense substantive realism is true, but not on its own terms, since the intrinsic normativity of a maxim in the form of a law is constructed by the procedure of rational scrutiny proposed by Kant. By this mechanism of practical reason, Korsgaard stresses, humans create value (112). Moreover, this type of reflection, unlike those types advanced by other reflective endorsement theorists, does not presuppose the justification of specific roles, desires, or human nature as authoritative sources of moral norms, and so allows us reflective distance from which we can critically assess the principles of action provided by our roles, desires, and nature. Put differently, reflection of this Kantian sort does not invoke sources of moral norms which themselves require further justification.

Korsgaard mobilizes this Kantian account of reflective scrutiny to defend her own view of the source of normativity. Like the reflective endorsement theorists, Korsgaard turns to the reflective nature of human consciousness, yet like Kant, she observes that reflection allows us to critically evaluate whether our various desires or inclinations provide normative reasons to act, where reason refers to reflective success, or the endorsement of a particular desire upon reflection. Now, in order to act, we need a reason to act, and reasons derive from principles such as the categorical imperative. And because the human will is free (or, more precisely, operates under the idea of freedom, as Kant says in the Groundwork), its principle of action cannot be imposed from outside itself; the will must therefore be autonomous, i.e. it must provide itself with its own principle of action. For Korsgaard, the idea of autonomy means that when one endorses a desire as a reason to act in accordance with a self-legislated principle of action, that principle is expressive of who one is (106-7). When, for example, one’s self-legislated principle of action is the categorical imperative, one sees oneself as a Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends, i.e. a member of that community in which all persons act in accordance with maxims that can be universally adopted. Put differently, autonomy reflects our practical identity, which in turn provides us with principles or laws of action. Just as we have the reflective capacity to endorse our various desires in order to have reasons to act, we also have the reflective capacity to endorse a conception of our practical identity. For example, I am a Roman Catholic, an American, and a brother, and to the extent that I reflectively endorse these identities (and the principles of action which they provide, which in turn provide me with reasons for action), I value myself and my life in relation to this multifaceted conception of my practical identity. This conception is normative for me insofar as I value it and, Korsgaard maintains, some conception of practical identity is absolutely necessary if one is to have a reason to act and to live.

Thus far, we have seen that the reflective structure of consciousness asks us to endorse our desires, principles of action that make those desires reasons, and a conception of practical identity that provides us with principles of action. Korsgaard claims that to reject this entire structure of reflection would deprive me of a reason to act and to live, and insofar as I do have a reason to act and live (and must, in that I am a human with a normative conception of my practical identity), I must endorse my reflective nature. But to endorse my reflectiveness in this way is just to endorse what it means to be human, and thus amounts to an endorsement of my humanity itself. Hence Korsgaard writes: “Since you cannot act without reasons and your humanity is the source of your reasons, you must value your own humanity if you are to act at all.” Concomitantly, “you must value your own humanity if you are to value anything at all” (123). Humanity, then, is the condition for the possibility of all value and the source of normativity, and it is in this, transcendental sense that human nature is inherently and necessarily normative. Moreover, Korsgaard believes that to value humanity in one’s own person rationally requires that one values it in the person of others. And this is because, with a cue from Wittgenstein and the publicity of language, Korsgaard insists that practical reasons are public. Therefore, my humanity can only provide me with reasons to act if humanity understood as a shared, public reason provides reasons to act, and hence the humanity of other persons provides reasons to act and is the source of my moral obligations. More specifically, to value humanity in oneself and in others is to see oneself as a Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends and, if Korsgaard’s transcendental analysis is correct, this is a necessary practical identity for each and every human person. And because, as was stated earlier, the self-legislated principle of action for a Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends is the categorical imperative, it turns out that the scope and content of one’s moral obligations closely resemble the scope and content of the moral law as traditionally endorsed by Kantian reflection.

To conclude, it is notable that Korsgaard extends this transcendental account of normativity to defend the idea that humans have moral responsibilities to non-human animals. In brief, she observes that one’s animal nature is a basic form of identity on which the normativity of one’s human identity, the source of one’s moral obligations, depends. This means that “it is not just as human but considered as sensible, considered as an animal, that you value yourself and are your own end” (152). In other words, to value one’s humanity one must also value one’s animality insofar as one’s human nature presupposes one’s animal nature. To see this requires a further, more deeper level of reflection, which in turn demands a further level of endorsement, since it has already been demonstrated that one’s humanity is the source of all reasons and value. Hence one must endorse the value of one’s animality, and the reasons to act that one’s animal identity provides—for nourishment, to avoid pain, to reproduce, etc.—are not private reasons: insofar as one binds oneself by such reasons, one can be bound by other animals with these reasons as well. Put differently, because the reasons of non-human animals are also reasons for us, non-human animals can obligate us in the same way other humans can. As Korsgaard explains, “when you pity a suffering animal, it is because you are perceiving a reason. An animal’s cries express pain, and they mean that there is a reason, a reason to change its condition” (153). Consequently, just like our humanity, our animality is a source of normativity disclosed in Korsgaard’s incisive transcendental analysis.

