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Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counter-Insurgency
A searing indictment of US strategy in Afghanistan from a distinguished military leader and West Point military historian—“A remarkable book” (National Review). In 2008, Col. Gian Gentile exposed a growing rift among military intellectuals with an article titled “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” that appeared in World Politics Review. While the years of US strategy in Afghanistan had been dominated by the doctrine of counterinsurgency (COIN), Gentile and a small group of dissident officers and defense analysts began to question the necessity and efficacy of COIN—essentially armed nation-building—in achieving the United States’ limited core policy objective in the destruction of Al Qaeda. Drawing both on the author’s experiences as a combat battalion commander in the Iraq War and his research into the application of counterinsurgency in a variety of historical contexts, Wrong Turn is a brilliant summation of Gentile’s views of the failures of COIN, as well as a trenchant reevaluation of US operations in Afghanistan. “Gentile is convinced that Obama’s ‘surge’ in Afghanistan can’t work. . . . And, if Afghanistan doesn’t turn around soon, the Democrats . . . who have come to embrace the Petraeus-Nagl view of modern warfare . . . may find themselves wondering whether it’s time to go back to the drawing board.” —The New Republic
207 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2013
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About the author
Gian Gentile
12 books2 followersGian P. Gentile (October 9, 1957) is a retired US Army colonel, who served for many years as a history professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Gentile has also been a visiting fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a senior historian at the RAND Corporation.
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
February 15, 2025
Two falsehoods outright.
--He says that everything was honkey-dorey in Iraq until the Shia Mosque was bombed in 2005. This would be news to Medal of Honour winners Clint Romesha and David Bellavia who exchanged heavy fire with the terrs in 2004.
--He says that the US Army's use of "thin skinned tank destroyers" was why they got zapped en masse at Kasserine in the Ardennes. This would be news to French General Leclerc's 2nd DB (Armoured Division) which used that exact same "thin skinned tank destroyers" to zap several Panthers (i.e., the model of tank that went on to zap entire American regiments of Shermans at Herrlisheim in January 1945) at Dompaire in 1944.
As well, this book covers two wars, but is very sparsely endnoted compared to Colonel Edward Westermann's Hitler's Ostkrieg And the Indian Wars , which also covers two anti-partisan wars, and compared to Mark Mazower's Inside Hitler's Greece which only covers ONE anti-partisan war. In his note Gentile points out that he did consult some archives, but the archives he does cite are a mere fraction of those cited by Mazower who, again, covered only one war while Gentile covers two. Likewise, Gentile's book is extremely sparsely endnoted compared to Rudolf von Ribbentrop's My Father: Joachim von Ribbentrop which, like Mazower's book and unlike Gentile's book, covers only one war, and which cites a greater variety of archives than Gentile does, despite the fact that Rudolf von Ribbentrop set out to write a memoir, and not history per se.
This stark contrast indicates that Gentile is a sloppy, lazy historian and that this book is more in the category of James Holland, Ben Macintyre and Nicholas Rankin's endless childish Boys' Own books than in proper history like Colonel Westermann, Mark Mazower and Rudolf von Ribbentrop. Whereas Colonel Westermann, Mark Mazower and Rudolf von Ribbentrop wrote actual history, Gentile--like Bacevich and Douglas Porch--wrote a personal opinion book buttressed with perfunctory references to "history."
Moreover, in his endnotes--which he did not expect the average reader to consult--he attacks any criticsm of Westmoreland as "unfair and hypercritical"--when Westmoreland was revealed in Nick Turse's Kill Anything That Moves as the instigator of the West Point Protective Association that helped Ira Augustus Hunt and Julian Ewell escape justice for massacring 10,000 Vietnamese civilians like Curt von Gottberg massacred tens of thousands of Belarusians. This very strongly suggests that Gentile, along with his fellow Westmoreland hagiographers Andrew Bacevich and Douglas Porch--is as guilty as Franz Halder is of promoting the reine Wehrmacht myth, only updated to now cover Westmoreland, Iraq Augusts Hunt and Julian Ewell as well. Wolfram Wetter should write a book about Gian Gentile, Andrew Bacevich and Douglas Porch.
