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That Nothing is Known
This is an edition of one of the crucial texts of Renaissance skepticism, Quod nihil scitur, by the Portuguese scholar Franciso Sanches. The treatise, first published in 1581, is a refutation of Aaristotelian dialectics and scientific theory in the search for a true scientific method. This volume provides a critical edition of the original text, an English translation (the first ever published), a substantial introduction, and comprehensive annotation.
- GenresPhilosophy
324 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1581
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About the author
Francisco Sanches
4 books13 followersFrancisco Sanches was a Portuguese philosopher, physician and mathematician.
He is best known for his philosophical treatise on skepticism: Quod Nihil Scitur (That Nothing is Known). His work, alongside that of Michel de Montaigne's is notable for contributing to a revival of interest in skepticism in the 16th century, and for inaugurating the branch of 'constructive' or 'mitigated' skepticism.
He is best known for his philosophical treatise on skepticism: Quod Nihil Scitur (That Nothing is Known). His work, alongside that of Michel de Montaigne's is notable for contributing to a revival of interest in skepticism in the 16th century, and for inaugurating the branch of 'constructive' or 'mitigated' skepticism.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
May 12, 2025
Very unique in some ways.
Sanches is probably the most aggressive skeptic I've read so far. When speaking against his dogmatic adversaries, he is direct, acid, and openly disrespectful at times. As much as that may sound negative, it makes his reading much more colorful and full of personality -- you can see Sanches is not the kind of skeptic who's only interested in playing epistemological games -- he genuinely thinks Aristotelian dogmatism is a poison and aggressive skepticism is (at least at a preliminary stage) its antidote. He reminds of Shestov a little because of that.
Anyway, that's not the only thing unique about the text. Something that sets Sanches apart is that his attack is mainly directed toward one specific conception of knowledge/science, that derived from Aristotle and his medieval followers. Moreover, his attacks are wholly ad hominem and seem to be advanced in the interest of convincing those followers that their own conception of knowledge means that no knowledge can ever be attained. That is very similar to Sextus Empiricus' skeptical procedure as outlined in his Outlines of skepticism.
However, the appearance is only superficial. In reality, a great deal of Quod nihil scitur features unique arguments directed specifically against Aristotle, and that suggest Sanches' own nominalist and empiricist outlook on philosophy and science.
For example, he contests the essential/nominal definitions distinction, by arguing that, under that conception, we actually never achieve knowledge of any essence, since all definitions only gives us names, and each name is further defined by other, more obscure names, never giving us the actual essence of any thing (be it Man, Animal, Rational, etc.). This causes him to say that all questions are nominal questions; i.e., that every definition can only ever be nominal, and not essential.
Another particular point is that demonstration as conceptualized by Aristotle cannot be a science, nor used as a scientific method, since all of its supposed first principles can not only not be demonstrated themselves (something Aristotle himself said, so it's not Sanches dogmatizing here), but are also (as Sanches makes clear) very dubitable themselves, since no definition of the main terms of the premises have been successful at convincing us that we have determined a thing's essence - only names that can be applied to it.
Sanches contests Aristotle's definition of science as disposition obtained by demonstrations (dispositions pertain to the realm of memory and not knowledge), and also the accounts of knowledge as reminiscence (Plato) and science as knowledge of Aristotelian causes (he refutes both by using regress arguments, by also interestingly attacking the platonic theory using linguistic evidence that goes against its implications - something that reminds me a little bit of ordinary language philosophy). He then goes on to give his own definition of science: Perfect understanding of a thing. Given his skepticism about definitions, he refuses to further define the constituents of this characterization, but says it's understandable enough on its own.
If he had stopped there, Sanches wouldn't be much of a skeptic - he would be an enemy of Aristotle and his model of science in favor of a new conception of science and its method. And if he had stopped there, he wouldn't be much different from other figures of the scientific revolution such as Pierre Gassendi and René Descartes. Shockingly, however, Sanches goes on to argue that even under his conception of science, no science exists, and nothing is really known. It is at this moment that Quod nihil scitur truly reveals how fully skeptical its outlook is. And it is also here, at the second half of the book, that Sanches starts using classic skeptical arguments against the reliability of our senses and rational faculties.