[مهدی محمدی · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book has two characteristics which makes it readable. First, the way that author cultivates her ideas through dealing with different theories of normativity. Second, the way in which she interprets works of some great philosophers such as Hume and Kant.
Furthermore, "normative question" which is introduced as the main question of the book is extraordinary useful to face various theories in ethics. It could be used as a criterion for assessing other theories of normativity.

[Daniel Tovar · Rating 3 out of 5]

Like much of Korsgaard's work, I found it interesting but seriously mistaken.

[Alina · Rating 4 out of 5]

Korsgaard presents a stunning Kantian theory of ethics in a series of lectures. Her writing is lucid and more readable than most philosophical texts, given its lecture format. Her ideas are humanistic, and even existentialist, while preserving the best of Kant's transcendental method and ideas.

Korsgaard argues that Kant's arguments from the autonomy of reason fail to analytically entail that we ought to act under the categorical imperative, as the Kingdom of Ends formulation, in order to be free. Rather, Kant's arguments can show we ought to act in accordance with universal laws - but not particularly in accordance with treating every human as an end in herself. Moreover, Kant's formulations of the categorical imperative are ambiguous on how "wide" we should consider the circle of people for whom our maxim ought to be able to be universalized.

Korsgaard provides further arguments that, when supplied with Kant's, defends his full conclusions; her arguments also, in effect, provide principles that could determine the scope of the application of the categorical imperative, given a particular maxim. Korsgaard introduces the concept of "practical identity": a person's practical identity is her conceptualization of her social roles and duties, which define her selfhood, interests, and needs. Maxims for which a person wills should be universalizable up to to the circle of people who share her practical identity. For example, if I am a friend to someone, I want to make sure my actions, when I embody this role, could be performed by all people who are friends to others without contradiction, and with approval by my rational evaluation. This solves the scope problem.

To defend the Kingdom of Ends conclusion, Korsgaard argues that all of us share one aspect of our practical identity: the identity of being a human being. This is the foundation of all other aspects of our practical identity; I can be a friend only if I am a human. This foundational identity is the source of all value and normativity. If I encounter any value in the world (e.g., a friendship is empowering; the rain is rejuvenating), this presupposes that I value my own humanity. I can value something only if I regard myself as dignified and worthy, to have interests and needs that deserve being satisfied. Taking any value presupposes myself as an end. And I am not the only human. All people - and Korsgaard argues, all animals that can experience pain - are ends in themselves, by extension.

This is why it is not enough to act in accordance with any given law to secure freedom and morality. We must also act in accordance with regarding all sentient beings as ends in themselves. As sentient beings ourselves, if we fail to regard others as ends in themselves, we essentially deny or violate the dignity of sentient beings, and thus of ourselves. That is irrational and immoral; it violates the law of reason and, on Kant's theory, prevents us from being free.

Korsgaard shows that this neo-Kantian theory addresses the ultimate problem of the sources of normativity: What ultimately justifies any criteria used to evaluate moral goodness? For example, I may ask, why is it good to keep promises? If I appeal to utilitarian criteria (i.e., keeping promises will maximize happiness), I may again ask, why is it good to maximize happiness? A moral realist positions supporting utilitarianism would claim that happiness is intrinsically good. But Korsgaard shows that answer is untenable, as well as the answers offered by other major traditions in modern ethics (moral voluntarism and skepticism).

Korsgaard argues that, in contrast, Kantianism can address the question of normativity. Our reflective endorsement is the source of normativity. That is, we reflect on what we have presupposed is good, and ask what reasons we have for it; we might think these reasons are justified, and then we might even ask again whether our higher-order reasons for justifying those reasons are justified. Normativity, or the possibility of value, depends on such reflective evaluation. Korsgaard argues that the only objective ground of moral normativity is stipulated by the Kingdom of Ends formulation of the categorical imperative: whether a maxim could be willed by all members of the relevant community, in which the agent belongs.