This is basically a book-length version of Hitler's Kommandobefehl which cherry picks two isolated cases to argue that "unconventional warfare is doomed to failure" (while not going out of his way to mention his plaintive "Death of The Panzerwaffe" screed of an essay.) This ignores America's success in the 1779-1922 Indian Wars, which were, like Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-partisan wars.
What is more, there is a far more egregious case of the failure of nation-building in American history than Vietnam and Iraq. Gentile chooses to never mention it because, unlike Vietnam and Iraq, he approves of this particular failed attempt at nation building. This egregious failure of nation-building is the Reconstruction.
As well, Gentile says that checking his email about doctrine constituted a "regular night" for him in Iraq. Guess David Bellavia had an altogether different understanding of "regular night," as did Kurt Meyer and Otto Kumm.
And Gentile shamelessly reports how, after his second tour in Iraq, he rotated to a rear position teaching history to engineers, something actually competent tank officers like Franz Bäke and Michael Wittmann never did.
--He says that everything was honkey-dorey in Iraq until the Shia Mosque was bombed in 2005. This would be news to Medal of Honour winners Clint Romesha and David Bellavia who exchanged heavy fire with the terrs in 2004.
--He says that the US Army's use of "thin skinned tank destroyers" was why they got zapped en masse at Kasserine in the Ardennes. This would be news to French General Leclerc's 2nd DB (Armoured Division) which used that exact same "thin skinned tank destroyers" to zap several Panthers (i.e., the model of tank that went on to zap entire American regiments of Shermans at Herrlisheim in January 1945) at Dompaire in 1944.
As well, this book covers two wars, but is very sparsely endnoted compared to Colonel Edward Westermann's Hitler's Ostkrieg And the Indian Wars , which also covers two anti-partisan wars, and compared to Mark Mazower's Inside Hitler's Greece which only covers ONE anti-partisan war. In his note Gentile points out that he did consult some archives, but the archives he does cite are a mere fraction of those cited by Mazower who, again, covered only one war while Gentile covers two. Likewise, Gentile's book is extremely sparsely endnoted compared to Rudolf von Ribbentrop's My Father: Joachim von Ribbentrop which, like Mazower's book and unlike Gentile's book, covers only one war, and which cites a greater variety of archives than Gentile does, despite the fact that Rudolf von Ribbentrop set out to write a memoir, and not history per se.
This stark contrast indicates that Gentile is a sloppy, lazy historian and that this book is more in the category of James Holland, Ben Macintyre and Nicholas Rankin's endless childish Boys' Own books than in proper history like Colonel Westermann, Mark Mazower and Rudolf von Ribbentrop. Whereas Colonel Westermann, Mark Mazower and Rudolf von Ribbentrop wrote actual history, Gentile--like Bacevich and Douglas Porch--wrote a personal opinion book buttressed with perfunctory references to "history."
Moreover, in his endnotes--which he did not expect the average reader to consult--he attacks any criticsm of Westmoreland as "unfair and hypercritical"--when Westmoreland was revealed in Nick Turse's Kill Anything That Moves as the instigator of the West Point Protective Association that helped Ira Augustus Hunt and Julian Ewell escape justice for massacring 10,000 Vietnamese civilians like Curt von Gottberg massacred tens of thousands of Belarusians. This very strongly suggests that Gentile, along with his fellow Westmoreland hagiographers Andrew Bacevich and Douglas Porch--is as guilty as Franz Halder is of promoting the reine Wehrmacht myth, only updated to now cover Westmoreland, Iraq Augusts Hunt and Julian Ewell as well. Wolfram Wetter should write a book about Gian Gentile, Andrew Bacevich and Douglas Porch.
This is basically a book-length version of Hitler's Kommandobefehl which cherry picks two isolated cases to argue that "unconventional warfare is doomed to failure" (while not going out of his way to mention his plaintive "Death of The Panzerwaffe" screed of an essay.) This ignores America's success in the 1779-1922 Indian Wars, which were, like Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, anti-partisan wars.
What is more, there is a far more egregious case of the failure of nation-building in American history than Vietnam and Iraq. Gentile chooses to never mention it because, unlike Vietnam and Iraq, he approves of this particular failed attempt at nation building. This egregious failure of nation-building is the Reconstruction.
As well, Gentile says that checking his email about doctrine constituted a "regular night" for him in Iraq. Guess David Bellavia had an altogether different understanding of "regular night," as did Kurt Meyer and Otto Kumm.
