The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan

Cambridge Essential Histories

by Wilson D. Miscamble

This book explores the American use of atomic bombs and the role these weapons played in the defeat of the Japanese Empire in World War II. It focuses on President Harry S. Truman's decision-making regarding this most controversial of all his decisions. The book relies on notable archival research and the best and most recent scholarship on the subject to fashion an incisive overview that is fair and forceful in its judgments. This study addresses a subject that has been much debated among historians and it confronts head-on the highly disputed claim that the Truman administration practised 'atomic diplomacy'. The book goes beyond its central historical analysis to ask whether it was morally right for the United States to use these terrible weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It also provides a balanced evaluation of the relationship between atomic weapons and the origins of the Cold War.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, War, Military Fiction, American History, American

192 pages, Kindle Edition

Published April 11, 2011

Reviews

[Brittani · Rating 2 out of 5]

The political history of the atomic bomb between 1941-1945 as told by Miscamble:

1. Truman didn't use the bomb as a diplomatic tool against the Soviet Union.
2. Truman didn't use the bomb as a diplomatic tool against the Soviet Union.
3. Some stuff happened with Japan, whatevs.
4. Truman didn't use the bomb as a diplomatic tool against the Soviet Union.

Miscamble probably wanted to provide different information than the usual death and destruction of the atomic bombs, but repeatedly saying that Truman didn't use the bomb as a diplomatic tool doesn't exactly make for an informative read.

[Jake · Rating 3 out of 5]

Why did the Americans ultimately use nuclear weapons? What was Truman thinking when he called the shots? Were the Americans evil for dropping the bomb?

These are some of the questions the book poses and grapples with. It serves at the very least as very good introduction to answering the historical rational for why the Americans military did what they did.

Recommend for people interested in World War Two, the ethics of nuclear weapons, and for anyone simply curious about this topic

[Rob Mills · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very short read that walks through Truman's decision to drop the bomb. It seems more of a long essay targeted at revisionists that suggest it was all about the cold war all along. I've read a few other books on this and thought that this take was ok. Nothing truly insightful but a quick history lesson from a new perspective is always ok.

[Michael · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was my choice for my annual Memorial Day War history reading. A quick read, with a clear and well justified point of view. The afterward on the historiography of Truman's decision is especially helpful.

[Paul Cahill · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fantastic quick read. Very illuminating in regards to the historical context in which the use of the atomic bomb must be viewed.

[Jim · Rating 4 out of 5]

A question, which has a more disturbing implication: That the use of the atomic bomb was necessary to obtain the surrender of Japan or that is was not necessary? The latter either requires more then one hundred thousand civilians must die to accomplish for reasons whether malicious or not, and the latter requires the acknowledgement that the killing of so many civilians can, in fact, produce a moral good (the ending of the most costly war in human history).

In general, discussions of the use of the bomb take one of two positions: it was necessary and just or it was unnecessary and unjust. Father Miscambe seems to come to the conclusion (which I agree with) that bombings were a profoundly unjust act, but that those in the decision making process were correct, as then Secretary of War put it, "this deliberate, premeditated destruction, was our least abhorrent choice."

Claims that Japan was ready to surrender on something close to the terms they eventually did, or that that the bomb was used to intimidate the Soviet Union are rather easil put to rest. Miscambe spends much more time focusing the latter then the former since it involves more technical details. The author goes into detail into different members of the Executive's varying attitudes toward the Soviet Union, as well as there attitude toward using the bomb as a diplomatic tool from primary sources. He demonstrates decisively that President Truman did not favor using the bomb as anything other then a war weapon against Japan. Furthermore, he shows that Truman and his cabinet had no control over the bomb's use after clearing it's final use to the military.

The internal discussions within the Japanese cabinet are decisive. At no point did Japan's cabinet, include "peace elements," show a desire to surrender under the Potsdam terms of unconditional surrender. It is sometimes claimed that if the United States sent a message that they would preserve the the Emperor the surrender would obtained without the bomb. This is problematic because it's mistakes the concept of a constitutional monarchy and the "Imperial system" which was destroyed after Japan adopted it's constitution under the occupation. President Truman very nearly accepted and was encouraged so by Secretary of War Stimson) a message of surrender that accepting the Potsdam Declaration with the caveat "[this would] not compromise any demand which preclude prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." After it was made clear the implications of this Truman reversed himself and sent a message that made it that the Emperor would be subject to the Supreme Allied Commander, and tempered this anything that implied the permanent absolute existence of the Emperor with the proclaiming that "the ultimate form of government of Japan...shall be established by the freely expressed will of the people." (It is true that the U.S. leadership was not against having Japan retain the position of Emperor, or and Truman seemed surprisingly sanguine for someone he regarded almost as bad as Hitler getting to keep some sort of dignity. In fact, Hirohito would almost lose his grip on power but as the war crimes trials combined with the internal mechanism of the royal family before MacArthur put his foot down and made it clear he didn't want Hirohito going anywhere.)

