The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II

by John Mosier

Many military tactics during World War II were based on the assumption that new technologies would lead to decisive battlefield victories, demoralization of the enemy by intensive bombing, or even a quick surrender. Political and military leaders, Allies and Axis alike, believed that “blitzkrieg” was the best way to victory. But in The Blitzkrieg Myth, John Mosier argues that this was not the case.



Mosier examines the major European campaigns, including Germany’s invasion of Poland in the fall of 1939 and the fall of France in 1940, and demonstrates that they were, in fact, not blitzkrieg victories. Mosier asserts that new technologies clashed with the realities of conventional military tactics, and battle outcomes often depended on traditional warfare, in this bold reassessment of the military history of World War II.

John Mosier is the author of The Myth of the Great War. He is a professor of English at Loyola University in New Orleans. His background as a military historian dates from his role in developing an interdisciplinary curriculum for the study of the two World Wars, a program funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities. From 1989 to 1992, he edited the New Orleans Review.

“Should be valued as essential reading on the great conflict.” — Washington Times

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military History, Germany, War, Military Fiction

727 pages, Kindle Edition

First published January 1, 2003

Reviews

[Dj · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book is a mix of interesting observations and overstatement of points to support the premise of the author. It is oddly disappointing. The basic premise is that neither Fuller or Douhet had it right. Which is pretty much an accepted fact in the circle of Military Historians. Fuller's theory was that Armored attacks could and would devastate enemy units, it would break through the lines of the enemy and than in an expanding torrent it would keep going until the enemy had to surrender or withdraw to keep from being broken. To withdraw would be difficult since their rear area command and supply service would be getting overrun. A great theory, but one that looses ground in reality, due to the fact that most enemies will have AT weapons, will do their best to hold the shoulders until they can start to pinch off the break through. A almost exact replay of what happened during the Battle of the Bulge.
Douhet on the other hand was a proponent for the power of air power, believed that the Bomber would always reach its target. The Bombers would destroy enemy cities. There would be no need for an Army to go in, since the Bombers would devastate the countries infrastructure and population to the point that they government would be forced to surrender. A event that has never occurred in any real sense in the real world application of Air Power to force issues since the theory became a well beloved bible for many Air Force Generals, the world over.
Along with these two points, was the point that Fortifications are not irrelevant on a modern battlefield and the histories of WWII that praised the Blitzkrieg (a word the author avoids, focusing instead on Breakthrough).
In the first two examples he uses he does well to present his position, using Poland and the Low Countries to show that the Germans weren't really doing anything new and that the Poles and the Dutch actually gave a better accounting for themselves than is generally presented in books on the war. His position on the Poles has been being presented more and more often in recent times, giving a great deal of credence to his views.
Then things start to go off the rails. His views on France are in many ways less supportable, but the are still plausible. His view is that Belgium fought harder than is generally accepted and it was the retreat of the BEF that forced Belgium to finally surrender. His view on the French was that the front line troops fought harder and better than is usually allowed, and it was the rear area troops and the Political Leaders that panicked. He has sources to prove his point. While not an normally acceptable view of the situation it isn't something that couldn't be the case. The problem is that he starts to over state his case. He has a tendency to lay blame on the British that is less than likely to bear up under observation. Mostly it seems that he does that to prove his point.
Then he moves on to the Western Desert and more or less gives Montgomery massive kudos for not moving quickly after Rommel was in full on retreat. Something almost every historian in existence has either gotten angry about, or sort of passed over depending on their thoughts on how good Monty was as a General.
Then he moves on and getting to Normandy, he starts to rake the Americans over the coals for not having a plan to deal with the bocage, for heading east into the Brittany Peninsula after breaking out of the hedgerows, all the time overlooking the fact that Monty was the one who actually made the plans for the Normandy Invasion and its immediate following attacks. Showing a disturbing tendency to overlook the things that don't agree with his position. He also starts giving up very little signs that he might not be paying as much attention to the facts as he should. Things like saying that the British held the South side of the Bridge at Arnhem, which would have saved a whole bunch of 1st Airborne Paratroopers if it had been true.
He also ignores the Russians through most of the book and then states that they didn't attempt any breakthrough battles after 1941. An amazing statement, since when the Russians got their power up they would slam through German units and run almost in a straight line. It is something that comes up fairly often in German accounts and some of the Russian ones that are available. Toward the end of the war, the Russians would perform breakthroughs until they had to stop and let their supply catch up to them and reload for the next rush. If anyone proved that Breakthroughs could work, under certain conditions, it was the Russians.
He also blames the US for not having Artillery heavier than 8in to use against the fortress of Metz. Which is kind of interesting since for the most part, other than Metz it wasn't really an issue.
All in all his position on the Air Force issue is much more solid. The fact that no Nation has ever actually surrendered from just an air attack does a great deal to make his point for him and the US Strategic Bombing Survey does as well.
All things considered the book could have been a hell of a lot better and proved his point more thoroughly. It is interesting but flawed. A good book for a start to research the same subject, but not a great book in its own.

[Taveri · Rating 3 out of 5]

I found the contents fascinaing but the delivery stilted.  I had to read sentences several times over and found his references to other wars (although interesting) distracting.  They might have better served at footnotes.  The maps were not that helpful - for instance they didn't show where the Emael Fort was located in Belgium nor rivers he mentions.  I found the tank particulars too detailed and perhaps an appendix listing the armory with photos might have served the flow better.

Great facts about the losses on each side and how the decision to withdraw the BEF was detrimental at the time and later on when the Normandy invasion came as well as decisions to tie up forces in North Africa and attacking Italy - all attributed to Chuchill who mucked up in the Dardenelles (in WWI).

Giving how close things were on the western front it is amazing that Hitler went after Russia at all.

[Emmanuel Gustin · Rating 2 out of 5]

John Mosier's "The Blitzkrieg Myth" is advocated on its cover as a book that challenges many of the commonly held conceptions about the Second World War. We have been told, so argues Mosier, that the war was fought and won by offensives that involved speedily moving tanks and strategic bombers, but it was not. The author makes some challenging claims, and puts forward some interesting ideas.

Unfortunately, Mosier also resorts rather often to sleight of hand. He almost turns it into a parlour game, turning out one statement after another which is both factually true and highly misleading. One example must suffice, on page 125: "... a Belgian air force of around three hundred planes. Belgium, like the Netherlands, had developed its own fighter plane, beginning in 1936, and in 1939 had gotten a license to build British-designed Hurricane fighters." The innocent reader might be forgiven for thinking that in 1940, the Belgians had perhaps hundreds of these nationally developed Renard fighters, and scores of Hurricanes. There is no inkling in the text of the actual numbers in service: 0 and 11, respectively. In 1940, the Belgian air force still relied mostly on biplanes.

So Mosier is none too trustworthy on the details. What about the big picture? Here is Mosier's version of the French defeat in 1940: The overall French commander, general Gamelin, panicked. His panic infected the British commander, Lord Gort, and the French prime minister, Paul Reynaud. These two convinced the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, that the battle was lost, and although as a historian he should have known better, Churchill agreed to evacuate the British forces through Dunkirk. "So at this vital juncture, Churchill made a catastrophic misjudgment, all the more glaring because he should have been the most aware of the historical precedents of the French government being inclined to panic" (page 142). According to Mosier, it was this withdrawal that led to a general collapse of the Allied position, which up to then had been, at least according to Mosier, tenable.

Indeed a major challenge to the conventional wisdom, and a serious accusation. And some of the elements ring true: Gamelin was indeed shattered on the 15th of May, when he heard that German forces had broken through at Sedan, and he convinced Reynaud that the battle was lost. But what did Churchill do? Mosier omits to mention that he came to Paris on the 16th to hear the facts from Gamelin himself. After Gamelin's explanation, he asked the crucial question: "And where is the strategic reserve?" Churchill's and Gamelin's account slightly differ. According to Churchill, Gamelin replied "Aucune", there is none. Gamelin later wrote he had replied "Il n'y en a plus", there is none left. But this is the vital point the historian Churchill understood only too well: An army can indeed recover from a rout or a breakthrough -- if there is a reserve to plug the gap. By his own account, Churchill was indeed shocked, as he had every right to be. Nevertheless the evacuation of Allied forces through Dunkirk was only decided on the 25th, well after the battle was lost.

Conventional wisdom is that the battle was lost because of the decisive breakthrough of the German armored forces to the west. This Mosier opts to dismiss as "a salient" and a vulnerable one at that. This is hardly a simple rephrasing but central to his thesis: The doctrine of breakthrough operations was wrong, the war really turned on defensive battles and on offensives on a broad front. Mosier repeats this approach in his chapter on the Battle of Normandy, where he dismisses the American breakthrough at Avranches because it went "backward", i.e. westward, towards Brittany and Brest (page 239). He simply omits to mention that large forces were also sent eastwards. By doing so, he obscures the fact that the German position was untenable even before their failed counter-attack at Avranches, which he blames for the German defeat.

Mosier's big claim is that "In reality all the great armored thrusts were failures." (page 281) His summary of operations on the Eastern Front (page 176) is also telling: "[E]normous advances that, no matter how succesful and dramatic, failed to destroy the retreating armies; the decisive battles being conventional struggles for fortified positions. Although at first blush the conflict seemed to sustain the idea of breakthrough operations, by the time of Stalingrad it had become clear enough that these had failed." Particularly in reference to Stalingrad, such a claim is amazing. But Mosier chooses not to mention Operation Uranus at all. He may be correct in claiming that breakthrough operations did not destroy a retreating army, but he deliberately chooses to ignore the grim fate of forces that failed to retreat in time -- such as the 6th Army at Stalingrad -- and found themselves surrounded by the enemy. As millions of soldiers suffered such a fate during the conflict, this is hardly something to skip over lightly.

So it is with considerable cheek that Mosier finally accuses other military historians of "twisting the facts [...] ignoring the many failures [...] denying the evidence at hand" (page 281). 

Why nevertheless two stars? Because Mosier's book does have merits. It is well written, and if it makes many dubious claims, it also eloquently makes a few important points that appear to have real validity. For example, Mosier draws attention to the high standards of training of German officer cadres as the real reason for their success. And while this is hardly a revolutionary claim, it is a message to remember. He also reminds us that the French strategy of 1940 was not as foolish as was later assumed by a popular press that heaped ridicule on it.

[Ian Fleischmann · Rating 2 out of 5]

Mosier combines many interesting facts in an easily digestible format, but his overall argument is schizophrenic and poorly formed. At the end of the book, I'm still not sure what his central thesis was supposed to be (other than the fact that he really didn't like Fuller or Douhet). Maybe I didn't get it but I think his argument would be better phrased that the Germans did not succeed because of 'blitzkrieg' or 'breakthrough' but because they better applied the principles of war (Jomini) and incorporated all available combat power to achieve cross-domain synergy (mass at the decisive point).

[Martin Dunn · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have given John Mosier's The Blitzkrieg Myth four stars as I believe there is a useful role in authors who take a contrarian position, shaking up our thinking. That said, if you have not read other accounts of the campaigns in the Second World War, I suggest that you not start with this book. I also appreciate the arguments made by the reviewers who only gave Mosier two stars - and in particular recommend
Emmanuel Gustin's review.

In his introduction, Mosier names J.F.C. Fuller and Giulio Douhet as the sources of flawed doctrine - and attempts to group their theories together under term he coined as "breakthrough theory". This seemed to be setting up straw men. Fuller's vision of fully mechanised armies never came about. Douhet's strategy of attacking cities to destroy civilian morale did - but it was a desperation tactic, adopted when airpower proved incapable of reaching and destroying militarily significant targets.

It is unclear exactly how influential these two theorists were. Douhet does not appear to have been studied in the the UK, the only country that attempted to build a strategic bombing force before the war. Fuller was noted for his acerbic criticism of his peers and superiors, and his support for the the British fascists prior to the war made him highly suspect. Heinz Guderian mentioned the influence of "the Englishmen, Fuller, Liddell Hart and Martel" in Panzer Leader, but John Mearsheimer points out in Liddell Hart and the Weight of History that this reference was not in the the German edition of Panzer Leader, but included in the English version at the suggestion of the editor, Liddell Hart. If anything, the the German development of Blitzkrieg seems to be better attributed to Germany's own war experience, including the development of sturmtruppen tactics.

The failure of strategic bombing to break morale has been well documented elsewhere. Mosier adds little that is new.

Mosier gives his opinion freely over land operations. We learn that he likes Montgomery (notwithstanding the Arnhem disaster), thinks Rommel was over rated, and thinks that Eisenhower was wise to to let to pick favourites amongst Montgomery, Bradley or Patton. I put these into the category of opinions that others will want to argue about.

The most challenging point Mosier raises relates to the fall of France. The German drive through the Ardennes in May 1940 all the way to the English Chanel, forcing the evacuation of the British (and other) surrounded forces from Dunkirk is seen as the textbook example of Blitzkrieg. Mosier attributes the German success primarily to a loss of nerve by the French and British high command and politicians. He asserts that the breakthrough could have been countered if the British had only counter-attacked, instead of withdrawing - but a quick look at a map shows that this looks implausible.

Notably, Mosier only comments in passing on the Russian campaign, but this would be important to establishing his case. The German offensives of of 1941 and 1942 were also classic Blitzkrieg, sweeping around pockets of Soviet forces who later became prisoners - and the Soviet counterattacks also followed a similar model, punching through weakened defences in an attempt to surround German forces.

Mosier shows enthusiasm for attacking on a broad front, which must make most of those who have studied strategy worried. This seems to contradict the principle of concentration of force. In practice, what Mosier sees as a broad front is an illusion. The Second World War was ultimately decided by attrition - the Germans lacked the manpower and resources to win, and were gradually worn down, and the land campaigns (particularly in the East) were fundamental to that process. But what looks like a broad front on a large scale map, lacks texture and will have many subordinate (and narrow) offensives when examined at the tactical level. At the tactical level, concentration of force is still needed.

[Paul W · Rating 3 out of 5]

Conventional history holds, according to Mosier, that the Battle of France was won by new blitzkrieg (lightning war) tactics used by the Germans, leveraging their superior armoured forces and air forces against French forces sheltering behind the expensive and ineffectual Maginot Line. Mosier sets out to demonstrate that traditional accounts of the Second World War, such as this, are “seriously flawed …based on a slowly collapsing paradigm that is riddled with anomalies and contradictions”.

Mosier firstly explores the “mostly incorrect” theories about the use of tanks set out by JFC Fuller and air power set out by Douhet, theories upon which many histories of the second world war are based, and which form the basis of the title for this book. Although the outcomes of the battles are obviously known, Mosier argues against the established orthodoxy of ideas about the reasons for the outcomes of these battles. Rather than being determined by the application of innovative ‘blitzkrieg tactics’, Mosier argues that the outcomes of the battles were the result of the traditional factors which have decided battles: politics and strategy. But his attempts to differentiate ‘strategy’ and ‘blitzkrieg tactics’ seem, at times, an argument forced to fit the premise, rather than evidence of his hypothesis.

Mosier then sets out the role that construction of fortifications, rather than building tanks and aircraft, played in the preparations for war of both France and Germany. He notes that the steel plates used by the Germans instead of reinforced concrete when building their defensive fortifications weighed as much as two Pz Mk IIID tanks, and were a contributing factor behind the inadequate size of the Panzer forces at the beginning of the war and the fact that German tank production in the first half of 1940 barely offset their losses in the Polish campaign. Rather than the Maginot Line being a uniquely French expensive exercise in futility, the use of extensive fortifications was also adopted by the Germans in the west (Siegfried Line - which unlike the Maginot line ran from the full length of Germany's border) and the east.

Having set out to ‘bust’ these two myths, Mosier then assesses the established orthodoxy reflected in accounts of the battles in Poland, France in 1940, North Africa, Normandy and the Rhine.
In Poland Mosier argues it was the German Third Army, the least mechanized of all the German armies, which made the most rapid progress in the first seventy-two hours of the Polish campaign. And rather than dominating the battle, the losses suffered by the Luftwaffe amounted to more than a third of the aircraft they deployed. However, incongruously, and despite the premise of this book, Mosier concludes that ‘the real key’ to German success in Poland lay in the integration of their armoured and air forces.
To support his argument against the impact of blitzkrieg, Mosier notes that in the campaign in the Low Countries proportionally ‘the Dutch took more casualties and inflicted more losses on the attackers than did any of the other armies.’
Mosier also discounts the role of blitzkrieg in the fall of France, attributing the German success in crossing the Meuse not to the intrinsic strength of German armor, ‘but because the BEF then precipitously and unilaterally withdrew from the field of battle, leave the Allied front with an enormous gap in the center…’. Mosier repeats the point made by other authors that in May 1940 the French had more and better tanks than the Germans and more aircraft, but does not adequately explore the role of German leaders such as Guderian and Rommel, although at the end he does acknowledge the role that Germany's superior methods of training and empowering its officers and NCOs played in the initial German victories.
Mosier concludes: “That tanks and planes played a major part in the Second World War is indisputable; the error lies in assigning to these two instruments of war, together with the ideas about their employment, the chief or primary responsibility for the course of the combat.” Instead “History is formed by a complex sequence of events.”

This is a very readable book, with arguments generally well reasoned and supported by facts, albeit capable of being challenged.

[Erik · Rating 2 out of 5]

Mr. Mosier makes a truly earnest effort to reinterpret the historical lessons of WW2, but genuinely fails to prove the majority of his points or simply chooses to ignore/ misrepresent facts to create the basis for his revelations.

In some ways, he states the obvious. Certainly the Blitzkrieg in no way ended a war positively or completely defeated an enemy. The power of airforces to obliterate an enemy's ability to make war was also determined to be a false hope. These points, while true in a sense, fail to give proper credit for their importance in the overall outcomes. The Blitzkrieg tactics may not have ended the war favorably for Germany, but they proved sufficient enough to overrun multiple countries and soundly defeat/eliminate millions of troops.

Strategic bombing is a similar situation, where there can be little doubt that the elimination of Germany's ability to make fuel and critical war components ultimately led to it's demise.

Mosier's biggest failing is his blind hammering of his beliefs despite the plain facts that are common knowledge. His criticism of the Allied responses in France 1940 are completely lacking military commonsense. The French failure to have secondary fronts established to contain a breakthrough doomed them. The lack of reserves were critical. The attack on the British for pulling out is completely misguided and wrong. Their failure to do so would have likely cost England the war, and was almost guaranteed to not change the outcome for France even with a greater commitment. He gives almost no credit for the better training and leadership of the Germans to overcome anything the British could have done.

Being very familiar with the forces that fought in France 1940, I feel Mosier overstates the Allied strengths and has far too much faith in British assistance tipping the scales. History clearly shows that British assistance rarely mattered (see Greece, Yugoslavia) after France, and the British army was hardly any better led or equipped than the French. His minimization of the paralyzing affect that the German armor columns had on High Commands is also wishful thinking.

Speaking of armor, his viewpoints on the attacks of masses of armor as all failures is simply astonishing. His criteria for success is literally "Did the armor attack win the war? No? Then it failed". While I agree it is infantry that captures and holds ground, it is the tank/ mechanized forces which are the spear which plunges deep and causes the fatal wounds. Failing to recognize the importance of envelopments and the surrenders of millions of troops cutoff is irresponsible and disingenuous.

The book itself is generally well written, but organized poorly. I think Mosier could have greatly enhanced his arguments by being honest with the facts and acknowledging the challenges to his opinions. He could have presented his points, and then addressed refutes immediately so the reader has things fresh in his mind. Ignoring well known facts or omitting them hinders the reader's ability to give any credence to the author's viewpoints.

Overall it was an interesting read, in a bad way. Too many weak arguments and a main premise which seems to misrepresent the importance and roles of armor and bombers in WW2.
1.5 Stars

[Charles Inglin · Rating 3 out of 5]

The author takes as his mission the debunking of "The Blitzkrieg." It's worth noting that the word "Blitzkrieg" was a creation of western journalists and was never, as far I can tell, used by the Germans. For purposes of the discussion the author addresses two somewhat related concepts that arose from World War I. The first, most identified with "Blitzkrieg" in the public mind, is the theory propounded by J.F.C. Fuller that armored forces, i.e. "tanks", could punch a hole in the enemy defenses, then rush through more quickly than the enemy could respond, causing the enemy defense to collapse. The second theory, advanced by Italian airman Giulio Douhet, was that strategic bombardment by aircraft could on their own cause so much damage that the enemy's will and ability to resist would collapse. Both these theories were widely debated in military circles in the 1920's an '30's, and adopted in varying degrees in different countries. The author lumps both these theories under the catchall phrase "Breakthrough" and discusses how misunderstanding of them distorted planning. Ultimately, neither worked as advertised. Neither represented a brilliant new way of warfare or a panacea to the stalemate of the first world war. The German blitzkrieg of 1940 was more a demonstration of the proper tactical employment of combined arms. The bombing campaign against Germany, despite causing misery for the civilian population, resulted in no significant reduction of Germany's war production in very late in the war, though the author skips over what may have been its most important contribution. With the introduction of long range fighter escorts the bombing campaign became an old fashioned battle of attrition. The bombers forced the Germans to send up their interceptors where they could be destroyed by the allied fighters. In the end the Luftwaffe suffered serious laws in aircraft and more importantly experienced pilots, though at a terrible cost in bombers and crews.
The author's style is a bit acerbic and opinionated. At times he makes sweeping statements which makes the reader want to argue. He's very disparaging of the Sherman tank and praises the Russian T-34, though taken in total they're roughly comparable. He says the Sherman was under gunned and under armored, generally true compared to the later German tanks. But the frontal armor on the Sherman (50mm) was slightly thicker than the T-34 (47mm). The T-34 glacis was sloped at a better angle, and it had thicker side armor, also sloped. But that becomes academic when the German 50mm PAK38 L60 could penetrate both well beyond 500 meters. The 76mm gun on the T-34 was marginally, if at all, better than the 75mm on the Sherman. While neither gun could penetrate the frontal armor of a Panther or late model PZKW IV, much less a Tiger, they could penetrate the side and rear armor. And a point that's often ignored, the Sherman's 75mm had a very good HE round. One of the lessons of the North Africa fighting was that the primary enemy of tanks in the attack was not enemy tanks but enemy anti-tank guns. To combat them a tank needed a gun that fired high explosive from sufficiently long range. One could go on all day comparing the Sherman and the T-34, but when late model T-34-85's came up against late model 76mm gun Shermans in Korea the Shermans were more than a match for them.
There were some points about the Battle of France that were open to question or could have been addressed better. The author points out that the French had more tanks and better tanks than the Germans. The Somua S-35 and the Char B1 Bis were heavily armored and carried good AT guns, the bulk of the French tank force was made up of H35 and R35 tanks that were well armored but slow and typically under-gunned. Two other factors affected the French. Most French tanks didn't have radios. Others had radio receivers but not transmitters. Most French tanks also used a one man turret. This meant the tank commander had to acquire targets, load, aim and fire the main gun as well as direct the driver and try to figure out the tactical situation. Platoon leaders and company commanders were even more overloaded. The author dismisses both of these concerns in two paragraphs.
Completely ignored in the discussion is a comparison of the German and French command and control arrangements. The French, based on their WWI experience, planned for a tightly controlled battle directed from the top. Distrustful of radio, for fear of German radio intercepts, they relied on telephone and messengers. The Germans made more use of radio and younger commanders like Manstein, Guderian and Rommel believed in leading from the front, using radio, and giving commanders more freedom to act (sometimes much more than more senior German commanders liked). As a result The Germans could react to the tactical situation much faster than their French counterparts, who often received orders that were inappropriate to a changed situation. In modern parlance, the Germans were able to get inside the French decision loop.
One very minor, nitpicky point I'd like to comment on. In discussing the Russian-Finnish fighting in the Winter War the author goes on a bit of a tangent on the superiority of the Lahti-Saloranta M26 light machinegun and the M31 Suomi submachinegun. The LS-26 was a well made, accurate and effective weapon, but it was also complex and required a lot of maintenance, especially in the harsh conditions of the Finnish winter. But in practical terms it offered no advantage over the improved Browning Automatic Rifle variants adopted by Sweden (KG M/40) or Poland (Wz. 1928). Another nitpicky point, John Thompson invented the Thompson SMG, but did not invent the class of firearms called submachineguns. That usually is is attributed to the Italian Villar-Perosa of 1915, though the first really practical and widely used version was the Bergman MP18 of 1918.
But enough nitpicking. This is a good read for students of WWII and armchair tacticians, especially those who enjoy wandering off in Google searches.

[Ari · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an excitingly heretical book. The premise is that "blitzkrieg as described at the time and in most popular works about WW2 rarely happened and didn't or couldn't work. German success in 1939-41 was due to allied errors in detail, not due to a radical or unexpected shift in weapons and tactics." The author reminds us that the allies had more and better tanks in the Battle of France, comparable air power. He cites evidence that the allies were perfectly aware that the main conflict would be in Belgium and disposed their forces accordingly, and that the Maginot line and other fixed fortifications worked pretty well during the war. In his account, Poland went down in a month not because the Germans had revolutionized warfare, but because Germany was a larger richer country and Poland was also invaded from the East. And the mistake that doomed France was primarily that the allies ran out of reserves, that they panicked instead of making a determined counterattack in may, and they kept their air forces back out of the fight instead of committing it decisively.

In his . account, deep penetration by tank forces mostly doesn't work, and broad-front advances were the primary and most effective strategy in the war.

This point seems basically correct to me. Tanks are iconic and powerful, but cannot really fight on their own. Without infantry, they are awfully vulnerable to ambush, and cannot seize cities or other built-up territory. And even combined arms motorized forces are more limited than some accounts imply. We easily forget that a tank has a gas tank and cannot go too far without needing to be refueled. Tactical breakthroughs are possible, but the depth of armored penetration is limited. This is obvious to professionals. It tends to get left out of some of the more starry-eyed accounts of blitzkrieg, and was not emphasized by Fuller or other armored-warfare apostles.

Some of the author's claims seem to be mistaken. On page 203 he quotes a wildly inflated (and discredited) number for the deaths at Dresden. He acknowleges in passing that the Russian breakthroughs north and south of Stalingrad in November 1942 did have substantial consequences, but he doesn't explain how that fits with his argument. (On page 176.) The author only focuses on the western fronts; he has almost nothing to say about the war in Russia and almost no explanation for ignoring it. I suspect it would not entirely confirm his theories; I have the understanding that the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 did involve deep mechanized penetration.

The book is heavy on heroes and villains, particularly on unconventional ones. The author makes a strong defense of general Montgomery -- almost a hagiographic one -- we are treated to large words about "Great Commanders" and so forth. The author's point, once the patina of hyperbole is removed, is that he generally won battles, won them with moderate casualties, and had some grip on how to turn battles into campaigns. In contrast, the author is full of denunciation for Fuller and other prophets of mechanized warfare, and likewise for Douhet, Trenchard, and other bomber enthusiasts.

I suspect the book is generally right and generally worth reading. It's at least a useful corrective to many often-repeated and clearly wrongheaded notions.

One thing that gives me pause is that the author is an english professor and only an amateur military historian. He seems to mostly have his facts in order, however. And I notice that Lloyd Smith, who is a professional on exactly this, has recently published a book with a similar thesis: https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/3...

[Jack Curtis · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was ok. Didn’t like how the author kept being like yeah so all these guys said this but actually since I know everything this is what actually happened. Like bruh. Seems like a nerd, but not the good kind of nerd. The kind of nerd who says he’s very smart. He did have some good analysis of certain situations though and overall I enjoyed the book.

[Evan Þ. · Rating 3 out of 5]

The myth, Mosier argues, is the claim that Germany's conquest was thanks to a new method of fast, pointed armored-centric attack. Instead, he argues that most times such attack was tried by either side, it failed; and most gains were made by combined-arms broad-front attacks. The fundamental exception was the Battle of France, where (he argues) France only crumbled thanks to a lack of morale and Britain abandoning them to evacuate from Dunkirk.

Mosier does show that tanks weren't as good cross-country as thought; and that they didn't steadily advance faster than infantry could move. His analysis of German anti-aircraft guns (and failed early-war Allied bombing strategies) also appears insightful.

However, I think he minimizes the use of tanks anyway. Regardless of the actual speed at which they moved, they were mobile fortified gun emplacements. They prevented the trench stalemate of the last war. Perhaps (as Mosier argues) a line of forts could bring about stalemate anyway - but the difficulty was much higher than in the last war. Mosier doesn't mention this, but I think it's very significant.

[Eryck · Rating 5 out of 5]

seems everything you thought, and by that I mean everything you learned about WWll isn't true and completely wrong and this author is going to point it out to you. Even if he has to back pedal later on in the chapter by saying it my be kind of true.
Hey, controversies sell books and this book is full of them. But to be fair a lot of it is revealing in the sense that we have forgotten the facts or have or political or national egos get in the way. Such as, sure Russia defeated Germany in the East but the allies helped them by sending Russia 13,000 tanks among other outrageously large amounts of equipment. these kind of reminders pointed out are the highlights of the book for me. The author definitely knows a lot about the war but seems to bend over backwards to point out the flaws, failed policies, and mistakes from both sides. That being said it's still a great book which digs deep into the various subjects of the war and tries to approach from a different angle.

[Al Lock · Rating 3 out of 5]

Despite the fact that I agree with the author regarding both "blitzkrieg" and strategic bombing, I don't think this book does a very good job of laying out the shortcomings of the theories in question and also glosses over some important points.

The focus is mostly on debunking the breakthrough theory as being significant in the European theater of operations as regards the fall of France, and the return of the allies to France, etc. The points that debunk are there, but they are buried under a load of other material that makes the key points easily missed or even deemphasized - from the almost reflexive defense of Monty to the failure to credit the seizure of the Belgium forts except briefly, etc.

IF you are already very familiar with the campaigns in question (Poland, Finland, North Africa, Italy, Western Europe), you may find this book interesting.

[Sean Gilbert · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’m giving this 4.5 in reality, and rounding up for good measure and because my math teacher told me so.

It was very good. The myth of the Great War is better, but I believe the time period is a better one to read about.

I don’t think I agree completely with Mosier, I’m not sure you can analyze the effect of strategic airpower and not look at the pacific theatre where the Americans did not face nearly as much resistance as from the Germans. His points are still interesting and worth discussing. His humanitarian points are not nearly discussed enough when it comes to the western theatre of operation.

For some reason, casual critics of American policy will debate if dropping nuclear weapons on Japan was worth it, but not even realize the absolutely devastating tragedies on civilian populations in Dresden and Hamburg (and to be fair, Tokyo.)

[Vince · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book has a very interesting premise and was easy to read. That being said, I feel that the author did not fully explain what points he was arguing against. Several times in the text there were mentions of “common” myths that everyone except myself must know and that the author was bravely dispelling. In his arguments against strategic bombing, the author waffles on the effectiveness of tactical bombing where sometimes it was an overwhelming advantage and other times completely useless. I will admit that I enjoyed the details of German tank development but found the arguments against western Allied tanks specious at best. The author proudly proclaims that the T-34 was the best tank of the war but then devotes no time discussing how it was used in battle and how Soviet tactics were better. Overall, an okay book.

[James Booknight · Rating 3 out of 5]

Despite myself not being a regular military history reader nor the book being particularly well-written, the premise was captivating enough for me to want the why, and the book offers a reasonable enough defense that will give the reader an interesting conversation piece whenever the topic comes up. Unless the reader is particularly keen on the nitty-gritty of military history, however, this one is probably better summarized.

[Bradley Brincka · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very interesting revisionist history challenging some of the basic assumptions about the utility of military theories operative during the Second World War, namely the concepts of blitzkrieg, strategic air power, and to a lesser extent airborne capabilities. Mosier’s contention is that these supposedly revolutionary ideas deceived post-war historians no less than the belligerents themselves, each of whom sought to achieve rapid victory through employment of novel technologies and theories.

[Chris Basis · Rating 3 out of 5]

His WWI Book Was Better.

I loved his book on WWI, but this was just ok. The other book was supported by much more factual information. This book had some support like that, but it was primarily a mix of some facts, but also a significant amount of opinionated narrative. After reading his WWI book, I found this to be a mild step back.

[Cheng Jun · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book should be treated like fiction; very fun to read, but don't take seriously! Mosier is an engaging author, but many of the arguments are either outdated, blatantly false, or misinterpretations of historical fact. Overall a very fun read.

[Mac · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting perspective for the informed reader.

[David Griffiths · Rating 5 out of 5]

Thoughtful ideas on why and how Germany won the early battles, and why they eventually lost. Tough on the british. Excellent read for the overall picture of WWII Europe campaign.

[Brian · Rating 4 out of 5]

The book was a very interesting read about Blitzkrieg tactics.

[Peter Colasante · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very well written and dispelled some of what I thought I knew about WWII. It will give some insight in further reading.

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesting hypothesis, but it needs to be substantiated by historians, not English teachers.

[Jukka Häkkinen · Rating 2 out of 5]

Toisen maailmansodan panssarisodankäynnin teoriaa uudelleen tulkitsevan kirjan kompastuskiveksi muodostuu kaikkitietävä ja muita vähättelevä sävy.

[Readius Maximus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very interesting book! I like his unique style and insight though I don't know how much weight I put behind all his assertions. But I learned a lot and I don't think he is right in everything he claims but I need more research to confirm as I am new to WW2 reading. Totally recommend though!

Edit: Thoughts after second reading after further study.

I still recommend this book. It's an entertaining read and it if you are new to WW2 history it will make you want to investigate further like it did with me. He does jump around a lot and makes a lot of contradictory statements. Which can be entertaining at first but upon further reflection it can be slightly annoying.

Some main themes: He really dislikes Fuller and Douhet. The book should be re titled "Why Fuller and Douhet got it wrong" haha. The book seems to be focused on examining every scenario where the theorists got things wrong. Consequently he dislikes Patton who fully adhered to the Fuller theory and he likes Montgomery because he saw him as a more traditional general who used common sense instead of blind adherence to a theory. But I don't fully understand his interpretation of operation Market Garden. The operation was planned by Monty and yet he places the blame on the 'Allies' as a massively failed use of the Fuller theory. To me, after reading Guderian's Achtung Panzer, this operation is such a massive failure at the operational level it's almost criminal. So I don't see how he can still view Monty as a good common sense general who doesn't subscribe to the theories. If the German's had anything close to parity with the Allies all three airborne divisions would have been wiped out. I know Market Garden's main assumption was that the German's were basically done but sending tanks down a two lane road is the biggest and most obvious blind adherence to Fuller I don't understand how he absolves Monty.

Which brings me to another thing. In all his books he never once mentions Guderian's Achtung Panzer, where Guderian distilled the strengths and weaknesses of tanks in combat by an astute observation of tank use in WW1. Based on his constant slamming of Hitler and the Allies for their misuse of armor I would think he would like Guderian's treatise.

One major advantage the German's possessed in the early years was a tactical air force. Which once they established air superiority was deadly. The Allies even when they achieved air superiority never were able to replicate. Their strategic bombing and fighters hampered movement but never developed the accuracy of that the German dive bombers achieved in the early years. Which may have been suicidal as the German's had a strong ground air defense.

The allies not only lost air supremacy but the French and the British didn't really have a ground to air defense which allowed the slow German dive bombers to wreck them.

Overall: I think he stretches some things and misrepresents a few things to fit his narrative which is ironic. But he gets two major things right. The German's were technically inferior in tanks in the first several years of the war and they were inferior in motorization throughout. But due to superior German leadership they were able to overcome many defects and have a good amount of success until they were crushed by numerical and technical superiority.

My current theory is along these lines. Matthew Cooper in the German Army from 1933-1945 does a good if long examination of the German development of the war of movement and the great battles of encirclement. Clausewitz found that at the moment the decision was reached in a battle the causalities were equal on both sides and often higher on the winning side. But the scale of the victory was decided by how well the victors could pursue their enemy and capture prisoners and cannons. It seems Moltke's response was to try and encircle the enemy, which can make the decision easier to reach, and the victory is complete. But to enact this type of warfare you needed to disperse the decision making which empowers officers at all levels to make decisions. This seems to be the major advantage that the German's possessed throughout the war which Mossier is advocating even if he doesn't go into all the details.

[Shane Hall · Rating 2 out of 5]

It struck me repeatedly throughout the book that Mosier seemed to believe most, if not all principal figures involved in the strategic planning of the war were adherents to the theories of Fuller and Douhet. This is not the case, especially with the Germans; Hitler certainly wasn't one, as is evidenced by the accounts of those who were, such as Guderian or Rommell.

As well, I found Mosier's examinations often disregarded significant and well documented factors almost as if he were genuinely unaware of them.

His overall point about the role of the theories is correct, but his reasoning is often flawed.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

While not 100% perfect, Mosier makes some intelligent and well supported arguments. He has the distinct advantage of not being a partisan of any of the big names in World War II, and so offers probably as close to a fair assessment of Rommel, Bradley, Montgomery, etc. as you're ever going to read.

At it's core, this book is about the doctrines to which World War II leaders clung, how those doctrines where unrealistic, how those doctrinal theories affected conduct of the war (and largely failed), and how interpretations of the war were made to fit the theories of those doctrines. Everyone with an interest in World War II or modern military doctrine and theory should read this book.

[Stephen J. Mauris · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thoughtful

Challenges many assumptions but only by relying on carefully made arguments based on a wide range of factual observations. I do challenge the notion that the Italian campaign by the Allies did not tie down significant German forces. Taken with dispersals of Wehrmacht troops in the Balkans and Sardinia, the troops pitted against the Allies were all unavailable to German commanders in Russia or France.

[Bud · Rating 4 out of 5]

John Mosier debunks the view that the invention of the airplane and the tank during WWI would result in massive breakthroughs on the battlefield in WWII. He shows how Hitler, Rommel, von Manstein, Montgomery, and Patton were equally seduced by the blitzkrieg myth - and how conventional military tactics rather than a blitzkrieg strategy won the day.