And Gentile shamelessly reports how, after his second tour in Iraq, he rotated to a rear position teaching history to engineers, something actually competent tank officers like Franz Bäke and Michael Wittmann never did.
January 11, 2020
Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (2013) by Colonel Gian Gentile looks at how the US has embraced a doctrine of successful counterinsurgency and why it doesn't work. Gentile is a history professor at Westpoint and he did two deployments to Iraq during the Second Iraq War.
Gentile describes how the US created a counterinsurgency mythology that suggested that the techniques the British used in Malaysia could successfully be used in other wars provided the right general was in charge. Gentile describes why the circumstances that the British won in Malaysia were different to the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Gentile looks at the British actions and their opponents in Malaysia and compares this to the US's opponents in other wars. He points out that the US faced many more better supplied, better motivated opponents and that an updated counterinsurgency strategy would still fail. Gentile points out that in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan before changes in leadership soldiers were very much aware of counterinsurgency tactics and the importance of getting the local population on their side. In Vietnam this clearly failed. In Iraq Gentile suggests the US's improvements in the occupation of Iraq were due to Al Queda abusing the local Sunnis and the Sunnis getting tired of this and the fact that the US could use money to change their allegiance. In Afghanistan Gentile suggests that the US will not succeed. Gentile also points out that the good tactics and good leader strategy is exactly what the US military wants to hear.
Gentile makes a powerful critique of people who suggest that the US can win any counterinsurgency war by applying the tactics in the updated US counterinsurgency manual 2-24. He suggests that if the locals perceive the US as a foreign force occupying them and forcing their values on them the US will not succeed. He suggests that there is far too much belief in the power of these tactics in Washington and that this has led to the US over extending itself and engaging in unwise foreign wars.
Wrong Turn makes its case very well and is definitely worth reading for a solid critique of US global military tactics. Gentile's view of what was happening in Afghanistan has been born out by the 7 years in that war since the book was written.
Gentile describes how the US created a counterinsurgency mythology that suggested that the techniques the British used in Malaysia could successfully be used in other wars provided the right general was in charge. Gentile describes why the circumstances that the British won in Malaysia were different to the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Gentile looks at the British actions and their opponents in Malaysia and compares this to the US's opponents in other wars. He points out that the US faced many more better supplied, better motivated opponents and that an updated counterinsurgency strategy would still fail. Gentile points out that in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan before changes in leadership soldiers were very much aware of counterinsurgency tactics and the importance of getting the local population on their side. In Vietnam this clearly failed. In Iraq Gentile suggests the US's improvements in the occupation of Iraq were due to Al Queda abusing the local Sunnis and the Sunnis getting tired of this and the fact that the US could use money to change their allegiance. In Afghanistan Gentile suggests that the US will not succeed. Gentile also points out that the good tactics and good leader strategy is exactly what the US military wants to hear.
Gentile makes a powerful critique of people who suggest that the US can win any counterinsurgency war by applying the tactics in the updated US counterinsurgency manual 2-24. He suggests that if the locals perceive the US as a foreign force occupying them and forcing their values on them the US will not succeed. He suggests that there is far too much belief in the power of these tactics in Washington and that this has led to the US over extending itself and engaging in unwise foreign wars.
Wrong Turn makes its case very well and is definitely worth reading for a solid critique of US global military tactics. Gentile's view of what was happening in Afghanistan has been born out by the 7 years in that war since the book was written.
July 1, 2020
COL Gentile has some valid points about COIN, mainly that COIN itself will not bring the US to victory in modern & future wars, however he, himself, seems to cherry pick history to support his thesis. Near-peer & peer competitions will never return to what they were in during the World War era, an era that was brief & unusual when one looks at the overall history of US military interventions across the globe. Gentile, like many career Army officers, suffers from this delusion that someday the next “big war” will break out and the US will need to take up the reigns laid down following World War II and go for broke. This is highly unlikely, and this historian misses that point in an astounding fashion.
While offering his view that COIN is the wrong thing for the US military to focus on, he offers no solutions in the alternative. How this reads is this is a commander who is unable to accept that he was unsuccessful in his mission while deployed to western Baghdad, an area of operation in which I operated a year later (06-08). I saw first hand the tactical and even strategic successes that these strategies and the commanders who implemented them were able to achieve. While I agree with COL Gentile that COIN isn’t THE solution, it is certainly part of a better solution than planning for wars that are never going to occur in the future. Even if we became involved in a high intensity war with a near-peer or peer competitor, it is unlikely to endure very long before transforming into the low intensity war that, thanks to people like COL Gentile, we are wholly unprepared to succeed in. Two out of five stars.
