Карнавал революції. Центральна Європа 1989 року

by Padraic Kenney

Книжка американського історика Педрика Кені про "карнавальний" складник центральноевропейських "оксамитових" антикомуністичних революцій постала зі свідчень її учасників, громадян кількох центральноевропейських країн - головно Польщі, батьківщини знаменитої "Помаранчевої альтернативи", але також Словаччини, Словенії, Угорщини, Чехії, Східної Німеччини та України: чимало сторінок присвячено пробудженому Львову, насамперед діяльності Товариства Лева.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Poland, Politics

471 pages, Paperback

First published March 18, 2002

Reviews

[Данило Судин · Rating 4 out of 5]

Цю книжку було видано 2006 р. і в післяреволюційній ейфорії вона дещо загубилася. Втім, я прочитав її лише зараз і вважаю дуже актуальною. Попри те, що автор не намагається вибудувати теорію і практику ненасильницького спротиву в цій праці, корисні висновки для України-2014 можна зробити.

Перш за все, автор шукає причин, чому "карнавальні революції" могли відбутися в 1980-х рр. Він таких причин знаходить декілька: небажання комуністиних урядів вдаватися до широкомасштабних репресій, наявність в комуністичних урядів мінімального почуття патріотизму, "тиск" з боку Москви. Саме такі основні висновки П.Кені, хоча я б додав ще декілька, про які він пише в самій праці, хоча не хоче узагальнювати. Але спершу про ці три пункти.
1. Влада не хотіла застосовувати широкомасштабні репресії. На це впливали різні фактори. Деколи це була політична культура самого суспільства: польські комуністи в цьому плані виглядали найбільш ліберальними та європейськими. Частково це був вплив пункту 3, тобто тиску з боку Москви з вимогами про перебудову та лібералізацію.
2. Це найцікавіше. Навіть комуністи вважали себе елітою конкретного суспільства, а тому бачили, що їхня країна котиться в економічну прірву. Через це вони були готові до реформ, а також - і до поступок та круглих столів з народом.
3. Москва зайняла курс на перебудову, чого вимагала від країн Варшавського блоку. Це був дзвінок для прихильників силових методів: якщо почнете бити свій народ, то на допомогу з СРСР не розраховуйте. Фактично, СРСР скасовував "доктрину 1968 р.", тобто втручання в справи Центральної Європи.

Окрім цих тез, слід виокремити ще декілька.
4. Карнавал. Проблема комуністичних суспільств полягала в тому, що народ був атомізований, тобто люди не довіряли один одному, та переляканий, тобто боявся репресій з боку влади. Революція 1988-1989 стала можливою завдяки попередній підготовці: людей вчили не боятися і організовуватися. Власне, для цього карнавал був найбільш придатним: він не вимагав від своїх учасників поважних жертв, страшної конспірації та входження до підпільних організацій. Та й участь в ньому загрожувала мінімальним покаранням. Фактично, "карнавальні акції" були аполітичними, бо не висували політичних вимог. Проте мали чіткий політичний підтекст. Наприклад, вимоги скасувати обов’язкову службу в армії і замінити її альтернативною. Парадоксально, але в комуністичних країнах людина могли не служити в армії через свої релігійні переконання. Отже, виходило, що комуністичні країни поблажливіші до релігійних людей, хоча релігія - опіум для народу! Тим більше, що соц.табір - за мир у всьому світі. Отже, як це так: ми за мир, але всі мають відслужити в армії. Аналогічні акції стосувалися і більш поточних проблем. Наприклад, екологічних, збереження історичних пам’яток чи навіть браку туалетного паперу! Якщо "ми" живемо краще за загниваючий захід, то чому у нас немає туалетного паперу? До речі, стосовно останнього була акція, де люди вийшли з плакатами "Хто боїться туалетного паперу?" А й справді: чому комуністична влада має боятися питання про туалетний папір?
Інший вид карнавалу стосувався офіційних заходів. І ось тут "карнавальщики" пародіювали офіційну риторику та символіку. Наприклад, на день Жовтневої революції організатори одного з гепенінгів закликали учасників вдягнути що-небудь червоне, а як немає одягу, то купити булку і полити її кетчупом. А як немає булки, то просто замастити руку кетчупом. Карнавалізація офіційних символів ставила владу в цуґцванґ, тобто ситуацію, коли будь-який хід тільки погіршує становище. Репресії проти карнавалу показували слабкість влади та її антинародний характер, ігнорування підривало довіру людей до влади, бо показувало, що владу можна ігнорувати.