Sanches argues that, when it comes to knowledge, all we really have is sense experience and reasoning that infers conjectures on the basis of sense experience (and that creates false fictional entities such as universals when it runs amok without experience). To acquire perfect knowledge about a thing is to come to know its essence. That cannot be achieved through experience alone, since we only have access to a thing's accidents (or, to put in kantian terms, the phenomena), and not its essence (the noumena). There wouldn't even be a need for a science if we had that kind of access. The essence of a thing must be inferred from what we observe of its accidents, which also requires that the knowing subject, the object of investagion and the environment in which the investigation is happening are in optimal conditions. He then argues that skeptical considerations show that neither the subject, nor object, nor the external conditions are in optimal condition or "perfect", as Sanches puts it. When it comes to observing the object itself through the senses, he makes use of several arguments against the reliability of the senses, many of which are actually part of Aenesidemus' tropes of relativity (for example, that an object appears different depending on things such as observing it under water, or through different types of glass, or in dark places, etc.). When it comes to reason, he argues that (i) there is no perfect body capable of making truly epistemically reliable judgments on the essence of things; (ii) even if there were such a body, he would likely be taught by imperfect teachers, or might not be interested in it at all, or might be affected by cognitive biases; (iii) even if he had a perfect body, he would still be subject to aging and its effects on his own inclinations and opinions (and at which age did he make the correct judgement?); (iv) even if he weren't, he wouldn't accumulate enough experience to acquire true science about things in a lifetime, and he would need to read books whose authors are in constant disagreement, leading to doubt and error. Therefore, since none of these parts is perfect, and these are necessary for science to flourish, nothing is known.
This is a very brief summary of what happens in the book -- there's a lot of details worth checking out that I'm ommiting here for the sake of brevity. Nevertheless, this sums up the crucial parts. In general, this was a very interesting read. Sanches' use of ancient skeptical arguments, but also new ad hominem arguments and arguments inspired by his empiricist and nominalist tendencies make him very unique among other renaissance skeptics. Plus, as I said, his writing is very entertaining and direct to the point, which for 16th century standards is a relief for me. Highly recommended for those interested in the history of skepticism.
Sanches is probably the most aggressive skeptic I've read so far. When speaking against his dogmatic adversaries, he is direct, acid, and openly disrespectful at times. As much as that may sound negative, it makes his reading much more colorful and full of personality -- you can see Sanches is not the kind of skeptic who's only interested in playing epistemological games -- he genuinely thinks Aristotelian dogmatism is a poison and aggressive skepticism is (at least at a preliminary stage) its antidote. He reminds of Shestov a little because of that.
Anyway, that's not the only thing unique about the text. Something that sets Sanches apart is that his attack is mainly directed toward one specific conception of knowledge/science, that derived from Aristotle and his medieval followers. Moreover, his attacks are wholly ad hominem and seem to be advanced in the interest of convincing those followers that their own conception of knowledge means that no knowledge can ever be attained. That is very similar to Sextus Empiricus' skeptical procedure as outlined in his Outlines of skepticism.
However, the appearance is only superficial. In reality, a great deal of Quod nihil scitur features unique arguments directed specifically against Aristotle, and that suggest Sanches' own nominalist and empiricist outlook on philosophy and science.
For example, he contests the essential/nominal definitions distinction, by arguing that, under that conception, we actually never achieve knowledge of any essence, since all definitions only gives us names, and each name is further defined by other, more obscure names, never giving us the actual essence of any thing (be it Man, Animal, Rational, etc.). This causes him to say that all questions are nominal questions; i.e., that every definition can only ever be nominal, and not essential.
Another particular point is that demonstration as conceptualized by Aristotle cannot be a science, nor used as a scientific method, since all of its supposed first principles can not only not be demonstrated themselves (something Aristotle himself said, so it's not Sanches dogmatizing here), but are also (as Sanches makes clear) very dubitable themselves, since no definition of the main terms of the premises have been successful at convincing us that we have determined a thing's essence - only names that can be applied to it.
Sanches contests Aristotle's definition of science as disposition obtained by demonstrations (dispositions pertain to the realm of memory and not knowledge), and also the accounts of knowledge as reminiscence (Plato) and science as knowledge of Aristotelian causes (he refutes both by using regress arguments, by also interestingly attacking the platonic theory using linguistic evidence that goes against its implications - something that reminds me a little bit of ordinary language philosophy). He then goes on to give his own definition of science: Perfect understanding of a thing. Given his skepticism about definitions, he refuses to further define the constituents of this characterization, but says it's understandable enough on its own.
If he had stopped there, Sanches wouldn't be much of a skeptic - he would be an enemy of Aristotle and his model of science in favor of a new conception of science and its method. And if he had stopped there, he wouldn't be much different from other figures of the scientific revolution such as Pierre Gassendi and René Descartes. Shockingly, however, Sanches goes on to argue that even under his conception of science, no science exists, and nothing is really known. It is at this moment that Quod nihil scitur truly reveals how fully skeptical its outlook is. And it is also here, at the second half of the book, that Sanches starts using classic skeptical arguments against the reliability of our senses and rational faculties.
Sanches argues that, when it comes to knowledge, all we really have is sense experience and reasoning that infers conjectures on the basis of sense experience (and that creates false fictional entities such as universals when it runs amok without experience). To acquire perfect knowledge about a thing is to come to know its essence. That cannot be achieved through experience alone, since we only have access to a thing's accidents (or, to put in kantian terms, the phenomena), and not its essence (the noumena). There wouldn't even be a need for a science if we had that kind of access. The essence of a thing must be inferred from what we observe of its accidents, which also requires that the knowing subject, the object of investagion and the environment in which the investigation is happening are in optimal conditions. He then argues that skeptical considerations show that neither the subject, nor object, nor the external conditions are in optimal condition or "perfect", as Sanches puts it. When it comes to observing the object itself through the senses, he makes use of several arguments against the reliability of the senses, many of which are actually part of Aenesidemus' tropes of relativity (for example, that an object appears different depending on things such as observing it under water, or through different types of glass, or in dark places, etc.). When it comes to reason, he argues that (i) there is no perfect body capable of making truly epistemically reliable judgments on the essence of things; (ii) even if there were such a body, he would likely be taught by imperfect teachers, or might not be interested in it at all, or might be affected by cognitive biases; (iii) even if he had a perfect body, he would still be subject to aging and its effects on his own inclinations and opinions (and at which age did he make the correct judgement?); (iv) even if he weren't, he wouldn't accumulate enough experience to acquire true science about things in a lifetime, and he would need to read books whose authors are in constant disagreement, leading to doubt and error. Therefore, since none of these parts is perfect, and these are necessary for science to flourish, nothing is known.
This is a very brief summary of what happens in the book -- there's a lot of details worth checking out that I'm ommiting here for the sake of brevity. Nevertheless, this sums up the crucial parts. In general, this was a very interesting read. Sanches' use of ancient skeptical arguments, but also new ad hominem arguments and arguments inspired by his empiricist and nominalist tendencies make him very unique among other renaissance skeptics. Plus, as I said, his writing is very entertaining and direct to the point, which for 16th century standards is a relief for me. Highly recommended for those interested in the history of skepticism.