The Emperor's agreement to these terms triggered a attempted coup that wished to sideline him. It was the Showa Emperor, earlier after the bombing of Hiroshima, decided the war was so destructive as to be pointless to continue. The Japanese cabinet was deadlocked between hardliners, and proponents for a negotiated peace. The second bomb did not shift this deadlock. Under the rules of Japanese governance, Prime Minister Suzuki should have resigned but in the desperate situation he did not and instead summoned a conference at the Palace, where after listening to the debate between the two parties, the Emperor intervened.

The question then is not whether Japan would have accepted an unconditional surrender or near such surrender before the bombs were dropped. Would have Japan surrendered anyway even if the bomb wasn't dropped? Well, not immediately certainly. It has been suggested that the invasion by the Soviet Union caused Japan to surrender MORE then the two atomic bombs. The military significance of that invasion is without question, but the hardliners in the Japanese cabinet still imagined that Japan could be held against invasion. A strong case has been made here and elsewhere that Japan better prepared it's population for invasion, and could have inflicted huge causalities in the event of such an invasion (although the talk of 1 million American dead and injured does perhaps seem overblown) although arguments can be put forward that Japan would have been driven surrendered before an invasion. The problem is that these raise significant ethical questions as well.

It was not felt generally by those in the know that the atomic bomb was necessarily a war ending weapon. When the Trinity test preformed better then expected this did raise the hope that it was possible, but war planning continued as before. Strictly speaking, the atomic bomb is a logical successor to the firebombing of civilian population centers in Germany and Japan. Had the war continued such bombings would have continued, and more atomic bombs would have been dropped (indeed American troops would have passed through radioactive contamination, as information on this was not totally apparent).

The human cost of continuing the war it must be said, unless Japan surrendered very quickly, would have been tremendous even assuming Japan was not invaded. The United States had a blockade of Japan's supply lines to the outside world. An element of this was actually called "Operation Starvation" and had the potential to cause mass civilian deaths. At Nuremberg, prosecutors attempted to charge Admiral Donitz and Radaar for use of "unrestricted submarine warfare" for sinking civilian ships without warning, but had to drop it once Chester Nimitz stated the US engaged in the same practice (both guilty of other crimes and sentenced to prison). Although whether problematic United States Bombing Survey is right that a better coordinated effort to starve Japan out could have ended the war earlier I don't know. Although it's not in the same, Leningrad was starved to the effect of more then half a million dead without breaking. Is it morally better to blockade a people and let them starve then to bombard them from the sky or are they both equally wrong?

Former President Hoover, the closest thing America's ever had to a pacifist in the White House, did not know about the atomic bomb. He didn't get along with FDR (who always jabbed at him), but Truman felt a special kinship to the only living former President. Hoover advised Truman not to invade Japan even if it meant leaving contracted for the Empire in place. The invasion would take too many American lives, and not be worth it.

Japan, several days after the bomb was dropped, complained through the Swiss, that the bomb killed disproportionately without regard for woman or children. President Truman, in his radio broadcast after the bomb was dropped called Hiroshima, "a military base." Truman also remarked privately, that unlike Japan, when using this new weapon we would not target women and children. The author is correct when thinking that Truman is being self-deceptive here. Truman would be very combative when the question of the morality of the bomb was brought up, bringing up "Pearl Harbor" and Japanese "murders." He would later begin to speak of the need be cautious in the use of such a terrible weapon. Several advisers who had no issue with the bomb at the time would later come to question it's use.

Truman's harshness, or callousness must be understood in context. World War II was the most terrible war in human history. Japan's complaint about targeting civilians might have made sense to Japanese on some level. Japan hadn't killed American civilians, or destroyed American cities, why was American doing the same. Yet, America had regularly complained about Japanese behavior toward Chinese civilians, and then most importantly, Japan had launched a sneak attack (if only half by a mistake in diplomatic messaging) on the United States, and treated American prisoners horribly. When discussing whether bombing Hiroshima was right or wrong we don't have this perspective (anymore then if we were a wounded survivor of Hiroshima).