I found Korsgaard's theory very appealing. It also sheds new light on Kant's original theory. This book includes four additional thought-provoking essays, by philosophers who critique and respond to Korsgaard. I would recommend this book to anyone interesting in Kant, ethics, or existentialism.

[Will S · Rating 5 out of 5]

The rare single book where you get to read it, be impressed and convinced by its arguments, and then become completely disabused of its arguments via devastating criticisms issued by the best philosophers of the era in book's own replies to the author.

[Jacob Williams · Rating 3 out of 5]

Korsgaard wants to provide a foundation for morality that is binding for every rational being, but without resorting to the claim that moral facts just exist in the world in some mysterious way.

The most interesting thing about her theory is how she grounds morality in identity. If an important part of my self-conception is (for example) that I’m a good parent or friend or citizen, I can’t mistreat my child or friend or fellow citizen without challenging my own identity: mistreating them would force me to acknowledge that I’m no longer the kind of person I saw myself as. We’re often very motivated to avoid such challenges to our self-conception.

But Korsgaard is searching for a universal moral law, so she needs to ground it in an identity that everyone shares. This identity, she proposes, is “Citizen of the Kingdom of Ends”; that is, a rational being whose goals are valuable. I find her argument somewhat hard to follow due to its meandering presentation, but perhaps the clearest overview is near the end:

Guided by reflection, we may be led to see that our tendency to treat our contingent practical identities as the sources of reasons implies that we set a value on our own humanity and so on humanity in general. This realization leads us to the moral principle of valuing humanity as an end in itself.[1]

Instead of offering us a way to say X is objectively wrong, Korsgaard’s theory is meant to offer us a line of argument we can use to convince any rational person to believe that X is wrong. She believes “any reflective agent can be led to acknowledge that she has moral obligations”[2]. As I understand it, the strategy relies on drawing out some latent contradiction between believing that your own goals are worth pursuing and believing that you have no moral obligations.

I think there are a lot of weak points in the book, but I’ll focus on two here.

1. Ambivalence about nihilism

Technically, Korsgaard doesn’t claim that her view proves you ought to care about everyone’s interests. She only claims to show that you either ought to care about everyone’s interests, or adopt total “normative skepticism” and not care about even your own interests. My own preferred argument for morality involves a similar dichotomy: I think the arguments for reductionism about personal identity show that either you have a reason to care about everyone’s future pleasure and pain, or you don’t even have a reason to care about your own future pleasure and pain. On my view, though, these are not equally valid options; the absurdity of the nihilistic option is meant to help you see that the moral option is objectively correct.

By contrast, given Korsgaard’s metaethical position, it seems like she would have to say the choice between morality and nihilism is entirely arbitrary. I see this as a weakness because I think we can directly perceive that there is something non-arbitrary in the choice. Although it’s plausible that for many of the things we value, such as art and music, their value derives from our attitude/reactions to them, I do not believe this is true of (for example) the subjective experience of pleasure or joy. If I imagine a person who experiences those feelings in the exact same way I do, yet does not believe or act as if those feelings have value—perhaps makes every effort to avoid experiencing them—it seems to me that the person must be in some way mistaken or confused. That person’s failure to value joy does not render their joy valueless. But on Korsgaard’s view we would have to conclude that it does.

2. Failure to establish universality

Let’s assume this part of the above quotation is a sound argument (though I don’t think it is):

our tendency to treat our contingent practical identities as the sources of reasons implies that we set a value on our own humanity

Then Korsgaard needs to establish that the next bit follows from that:

and so [we set a value] on humanity in general

But her argument for this seems very weak. She relies on the claim that reasoning is an inherently public or social activity, and that simply learning about someone else’s reasons automatically leads us to acknowledge those reasons as having some normative force:

If I say to you ‘Picture a yellow spot!&rsquo you will. What exactly is happening? Are you simply cooperating with me? No, because at least without a certain active resistance, you will not be able to help it. Is it a causal connection then? No, or at least not merely that, for if you picture a pink spot you will be mistaken, wrong. Causal connections cannot be wrong. What kind of necessity is this, both normative and compulsive? It is obligation.[3]

That’s an, um, creative way to use the word “obligation”. But the following is true to some extent:

All I have to do is talk to you in the words of a language you know, and in that way I can force you to think.[4]

And thus other people can force us to consider their reasons in our own decision-making. Korsgaard thinks that when this happens, it’s natural and normal for us to consider those reasons as mattering by default:

We do not seem to need a reason to take the reasons of others into account. We seem to need a reason not to.[5]

Okay. But what if we say that a sufficient “reason not to” is simply: it doesn’t affect me? Korsgaard thinks the other person can then ask us to imagine ourselves in their position, and we will automatically (perhaps involuntarily) do so, and will thus feel the force of their reasons ourselves.[6] And she seems to think we’d be involving ourselves in a contradiction or inconsistency if we believed something like if I were you, X would be a valid reason at the same time we believed X is not a valid reason.

