Objectivity: A Very Short Introduction

Very Short Introductions #316

by Stephen Gaukroger

- Is objectivity possible?- Can there be objectivity in matters of morals, or tastes?- What would a truly objective account of the world be like?- Is everything subjective, or relative?- Are moral judgments objective or culturally relative?Objectivity is both an essential and elusive philosophical concept. An account is generally considered to be objective if it attempts to capture the nature of the object studied without judgement of a conscious entity or subject. Objectivity stands in contrast to an objective account is impartial, one which could ideally be accepted by any subject, because it does not draw on any assumptions, prejudices, or values of particular subjects. Stephen Gaukroger shows that it is farfrom clear that we can resolve moral or aesthetic disputes in this way and it has often been argued that such an approach is not always appropriate for disciplines that deal with human, rather than natural, phenomena. Moreover, even in those cases where we seek to be objective, it may be difficult tojudge what a truly objective account would look like, and whether it is achievable.This Very Short Introduction demonstrates that there are a number of common misunderstandings about what objectivity is, and explores the theoretical and practical problems of objectivity by assessing the basic questions raised by it. As well as considering the core philosophical issues, Gaukroger also deals with the way in which particular understandings of objectivity impinge on social research, science, and art.ABOUT THE The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Logic, Reference, Education, Sociology, Science

129 pages, Kindle Edition

First published March 22, 2012

About the author

Stephen Gaukroger is a British philosopher and intellectual historian. He is Professor of History of Philosophy and History of Science at the University of Sydney. Recently he also took up a position as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen.

He received his BA (hons) in philosophy, with congratulatory first class honours, from the University of London in 1974, and his PhD, in history and philosophy of science, from the University of Cambridge in 1977. He was a Research Fellow at Clare Hall Cambridge, and then at the University of Melbourne, before joining the Philosophy Department at Sydney in 1981. In 2011, he moved to the Unit for History and Philosophy of Science. He is a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities, a Corresponding Member of l’Académie Internationale d’Histoire des Sciences, and in 2003 was awarded the Australian Centenary Medal for contributions to history of philosophy and history of science. He is presently Professor of History of Philosophy and History of Science, and ARC Professorial Fellow. His work has been translated into Arabic, Chinese, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Serbian.

Reviews

[Varad · Rating 4 out of 5]

Objectivity isn't what one sees, it's how one looks. That's the gist of Gaukroger's brief book. Some readers may be dissatisfied as he doesn't offer one universal definition applicable to all situations and subjects. He starts that way by enumerating three alternative conceptions of objectivity: that it requires judgments that are free of prejudice, "that it should be assumption free," and that it should represent things accurately (10). As he shows, however, how closely one can meet these standards depends on what they are being applied to. Objectivity in physics isn't the same as objectivity in ethics. That's the main theme of the book, that objectivity is a matter of fairness and accuracy, and less a matter of not being biased or having no values involved.

Gaukroger in several vary brief chapters considers how objectivity works in various fields and objections to objectivity. In one chapter, for example, he considers whether objectivity is possible if our understanding of the world is merely a product of the way the mind structures it. As you might gather from this, there's a lot of philosophy in the book, especially epistemology. He also deals with the popular notion that things like Heisenberg's uncertainty principle have proved that science has reduced the prospect of objectivity to a nullity. Maybe the most valuable chapter is the one where Gaukroger dismisses the myth that the purest objectivity is to be found in numbers. Dumb number crunching is not a form of objectivity, he argues, because it does not guarantee objectivity. Instead, it evades it. Numbers assist judgment, they can't replace it.

The trickiest chapters are the last three, which deal with objectivity in the study of human behavior, in ethics, and in aesthetics. On the first, Gaukroger explains how the pursuit of objective explanations of social phenomena led scholars to adopt functionalist models which aped the natural sciences. The only problem, of course, is that humans "are unlike chemical reagents" (81). An alternative approach is to treat the human and natural sciences differently, with their own criteria and methods. That seems to work, but at the price of getting us farther from any model of objectivity that might have universal applicability. The dilemma with ethics appears even more insoluble. If there are no universal moral standards, then does moral objectivity merely become the pursuit of some kind of rule that can be applied consistently? That may be objective, but it makes a poor claim to any kind of robust ethical content.

In the end, Gaukroger affirms that objectivity is "context-dependent" and something "we learn how to achieve in context-dependent ways. It is not a one-size-fits all notion" (104). At first it seems that the traditional view that objectivity "requires a degree of indifference in judging that may conflict with our needs and desires" appears right (103). But once you apply it, objectivity changes. In science questions of the nature of evidence and the methods used to acquire them come into play. In daily life, on the other hand, overcoming ones prejudices does seem to matter most. Human actors aren't chemical reagents, after all. As I suggested at the beginning, some may find Gaukroger's reluctance, even dismissal, of the possibility of one universal standard of objective to be unsatisfying. But given the mischief that ensues when humans are treated like chemical reagents, that's probably for the best.


Posted Tuesday, September 8, 2015

[Henrik Maler · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very readable closer look at the concept we call “objectivity”, despite its informational richness and complex questions dealt with. This is due to the virtues of analytic philosophy which Stephen Gaukroger notably practices: clarity of thought, precision of expression, systematicity of thought and writing, rigour of argumentation, and conceptual creativity (although he does not propose his own concepts but rather elaborates on already existing ones). He does propose his own conception and arguments though.

Some ideas I took note of
What is objectivity?
There are five different understandings of objectivity. It can refer to
1. freedom of a statement or theory from prejudice and bias
2. freedom of a statement or theory from assumptions and values
3. universal agreement (although only being a sign of objectivity, not its meaning)
4. the accurate representation of our world (since 18th century)
5. an accurate representation being attained by a certain procedure, a particular way of pursuing enquiry, which makes use of a particular set of internal criteria (most notably reliability) that guide our interpretation of evidence and our choice between alternative viewpoints towards the best answers to the questions we pose (not towards the truth as Gaukroger argues).

What is its relation to truth and justification?
- Intuitively, objectivity understood as accurate representation is closely related to truth as truth poses the reason to be objective in the first place. Yet, as we do not know what the truth is, objectivity is motivated by improving our justificational grounds.
- “A theory that represents things as they are is thereby true, but it is not thereby objective.” (p. 51): One can “know” the truth without using an objectivity-attaining procedure, without universal agreement, imbued with prejudice and bias, for example when one makes a lucky guess or when one just has some intuition.
- Also, one can be perfectly objective but still not attain the truth. Geocentrism and scientific theories of the past serve as many examples.
-> Reinterpreting evidence to make evidence fit the theory can be necessary in order to find an accurate representation, although reinterpretation seems unobjective. Reinterpretation can be OK because it can happen that the evidence does not rule out one’s hypothesis but auxilary sub-hypotheses that need to be adjusted. Seeking reliability of results, one adopts a procedure with rational standards that grants objectivity.
- Truth was seen to guide arguments to where they should end, whereas objectivity constrain arguments in how they should begin and proceed.
- “If there is one lesson to be learned from the history of science, it is that objectivity does not discriminate between good and bad questions. If you deploy objective procedures in answering a misconceived, confused, or misleading question, it is highly likely that the answer will not get you anywhere. ” (p.61)

Doesn’t science show that there is no obejectivity?
- Relativity theory proves that observation is relative to the observer. Does it? No, it changes what is relative and what is fixed: it does not simply make everything relative. “It is not as if its truth is relative to some physical state.”
- Quantum mechanics proves that the observer cannot help but to interact with the observed and thereby change it. But that only means that new procedures have to be developed in order to secure objectivity.

Isn’t everything (epistemically) relative?
- “An objective theory is not one that simply chooses one set of viewing conditions over others and then stipulates that these will be the objective conditions. […] Rather it tells us how it will look under ****any**** conditions, ideally, or failing that how it will look in a specified range of conditions.” (my emphasis)
- About cognitive and linguistic relativity, conceptual structuring being a universal feature of the mind: “Our minds structure our experience and our thought in fundamental ways. To think that this in itself could compromise objectivity is to imagine that we could think without brains, see without eyes. […] Unmediated perception (and thought) is not objective perception: it is not perception at all.” (p. 39).
-> That’s why objectivity comes in degrees. A view from nowhere is the most extreme case of objectivity, but is impossible. Thats why truth cannot be equated with it. Truth is absolute. Objectivity in terms of freedom from prejudice and bias encourages an absolute notion.
- Different ways of carving up the world has no relativistic consequences, because using different methods simply do not undermine absolute truth. They are doing different things, maybe even serving different purposes, but they are compatible with each other.
- Our beliefs do not shape everything we perceive. No matter how different some beliefs are, people perceive the same thing (e.g. Müller-Lyer illusion).

More about objectivity as accurately representing something
- “Objectivity is costly: in different context, securing objectivity in scientific atlases may demand sacrifices in pedagogical efficacy, colour, depth of field, and even diagnostic utility.”
- Four kinds of objectivity in terms of accruate representations:
1. capturing the essential nature, removing all variant aspects; “the particular can never serve as a pattern for the whole”(Goethe)
2. mechanical objectivity: capturing the appearances along with its variant aspects, unmediated by any filter criterion; “anything other than “mere” appearances goes beyond what we can objectively determine.” (p. 57); usually fails to adhere to its own criteria (a picture’s lighting, focus etc.)
3. structured objectivity: stripping away any perspectival elements; a view from nowhere; endorsed by the logical positivists; unclear why abstractness (algebraic over geometrical representations) leads to more accurate representations
4. trained judgment: “identification and elimination of arbitrary judgments, […] “balancing various conflicting considerations rather than finding a single absolute standard” (p. 59), separating “the informative and the uninformative, with a view to producing reliable results” (p. 62)
- Prior expectations (prejudice, bias) to observation can lead to accurate representations if sound theoretical grounds exist.
- “Any satisfactory account of objectivity must take account of […] questions about what counts as an explanation, for example, and what counts as evidence. Such variations do not in themselves necessarily undermine objectivity.”
- Quantification cannot replace judgment, but it can support it, especially in cases where our intuition might lead us to believe and act in short-sighted ways.

Can the study of human behavior be objective?
- Functionalistic explanations are general and independent of specific aspects, yet they miss out on capturing what is distinctive of the individual subject-matter.
- To deny the anthropologist his objectivity, is unjust because he takes far greater care to provide a detailed account than the functionalist to explain.
- Functionalist explanations correspond to scientific explanations where there are majorly causes and no reasons, but humans and human behavior are guided by reasons. So should both functionalistic and anthropological explanations be endorsed?
- The danger of functionalistic anthropology is to assume that all communities have sth in common, for example the need and motivation for social cohesion, although they potentially do not.

What is the difference between interpretation and explanation? Between reasons and causes?
- giving the reasons someone has for doing something is interpretation, reasons corresponding to the beliefs and motivations of humans
- giving the causes of their behavior is explanation, causes corresponding to the mechanical course of events leading up to behavior

[Huzo · Rating 4 out of 5]

"If we perform an experiment or carry out an observation, we usually have a good idea of what kind of result we will get. Sometimes we get unexpected results, and, when we are testing a theory, these results may contradict what the theory predicts the outcome should be. Shouldn’t one reject the theory when this happens? After all, doesn’t objectivity dictate that if a result of an experiment conflicts with our expectations then this shows that there is something wrong With our expectations? Certainly, Popper thought so, and this was the core idea behind his association of falsificationist methodology with intellectual honesty. But more recently, there has been a revival of the thesis of Pierre Duhem, a historian and philosopher of science working at the beginning of the last century, who argued that it is impossible to test any scientific hypothesis in isolation, because there are always auxiliary assumptions involved, and these are intimately tied in with the hypothesis itself. Even seemingly straightforward hypotheses are routinely part of a complex network. So when an observation or experiment yields a result that contradicts one’s hypothesis, it could be one of the auxiliary hypotheses that is at fault, and not the one that the experiment was designed to test."

[T. C. A. Massey]

Seemed to be an 'apologetic' of sorts

In explaining ( though Carefully )

The Historical Processes ( evolution / distortion )

Of "OBJECTIVITY" as an Idea,

a Concept,

An Ideal,

A ( incomplete ) Process,

as attempted,

& it's Status within Historically Referenced Literature,

MOSTLY Scientific Papers

Discussing at "Sociological" etc..
Higher Levels of Abstraction

Including this 'Abstraction' Process itself
In a Literary / Literatured Sense.

I KNOW it is a "Very Short Introduction to"

&

Summationed as the Literal Authoritizing

Is what OXFORD's Bread & Butter is


I will enjoy Systemstizing

&

Then Processing each Text

When I return to the Problems of "REAL" OBJECTIVITY

once I have gathered Enough EMPIRICALLY Valid Information :)

[Ahmet Ramazan Akur · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kitaba başlamadan önce tahmin ettiğimden, daha az ilginç bir konu imiş objectivity. Beklentimi karşılamamasının bir nedeni bu, bir diğeri de; bir konu hakkında farklı tanımların eksikliklerinden bahseden kitaplardan sıkılmış olmam.

Tanımlanmış bir şeyi, karşılamayan örnek bulabilmek kolay olacağı için; çoğu kişi kitaplarında bundan kaçmak adına tanım yapmadan sadece yapılan tanımların eksikliğinden bahsediyor. Bu da bir yöntem olabilir, belki daha iyi de olabilir, çok iddaalı değilim bu konuda ama dediğim gibi biraz sıktı ve kaçış yöntemi gibi gelmeye başladı.

[Can Özer · Rating 3 out of 5]

Unfortunately Gaukroger does not offer a general introduction to objectivity; he primarily talks about objectivity as a predicate of processes/inquiries, particularly as a feature of scientific inquiry. His account deserves praise for its historical and institutional approach with a multitude of real-life examples, but as he explicitly writes, the answers to his questions won't come from "speculative epistemology." In these aspects the book is probably better suited for people who are significantly more interested in science than philosophy.

[Plato · Rating 4 out of 5]

So good and the writing is very clear! Gaukroger's book should be read by anyone trying to understand the contemporary significance of the idea of objectivity in our knowledge and how it is defined in many ways that have varying degrees of effectiveness in its application.

[Kimberly · Rating 3 out of 5]

Looks at the different theories and definitions of objectivity, what it can mean, what it cannot mean, etc. A good book, although it does not lead you to many conclusions on the matter.

[Michael F Duerden]

Just started reading

[Marcos Pensive · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reads more like an essay than other books in the series, as it posits a specific viewpoint, but it's still pretty good as an introduction and the point it makes is fairly solid, if incomplete.

[Brandon Stariha · Rating 4 out of 5]

Objectivity is back on the menu 😎

[Andrew Langridge · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Objectivity is more mundane than truth, but herein lies its power."

This is a thought-provoking little book, which asks the important questions and invariably hits on the right answers. For the author, Stephen Gaukroger, it is important that we distinguish objectivity from truth. He says that objectivity is better understood, negatively, as freeing ourselves from bias rather than, positively, as truthfully depicting reality. In our rational endeavors, we are making reliable judgments rather than eliminating all assumptions. He points to the inescapable element of choice and expertise in scientific practise that is forgotten when treating scientific theory as determined solely by evidence.

In a chapter on human behaviour, Gaukroger provides an interesting illustration of objective analysis applied to tribal rain dances, and his model of objectivity is particularly well-suited to the socio-political domain. I am less convinced of its applicability to the pure science domain, in which quantification takes on a more fundamental role. He says "quantification is a tool for understanding a world it has itself created", but mathematics is also the "language of nature" as Feynman puts it, providing the component of necessity to physical descriptions. If there are five coins on the table, and I count five then surely I have arrived at the truth. The author seems to imply that this is purely a matter of how 'coin' is defined, or how I go about counting. Mathematics is not just a disciplined discourse permitting premises to be clearly stated and errors in reasoning to be reduced, it also helps us to expose hidden patterns in nature, thereby enabling scientific innovation and discovery.

[Doug · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good tour of the cosmos of objectivity - it's history, development, and it's distinction from truth. I'll bail on a review and just put up my favorite quote from pg. 67 "If there is no view from nowhere, there is no limiting case where, having progressively become more and more objective, a theory can finally attain absolute objectivity. Objectivity does not become like truth in the limiting case. Indeed, some of the deepest and most persistent problems for understanding objectivity arise when one tries to make it absolute, or at least inadvertently thinks of it in absolutist terms."

[Daniel Wright · Rating 2 out of 5]

Chapter 1: Introduction: The varieties of objectivity
Chapter 2: Is objectivity a form of honesty?
Chapter 3: Doesn't science show there is no objectivity?
Chapter 4: Isn't all perception and understanding relative?
Chapter 5: What about out conceptual structuring of the world?
Chapter 6: Is it possible to represent things objectively?
Chapter 7: Objectivity in numbers?
Chapter 8: Can the study of human behaviour be objective?
Chapter 9: Can there be objectivity in ethics?
Chapter 10: Can there be objectivity in taste?

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not riveting, but useful. For the student of philosophy, the author spans metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics in his treatment of objectivity.

[Mills College Library]

121.4 G268 2012