The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics

by Paul Bracken

A leading international security strategist offers a compelling new way to "think about the unthinkable."

The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons—a luxury that we can no longer indulge. It’s not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the reemergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age.

In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises.

Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics.

 

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Politics, Military Fiction, International Relations, War, Technology

333 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 13, 2012

Reviews

[Relstuart · Rating 3 out of 5]

Slightly dated but still worth the read because the questions asked are worth thinking about. The Cold War dominated by two nuclear super powers is over. Now nuclear conflict is very much a multiplayer affair with 8 to 9 nations with the bomb and the big two cannot control the world and how or whether nuclear power is brandished and/or used.

America needs to think about themselves in light of this new reality and needs to modernize their force because in some ways we are in last place when it comes to having a modern nuclear organization. When nuclear power is used (use means so much more than violent firing of a nuclear device) last place is not a good place to be.

Pretty thought provoking.

[Sean Coombs · Rating 5 out of 5]

Long form exploration of the utility of nuclear forces is essential in the modern world. Paul does an excellent job informing, questioning, and insinuating the international state of nuclear affairs. Great primer for anyone interested in the subject.

[Roger Burk · Rating 3 out of 5]

The thesis is that this second era of nuclear armaments that we're living in, with many diverse countries having nuclear weapons, is different from the first (the Cold War) and requires different ways of thinking and different policies. That's fair enough, but the author doesn't say much about what those policies should be, except that the US should make a no-first-use pledge (which maybe isn't a bad idea). He had lots of Cold War experience in think tanks and includes some eye-opening stories. For instance, within months of signing a treaty outlawing them, the Soviet Union established three competing biowarfare programs. They had 70,000 people working in more than 40 plants making deadly viruses and bacteria. There were mobilization plans to bring tens of thousands of new workers in and start filling shells and bombs and shipping them to the front. Some bioagents were even going to be loaded onto ICBMs. None of these mobilization plans were or could be exercised to ensure there were no accidents or leakages. Executing them would surely have left a trail of death across the USSR.

[Liquidlasagna · Rating 4 out of 5]

Penetrating.... Bracken is an example of why fresh and fearless thinking is required when considering the near-term future of geopolitic.... Everyone interested in nuclear proliferation in the Middle East should read this book.

Robert D. Kaplan

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There are some rather odd reviews of this book, by odder 'famous people', so don't let that turn you off from the less loopy reviews out there.

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Amazone

Explosive volume from a colleague of Dr. Strangelove
8/10

Paul Bracken is a professor at Yale. Before Yale, he used to work with Herman Kahn (Dr. Strangelove's character was partially based on Kahn). The book is well written and raises critical questions about nuclear weapons.

It is not pretentious or esoteric. I think he has some profound insights. The book is a warning. The new global nuclear system is out-running the current conventional thinking

There are eight acknowledged nuclear powers today: the US, Russia, UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel has the bomb but does not publicly acknowledge it. Iran is developing a bomb. Brazil and Japan have the technical capability and economic resources to go nuclear if they so choose.

Bracken may be right: it's impossible to eliminate nuclear weapons. The only solution is to 'manage' them.

He is probably right that the next nuclear crisis will be highly dangerous. The multi-player games are inherently less stable than two-player games. However, there is no discussion in his book about what "nuclear weapons" mean.

Today, there is a blurring between tactical nuclear weapons and non-nuclear systems with a capability for precise powerful strikes. Moreover, "tactical" nukes can be used for strategic missions. They can be put on small drones, etc.

Bracken is not asking: "What are nuclear weapons"? I think it would be a good question. The EMP (electromagnetic pulse) nuclear weapon will be exploded in high altitude. It will no longer kill millions with radiation and destroy the cities. But the use of electromagnetic pulse will paralyze electronic equipment; knock down power-grids and communication networks. It will spread panic. In a sense you no longer need nukes in the old capacity.

The author tend to see the role of the United States through rose-colored glasses. He believes that U.S. is a benevolent observer of a spontaneous race.

He dismisses the missile defense, he thinks the U.S. missile defense has no bearing whatsoever on the issue. I disagree, I think the strategic missile defense seriously alarmed both Russians and Chinese who fear that the American missile defense will diminish their deterrence capabilities. The Russians have openly said so. Now they are furiously working on upgrading and improving the nuclear arsenals.