But that’s not necessarily true. Reasons can be agent-relative. If we’re playing chess, for example, I acknowledge that you should try to checkmate me, but I also believe I should try to stop you from checkmating me. There’s nothing inconsistent about that. Are moral questions like that? Can it simultaneously be true that you should try to benefit at my expense, and that I should try to benefit at your expense? Most of us would answer no, but some people say yes, and Korsgaard’s arguments seem insufficient for showing that the latter group is making any sort of error.

[1] Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 250.

[2] Ibid., 125.

[3] Ibid., 139.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., 140–41.

[6] Ibid., 142–44.

(crosspost)

[Ross · Rating 5 out of 5]

Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids. [...] For to violate them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be who you are. That is, it is to no longer be able to think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself and find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. It is to be for all practical purposes dead or worse than dead.

Korsgaard seeks to answer the "normative question": what justifies the claims that morality makes on us? In addition to addressing how and why moral ideas can have important practical and psychological effects on us, she also attempts to justify granting this kind of importance to morality. Her account is Kantian, with an emphasis on practical identity. The responses from Cohen, Nagel, Guess, and Williams fail to damage her project too much, before she provides a thorough and convincing reply in the final section of the book (the benefit of being the author of the book, I suppose). Nagel's objections seem to me the most convincing of the four, but it is worth reading The Sources of Normativity for anyone who wants to decide for themselves.

[Benjamin · Rating 1 out of 5]

Rational normativity? How about western-centric exceptionalism and Aristotelian ethics masquerading as truth? The rational is born from the normative, not the reverse. I disagree with the fundamental tenants of this book.

[Julius · Rating 4 out of 5]

Die Autorin argumentiert sehr gradlinig von

1. Pfufendorf und Hobbes ("normativity must spring from the commands of a legislator")

2. und die Aussage "The thinking self has the power to command the acting self, and it is only its command that can make action obligatory. A good thinking self commands the acting self only to do what is good, but the acting self must in any case do what it says." hin zu

3. Realisten wie Nagel ("reasons are intrinsically normative entities") und schliesslich zu

4. "Reflection has the power to compel obedience, and to punish us for disobedience. It in turn is bound to govern us by laws that are good. Together these facts yield the conclusion that the relation of the thinking self to the acting self is the relation of legitimate authority. That is to say, the necessity of acting in the light of reflections makes us authorities over ourselves. And in so far as we have authority over ourselves, we can make laws for ourselves, and those laws will be normative. So Kant's view is [...] true. Autonomy is the source of obligation." (pp. 164 - 166).

[Ralph Palm · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent, 'Rawls-grade' application of Kant to contemporary philosophy, with an Isaiah Berlin style fluency with the historical literature. She also rights clearly on a complex topic, which is as welcome as it is rare.

In my opinion, things get a little muddled in the 4th lecture, but that might be due to my lack of familiarity with the contemporary versions of the issues. The responses included from other authors are even more of a mess, but since I know at least 2 of them (Thomas Nagel & Bernard Williams) are competent writers, I think it's likely a a consequence of the format than an actual confusion in their views.

Lastly: although Korsgaard doesn't mention the connection here, her technique of not simply describing the historical views in sequence, but also showing how the failures of the earlier lead into construction of the latter ones is straight out of the Hegel playbook. So, you know, bonus points.

[FP⚡️ · Rating 3 out of 5]

My 3 stars are awarded to the two great opening lectures on the history of metaethics, and the incisiveness critical addenda by Nagel et al. at the end, and not any of the actual normative theory in the middle... Will perhaps write a fuller criticism of practical identity-based procedural realism at some point, but I think Cohen and Geuss basically captured it. There are like 100 reasons to dispel Korsgaard's theory, but I think the top like 1-3 of them are sufficient grounds on their own. That being said, the metaethical history section was genuinely fantastic, and I'm glad I read the book (and am at least open to changing my mind...)