5. Ідеологія. Як не дивно, але влада також не могла йти на репресії (і проти карнавалу в першу чергу), тому що була владою трудового народу. Відповідно, застосовувати силу щодо свого власного народу - це підривати власну легітимність. Ось цього комуністичні режими боялися. Страх втратити обличчя перед Заходом, щоправда, дещо компенсувався підтримкою з боку СРСР. Але коли і СРСР перейшов до більш ліберального курсу (перебудова), то комуністичні режими втратили будь-яку легітимізацію застосування сили щодо власного народу.

6. Ресурси. Будь-який рух потребував ресурсів: чи комуністичних, чи західних. Існує теорія суспільних рухів, яка стверджує: власними силами суспільних рух не може розвинутися, оскільки його учасники мають замало ресурсів для боротьби. Якби вони ці ресурси мали, то не протестували б. Проте перемогти цей рух може лише тоді, коли матиме ресурси. Для цього треба залучати аутсайдерів, тобто людей ззовні, які мають ресурси. У випадку Центральної Європи такими людьми були "американці", які часто передавали фінансову допомогу протестувальникам в Центральній Європі. Або комуністичні уряди! Останні вірили, що політичні протести можна каналізувати, скерувавши їх на неполітичні цілі. Таким чином виникали екологічні товариства, мистецькі спілки тощо. Відповідно, "карнавльщики" всього лише мусили опанувати ці офіційно дозволені інституції. Звісно, якщо влада не хотіла такого робити (як в СРСР), то карнавальні революції зазнавали краху.

7. Карнавальні революції не можуть змінити владу. Як не дивно, але політичні карнавали можуть "розігріти публіку", тобто створити передумови для розвитку громадянського суспільства, але не здатні висунути політичні програми, які б підтримувалися всім суспільством. І тим більше, лідери таких революцій не можуть виступати повноцінними гравцями на політичній сцені. Їхнє поле діяльності - вулиця, а не парламентські комітети та фракції. У всіх Центральноєвропейських країнах карнавальні революції були "використані" старою опозицією, щоб прийти до влади. Пишу "використані" в лапках, бо йдеться лише про те, що стара опозиція стала для комуністів партнером у політичній грі лише після того, як комуністи зрозуміли: народ таки можна змобілізувати. Крім того, стара опозиція мала досвід і могла залучитися до роботи державних установ доволі швидко, чого не могло статися з лідерами карнвальних революцій.

8. Мотивація. Як не дивно, але лідери карнавальних революцій в 1990-х роках відчували розгубленість: поки вони боролися за благо всіх, їхні однолітки здобували освіту, рухалися вгору по кар’єрній драбині. І ось в 1999 р. карнавальним революціонерам слід вже або наздоганяти своїх більш успішних однолітків, або ставати маргіналами. Чи це не підриває мотивацію до участі в революціях?

Загалом, книжка цікава і актуальна саме для сучасного українського суспільства.

[Alexandra · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not as fun as the title suggests

[Kriegslok · Rating 5 out of 5]

"A carnival breaks down borders of all kinds. It forces a suspension of the usual rules of society, issuing a challenge to the existing order and reversing social and political hierarchies."

The ruling regimes of post-war Central Europe had a legitimacy problem, with the possible exception of the DDR, from their foundation. Born out of the USSRs desire to have a buffer zone of client states between itself and the West, a not totally unjustifiable paranoia about Western intentions on the part of Stalin, the states liberated by the Red Army got off to a shaky start. As the USSR "parachuted" in Moscow approved leaderships and weeded out suspect nationally oriented Socialists and Communists, as well as any other significant political, or "unreliable" national figures, it made a rod for its own back that grew in strength as Moscow aged and the system weakened. Overly nationally oriented programmes were viewed as a threat, as was any deviation from a line that deviated from the tight Moscow leash that determined economic, political, social and international policy. However, this book is not directly concerned with, and has little to say about, the structures and operation of the regimes themselves. That is, not beyond how the system of government, representation and the struggle to function at a level where it was possible to satisfy economic expectations of the population, resulted in the birth of civil resistance to the ruling parties.