If Japan could not be forced to surrender quickly then were the atomic bombs the right course of action? Elizabeth Ascombe, who disputes that they were necessary, said the bombs were "always murder." The author says, that viewed in isolation, the use of the bombs were a "deeply immoral act," is not "obviated" by the fact that is done in a good cause. He does not say that the decision was incorrect, however. Indeed, just before this, he quotes from Machiavelli (who he correctly notes is misunderstood) saying, "a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good."

If the bombs were wrong then the firebombing that proceeded them would have been wrong. Ethically, the morality of starving a population had already been condemned before the war. There seems little question however that applying the Geneva Convention in the most liberal manner to Japan would have led to America losing the war, and I do wonder if the bomb had become available earlier and Germany was not defeated the same people questioning the use of the bomb on Japan would have questioned it's use on Hamburg or Stuttgart in 1942 if it could have prevented so much of the Nazi horrors, although again the same philosophical issues would apply.

In the final analysis, as the hideous St. Just said with a somewhat different meaning, "One cannot reign innocently."

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

“The Most Controversial Decision” is as-advertised in its thoughtful rebuttal of the revisionist view that victory in the Pacific was imminent without the use of nuclear weapons and that Truman’s use of them was as much (or more) about postwar geopolitical considerations than about defeating Japan. This revisionist view is difficult to square with the case laid out by the author. However, the chapter “Necessary, But Was It Right?” did not live up to its billing or my expectations, in that it fails to delve into the deeper questions of just what is permissible to save lives. The author effectively slaps down the idea that the war in the Pacific could have been won without either nuclear weapons or massive American and Japanese casualties, and the arrows he aims at those who self-righteously declare that Truman (of whom I’m no fan) was a war criminal hit home. But he does not really engage with the question of whether it can be “still right” even if hundreds of thousands (or even millions) of lives were ultimately spared by their use. Is it right to directly target civilians to save a million people? A billion? This is perhaps a rabbit hole with no end but strikes me as a central consideration in any debate over whether the use of nuclear weapons in Japan was morally justifiable.

[Beth · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is one of the most fascinating monographs I’ve read. The author defends the American decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan—however difficult the decision was. He supports his claims with evidence from US and Japanese officials’ personal papers—as well as the circumstances of a bloody and long war, US military exhaustion, recent carnage in the Pacific, Japanese intelligence and preparations to defend their mainland to the death, a billion dollars invested in atomic bomb development, and Truman’s heavy reliance on advisers following his surprising placement in office and not knowing FDR’s intentions.

[Cyrus Douglas Vincent · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good read, not long but well-researched. The author suggests that, for good or ill, the human consequences for dropping the first Atomic Bomb were not thoroughly considered at the time or, more accurately, they were subordinate to speedily ending the war. Setting aside the ethical consequences of the decision, the book itself is an excellent analysis of decisions made at the time and a good use of an afternoon.

[Sarah Taffet · Rating 2 out of 5]

It was fine… I like how it focused on Truman but it felt very repetitive and that there wasn’t any new information we didn’t already learn in school. Met the author though he was very nice and knowledgeable

[Jesse]

:/

[Sophie Nye · Rating 3 out of 5]

Another book for my class. It was definitely interesting, although I kind of question certain ideas that the author brings up.

[Nakul · Rating 5 out of 5]

Politics, nationalism, patriotic frenzy and war. And in the midst of this is the choice - the choice of deploying the first ever atomic bomb. This book is a well researched and thoroughly annotated piece, but it is surprisingly not so much about the decision itself but of the events leading upto it. The geopolitical scenario, the climate in Europe and South East Asia, the political conditions in USA - where the great Roosevelt who had steered America for 3 presidencies through Depression and the War unexpectedly left it all to Truman. The book deals with the years 1945-46, the making of the bomb, the deployment and the aftermath the people involved.

We get a surprisingly nuanced portrait at all the actors - Mr. Truman, Mr. Stimson the Secretary of War, Mr. Brynes, Stalin, Churchill and more. Mr. Wilson immerses you in the context of war ridden US at the time and then questions the atomic diplomacy at the time and whether the bomb should have been used.

This is a quick and extremely interesting read at one of history's most poignant/ugly moment, and how the world collectively crossed the Rubicon.