[Anders · Rating 5 out of 5]

So far, I've only read the prologue and chapter 3. This book is incredible. We spent 2 weeks in my ethics class going over Kant's 'Groundwork', and I still felt like I knew nothing afterward. After reading just a little bit of Korsgaard, I feel like all of it just clicked. I'm not a Kantian, but this is some of the best and most clear philosophical writing that I've read, and it is absolutely deserving of 5 stars.

[Ana Ruiz · Rating 5 out of 5]

I only read one of the essays in this book, but, Gosh, do I really have to get to the other ones at some point. If any one will convince you of being a kantian at this point, and make it beautiful (instead of dry-boring-old-German philosophy) in the meanwhile, it's Christine. Good for her, and for all of us that get to read her.

[Jacob MacDavid · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is both an excellent take on our reasons to be moral (and our practical reasons in general), and a helpful history of moral philosophy. I don't think the view actually works, but it's nonetheless a rich, insightful, beautiful way to think about what it is to be human, particularly what it is to be a human with deep cares and values, who must make moral decisions in a confusing world.

[Jocelyn (foxonbooks) · Rating 4 out of 5]

Korsgaard speaks in a clear, understandable way about exceptionally complex subjects. I don't know to what extent I agree with her conclusions, but she has introduced many fascinating ideas about rationality, morality and where we might find normativity with this series of lectures.

[Juliana Zuluaga · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book. Very clear how she presents her arguments and thesis. The objections and replies are also great to clear up and further development of her ideas. It gives the reader a very good summary of the heading answers to the normative question.

[Ayush · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant, reflective summary of the major arguments for normativity. What is particularly compelling is how Korsgaard discusses not only the broad points of a critique but why there is a tendency among certain philosphers to argue things a certain way.

[Roy Kenagy]

RK BABEL CITED IN THIS LIFE PERSONS

[B · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent and thought-provoking. Worth re-reading in its entirety, but especially chapters 3 and 4.

[Ana Sofia · Rating 3 out of 5]

Korsgaard le da muchas vueltas a la normative question, recomiendo solamente lectures 2 y 3 pero siento que overall no me dio mucho el libro lol

[Kaidi Pan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Who doesn't like Christine Korsgaard?

[Joshua Stein · Rating 3 out of 5]

Korsgaard is a legend in modern ethics and meta-ethics, and this book is a pretty good illustration of why that is. The arguments are succinct, poignant, and thoughtful; she considers a pretty wide range of possible views advanced throughout the 19th and 20th century ethics literature. One of the challenges with the book, and it does weigh a bit on my review of the book, is that the language is often more obscure and technical than it needs to be, and dwells on a lot of references within the literature that give it the distinctive texture of academic writing. (To a certain extent, that's just a convention in the discipline, but it does really get in the way of some of the more interesting ideas.)

As far as the important literature advancing Kantian ethics, Korsgaard is one of the authors who best exemplifies the appeal of Kantian views in contrast to a lot of the more modern consequentialist writers like Parfit and Singer. Further, she defends the view in a way that is really close to the Kantian approach to argument, focussing on the self as a rational agent and working from there to talk about moral norms and obligations. This approach to argument, and the fact that it is so succinct, makes me think that Korsgaard is probably under-read among a lot of modern ethicists; personally, I would prefer using her work to talk about Kantian senses of obligations than a lot of the other writers, and try to set her up as a foil.

Like a lot of what I read, I wouldn't recommend the book to those outside of ethics. However, it is definitely something that I would bookmark for teaching an upper-division undergraduate class at some point in the future.

[Andrey Babitskiy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Four lectures by a well-known philosopher, published as a book, with critical commentaries by a few notable colleagues, namely, Thomas Nagel, Bernard Williams, GA Cohen, and Raymond Guess. Korsgaard has an agenda; she not only reviews sources of [moral] normativity proposed by her predecessors, but also tries to develop her own reflective approach, based on Kantian ideas. Informative, analytical, and fun to read. The polemical part of the book is worth the time, too.

[Neil Aplin · Rating 1 out of 5]

Yes, I know, a bit beyond my pay-grade, but after failing to understand my step-daughter's essay on the subject, she offered me the book and I feel I owe it to everyone that I get my small head around all this!

Unfortunately I had to struggle through this to the end to convince myself that I hadn't a clue what was being discussed - dense and impenetrable! Not sure how anyone can fathom this out, there must be a breed of reader/thinker well beyond my reach!

[Yusef Asabiyah · Rating 5 out of 5]

What I most remember and love about this book is the use of Nietzsche. I read the book primarily to get a wider perspective than the one I had from Nietzsche, and then what I get is different, and more beautiful perspective on Nietzsche.