Padraic Kenney, the book's author, was a student in Wroclaw when civil resistance was at its zenith. I was lucky enough to be studying as an Erasmus student at Wroclaw University when he was teaching there and attended his seminars. The book is a culmination of his own experiences of the time and extensive (probably the most wide ranging) primary research undertaken of the largely neglected role of ordinary people in the civil groups that organised opposition in a society where there was little, or more often no, room for alternative viewpoints or opposition to the "Party line".It is split into two sections, the first deals with the founding, growth, structures and strategies of the civil opposition. The second part is effectively a historical review of key events in the lives of the civil opposition movements of Central Europe in the late 1980s. The sections are separated by an interesting portfolio of rare archive photos from the 1980s opposition.

Poland features prominently in this book and the author locates the grassroots uprisings that brought about the eventual collapse of the ruling regimes as having their origin in the wave of Polish resistance that built steadily from the late 1970s and brought about the foundation of the workers Solidarity union. However, the imposition of martial law effectively crushed the open activity of Solidarity leading to an underground resistance which struggled to remain relevant and arguably only emerged as a politically relevant actor again thanks to new forms of civil resistance which are the subject of this excellent book.
Officially drawing their legitimacy as being the self-declared leading representative of the working classes the ruling parties of Central Europe placed themselves in a corner when it came to responding to dissent which became clearly mass based. Individual Marxist based critiques could be silenced politically as not adhering to the tenets of  "democratic centralism", perhaps through expulsion from the Party, the country, or in serious cases "fraternal assistance" and "disappearance". The people were more of a problem. Unlike many of the overtly fascist and military tyranny's supported or tolerated by the West, the states of Central Europe based what they presented as popular legitimacy on being legally established entities in which the rights of citizens to a range of freedoms were enshrined in law and constitutions. Unlike many of the contemporary regimes of Latin America the use of blatant terror and death squads was not an option in Central Europe. In the post Stalin era especially, shooting people, or making them disappear, were not a prefered option for winning support or compliance (and tended to backfire quite badly on the occasions the techniques were used). The Prague Spring events, and several smaller confrontations in Poland over the years, were on the one hand defeats for mass popular opposition, but also, in the longer term, further defeats for the legitimacy of the ruling regimes.

Opposition groups were often denounced as reactionary and Western inspired and supported plots. It is clear from the book that opposition groups enjoyed significant external material and moral support both from those with a Western human rights agenda and with politically driven goals. The US propaganda "Radio Free Europe" station played an important part in broadcasting news of actions and activities of the various groups across Central Europe, especially highlighting political prisoners, offering a level of publicity that could embarrass the ruling regime. However, while this was often used and appreciated it is interesting to read of the misunderstandings that existed in both directions and the differences in aims and means that could occur beyond the confusion of simple cultural factors. 

The civil opposition frequently took great care to act within the bounds of the law. Issues chosen for targeting were frequently those which the authorities could not easily object to. Kenney notes campaigns included "...a temperance movement in Warsaw, the celebration of folk tradition in Lviv, a march against nuclear holocaust in Budapest, a campaign to clean up Bratislava". Sometimes an attempt was made to use official organisations to resource such campaigns, equally official organisations might attempt to steal a campaign's clothing as its own making it "safe". However, as Kenney notes "precisely because they were so innocuous, they backed regimes into uncomfortable corners", and as they were not direct opposition as such they gave people a relatively safe way of becoming active and involved in civil protest with less risk than direct displays of public opposition. A large number of such activities across the region are examined here in detail.