[George · Rating 5 out of 5]

A well written, well documented analysis of the decision to use the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Using detailed intercepts from the above top secret MAGIC and ULTRA intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic and military codes it is UNDENIABLE that Japan was never on the verge of surrender in July 1945. It is revisionist history and a willingness to suspend belief from those so morally against using weapons of any kind that believes otherwise.

In addition the proceedings of the Japanese Council ( to the Emperor) that basically ran Japan provide NO EVIDENCE in any way shape or form, that Japan, which still had a standing army of 5,200,000 men and a NAVY although decimated and without many capital ships had 1,800,000 men under arms, had ANY intention of surrendering. The policy of KETSU-GO, well documented from multiple sources, was to inflict as much damage as possible on any invading force so that the Allies would sue for peace. The deliberate arming of the civilian population , which also occurred on Okinawa and resulted in the loss of life of well over 100,000 "militia", is also well documented.

Lastly it has been firmly established from records of the time that between 250,000 and 300,000 people were dying in South East Asia and China EVERY MONTH due directly to continued Japanese aggression. Further prolongation of the war would have killed orders of magnitude more people than were ever killed by the atomic bombings and their subsequent aftermath. And that does not even begin to tell the story of how many Japanese would have died from continual bombing, invasion, starvation and disease every month the war lingered.

Lastly, for the revisionist historians out there, there is absolutely nothing in any historical record that purports to show that the Soviet intervention after the first bomb was dropped was going to cause the complete and utter collapse of the Japanese military. In fact it is an absurdity in and of itself, that a Japanese army that fought for every inch of the Philippines, Okinawa, Iwo Jim, Tarawa, Saipan, Tinian, Peleliu and a dozen other places, was going to surrender 24 hours after a minor Soviet Army invaded Manchuria.

[Paul · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a deliberately short book, in the Cambridge Essential Histories, written by an expert in Truman and the transition from Roosevelt to Truman, but self-avowedly dependent on other experts for the subject.

It is also admittedly written by a proponent of the traditional position on the decision to drop the atomic bomb. The summary is a good one, although like some critics I have found in journals, the chapter on "Necessary, but was it Right?" is at the least too short, at the most contradictory of his own tradition.

I agree that the author, although a Catholic priest, fails to deal with the morality issue well. It may be that the chapter is like the book a summary. And certainly, quoting Machiavelli almost approvingly is bothersome. But most certainly, the author does not deal with the moral tradition of the Church at all.

The series is intended to be textbooks in college courses, intended to raise issues. The book does do that well.

[Peter · Rating 4 out of 5]

What went into Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan? Miscambles, a Catholic priest, interprets the decision in the light of Japan’s propensity for brutality and its firm resistance to any surrender (as shown repeatedly on islands like Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and Tarawa). In addition to Japanese intransigence and brutality, the anticipation of possibly millions of military and civilian deaths from an invasion of Japan, and the idealogical and (possibly) post-war military struggle with the Soviet Union played significant roles. Miscamble concludes that the use of The Bomb was justified.

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is very well written. At first I thought this book was primarily about the use of the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but Prof. Miscamble also discusses the use of the atomic bomb as a political/military tool during the opening stages of the Cold War. It is hard to write that I enjoyed this book; not because of the book itself, but because of the subject matter.
I recommend this book to anyone who wants to learn about the atomic bomb and the reasons behind it use on Japan, but also as tool or lack there of during the opening salvo of the Cold War.

[The Book : An Online Review at The New Republic]

THIS BOOK, by the priest and cold war historian Wilson D. Miscamble, is a volume in the Cambridge Essential Histories series, which is (according to its statement of purpose) “devoted to introducing critical events, periods or individuals in history … through thesis-driven, concise volumes.” Concise The Most Controversial Decision certainly is: it packs into its 150 pages discussions that other scholars have spent careers grappling with. Read more...

[Efranken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Truman and atomic bomb

[Derek · Rating 1 out of 5]

This is essentially a slightly more sophisticated version of Paul Walker's trashy defense of the use of the atomic bomb ("Truman's Dilemma"). A hagiographic love-affair with Truman and Byrnes at its worst. Nasty reading, nasty writer.

[Jm2 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent book on the decision to use the Atomic Bomb on Japan to end WWII.

[Samara · Rating 5 out of 5]

A cogent presentation of the pre-hiroshima world and more--a must-read for intelligent historical discourse of 20th century politics

[Andy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Excellent analysis, though not the most readable book ever written.