Endurance and War: The National Sources of Military Cohesion

by Jasen Castillo

Scholars and military practitioners alike have long sought to understand why some country's militaries fight hard when facing defeat while others collapse. In Endurance and War , Jasen Castillo presents a new unifying theory—cohesion theory—to explain why national militaries differ in their staying power. His argument builds on insights from the literatures on group solidarity in general and military effectiveness in particular, which argue that the stronger the ties binding together individuals in a group of any kind, the higher the degree of cohesion that a group will exhibit when taking collective action, including fighting in war. Specifically, he argues that two types of ties determine the cohesion, and therefore the resilience, of a nation's armed forces during the degree of control a regime holds over its citizens and the amount of autonomy the armed forces possess to focus on training for warfighting. Understanding why armed forces differ in their cohesion should help U.S. military planners better assess the military capabilities of potential adversaries, like Iran and North Korea. For scholars of international politics, cohesion theory can help provide insights into how countries create military power and how they win wars.

325 pages, Hardcover

First published January 20, 2014

Reviews

[Patrick · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book is an analytical mess that oversimplifies a fairly complex problem in military analysis and tries to apply it to international relations. It makes some strange conclusions about national or military service or unit level cohesion based on evidence/details that were likely out of date years before the “cohesion test” took place. The book also seems to place a lot of weight on historical myths of French combat experiences and plays overmuch into the meme about the German military being the most combat effective. The book also seems to discount contradictory instances of desertions and surrenders as being due to unexplained tactical errors rather than a lack of cohesion.

[Ted Tyler · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent contribution to the field of international security studies. In this book, Castillo seeks to provide insights into why some militaries continue to fight, while others give up due to a lack of endurance. He proposes a theory of "military cohesion" that depends on two variables: the degree of control a regime holds over its citizens and the amount of autonomy the armed forces possess to focus on training for warfighting. High control allows for the enforcement of unconditional loyalty, which leads to fighting no matter the odds. Autonomy to train gives armed forces the opportunity to create unit bonds and adopt flexibility in training and tactics. Control and autonomy create four distinct militaries, each with different degrees of cohesion: messianic, authoritarian, professional, and apathetic.

Messianic: The Wehrmacht (Nazi Germany) and The North Vietnamese. These two militaries enjoyed strict regime control and high degrees of autonomy. Both fought with tremendous intensity, even as the Allies pushed back the Germans and the North Vietnamese took great casualties in the American-Vietnam War. They ultimately believed in the righteousness of their cause and fought to the bitter end. The Germans fought fiercely even though WWII was a lost cause after D-Day. The North Vietnamese never won any significant battles against the US military, but the Vietnamese kept fighting until the American public grew weary and placed pressure on the Johnson and Nixon Administrations.

Authoritarian: The Soviet Union. When the Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union, the Soviets fielded about 5 million soldiers against an army of about 3 million. The Soviets were quickly driven back, but kept fighting and held out for years in Moscow and Leningrad. The Soviets ended up taking an estimated 28 million casualties (deaths and wounded), and at points, they lost 20 people for every 1 German soldier. But the Soviets kept fighting. Why? The high degree of regime control. Russian nationalism, Soviet ideology, and a ruthless domestic security system created a fierceness in the Soviet military. Fear of Stalin, fear of losing to the Nazis, and the intensity of fighting for one's homeland made the Soviets a force to be reckoned with. They had poor tactics and little freedom, but the military kept fielding men (and women) to fight back.

Professional: The United States, France (WWI), and Germany (WWI). Professional militaries have low degrees of regime control and high degrees of autonomy. When goals are clear and the conflict seems winnable, the militaries have a moderate level of cohesion. The US fought well and inflicted many casualties in Vietnam, but when the conflict seemed unwinnable, the military was less eager to fight. Officers were "fragged" and soldiers deserted. Draft dodgers went up. The US never gave up, but the force fought with less cohesion at the end of the war. The French spilled significant blood throughout WWI. Seeing the way they fought and the number of casualties, made me see how war-weariness affected the French. Too many valiant Frenchmen lost their lives. This created a tense relationship with the politicians in the interwar period. The Kaiser's army also fought well until it became clear that WWI was not going to end favorably. Only when the Spring Offensive of 1918 faltered, did the professionals lay down their weapons.

Apathetic: France (WWII). The French had a powerful military and fielded better tanks than the Germans, but the French had a stale doctrine, a weak civil-military partnership, and a lack of trained troops. There were many times that blitzkrieg could have been stopped, but a hesitancy to act, combined with an undisciplined military force led to problems. The Germans made many reckless moves in the opening movements for the Battle of France, but the French could never capitalize. French generals decided to surrender and spite the politicians, rather than continue fighting.

This is a useful theory and suggests that non-material factors require more study. A well cohesive force will fight more fiercely than a non-cohesive force with great materials and firepower.

[Al Johnson · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a difficult "3" star rating to give.

The reason was that the basic definition Castillo provided for cohesion, was far broader than the functional definition of cohesion that military studies assigns it. Combat cohesion is simply the definition of how well an organization (be it two people to a division or more) will maintain the organizational bond in combat. It does not assign a combat effectiveness, nor a morale factor. Many historical incidents of very cohesive units demonstrate that on occasion they will simply refuse to fight. World War I saw cohesive French units that mutinied against higher echelons orders to fight and simply forged their own truce with the enemy. They were still cohesive, just not willing to fight. However, Castillo assigns combat effectiveness, morale, and comittment under the blanket of cohesion. It is this error that makes the book lose a four star rating.

Having said that, the book is an excellent primer for analyzing the factors that go into unit cohesion, when the cohesion in a unit will break, and the different types of organizations and how factors affecting cohesion will vary depending on the type of unit.

Endurance and War breaks armies into four distinct types. This is helpful in understanding where each type of army gains its cohesion from, and where that cohesion can be broken. The examples given show why France folded rather quickly in 1940 yet the Soviet Union in 1941 did not despite taking 10x more casualties.

The book also helps to add to the existing literature on cohesion theory by placing the work of such forerunners as Shills, Janowitz, Marshall, and others in perspective. While their theory worked for one or two types of unit cohesion models, it was not able to predict for the remaining two, as Castillo points out. This more detailed understanding of cohesion theory is an excellent addition to the sparse literature available today and is highly recommended despite the problematic definition given for cohesion in the beginning.