While offering his view that COIN is the wrong thing for the US military to focus on, he offers no solutions in the alternative. How this reads is this is a commander who is unable to accept that he was unsuccessful in his mission while deployed to western Baghdad, an area of operation in which I operated a year later (06-08). I saw first hand the tactical and even strategic successes that these strategies and the commanders who implemented them were able to achieve. While I agree with COL Gentile that COIN isn’t THE solution, it is certainly part of a better solution than planning for wars that are never going to occur in the future. Even if we became involved in a high intensity war with a near-peer or peer competitor, it is unlikely to endure very long before transforming into the low intensity war that, thanks to people like COL Gentile, we are wholly unprepared to succeed in. Two out of five stars.
January 1, 2025
This took courage to write, given the author’s position and the overwhelming view of the military from 2006-2021. Therefore, any well researched and balanced criticism of the COIN hegemony is/was desperately needed.
Some of the arguments he uses, especially comparing the before/after in Malaya, seem weak and unnecessary. They detract from the stronger argument, of which the author has primary experience, that COIN was being implemented in SWA before the disgraced Generals Petraeus and McChrystal brought forth their cult of personality.
The purpose of the book is to debunk COIN as the savior of American military policy, and not to provide the alternative. Fair. But addressing the alternative with only a single page of of cursory “Hail Mary” options cheapens the preceding argument.
Also… this book could have been an article or a pamphlet.
Some of the arguments he uses, especially comparing the before/after in Malaya, seem weak and unnecessary. They detract from the stronger argument, of which the author has primary experience, that COIN was being implemented in SWA before the disgraced Generals Petraeus and McChrystal brought forth their cult of personality.
The purpose of the book is to debunk COIN as the savior of American military policy, and not to provide the alternative. Fair. But addressing the alternative with only a single page of of cursory “Hail Mary” options cheapens the preceding argument.
Also… this book could have been an article or a pamphlet.
September 6, 2013
Having recently read Galula, "The Insurgents", "The Way of the Knife", "Ghost Soldiers" "The Outpost", "Invisible Armies" and "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" I was heavily pre-disposed to be entirely unsympathetic to Gentile's thesis re the inadequacies of COIN. What could be better, though, than a book that shifts one's perspective unexpectedly? On this front Gentile sprints directly to a four star rating. There is nothing new, nor apparently particularly innovative about COIN; in fact it is an over-statement to think of it as a strategy at all. At best it is a set of historically sound, when narrowly and appropriately applied, tactics. Our misuse of COIN, perhaps over over-dependence, in Iraq and Afghanistan leaves me thinking we led with tactics and allowed them to determine our strategy, such as it was.
Gentile loses the fifth star by failing to be prescriptive about what to do instead. In Kaplan's recent book, "Revenge of Geography" he leaves the debate abruptly; suggesting a change of focus to our Southern border without sufficient thought or prescription for current or future conflicts elsewhere. I gather the essence of his recommendation is do nothing. This feels a little like taking a dependency on magic, or leaves us in a position of running around putting out brush fires. Maybe that's our fate. Either way, we're about to find out.
Gentile loses the fifth star by failing to be prescriptive about what to do instead. In Kaplan's recent book, "Revenge of Geography" he leaves the debate abruptly; suggesting a change of focus to our Southern border without sufficient thought or prescription for current or future conflicts elsewhere. I gather the essence of his recommendation is do nothing. This feels a little like taking a dependency on magic, or leaves us in a position of running around putting out brush fires. Maybe that's our fate. Either way, we're about to find out.
September 27, 2014
Better than expected. I thought Gentile would come at this subject with the normal "big Army" bias, i.e., anything not involving armor, mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and attack aviation wasn't worth fighting. However, he surprised me by focusing on the strategic aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN), noting that if that context isn't aligned properly with the others, it doesn't matter how good your tactics and leadership are, you will lose. The writing is direct, well organized, and amply supported by copious amounts of endnotes. Due to the book's size, however, Gentile never answers the question of whether COIN is ever the right answer. What if, in other words, the strategic, operational, and tactical imperatives were properly aligned, would COIN be the appropriate option? He leaves the reader with the sweeping conclusion that it is never the right answer. This is still difficult to fully accept. Nevertheless, probably the best book of the bunch of counter-"coinista" reformers out there currently. Recommended.