From the mid 1980s Kenney identifies a "shift" in the nature of opposition, away from the dissident "intellectual critiques of the communist system" and towards "...opposition grounded in concrete concerns. Anti-military protests, environmental action, and defense of cultural autonomy...". The Polish organisation WiP, Freedom and Peace, emerged at a time when Solidarity remained largely underground and invisible. WiP filled a space for opposition beginning with campaigns around conscientious objection and military service but broadening its activities to include a range of peace and environmental issues, often providing direct support and encouragement to local campaigns while they found their feet. Kenney notes that WiP "...won not through compromise, but confrontation" (non-violent) and managed to remain "a step ahead of the regime, not reacting to it".
The close connections and support networks built between Central European civil groups are perhaps not that well known. This book documents in detail the connections made. Methods were learnt and activists met to exchange experiences and give each other support. Polish groups were clearly way ahead elsewhere in terms of underground and overground organisation with a samizdat and publications network unlike anywhere else. This apparently existed to the extent that the Polish groups supplied publications, printing facilities and equipment across fraternal borders with an organised smuggling system operating over the Tatra Mountains. All much to the annoyance of the security services of the more serious states.
Perhaps today the most famous of the groups to have appeared on the scene is Orange Alternative, the surrealist, happening based group, under the charismatic guidance of Maria "Major" Fydrych of Wroclaw in 1981. It is in Orange Alternative that the subversive nature of the "carnival" discussed by the author is perhaps most clearly articulated. A founding act was the modification of Solidarity graffiti, which had been overpainted by the police, to take on the appearance of gnomes ``...as if, by Hegalian logic, the synthesis of opposing ideas (a slogan and its negation) would produce a new idea" whereby passersby were "forced to consider the point of the struggle over wall space, and to wonder why little elves were so threatening to communists". Orange Alternative adopted a number of  tactics in their struggle for the streets but generally drawing on over identification with the official ideology, mockery, and lots of surreal humour. The Orange Alternative "Children's Day" celebration event saw 1000 dancing, singing, elves in red caps who were rounded up by police for the crime of......? Making the authorities look foolish and wrong footing them became an Orange Alternative forte and one which was borrowed with some success elsewhere. "Major" Fydrych was not a great fan of authority, or Solidarity, and "legend has it that while Fydrych got few votes (in the Wroclaw senate elections standing against Solidarity) he actually won a majority in one election precinct; that of the riot police barracks. They more than anyone appreciated Fydrych's fame". Orange Alternative played an important role in making people feel like they had a right to be on their streets and reclaiming public space, something which seems to make all states very uncomfortable and aware of their fragility.

"The agenda of opponents of Central European communism ... seemed suspicious - not least because they reaped praise from the likes of Ronald Reagan or Margaret Thatcher. In speaking out against the evils that their regimes had perpetrated in their stalinist pasts, Central European activists sounded as if they were opposed to the very idea of socialism (as many were). If so, this smelled, to the Western left, like a return to the semi-authoritarian nationalist regimes of prewar Central Europe". In the more longterm a significant number of those involved in the more reactionary and nationalist extreme rightwing regimes emerging in Central Europe today had their roots in the civil opposition of the 1980s, leading figures in this rogues gallery being Hungarys Viktor Orban and Slovenias Janez Jansa. Civil activist groups like Orange Alternative no doubt played a significant role in holding and preparing the ground for the fall of the ruling regimes but were quickly usurped at the negotiating tables where establishment opposition figures stepped in followed by a stream of advisors from the West. It is interesting to note the divisions that this caused in the opposition between those who found a place in the new system and those who rejected the new system as well and who felt to an extent sold short or betrayed by the new system. Robert Jezierski of Orange Alternative mocked the obedience of those flocked to the ballot box "I take out my soul and put it in the ballot box...and I don't have to do anything or think anything. The senators will do it for me". Arguably, although not covered by this book, the collapse of the regimes of Central Europe opened a vacuum which sucked in a slick and sophisticated marketing operation from the West. There was no time for experimentation or alternative, all was swept away in a cynical and unstoppable wave which certainly in the case of the DDR was nothing short of  Anschluss. Many, perhaps most, are satisfied now with consumer plenty and states which, for the most part, aren't interested in what they say or what they do.
In conclusion Kenney writes "... negotiations would have been quite unlikely without the active opposition of the previous half-decade. In place of the apathy and resignation of the urban majority, and hermetic underground militancy of a tiny minority, there arose a much broader social commitment to concrete, open engagement. The regime did not agree to negotiate because this or that opposition leader showed indefatigable determination (nor, of course simply due to economic decline and Western pressure, both of which had been the case for a long time). The catalyst to dialogue was the broad social unrest on dozens of stages".
This is an important and fascinating study both of a period in history and the nature and organisation of opposition. While opposition is of a time and place and is tailored to specific circumstances it always provides lessons for those who follow and for the never ending battles between people and authority. Some of the methods and lessons of the 1980s were in evidence in the Wroclaw of the early 2000s in the anti-war movement and Reclaim the Streets events I encountered there and have played a part in a range of public protest across the region since. Arguably this book has as important lessons for future resistance to power as it is a record of the success of resistance of the past.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is another of the books I read in graduate school that I hope I will one day have time to really read properly. From what I could tell from my hurried skimming (now several years ago), it is excellent. Kennedy discusses the “Fall of Communism” from the inside, not from the point of view of the wielders of power, but from that of the many seemingly powerless dissidents who had worked in isolation for years until Glasnost changed the rules of the game. Because he had been there as a student at the time, some degree of autobiography (and certainly bias) creeps in, but it remains a fascinating portrait of free thinking and rebellion within a “totalitarian” system.