The fear of U.S. by Iran and others may be a catalyst of the second nuclear age. Therefore the issue of spread of nuclear weapons is linked with the question of the U.S. global hegemony. It is a question of Grand Strategy, not merely of "management".

What the book misses is an ejection of grand strategic and ethics-related probing. It is very visible in the case of Japan. He advocates Japan going nuclear, since it could be one of "legitimate" nuclear countries, "good guys". It will help the burden of the U.S.

I think he is mistaken. I don't believe Japan going nuclear would bring a strategic benefit. Besides, many Japanese consider nuclear weapons to be unethical. But Bracken doesn't believe in the nuclear bomb as an ethical question.

I also think his treating countries in terms of "good guys" or "legitimate" nuclear powers, and "bad guys" is contra-productive.

In the end, it is very hard to agree that the "management" of the nuclear weapons in terms of scenarios is the right way ahead.

It is the issue of diplomacy, foreign policy, and more broadly - grand strategy.

This strategy must be comprehensive and based on assessment of interests, threats, and resources with the long-term objectives taken in consideration. It seems to be beyond his survey.

Still, Bracken's book is a provocative, detailed and welcome examination of the emerged order, which he calls the second nuclear age. I recommend it.

Igor Biryukov

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[I like to add a thought to Igor's review, Kenneth Waltz seems to feel that two nuclear powers is one of the most dangerous things around, and the threat diminishes with more in the nuclear club, but then it rapidly increases where when you get 7-12 players that the dangers shoot right up.]

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Outstanding and ground-breaking new work
10/10

Little has changed in the literature on nuclear strategy and nuclear warfare in the past 20 years. Philip Bobbitt's work "The Shield of Achilles" is one notable exception. But Bracken does an amazing job here describing the multiple reasons why we had all better begin thinking about the unthinkable once again.

More than that though, it occurred to me that the most insightful, creative thinkers about the future may well be nuclear strategists. In other fields, experts can make wild prognostications just to make headlines or a name for themselves. But in nuclear strategy, you had better be damned well sure you understand how the world might evolve because if you get it wrong, billions of people will die and civilization may come to an end.

This book is very crisp, hard-hitting, and fast-paced. Entire academic departments are sometimes eviscerated in three sentences. And the author knows what he is talking about. He's sat through the war games, lived in think tanks, seen the whole Cold War through to its end. We should all take pause that someone with this biography is now sounding the klaxon and asking everyone to wake up and pay attention.

Joshua Philip Manchester

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Back to the future
6/10

An engaging crtique of nuclear strategy, politics, and risks in the 21st century, and especially relevant given current developments on the Korean pennisula. The underlying premise of the book is that we are in a second nuclear age that has little in common with the first, the Cold War; and that thinking, strategy, and risk-minimisation need to shift to accommodate a contemprary multipolar nuclear environment including the traditional primary powers of the Cold War, as well as new (Isreael, India, Pakistan), and emerging powers (Iran). This is an engaging discussion and reinforces that risk of nuclear annihlation remains high, if not higher, post Cold War. Where the book fails is what I call the credulity of American credibility: its failure to accept US strategic and polictical faillings, or its role in sustaining the Cold War. Still, this does not detract from the important message of the book that the global nuclear environment has changed, and that we ignore these changes at our peril.

Darren

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Intelligent and Insightful
10/10

The author has the ability to transform complex concepts into something others can readily understand and has many penetrating, well-informed insights. Game Theory applied to Pakistani and Indian nuclear war options? That could easily have degenerated into page after page of unreadable technical gibberish. Instead it was fascinating - as was much covered in the book.

Perhaps the most insightful part of the book was on the role Nationalism in strategy. Many countries are highly nationalistic - almost all are more so than the United States. At baseline many Americans have a poor understanding of how strategists in other countries view their adversaries (and their friends). This becomes somewhat more important when they have nuclear weapons.

Generals always prepare for the last war. So do politicians and bureaucracies. If history is any guide, I would wager that our next conflict will not involve terrorists and counterinsurgency. Perhaps it has been unwise to let our nuclear force atrophy - and to the author's point - to stop thinking about strategy in any meaningful way.

curtis a lane

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A Brilliant Discussion of the Future of Nuclear Weapons
10/10

In an era where the last of the Cold Warriors - the arms control bureaucracy which has now morphed into the global zero movement - have drowned out any sensible discussion of nuclear weapons Paul Bracken brings a clear-eyed view of what has been happening and what could happen. Using the history of the Cold War and how it unfolded he has laid out lessons for the second nuclear age which can be used to navigate our way forward.

Bracken's work eschews the political correctness that surrounds current US nuclear policy. While he is no nuclear hawk at the same time he does not get sucked into the bromides of the arms control cold warriors. His call for seriously analyzing the unfolding strategic environment and the role of nuclear weapons is essential to a future peaceful century. We ignore his advice at our peril.

P. Perrone

[Puwa · Rating 5 out of 5]

Science could land man in the moon, science could destroy the human, when the physics wise eyes search the natural sources in the eye of the heart shall not be spoiled, Hiroshima was created because of the spoiled heart eye, many intellectual leaders in the world tried best to see the revolution in science. When the science river flow uncontrol the common sense must control it and make it for human needs. Poorness vanished, inflation destroyed, resources been to flow, life prospered, hereafter feel happy everything for everybody is the primary democratic ambition of science and innovation. Science is the key to heaven in the earth, but it should not be the scale of the abyss.

With the above citation, I am here continuing my review of The Second Nuclear Age by Paul Bracken, necessity is the mother of invention, everything conceives by necessity not by possibility, necessity creates demand. Many projects management led to destruction more than construction in the accord of problem, need, and opportunity.

Discovery, Invention, and Innovation

Discovery is a testimony of the action, means is a theory, the invention is to discover a new thing which never been done before, innovation is an act of making changes to the existing product or service by introducing new ways or ideas in different versions.

The pros and cons of superpower

The age of the nuclear revolution standardized the strength of the country’s superpower as the author prescribed the USA and India nuclear versions changing constantly in the context of “moment of choice”. The summary of the defense budget of the GDP of the mentioned countries precisely forecast the bureaucracy power more than the democracy as such in 1953 US defense budget was 11.7 percent of GDP, Korea, and Vietnam was 10 percent and it went down sharply, the Regan administration peaked at 6 percent, and GHW Bush administration was 4.6 percent. America spent 40 percent of GDP to defeat Japan and Germany in World War two, Soviet Union consistently spent 25 percent of its GDP on the military by diverted from consumption and no investment, and it grotesquely oversized defense and undersized consumption. The author narrates the size differences of Army between the USA and the Soviets according to the MPR (Military Participation Ratio) against the population. But the criticism is that the extended age eligibility, men in their early thirty pulled out of their careers and families, as a result the country will face economic depression due to the shortage of the human capital for the new industrial revolution.

The author’s lesson of the nuclear age is how the superpower countries should control arms with the negotiation act between the treaties without violating the law, but the Soviets violated the biological war pact against the USA by making “Absolut” anthrax, the author said. Words are more dangerous than nuclear weapons and they can change the balance of power overnight. Nuclear head games played a vital role during the cold war in the form of bureaucracy in the accord of “shut up and follow orders”, by the higher authorities. Further, the author describes the leaders' head games as Jimmy Carter’s “Doomsday” the giant nuclear warplane flew back to Georgia for which Moscow to learned of. Organizational Behavior (OB) is the very respective attribute not only in warfare but also in the respective fields as curriculum in the management, OB is not an exact science or physics, it is an art of sociopsychology that offers a lot of valuable insights to deal with to design and manage complex situations. The crisis for peace is violating the international law, misdirecting resources, and rivalry (technology and strategy) but the way of author’s out of box thought “thinking about unthinkable” is important to have an enormous impact of good quality to put forward first in the place.

No matter whatever the issues in the world poverty, starvation, unemployment, etc. but the nuclear marathon between communism and capitalism taking a path. Every leadership role in the nuclear countries aiming for superpower head game with an extreme philosophy of self-reliance but it would be comic and using nationalism is a fantasy. Russia back in 1990s, China’s inequality, Israel’s internal political differences, India’s fragmented politics, and Pakistan’s incompetent governance, all the above countries use nationalism. The author precisely mentioned the troll of the fake leadership in order to test and succeed the nuclear research, but throughout my reading, I don’t see the smart power of the UN security council to mitigate and manage the risk including the permanent member countries.

In my conclusion, the author constructed a wonderful analytical thought throughout his global experience, in terms of geopolitics, economics, regional power, and technology. It’s very interesting to know the ability of the different leadership skills and their bilateral and multilateral negotiation policies to maintain world peace with possible sequences. The author deeply narrated the unstable situations of countries between 1960 and 1991. Overall “The Second Nuclear Age” is a full-fledged geopolitics package, thanks a lot to my colleague/friend Yasodhara Kapuge for lending the book.

[Randi Buros · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not an exhaustive treatment, but an excellent discussion on the more subtle uses (and non-uses) of national military power.

[Graham · Rating 5 out of 5]

Everything you think you know is mostly wrong. Nuclear weapons still matter to everyone else, if not the United States. Bracken gives an excellent explanation why.

[Niko Jaakkola · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a remarkable book, in that it has managed to shift my perspective on nuclear weapons. I have regarded these weapons, literally essentially all my life, as the ultimate evil which must somehow be abolished before we finish ourselves off. After reading 'The Second Nuclear Age', I now consider them as the ultimate evil which we are nevertheless unlikely to banish in any near future. The job is then to manage them -- to ensure that we avoid conflicts involving the detonation of nuclear weapons; and that, if we fail at this, we can keep any conflict manageable.
The Cold War grim logic of MAD -- 'mutually assured destruction', with arsenals numbering tens of thousands of warheads -- implied that a nuclear war was impossible to win and, perhaps, impossible to contain as well. Bracken's argument is that this kind of thinking is a product of its era, what he calls the 'first nuclear age'. That era is now history.

Bracken's 'second nuclear age' refers to the era we now live in, even though we may not have realised it yet. Our age is characterised by multipolarty -- there are, and will be, more nuclear powers, whether major (like India) or small (Pakistan, North Korea, Iran). The proliferation of new powers means regional tensions become more important: in East Asia; in South Asia; in the Middle East. The new, smaller nuclear powers are not waging a MAD strategy. They play with fewer weapons, and with different goals in mind. There are new technologies (precision munitions, cyber attacks, etc.) which interact with novel nuclear strategies, in ways unforeseen.

This is an unstable situation: norms have not been established; plans and strategies have not been tested by real crises. Worst of all, the US has kept its head in the sand regarding the new world we live in. Bracken argues that this may come to bite back with the first serious nuclear crisis of the second nuclear age. Untested plans, old strategies unfit for new realities, will mean the crisis may be mishandled. Bracken does not call for e.g. US modernisation of its nuclear arsenal; but rather for a modernisation of its nuclear strategy. Nukes are in vogue again, and decisionmakers need to be prepared for the next big thing.

The next big thing need not be a mushroom cloud (even though it could lead to some). Bracken argues that nuclear weapons can be, and have been, used without actually detonating them. Signalling; head games; subtle warnings of potential escalation. The US and the Soviet Union practised all of this. Nuclear weapons were useful to the Cold War superpowers; they are useful to those who figure out how to use them. That's why we have seen proliferation!

I used to think the US tragically missed a window, in the 'unipolar moment', to push for truly dramatic arms reductions. Bracken's argument is that this window was never there. Indeed, as soon as the unipolar moment emerged, smaller powers decided they would have to rapidly get warheads: they might be the only defence against overwhelming US superiority in conventional weapons. This is not a bad argument: India and Pakistan armed up soon after the end of the Cold War. It is easy to see that it might not have been possible to stop this, even had the US tried its best.

So what is to be done? Bracken recommends hard thinking and the setting of conventions by the major nuclear powers. Wargames need to be tried out. How are North Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia etc. going to 'use' the bomb? For example, Iran is already using it, even though its bomb is not even ready yet: simply building up its stockpile of enriched uranium, after Trump withdrew from the multilateral nuclear accord, is political currency. But how will Israel react? Is there a risk of Iranian head games accidentally going a step too far? We need to understand the rules of this new game.

Crucially, the major powers need to find ways of containing regional nuclear crises to the regions in question. The smaller powers will try to rope in the bigger ones in any crisis. This is where the greatest dangers lie, and the major powers must understand how dangerous it will be for them to get involved. 21st century nuclear policy cannot be about counting US and Russian warheads. It needs to be about a multilateral understanding of the global rules, of what is acceptable behaviour, in this most dangerous game.

This is a very provocative, if unsettling, book. We have collectively forgotten about nuclear weapons, but they have not gone away; they are just sleeping. 'The Second Nuclear Age' is a forward-looking perspective on how to start thinking about these evil things again. Highly recommended.

[Matt Caris · Rating 4 out of 5]

An eye-opening re-examination of nuclear weapons in global politics today. Bracken convincingly argues that the West - especially the US - has ignored or dismissed nuclear weapons for so long that we are in the process of being caught flat-footed by their re-emergence on the world scene. Bracken illustrates how the concepts and thinking that was so critical to managing the Cold War's "First Nuclear Age" have gone completely unchallenged at best, and forgotten and ignored at best, and that it is long past time for a thorough re-evaluation. This book should make you uneasy and will probably challenge everything you think you "know" about nuclear strategy and the potential use of nuclear weapons today.

[Tobias · Rating 4 out of 5]

Clear, concise, accessible introduction to the problems of nuclear weapons in the twenty-first century. Bracken rightly argues that a world with as many as nine nuclear powers - varying in wealth and power - will look very different than the cold war and we need to update our thinking about nuclear weapons accordingly. Wished for more detail in some places but for a broad overview very good.

[Daniel Bava · Rating 4 out of 5]

An unnerving look at the greatest destructive force man possesses and the often (more than we realize) tenuous threads which hold it from spilling into global destruction. Thought provoking book about international nuclear issues.

[Ikang Maulana Mas'ud · Rating 3 out of 5]

Penjelasan untuk menghadapi masa nuklir kedua memang sangat singkat namun kurang mendetail.

[Mark Kagan]

h.t Niko

[Jon-Erik · Rating 4 out of 5]

The central thesis of this book is that we need a new nuclear policy for a different, multipolar nuclear world. It's very true. Most anything you read about the status of our nuclear forces today is not heartening.

Though it isn't the central thesis, the critical argument that makes this thesis ring true is the fact that nuclear weapons have a use, even if you don't fire them. Bracken illustrates several scenarios, results of war games, and historical precedents where the mere presence of nuclear weapons in a country's arsenal (even where erroneous) changed the outcome in a meaningful way. The other central point is that whether or not Americans want to think about nuclear weapons or want to contemplate their use, other countries are. So we need to be ready.

One point missing from this book that needs to be discussed further is that not all nuclear weapons are the same. Some made for artillery-like purposes by the United States and some tested by nuclear states like North Korea are not even measured in kilotons. Others, like the "Tsar Bomba" tested by the Soviet Union in the 60s were 50 megatons and could have been designed for an even bigger explosion. Yes, they are all nuclear weapons. Yes they are all "WMD"s, but there is a huge difference.

A "Davy Crockett" detonated in New York city would struggle to kill as many people as died in 9/11 and would be survivable only about 200 feet away. Tsar Bomba would instantly kill almost 8 million people and would leave everyone in the open from Princeton, New Jersey to Stamford, Connecticut with third degree burns. One would be bad, the other could be civilization destroying.

We can't think of these as all the same thing. Obviously, we don't want any proliferation of any nuclear weapons at all and reducing the existing ones is important too. But we can't base any strategy, including the ones Bracken identifies, by acting as if all are the same. A clear division lies between atomic bombs and fusion bombs, and another even more important cleavage lies between those countries with missile technology and those without it. A country with a 1kt atomic bomb and no missiles can't do anything except get itself nuked back. A country like the US, China, or Russia with megaton-strength weapons on ICBMs can cause a society to collapse. These are very, very, very different problems.

[Steve Smits · Rating 4 out of 5]

Professor Bracken brings needed attention to the nuclear issues and dangers facing the world in the post-Cold War era. He demonstrates that our current policy on nuclear arms, while focusing on the important matter of non-proliferation, significantly neglects to strategically analyze and respond to the reality that nuclear weapons exist (and won't go away) in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. The presence of nuclear weapons in countries like Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea -- and likely soon in Iran -- make the interactions between parties significantly more complex and intricate. We must recognize how nuclear weapons affect the balance of power, and the range of strategic choices available to nations in conflict if we are to craft a national policy, and partner with other nations, to deal with the exigencies of a post bipartite nuclear world.

Strategic nuclear logic is fascinating because it is often counter intuitive. Their cataclysmic destructive power suggests they simply can never be used, but having them opens up many paths for nation-to-nation interactions that are not conceivable without them. Bracken's book delves deeply into the possibilites for national policies that nuclear weapons create. His description of Iran and Isreal and North Korea v. the world are illuminating. Perhaps most worrisome is the imbalances in technology and capacity between Pakistan and India which could push a desparate, poorly governed Pakistan over the nuclear brink.

Professor Bracken valuably reminds us that thinking of nuclear weapons as passe, irrelevant weapons in the post Cold War era is a seriously short-sighted view in light of their continued presence and growth among regional powers.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a splash of cold water to the face for those of us raised in the Cold War. While we in the United States have lost our focus on the geopolitical implications of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world, the rest of the world hasn't, with Pakistan, North Korea and India starting or expanding nuclear programs and Iran poised to join the nuclear club. This book is a welcome reminder that nuclear strategy is still immensely important and that we have taken a 20 year holiday from thinking seriously about the topic.[return][return]As Paul Bracken astutely observes, the Second Nuclear Age will be multilateral instead of bilateral, regionally-focused and driven by nationalism rather than the systemic struggles of the Cold War. Much of our thinking, Bracken argues, is centered on the old models of Soviet-American arms control treaties and the increasingly dysfunctional Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, while what we need is a thoughtful examination of how the nuclear component will affect regional confrontations in the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and East Asia. [return][return]Bracken suggests that the Second Nuclear Age will have its own versions of the Berlin blockade and Cuban Missile Crisis and that America's national security players need to think now about the implications of the existence and possible use of nuclear weapons in the 21st Century's geopolitical confrontations.[return][return]This is a very fine book and a must read for serious student of diplomacy or national security.

[Julie · Rating 3 out of 5]

long story short, we do not live in the Cold War era anymore and leading powers are long overdue in adjusting nuclear strategy accordingly. a multipolar world requires more complex strategy to manage ever-evolving technology and subsystems than the bipolar, Cold War did and not much has happened to remedy this situation. nuclear powers who signed the NPT have not rid themselves of their weapons, thus nukes have proliferated and will most likely continue to do so in regional areas such as the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia. more importantly, nuclear weapons technology is evolving faster than anyone's efforts in creating nuclear strategy, most notably between India and Pakistan.

so essentially, everyone is accumulating more stuff - in particularly, dangerous stuff - and not taking time to build shelves to properly organize the stuff. this is one of the many red flags the author raises when observing how nuclear weapons are presently managed.

despite not really telling readers how we should go about fixing these problems, I still found this book helpful in understanding why the UN's NPT is failing.

a final note: the writing made the literature lover in me wretch. lacked any sense of grace and flow but then again, this an IR book.

[Lee Spitzer · Rating 2 out of 5]

Paul Bracken from Yale University urges us to think more systematically and creatively about the role nuclear weapons are playing in the twenty-first century, which he characterizes as being part of the second nuclear age.

Stylistically, the book is non-technical and quite readable, but he repeats himself too often; a good editor could have shortened his argument by several dozen pages. The charts are almost insulting in their simplicity; were they taken from poorly designed powerpoint presentations he has delivered?

In term of substance, Bracken makes several good points concerning the role nuclear weapons play in geopolitics for both the first and second ages. However, the book is inexplicably flawed due to its neglect of how to handle non-governmental rogue and terrorist groups that might gain access to WMD. Why wait until the last page of a 290 page book to bring up this issue?

[Mark · Rating 4 out of 5]

Concisely-written and brisk to read, "The Second Nuclear Age" offers up a very frightening perspective on an arms race that the American public is largely blind to at this juncture. Paul Bracken looks at the future of nuclear proliferation as an inevitable race for developing nations to build their own nuclear weapons and negotiate with the original nuclear powers as a peer. Mr. Bracken firmly believes in the traditional deterrence doctrine of nuclear weapons as useful when unused, and he does see the US (and its nuclear stockpile) as a stabilizing influence in this new and more chaotic world order. He also offers up some interesting ideas, such as arms control initiatives the US can pursue, plus musings on the surprising results of three-way conflicts (think of who really came out on top when it was US vs. Iran vs. Saddam Hussein's Iraq.) Recommended to general audiences with interest in international affairs and history.

[John Schneider · Rating 5 out of 5]

When I picked this book up, I expected a dry but insightful look at nuclear strategy for the 21st century. "The Second Nuclear Age" was far more interesting and much more engaging than I expected; it was also quite succinct in its analysis which enabled it to cover a great deal of ground without repetition. If you are looking for an exhaustive analysis of nuclear strategy and every scenario imaginable, look elsewhere. If you are looking for a book that introduces you to a new way of thinking up nuclear weapons and the challenges facing world leader, then read this book. Also, anyone doing research on this topic will be very well served by Bracken's bibliography.

[Sherri · Rating 4 out of 5]

For those of us who grew up with the cold war, this is a must-read to understand the changed landscape of nuclear weapons and war. MAD may be more unlikely, but maddening behavior by young nuclear states is happening more than we think. For those who are too young to remember the cold war, it's a primer to nuclear war, weapons, tactics and strategy for the current nuclear age. Nuclear weapons are very much alive and spreading. The major powers need strong new policies, strategy and tactics that will deter and contain nuclear weapons use today.

[Nick · Rating 3 out of 5]

I wouldn't say that Bracken is a Pollyanna on the subject of the future of nuclear weapons, but he makes a compelling argument that whether we love the bomb or not, we'll be living with it for the foreseeable future, and if we don't think about what that means for our engagements with other nations then we're likely to find ourselves making major decision at times of crisis. The recent nuclear arms agreement with Iran might change some of the calculations a bit, but much of what's discussed is as relevant now as it was at the time of publication.

[Heather Marie · Rating 4 out of 5]

I agreed with his conclusions about needing to change our thinking about nuclear policy, and the shift in regional dynamics, but I also wholeheartedly disagree with much of his evidence. He makes the US out to be much more apathetic toward nuclear weapons than it actually is, and I feel that he plays down the importance of first strike capabilities, the US' arsenal, and the nuclear taboo to make his point. It is more of a 3.5 for me, but since I do agree with his ends, I gave him the benefit.

[Raj Agrawal · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good Westphalian-perspective primer on modern nuclear strategy

This is a good overview of how nuclear weapons play a role in a multipolar international system. The scenarios presented are plausible, and the courses of action are good starting points for discussion.

While non-state actors are largely ignored, this book provides a thoughtful primer for modern nuclear strategy.

[Iqbal Sidhu · Rating 2 out of 5]

Mr. Bracken writes with flourish and apparently deep confidence in what he holds to be true. It's a shame that most of his views, from seeking to allowing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries to arguing to actively pivot the US foreign policy around nuclear bullying, are pure nonsense. Read this drivel if you want to know how the hawks (more likely the vultures) in the US security establishment view the world.

[Becca · Rating 2 out of 5]

Thank you for my First Reads copy!
The two stars are for writing quality. I suppose the author was aiming to make this an easy read for a general audience, but what he achieved was immature writing. I couldn't get past it because it affected the tone of the book, which should have been urgent and frightening.

[Raj Agrawal · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a good overview of how nuclear weapons play a role in a multipolar international system. The scenarios presented are plausible, and the courses of action are good starting points for discussion.

While non-state actors are largely ignored, this book provides a thoughtful primer for modern nuclear strategy.

[Peter Rooijmans · Rating 1 out of 5]

The author describes the spread of nuclear weapons. He describes the ways, in which nuclear capabilities have in the past influenced foreign policy choices and options.
He concludes, that the US should spend more thought on the consequences of a multipolar nuclear world for its own nuclear policies.

[Tripp · Rating 4 out of 5]

The opening and closing chapters are great. In them, Bracken persuasively argues that the theoretical models that guided thinking about nuclear weapons in the Cold War are no longer sufficient. The detail chapters are good, but mostly as guides to thinking about what might happen. It's a useful corrective against complacency.

[Jim · Rating 3 out of 5]

A sobering book on the dynamics of the multipolar, post-Cold War nuclear world. Bracken makes a strong case for thinking through the relatively unexplored issues of how nuclear powers--large or small--might use these weapons in pursuit of their interests.