July 26, 2014
Although this book is not on WWII, it is a spin-off of my reading on end of war policy starting with the issues of the surrender of Japan and the atomic bomb. It is a savagely depressing book, emphasizing the impossibility of reconciling the spin on tactics (counter-insurgency) with failed and failing strategy.
The author attacks the misuse of dreams of tactical victory by counter-insurgency, studying its so-called successful use in Maylaya, under its special circumstances, and arguing that the application of counter-insurgency to situations where outside help and inside strength, along with civil war, meant that counter-insurgency could not work.
The author argues, I believe, that we simply cannot win in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Cf. FM 3-24 rewritten basically by General Petraeus in 2006.
The author attacks the misuse of dreams of tactical victory by counter-insurgency, studying its so-called successful use in Maylaya, under its special circumstances, and arguing that the application of counter-insurgency to situations where outside help and inside strength, along with civil war, meant that counter-insurgency could not work.
The author argues, I believe, that we simply cannot win in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Cf. FM 3-24 rewritten basically by General Petraeus in 2006.
November 3, 2015
Short, provocative, and worthwhile. Colonel Gentil tries to deconstruct the COIN narrative so prevalent in American military circles these days. His strength comes in the historical analysis of the British in Malaya and the differences between their success their and the application of those principles to the American effort in Vietnam. While Colonel Gentil does an admirable job destroying the narrative of counterinsurgency (savior general, better war, protect the populace, etc) he does not satisfactorily show that events like the surge were wholly due to factors outside COON doctrine. The most glaring example of this is the COIN principle that you need 40:1 in order to wage an effective COIN op. Yes, the Anbar Awakening was crucial; couldn't the increase of troop levels have been as well?
July 1, 2016
Gian Gentile has long been one of the most outspoken critics of the cult-like obsession with population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) that swept the US Army from 2006-2009 on the coat tails of General David Petraeus' self-promotion campaign. Gentile recognized the charlatans before most of us, and he sounded the alarm about the snake oil that they were trying to sell as the "New American Way of War."
This book is a well-written rebuttal to the hagiography of Petraeus offered by authors such as Paula Broadwell, Tom Ricks, and Linda Robinson (among others). Gentile objectively analyzes the population-centric approach to COIN, exposing its flaws and the propaganda that has allowed it to spread. Even if you are a disciple of David Galula-style COIN, this book should be on your reading list.
This book is a well-written rebuttal to the hagiography of Petraeus offered by authors such as Paula Broadwell, Tom Ricks, and Linda Robinson (among others). Gentile objectively analyzes the population-centric approach to COIN, exposing its flaws and the propaganda that has allowed it to spread. Even if you are a disciple of David Galula-style COIN, this book should be on your reading list.
September 10, 2013
This book is a valuable contribution to the conversation regarding counterinsurgency and its place in the military's toolbag of tricks. However, reading this, I often felt like the author was sacrificing his prose to his polemic. Additionally, the two theses (a. COIN is wrong and misguided and b. savior generals implementing COIN is a media myth that persists because it sounds good and makes us feel better) were so conflated as to lose cogency - and authority. There are many fine words regarding COIN in this book, but not, as the author hopes, the final ones.
I also recommend reading "Losing Small Wars" by Frank Ledwidge for another perspective that isn't necessarily pro-COIN.
I also recommend reading "Losing Small Wars" by Frank Ledwidge for another perspective that isn't necessarily pro-COIN.
October 30, 2013
Clear and succinct argument on why America's current revolutionary COIN strategy is nothing new, and, if not checked, encourages perpetual warfare/nation building.
Addresses all supporting evidence from FM3-24, and provides another perspective that reflects the progress of the wars today.
Addresses all supporting evidence from FM3-24, and provides another perspective that reflects the progress of the wars today.
January 26, 2016
Absolutely a very clear analysis of what works and what doesn't work in counter-insurgency war, especially addressing the British experiences in Malaya and the US experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan.
March 7, 2015
Good critique of COIN.
Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews