Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism

by Adrian Kuzminski

Pyrrhonism is commonly confused with scepticism in Western philosophy. Unlike sceptics, who believe there are no true beliefs, Pyrrhonists suspend judgment about all beliefs, including the belief that there are no true beliefs. Pyrrhonism was developed by a line of ancient Greek philosophers, from its founder Pyrrho of Elis in the fourth century BCE through Sextus Empiricus in the second century CE. Pyrrhonists offer no view, theory, or knowledge about the world, but recommend instead a practice, a distinct way of life, designed to suspend beliefs and ease suffering. Adrian Kuzminski examines Pyrrhonism in terms of its striking similarity to some Eastern non-dogmatic soteriological traditions-particularly Madhyamaka Buddhism. He argues that its origin can plausibly be traced to the contacts between Pyrrho and the sages he encountered in India, where he traveled with Alexander the Great. Although Pyrrhonism has not been practiced in the West since ancient times, its insights have occasionally been independently recovered, most recently in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Kuzminski shows that Pyrrhonism remains relevant perhaps more than ever as an antidote to today's cultures of belief.

Genres: Philosophy, Buddhism, History, Nonfiction, Religion

170 pages, Kindle Edition

First published June 1, 2008

Reviews

[Peiman E iran · Rating 3 out of 5]

‎دوستانِ گرانقدر، از آنجایی که در موردِ مفهوم و فلسفهٔ مکتبِ <پیرهونیسم> در اینترنت و وب سایتهای مختلف، به خوبی پرداخته نشده است، لذا در این ریویو توضیحاتی در موردِ این مکتب برایِ شما عزیزان در زیر مینویسم
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‎عزیزانم، مکتب <پیرهونیسم> در قرنِ سوم پیش از میلاد توسط <پیرو> در یونان متولد شد و پیروان آن خود را جستجوگر مینامیدند و اعتقاد داشتند که تنها با برخورداری از تأییدِ چیزهایی که نسبت به آنها دانشِ کامل و کافی نداریم، میتوانیم به "آتاراکسیا" یا همان آرامش برسیم. لذا بهترین روشی که میتوان برگزید تعلیق قضاوت و داوری و پرهیز از تأکید میباشد... این بدین معنا نیست که پیروانِ این مکتب اهلِ عمل نبودند، بلکه زندگی و کارهایِ خویش را بر اساسِ سنتهای رایج و آداب و رسومی که در جامعه برقرار بود، تنظیم میکردند
‎مهمترین مسئله ای که از این مکتب به بیرون کشیده شد، همان واژهٔ تعلیق و یا "اپوخه" بود... "اپوخه" اولین بار توسطِ <پیرو> بکار برده شد و پس از او و در قرن اول پیش از میلاد <انزیدمس> کلمهٔ "اپوخه" یا همان تعلیق را گسترش داد
‎درموردِ "اپوخه" باید بگویم که این کلمه در کاربردِ فلسفی به معنایِ لحظه ای فرضی میباشد که در آن تمامیِ قضاوت ها و داوری ها دربارهٔ وجود دنیا به حالت تعلیق و یا همان "اپوخه" در می آید
‎این موضوع که توسط مکتبِ <شکگرایان> مطرح شده است، نقشی اساسی در فلسفهٔ شکاکانه را ایفا میکند
‎بعدها <ادموند هوسرل> فیلسوفِ آلمانی، بر رویِ کلمه و فلسفهٔ مربوط به "اپوخه" بسیار پژوهش کرد و آن را رونق بخشید و در موردِ آن اینچنین میگوید که: انسان از راهِ اپوخه و تعلیقِ پدیدارشناسانه میتواند قضاوتِ خود را دربارهٔ جهانِ خارج و هستی، به حالت تعلیق درآورد و پدیده هایِ هستی را چنانکه به خودآگاهی انسان شناسانده و معرفی میشوند، موردِ پژوهش قرار دهد
‎پس عزیزانم، لازم است بگویم که در پژوهش و تحقیقِ پدیدارشناسانه "اپوخه" فرآیندی است که طی آن پیشداوری ها و فرضیات را کنار میگذاریم تا بتوانیم پدیده ها را با توجه به سامانهٔ ذاتی که در خود دارند، شرح دهیم... برایِ این منظور از روشِ "پرانتزبندی" استفاده میکنیم که در فلسفه به معنایِ دوری گزیدن گام به گام از فرضیات و باورها دربارهٔ یک پدیده و برایِ بررسیِ موشکافانه و دقیقِ نمایان شدنِ پدیده ها در جهان میباشد
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‎دوستانِ خردگرا و فلسفه دوست، میدانم که این موضوعات پیچیده و کسالت آور است، امّا برای دوستانی که اهلِ کتاب و فلسفه هستند، لازم است که با این مکتب ها و واژه ها و اندیشه هایِ آنها آشنا شوند
‎امیدوارم این ریویو برای شما دوستانِ گرامی، مفید بوده باشه
‎<پیروز باشید و ایرانی>

