What do you think?
Rate this book
Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (Soviet
David Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level and its connection with deep battle, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its refinement and application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.
442 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1991
10 people are currently reading
250 people want to read
About the author
David M. Glantz
100 books219 followersDavid M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.
He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.
After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.
In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.
A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.
Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.
Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.
He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
June 22, 2017
Starts slow but builds into a great analysis of Soviet (Russian) doctrinal thought from 1918 to 1990. Glantz details the policy/strategic, operational, and tactical evolution over time to include a detailed description of force structure. This structured book is easy to read and understand.
It provides context to Russia's current approach to warfare because understanding where you came from helps figure out where you are. I was skeptical but thoroughly enjoyed the read. It has already assisted my understanding as I read my next book on the WWII German-Russian Front.
It provides context to Russia's current approach to warfare because understanding where you came from helps figure out where you are. I was skeptical but thoroughly enjoyed the read. It has already assisted my understanding as I read my next book on the WWII German-Russian Front.
May 6, 2022
Interesting as a reference. The academic style means the book is not terribly readable. Definitely good to have on the shelf next to the actual Soviet theorists.
October 2, 2016
Unbelievably dense and dry, but a very good overview of a key topic for anyone interested in contemporary military history.
July 14, 2022
Reading books from my library that I first read over 20 years ago.
What's old is new again, or so it would seem. This book - Soviet Military Operational Art - should be an additional reference book to a recently published book titled: Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea: The Modern Application of Soviet Political Warfare.
Soviet Military Operational Art was published in 1991 and has a forward by Gen Carl E. Vuono. The book has 8 chapters and over 20 pages of notes. There are 266 reading pages. The author provides details on notes and primary references and a total of 115 supporting tables and charts of supporting information.
Soviet/Russian Military Science is steeped in history. The Soviets/Russians view history as a process of development and history is a science that is studied with the goal of understanding the present and the prospects for the future. This included integrating all the lessons learned cross- domain.
Although the present situation in the Ukraine - as of 7/14/22 - appears to be militarily and operationally messy - the Russians have followed an all to familiar playbook. The Russians have applied a precision to the terms and definitions of there military science, yet many in the west refer to the present strategy as hybrid and asymmetrical. This is false. Even Gen Gerisimov back in 2014 and 2016, indicated that the Soviets do not practice hybrid or asymmetrical war. If you can find this book, get it. its a great historical primer for the other book i mentioned and what you can expect to see after the Ukraine.
What's old is new again, or so it would seem. This book - Soviet Military Operational Art - should be an additional reference book to a recently published book titled: Russian 'Hybrid Warfare' and the Annexation of Crimea: The Modern Application of Soviet Political Warfare.
Soviet Military Operational Art was published in 1991 and has a forward by Gen Carl E. Vuono. The book has 8 chapters and over 20 pages of notes. There are 266 reading pages. The author provides details on notes and primary references and a total of 115 supporting tables and charts of supporting information.
Soviet/Russian Military Science is steeped in history. The Soviets/Russians view history as a process of development and history is a science that is studied with the goal of understanding the present and the prospects for the future. This included integrating all the lessons learned cross- domain.
Although the present situation in the Ukraine - as of 7/14/22 - appears to be militarily and operationally messy - the Russians have followed an all to familiar playbook. The Russians have applied a precision to the terms and definitions of there military science, yet many in the west refer to the present strategy as hybrid and asymmetrical. This is false. Even Gen Gerisimov back in 2014 and 2016, indicated that the Soviets do not practice hybrid or asymmetrical war. If you can find this book, get it. its a great historical primer for the other book i mentioned and what you can expect to see after the Ukraine.
March 30, 2015
Interesting, non mainstream read. I am happy the cold war remained cold.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews