War Beneath the Sea is the comprehensive account of submarine conflict in the Second World War. Padfield covers all the major belligerents, going beyond the standard accounts of the Battle of the Atlantic and the 'clean sweep' patrols of Mush Morton in the Pacific to develop a systematic account of the submarines of Nazi Germany, the United States, Japan, Britain, and even Italy.
The submarine had made its significant debut as a weapon in the First World War, where unrestricted submarine warfare threatened the British empire and helped bring America into the war. The power of the submarine in commerce warfare was only systematically developed by the Nazis, and in particular Admiral Donitz, who combined high quality boats with a doctrine of aggressive surface night attacks. Nazi night optics were a cut above, and a clever binocular pedestal mount fed observations from the conning tower directly into the torpedo fire control center. By comparison, British boats were small and slow; their antisubmarine doctrine completely atrophied. American boats were the most impressive at the beginning of the war, with air conditioning for crew but were hindered by a cautious attack doctrine and the fatally flawed Mk 14 torpedo, with detonators that simply did not work. Japanese boats were large, but wedded to a doctrine of decisive fleet battle that reduce their flexibility.
As we all know, the Second World War started in 1939 with the invasion of Poland, and subsequent declaration of war by France and Britain against Nazi Germany. This was a problem for Donitz, since he had been promised that the war would start in 1942, when the U-boat building program would be completed and he'd have 300 U-boats. Instead he went to war with only a few dozen ready for action in the Atlantic. His forces ran wild in the First Happy Time against disorganized British defenses, but they lacked the numbers to be truly decisive.
The Battle of the Atlantic was one of the major campaigns of the war. Meanwhile, British submarines operating from Malta and Alexandria faced a miniature version of the shipping campaign against Axis transports to North Africa. The Maltese boats faced truly horrific conditions during the siege, but presented a perennial thorn in the Axis side.
Submarine actions depended on the courage and judgement of commanders, but it was also a technological war. It was in this area that the Allies succeeded, with development of centrimetric radar giving their submarines and escorts a major advantage. Convoy escort building, new weapons like the Hedgehog depth charge projector, and doctrine for pursuing U-boats tilted the submarine war towards the Allied side. The final days of both the Japanese and Nazi services were essentially suicide operations for little gain.
Padfield blends first-person accounts of actions with a synoptic view of the campaign. He has a generally positive view of the sailors who served, and isn't afraid to shy away from judgment of higher commanders. Donitz, though an avowed Nazi, understood the use of U-boats as a weapon. His failure to keep up with technological changes doomed his arm, and his men. On the allied side, their was a surprising lassitude at proper convoy tactics and aerial escorts. Britain forgot the lessons of the First World War, and the United States ignored what their Allies had learned months before, likely due to Earnest King's Anglophobia. The diversion of long range bombers and radars to the strategic bombing offensive, which delivered relatively few results early on, when as few as 100 planes could have tilted the balance in the Atlantic, is one area of folly. The obstinance of Pacific Command over the reliability of the Mk 14 is another area.
Having read quite a few of these naval histories, Padfield joins the top ranks of authors.