[Anthony · Rating 4 out of 5]

I learned from this book that a certain Greek called Pyrrho accompanied Alexander the Great to India, and possibly interacted with the early Buddhists. His experience in India led to the development of thoughts and ideas called Pyrrhonism, the tenets of which are strikingly similar to those of the early Mahayana Buddhism. A very informative book,which suggested to me that I’ve probably been underestimating the extent to which ideas cross-fermented across the Eurasian continent, especially during and after the period of Alexander the Great, and opened my eyes to the impact of Pyrrhonism (and hence early Buddhism) on the development of subsequent western thoughts, via Hellenistic (philosophical) skepticism.

[So Hakim · Rating 3 out of 5]

Analyzing possible Indian influence in the Greek philosopher's thought. In 3rd century BC, Pyrrho of Elis went to India as part of Alexander The Great's troop. He then went home to set up his own school, Pyrrhonism, which is usually classified as a sort of Greek Skepticism.

Naturally there is a question. What is, if any, possible Indian influence in his thought?

Delving into what may look like academic hair-splitting, Adrian Kuzminski contends that Pyrrhonian Skepticism is distinct from its Greek cousins. He starts by distinguishing their strains: from the Academic Arcesilaus and Carneades, to (what Kuzminski sees) as more true-to-Pyrrho Sextus Empiricus. His verdict here is interesting. Instead of claiming "nothing is knowable", Pyrrhonian skepticism is more about suspending judgment in order to reach ataraxia (i.e. calmness).

This, then, set the discussion to Pyrrho's Indian experience. Kuzminski consider that Pyrrhonian philosophy has at least some parallel with Madhyamaka Buddhism. Indeed he sees both as soteriological creeds championing suspension of judgment. (Some textual comparison ensues)

Now this doesn't mean Kuzminski says Pyrrho was a Buddhist. In fact his claim is more modest. Instead of bringing Buddhism from India, Pyrrho might have reinvented it in Greek context, inspired by his journey.

Last chapter of the book talks about "Modern Pyrrhonism". The author surveys that, despite centuries of obfuscation, there are at least two thinkers that could be said as 'Pyrrhonists': Berkeley and Wittgenstein. This serves as closure to the tome.

Overall Kuzminski built his case well, even if at times overstated. I think he may be onto something here -- the kernel thesis sounds convincing -- but whether his verdict is accurate should be seen in light of further research.

[Tony Gualtieri · Rating 5 out of 5]

Pyrrhonism claims the middle ground between dogmatism and scepticism. While sceptics claim that all dogmatic beliefs are false, Pyrrhonists suspend judgment about nonevident things, including the claim that all beliefs are false. While this sounds like a minor distinction, the implications are profound. The Pyrrhonist goal of tranquility (ataraxia) is quite different from the disputations of scepticism. Pyrrhonism has parallels to the philosophy of Madhyamaka Buddhism as described in the writings of Nāgārjuna and Chandragupta. Both schools of thought find a middle path between the true and the false. Pyrrho is known to have traveled with Alexander to India, where he met with various sages. Kuzminski suggests that this is more than a coincidence.

This is a dense book that reclaims Pyrrhonism from academic scepticism with which it has been confused. There is a long discussion on what distinguishes the evident from the nonevident, including such arcane constructions as the "evidently nonevident" (things such as consciousness which do not appear directly to our senses but which are implied by anything and everything that does appear). A final chapter makes a case for Wittgenstein as a modern Pyrrhonist. My only complaint is that there are several typos cluttering the text making it difficult to explicate some sentences.

[Paras Sharma · Rating 3 out of 5]

3/5 ⭐⭐⭐
The book talks about a certain philosopher from Ancient Greece who was known as Pyrrho. Pyrrho accompanied Alexander the Great to India, and possibly interacted with the early Buddhists. Kuzminski attempt to connect the dots between Indian school of thoughts with ancient Greek is nothing but fascinating. Kuzminski has an excellent understanding of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, probably the best I have read in any western literature. Kuzminski gives perfect undertones to Pyrrhonism with more than satisfying historical details. It was a pleasant read overall. My only complaint is that Kuzminski sometimes go out on a limb here and makes certain claims, which are questionable.

[Randal Samstag · Rating 4 out of 5]

Kuzminski's book is a defense of a thesis championed by Everard Flintoff (1980, "Pyrrho and India", Phronesis) to the effect that we should take Diogenes Laertius at his word; that Pyrrho of Elis when he went to India with Alexander he there "forgathered with the Indian Gymnosophists (naked wise men) and with the Magi. This led him to adopt the most noble philosophy, to quote Ascanius of Abdera, taking the form of agnosticism and suspension of judgement."(Hicks translation, Volume II, Book IX, Chapter 11). For a contrary argument see my review here of Bett, Pyrrho.

[Tomislav · Rating 3 out of 5]

Pyrrhonism is an ancient Greek philosophy commonly linked to skepticism. As Kuzminski argues in the introduction it is quite distinct from skepticism because the main goal of Pyrrhonists is the suspension (rather than affirmation or denial) of belief in non-evident things such as religions, ideologies, scientific paradigms and complex theories in order to reach ataraxia. In that sense Pyrrhonism was primarily a soteriological practice, a way of life that embraces calmness and intellectual humbleness, rather than an elaborate, pretentious theoretical school. Academic skeptics on the other hand were dogmatists who firmly believed in the non-existence of truth, who often lost their main point by focusing on the confusing details of their theories, and whose philosophical goal was to win pointless intellectual debates. After this introduction the rest of the book is mostly spent on intellectual debates with other scholars who wrote on the subject, and exploring in great detail what some claims from Sextus Empiricus and Buddhist texts actually mean. It is a fairly dry read and the book sometimes seems to lose the focus, such as in the very lengthy debate about the evident and the non-evident.

I can’t really say how convincing the main thesis of the book is, mainly due to my lack of knowledge of Madhyamaka Buddhism; sometimes arguments seem convincing, sometimes less so. Kuzminski is not the only author arguing for their connection, but the thesis also has its critics. There are also differing interpretations about whether Greeks were more influenced by the Indians or vice versa, but this short book doesn’t go into such historical and biographical details, it deals purely with philosophical concepts. Pyrrhonism obviously lacks some of the more religious elements of Buddhism, even though, strangely, very similar ideas and beliefs were actually present in other Greek philosophical schools. The book is not very detailed or convincing in dealing with such issues. I actually found the parts in which Pyrrhonism is compared to academic skepticism and modern philosophy much more readable and interesting than the parts about Buddhism. There are large parts of the book that aren’t really about Buddhism, despite the title, it is more a collection of essays about Pyrrhonism somewhat focused on its relation to Buddhism.

[Senny Stevens · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was hoping to like this book more, but it came up a bit short. I think it's a necessary book, but insufficient. Anyone interested in Pyrrhonism or any form of skepticism should read it, but here are my main complaints:


The Greek-Buddhist connection is not explored as thoroughly as the title suggests.
Too much of the book is spent combating previous authors' misinterpretations of Pyrrhonism instead of saying more about Pyrrhonism.
The book could expound more in different directions (e.g. how Pyrrhonism could be better applied in life today).


On the positive side:


I enjoy the writing style.
The research seems solid.
I like the connections to Berkeley and Wittgenstein.


I hope to see more in a future edition or additional volume.

[Owen Spencer · Rating 3 out of 5]

Thorough analysis of Pyrrhonism and its history. The Buddhism aspect to the analysis felt rather forced at some points, as though the author included it only to try make the analysis unique in some way, which didn't really add to the discussion.

[Karl · Rating 3 out of 5]

Ett svar på kritiken av stoicism
Pyrrhonisterna anklagar stoan för att vara dogmatisk och visst är den det, men på grund av att stoan inte ödslar tid på sina dogmer, på grund av att Stoans ethos ständigt är det viktiga är att människorna fattar goda beslut, på grund av hur resultatinriktad stoan är och hur avvisande mot disskusioner om metafysik, så gör det ju inget att dogmerna är felaktiga. Om man handlar som att ens dogmer är ett narrativ, inte en praktisk sanning så gör det väldigt lite om dogmerna inte är korrekta.

Att studera Pyrrho
Att studera Pyrrho är ä pojkar tränades att känna apati inför hunger och kyla, eller om hur ndå intressant. Idéen om att han förde in indiska idéer i väst sätter saker och ting i ett nytt ljus. Det blir naturligt att Apatheia -> Ataraxia är en direkt motsvarighet till begärets upphävande -> Nirvana. Det blir naturligt att se Jesus, Buddha och Diogenes som del av samma tradition av visa kringvandrande asketer. Påståendena man stöter på i de antika historikerna om hur spartanskaen asketisk filosof bet av sin egen tunga och spottade den i ansiktet på den tyrann som just dömt honom till att få tungan avskuren - det blir mer naturligt, mer rimligt om man sätter det i sammanhanget att Grekland och Indien hade täta filosofiska band. Saker som kändes som saga i medelhavets historia, tycks mycket mer rimliga efter att ha läst den här boken.

Vandrande visa är dåliga förebilder
Vill du vara en vandrande vis? Borde man vilja det? Borde man lära sig att vara apatiskt till familjen, staden, nationen och mänskligheten? Näe. Det kan vara ett gott liv men det är inte ett säkert kort. Människor med valmöjligheter, miljardärer och vanliga visa människor väljer inte att bli kringflackande, familjelösa asketer. Utan man väljer att göra vad stoan förespråkar, att hänge sig familjen, staden, nationen och mänskligheten. Visa människor behöver inte sticka ut extremt i sin livsföring. Det finns något riktigt banalt i att se upp till munkar och asketer, ändå gör man det. När jag ser en tjock asiatisk farbror i orange skrud promenera runt, så känner jag spontant respekt för honom. Men jag vet inte att han är vis. Jag vet inte att hans känslotillstånd är bättre än mitt. Det ända jag vet är att han valt att göra konstiga saker.

Goda förebilder ska inte se ut som helgon, de kan vara vanliga människor som man lägger märke till har en särskild dygd. Om jag träffar någon som är duktig på att ställa frågor, så kan jag försöka fråga på samma sätt. Om jag träffar någon som är duktig på att få andra att känna sig trygga i en ny grupp, så kan den personen vara min förebild. Etc. Att beundra det konstiga, det ogreppbara är inte sunt. Om man sätter som måttstock "Jag ska vara mer som Jesus" eller "Jag ska uppnå Nirvana" så är det svårt att mäta sin framgång, det är svårt att ens veta vad man siktar på. Det blir så mycket mer konkret att bygga upp sin moral och att öva sig på att vara god genom att göra konkreta saker i det lilla, i de sammanhang där man rör sig. Man kan intressera sig för dem ingen annan talar med och lära sig finna det genuint intressanta. Den här sortens förhållningssätt är lika fritt från doxa som Pyrrhos skepticism samtidigt som det är Stoans modus-operandi och Confucius lära.

[Daniel Mureșan · Rating 5 out of 5]

I've never had a book in "reading" state for year. This is the one!

It is a purely philosophical lecture with a fair share of history.

Lots of reviews here focus on the history part rather than the philosophical aspects which results in unjust ratings. The last chapter of the book makes it obvious why pyrrhonism as a way of life leads to ataraxia.
În my opinion, pyrrhonism is the philosophy behind the practice of meditation and mindfulness, where one focuses on present sensations and thoughts (which the pyrrhonians call "appearances") and suspends judgment about impressions and beliefs about these sensations. Do you feel an itch? Either scratch it or leave it be. Don't think where does it come from. Don't think why it itches. Don't think about whether is it appropriate or not to scratch that spot while you meditate. These are all a second-degree appearances, or "non-evident" ones. The concepts of self or "ultimate reality" are also non-evident appearances. You will never know them, thus your beliefs about them are not reliable. The pyrrhonian path, as opposed to both academic positivist and negativist dogmatism (theorizing everything or rejecting everything in a nihilistic way), is the middle path: suspend judgement until more clarifying appearances show up so you can further analyze the matter. Doing this, you free yourself from the struggle to find ultimate truths or live in a universe of ideas. You free yourself from the anxiety to appear in such way or such way because you believe society demands it.

I think this is the core message of the book, not who Pyrrho was, the influence of Indian teachings to the Greek philosophy or the resemblance between an ancient and misunderstood Greek philosophy and a buddhist practice. People lose a lot of wisdom for focusing on those aspects and getting past the core purpose of Pyrrhonism, as showcased by Adrian Kuzminski.

[Imogen Marcus · Rating 5 out of 5]

My philosophy.

[Ethan · Rating 4 out of 5]

For my review, see my Academia.edu page: https://utc.academia.edu/EthanMills