Kennedy describes the region as “Central Europe:” meaning, essentially any former Communist state that wasn’t integrated into post-USSR Russia, including both those which were Republics of the USSR (Ukraine, Lithuania) and those which were nominally autonomous satellites (Poland, East Germany). This is a wide range, but his focus is actually a much narrower and more centralized area – primarily Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Slovenia, with some mention of Romania, Ukraine, and other regions of Yugoslavia. “Belarus,” “Moldova,” “Estonia,” and “Bulgaria” (among others) are completely absent from the index. Within this region, he identifies five strands or traditions of dissent and resistance: reformism within the Party, the advocates of “civil society” like Vaclav Havvel, the churches, the counter-culture, especially that surrounding punk and jazz, and nationalist opposition. These all came together, he argues, during the 1980s, to give rise to Solidarity in Poland, and to inspire movements of dissent throughout the region. But, given the Soviet reaction to the overtly political movement of Solidarity, activists once again had to shift tactics to “Konkretny,” or concretism, which entailed a pragmatic yet hopeful approach which disguised or avoided overt political statements. Instead, they brought attention to the contradictions or weaknesses of the existing regimes without proposing clear alternatives.

The result was a mish-mash of bizarre and often opposing groups working together in an atmosphere Kennedy describes as “carnivalesque.” Temperance advocates jostled with drunken punks, nationalists and pacifists marched together, religious believers spoke alongside atheistic intellectuals, and the whole thing seemed more focused on how the world didn’t make sense than on any sense-making explanatory approach. As things spun more out of control for the regime, creativity among the dissidents became more pronounced and the use of humor emphasized as the best answer to stifling seriousness. Costumes and street theater were popular tactics. People spoke of having the police join in with events, rather than fighting them (this rarely worked). While the bureaucrats tried to control production, more and more people took back their lives, at least for a while.

Kennedy’s view of this period is, as I said above, probably biased by his own experiences with these groups and his own political affinities. Still, this is a very interesting and useful look at the ways in which people within an oppressive atmosphere can manifest their freedom, whether or not these manifestations were ultimately responsible for the collapse of the regimes in power or whether they were sustainable ways to run societies after the collapse. What the book really shows is the range of possibilities available for people who claim their agency, and that is ultimately what any good revolution is all about.

[Martina · Rating 5 out of 5]

A fascinating chronicle of social movements that overthrew communism in Europe.

[Maddie · Rating 3 out of 5]

3.5 stars

[Carrie · Rating 3 out of 5]

In terms of innovation and uncovering a period of history that was, at time of publication, not written about in terms of grassroots type movement, this is a great book. The details are great, but it is overwhelming at times, the author switches back and forth with his choice of identifier for groups (ie Freedom and Peace; WiP) and the anecdotes sometimes don't seen entirely relavent. A good read, but could have been better.

[Lyra · Rating 3 out of 5]

I'm reading an excerpt, a chapter called "How the Smurfs captured Gargamel, or a Revolution of style" and it's about the student uprisings in Poland in the 1980s and how they would make the police go crazy just by doing something radical like singing folksongs in public. Very good.

[Jonathan]

None