February 4, 2025
MOEILIJKKK, maar interessante filosofie (eigenlijk 2,5)
January 17, 2022
No Quod nihil scitur, Francisco Sanches faz uma apologia da dúvida metódica, da qual uma única conclusão se pode extrair: Que nada se sabe. E mesmo isso, diz ele, é altamente duvidoso. O autor consequentemente empreende um acirrado ataque à Escolástica e ao então popular sistema de conhecimento aristoteliano, que procura desmontar ao por em evidência os seus pontos débeis.
Mas apesar de nada se poder saber com certeza, diz o nosso caro filósofo, bastante se pode saber com probabilidade; e esta impossibilidade de apreender a verdade absoluta não deve servir de desencorajamento da pesquisa científica e da velha busca pela verdade. Verdade suposta, claro está - nunca absoluta. Nesta busca, o empiricismo indica o caminho; porque por enganadores que possam ser os nossos sentidos (como ele reconhece), a melhor aproximação à verdade continua a ser aquela que é guiada por eles, em detrimento de fantasias mentais como os universais de Aristóteles ou as formas de Platão.
Não deixa de ser irónico que, nesta luta supostamente sem tréguas contra o dogma, Sanches tenha feito tréguas com a maior ditadora de dogmas do seu tempo: a Igreja Católica, à qual convenientemente se esquiva de fazer críticas.
Nos dias de hoje, já longes do dogmatismo escolástico que deu azo à escrita deste livro, muitas destas questões são já coisa datada. Como me parece muito rara a possibilidade de algum dia vir a esbarrar num escolástico dos tempos contemporâneos que precise de ser rebatido com tais argumentos, vale este livro sobretudo pelo exemplo da dúvida metódica, que - dizem as más línguas - viria a ser uma importantíssima influência no Discurso do Método de Descartes.
Mas apesar de nada se poder saber com certeza, diz o nosso caro filósofo, bastante se pode saber com probabilidade; e esta impossibilidade de apreender a verdade absoluta não deve servir de desencorajamento da pesquisa científica e da velha busca pela verdade. Verdade suposta, claro está - nunca absoluta. Nesta busca, o empiricismo indica o caminho; porque por enganadores que possam ser os nossos sentidos (como ele reconhece), a melhor aproximação à verdade continua a ser aquela que é guiada por eles, em detrimento de fantasias mentais como os universais de Aristóteles ou as formas de Platão.
Não deixa de ser irónico que, nesta luta supostamente sem tréguas contra o dogma, Sanches tenha feito tréguas com a maior ditadora de dogmas do seu tempo: a Igreja Católica, à qual convenientemente se esquiva de fazer críticas.
Nos dias de hoje, já longes do dogmatismo escolástico que deu azo à escrita deste livro, muitas destas questões são já coisa datada. Como me parece muito rara a possibilidade de algum dia vir a esbarrar num escolástico dos tempos contemporâneos que precise de ser rebatido com tais argumentos, vale este livro sobretudo pelo exemplo da dúvida metódica, que - dizem as más línguas - viria a ser uma importantíssima influência no Discurso do Método de Descartes.
January 4, 2025
Na-ah. De vorige twee boeken kon ik nog tot op zeker hoogte volgen en me inleven in het verhaal. Mais wat was dit? Ik snapte zelfs niet wat ik aan het lezen was met een vertaling erbij.
Bon, radicaal scepticus van het eerste uur probeert Sanchez (die trouwens ook een NVA'er in Boom als naamgenoot heeft, ontdekt tijdens het Googelen) ons duidelijk te maken dat je niets kan weten. Kennis is volgens hem pure larie en apekool. Het enige dat ik weet, is - als ik een vraag niet weet op het examen - gewoon eventjes ga verwijzen naar Francisco.
Bon, radicaal scepticus van het eerste uur probeert Sanchez (die trouwens ook een NVA'er in Boom als naamgenoot heeft, ontdekt tijdens het Googelen) ons duidelijk te maken dat je niets kan weten. Kennis is volgens hem pure larie en apekool. Het enige dat ik weet, is - als ik een vraag niet weet op het examen - gewoon eventjes ga verwijzen naar Francisco.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews