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Virtues and Vices: And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy
"Foot stands out among contemporary ethical theorists because of her conviction that virtues and vices are more central ethical notions than rights, duties, justice, or consequences--the primary focus of most other contemporary moral theorists....[These] essays embody to some extent her commitment to an ethics of virtue. Foot's style is straightforward and readable, her arguments subtle..."--Choice
234 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 1978
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May 19, 2026
“It is surely clear that moral virtues must be connected with human good and harm, and that it is quite impossible to call anything you like good or harm” (120)
Philippa Foot was concerned with finding an objective basis for moral judgement and the quote above concisely captures both the problem and her solution. The trouble with moral judgements is that they too easily fall apart if you approach them with the same expectations of verifiability that one might for other, descriptive statements (see A.J. Ayer). For example, “the Earth is round” is verifiable, and it makes no sense for a person to say “the Earth if round for me” or “the Earth is not round for me.” The same cannot be said about statements like “what he did was wrong” because the underlying judgement lacks the same basis of verification. One can say “what he did was not wrong for me” or “what he did was wrong for me” and both could appear true.
The solution to the problem is to change our orientation of verification from descriptive statements of the world to evaluative statements that are based on a set of shared moral beliefs belonging to a society. Our shared moral beliefs are what guide our actions, and our actions are oriented toward preserving some aspect of what Aristotle described as eudaimonia but that we would better understand as human flourishing. Flourishing includes the preservation of life at its most basic, but also happiness, fulfillment, and self-worth. Our moral orientation toward flourishing (our own and others) is fulfilled through our choices, whether we choose to intervene to create a condition of flourishing or we choose not to impede it (46). Moral action is chosen and we enact our choices and through the lens of virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, &c.) which reside at the foundation of shared social beliefs, whether codified or not.
The most striking thing about the collection of essays is that Foot approaches her topic through the lens of language, using a heap of common circumstances in which we might use expressions of goodness (e.g., morality, goodness, correctness, &c.) to see how alterations to those circumstances (e.g., foresight, choice, agency, scope, &c.) alter a sense of the allowed common use of the term. When use is disallowed or is not customary, she takes it as an indication that the circumstance, as contrived, falls outside our received understanding of moral goodness. Through this process, Foot creates arrives at her belief in the importance of choice, beneficence, desire, and will and the way those aspects of human existence are shaped by the degree to which we belong to society and recognize a shared interest in pursuing human flourishing (120). Just like with the foundation of any commonwealth, there is a recognition that by preserving what is good for another, protecting their ability to pursue their flourishing, one preserves their own right to pursue the same.
At one point Foot writes …
The basis of these moral beliefs is that they appeal to recognizable virtues (e.g., strength, courage, wisdom, justice) that we either strive toward for ourselves or protect other’s rights to pursue the same (120). This, then, becomes the basis for arguing that we can see the effects of our acts and how they impinge or support another’s pursuit of virtue, which is why we cannot claim that something isn’t moral because it isn’t moral “for me” (124). This orientation to virtues and the common good still doesn’t quite get at the issue of moral obligation or duty, however. It is a view point that requires an active engagement with moral virtues and a recognition of their value (124). We might learn these in the home, school, church but we need to practice them, just like all virtues require continual practice according to Aristotle. Whether we deny those virtues for ourselves, fail to recognize the right of others to pursue them, the result can be complacent amorality.
The elusive “ought” or the normativity of moral behavior has to come through a recognition that our ability to pursue our flourishing depends on our commitment to a society that is likewise committed to upholding our rights to pursue it. Foot sees this as a “hypothetical imperative” as opposed to Kant’s “categorical imperative” which recognizes a duty toward moral action that derives from an act of reason that determines correct action which will be recognizable by its universality and non-contradiction. Hypothetical imperatives are instrumental and purpose driven, tied to individual motives, desires, and wills. We can always still choose not to act morally. The imperative is driven by a choice to remain part of a civil society that is, on the whole, organized to the sustainment of individual and collective flourishing in the promotion of the virtue of justice.
Some of the standout essays: "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," "Moral Arguments," "Moral Beliefs," "Goodness and Choice," "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives"
A couple of fun facts about Philppa Foot:
- her mother was Esther Cleveland, daughter of US President Grover Cleveland (i.e., POTUS #22 and #24).
- Foot was a core part of group of brilliant women who were philosophers and writers at Oxford between 1939 and 1942. These women included Elizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch.
Philippa Foot was concerned with finding an objective basis for moral judgement and the quote above concisely captures both the problem and her solution. The trouble with moral judgements is that they too easily fall apart if you approach them with the same expectations of verifiability that one might for other, descriptive statements (see A.J. Ayer). For example, “the Earth is round” is verifiable, and it makes no sense for a person to say “the Earth if round for me” or “the Earth is not round for me.” The same cannot be said about statements like “what he did was wrong” because the underlying judgement lacks the same basis of verification. One can say “what he did was not wrong for me” or “what he did was wrong for me” and both could appear true.
The solution to the problem is to change our orientation of verification from descriptive statements of the world to evaluative statements that are based on a set of shared moral beliefs belonging to a society. Our shared moral beliefs are what guide our actions, and our actions are oriented toward preserving some aspect of what Aristotle described as eudaimonia but that we would better understand as human flourishing. Flourishing includes the preservation of life at its most basic, but also happiness, fulfillment, and self-worth. Our moral orientation toward flourishing (our own and others) is fulfilled through our choices, whether we choose to intervene to create a condition of flourishing or we choose not to impede it (46). Moral action is chosen and we enact our choices and through the lens of virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, &c.) which reside at the foundation of shared social beliefs, whether codified or not.
The most striking thing about the collection of essays is that Foot approaches her topic through the lens of language, using a heap of common circumstances in which we might use expressions of goodness (e.g., morality, goodness, correctness, &c.) to see how alterations to those circumstances (e.g., foresight, choice, agency, scope, &c.) alter a sense of the allowed common use of the term. When use is disallowed or is not customary, she takes it as an indication that the circumstance, as contrived, falls outside our received understanding of moral goodness. Through this process, Foot creates arrives at her belief in the importance of choice, beneficence, desire, and will and the way those aspects of human existence are shaped by the degree to which we belong to society and recognize a shared interest in pursuing human flourishing (120). Just like with the foundation of any commonwealth, there is a recognition that by preserving what is good for another, protecting their ability to pursue their flourishing, one preserves their own right to pursue the same.
At one point Foot writes …
“Those who think they can get on perfectly well without being just should be asked to say exactly how such a man is supposed to live. We know that he is to practice injustice whenever the unjust act would bring him advantage; but what is he to say? Does he admit that he does not recognise the rights of other people, or does he pretend? [ …] If a man only needed other men as he needs household objects, and if men could be manipulated like household objects, or beaten into a reliable submission like donkeys, the case would be different” (129)
The basis of these moral beliefs is that they appeal to recognizable virtues (e.g., strength, courage, wisdom, justice) that we either strive toward for ourselves or protect other’s rights to pursue the same (120). This, then, becomes the basis for arguing that we can see the effects of our acts and how they impinge or support another’s pursuit of virtue, which is why we cannot claim that something isn’t moral because it isn’t moral “for me” (124). This orientation to virtues and the common good still doesn’t quite get at the issue of moral obligation or duty, however. It is a view point that requires an active engagement with moral virtues and a recognition of their value (124). We might learn these in the home, school, church but we need to practice them, just like all virtues require continual practice according to Aristotle. Whether we deny those virtues for ourselves, fail to recognize the right of others to pursue them, the result can be complacent amorality.
The elusive “ought” or the normativity of moral behavior has to come through a recognition that our ability to pursue our flourishing depends on our commitment to a society that is likewise committed to upholding our rights to pursue it. Foot sees this as a “hypothetical imperative” as opposed to Kant’s “categorical imperative” which recognizes a duty toward moral action that derives from an act of reason that determines correct action which will be recognizable by its universality and non-contradiction. Hypothetical imperatives are instrumental and purpose driven, tied to individual motives, desires, and wills. We can always still choose not to act morally. The imperative is driven by a choice to remain part of a civil society that is, on the whole, organized to the sustainment of individual and collective flourishing in the promotion of the virtue of justice.
“The desires on which a hypothetical imperative is dependent may be those of one man, or may be taken for granted as belonging to a number of people engaged in some common project or sharing common aims” (159). It is this shared project and the beliefs entailed therein that make the purposive or hypothetical case imperative at all. Situations that recur demand the same response (161) and to the extent that the same beliefs still hold that is where the normative force of moral action comes about (162, 166).
Some of the standout essays: "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," "Moral Arguments," "Moral Beliefs," "Goodness and Choice," "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives"
A couple of fun facts about Philppa Foot:
- her mother was Esther Cleveland, daughter of US President Grover Cleveland (i.e., POTUS #22 and #24).
- Foot was a core part of group of brilliant women who were philosophers and writers at Oxford between 1939 and 1942. These women included Elizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley, and Iris Murdoch.
December 30, 2012
The breadth of Foot's essays is one of broad span across the normative and metaethical terrain of the moral subjects of her day. The volume collects various papers from 1957 to 1977, some more notable than others: The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, which first introduced the trolley problem into moral philosophy; Euthanasia, wherein Foot calls for an infusion of delicacy into the normative question; and Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, in which she made an infamous rejection of the overriding reasons supposition identified with Kant.
While the papers introduce theses here bold and there inventive, the quality coincides with no particular philosophical issue nor with individual papers. Instead, Foot writes most provocatively and powerfully where she neither accepts nor rejects: her indecisiveness sees her at her most inventive and careful. So, the bolder the proposition therewith the less persuasive is the exposition to follow. While her active voice has its merits, the earlier papers in the volume have more charm for being less polemical.
Foot was one of several philosophers who presided over a rebirth or reinvigoration of virtue ethics, raised up here in the setting of analytic philosophy. This was brought to fruition not only by a presentation of positive views proffered in regards to the suitability of virtue for modern treatment, but also by the sharp criticisms she drew with others of those views that may now properly and broadly fall under the banner of non-cognitivism, and which were then dominant in moral philosophy. Some of Foot's moves remain as bold now as they were when she first made them, even where swathes of contemporary virtue ethicists have rejected these stategies. Nonetheless, she enjoys an influence in philosophers as wonderfully diverse as Rosalind Hursthouse and Robert Merrihew Adams; further, her writings helped with others to set the tone and subject of today's debates in the area of practical reason and virtue ethics.
While the papers introduce theses here bold and there inventive, the quality coincides with no particular philosophical issue nor with individual papers. Instead, Foot writes most provocatively and powerfully where she neither accepts nor rejects: her indecisiveness sees her at her most inventive and careful. So, the bolder the proposition therewith the less persuasive is the exposition to follow. While her active voice has its merits, the earlier papers in the volume have more charm for being less polemical.
Foot was one of several philosophers who presided over a rebirth or reinvigoration of virtue ethics, raised up here in the setting of analytic philosophy. This was brought to fruition not only by a presentation of positive views proffered in regards to the suitability of virtue for modern treatment, but also by the sharp criticisms she drew with others of those views that may now properly and broadly fall under the banner of non-cognitivism, and which were then dominant in moral philosophy. Some of Foot's moves remain as bold now as they were when she first made them, even where swathes of contemporary virtue ethicists have rejected these stategies. Nonetheless, she enjoys an influence in philosophers as wonderfully diverse as Rosalind Hursthouse and Robert Merrihew Adams; further, her writings helped with others to set the tone and subject of today's debates in the area of practical reason and virtue ethics.
October 22, 2021
Ah-mazing.
Really good... She takes on dismantling certain assertions of Kantian morality/deontology and she's damned good at it.
Her description of the principle of double effect is good. She dwelt a bit on linguistics (really good presentation of certain problems), however it seems to me she gravitates towards nicomachean/virtue ethics precisely because she doesn't know how to solve the Frege-Geach problem. But I might be wrong. (Though there are some issues in her position which she didn't bring to the table.) She does make a good case to establish that if (conditional) F-G is an issue, hypothetical/categorial imperatives are "arguable"... then, virtue ethics might be a possible answer.
I feel like reading a couple more books from her and probably Anscombe.
The bad, however... it's that it can be very dense. I love metaethics, but at times it was difficult to follow (probably because I still haven't completely dived in in some of the authors she references); therefore it took me a while to finish it. (And also because it's the type of read that has you ruminating and thinking of examples and connotations of the views she presents. So one dense but enlightened paragraph can mean half an hour of thinking "what if...?".)
Disclaimer: NOT FOR THE LAYREADER. This is not an introductory book.
Really good... She takes on dismantling certain assertions of Kantian morality/deontology and she's damned good at it.
Her description of the principle of double effect is good. She dwelt a bit on linguistics (really good presentation of certain problems), however it seems to me she gravitates towards nicomachean/virtue ethics precisely because she doesn't know how to solve the Frege-Geach problem. But I might be wrong. (Though there are some issues in her position which she didn't bring to the table.) She does make a good case to establish that if (conditional) F-G is an issue, hypothetical/categorial imperatives are "arguable"... then, virtue ethics might be a possible answer.
I feel like reading a couple more books from her and probably Anscombe.
The bad, however... it's that it can be very dense. I love metaethics, but at times it was difficult to follow (probably because I still haven't completely dived in in some of the authors she references); therefore it took me a while to finish it. (And also because it's the type of read that has you ruminating and thinking of examples and connotations of the views she presents. So one dense but enlightened paragraph can mean half an hour of thinking "what if...?".)
Disclaimer: NOT FOR THE LAYREADER. This is not an introductory book.
July 9, 2021
This collection of essays is a result of Foot's initial development of virtue ethics in the 70s at a time when virtue theory was much neglected in analytic moral philosophy. Foot revisited the traditional virtue-based moral theory of Aristotle and Aquinas according to which the moral virtues consist in courage, temperance, and, wisdom that are beneficial dispositions a person who acts morally should possess. Foot suggests that virtues are "corrective" passions that guide a person's action. But she further suggests that a person may possess certain virtues without acting in a way that makes his action virtuous. Examples are temperance may not operate as temperance in a timid and hard to please person, and, courage may not operate as courage in a person who habitually takes risk to do bad things for personal gain. Possession of virtuous passions/dispositions can in itself be neutral in moral worth. This notion makes how virtues operate in a person's actions to be nuanced and complicated.
Contained in this collection of essays are position papers she took against emotivism and prescriptivism. In "Moral Arguments", she argued there is no such evaluative element that could capture the 'whole' meaning of moral terms such as "right" and "wrong". Moral terms have determinate meanings to support moral arguments. But she thinks it is not easy to capture the whole moral code in any particular moral view. Yet it is not anything goes. In "Moral Beliefs" she analysed the relationship between evaluative elements and descriptive elements in moral statements. The logical gaps between factual premises in descriptive elements and evaluative conclusion is small if there is a common understanding of how certain effects follow given facts, though she acknowledged that an evaluation is something going "beyond" acceptance of certain facts. No one needs to accept an apparent conclusion just because one accepts certain facts. Here, it seems she accepts the fact/value distinction.
In "Goodness and Choice", she treated the concept of "good" in terms of functionality of that which to be called "good", such as a good knife's goodness being based on the knife functioning as a knife. This essay provides a good discussion of various considerations of good making properties in an era before the concept of supervenience.
Also featured in this collection of essay is The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect. This essay is one of the seminal essays of the trolley car dilemma. She provided many interesting examples to highlight the difference between 'oblique intention' and 'direct intention' in moral decisions, especially the difference in evaluative assessment with respect to direct action, toleration, and, omission.
Contained in this collection of essays are position papers she took against emotivism and prescriptivism. In "Moral Arguments", she argued there is no such evaluative element that could capture the 'whole' meaning of moral terms such as "right" and "wrong". Moral terms have determinate meanings to support moral arguments. But she thinks it is not easy to capture the whole moral code in any particular moral view. Yet it is not anything goes. In "Moral Beliefs" she analysed the relationship between evaluative elements and descriptive elements in moral statements. The logical gaps between factual premises in descriptive elements and evaluative conclusion is small if there is a common understanding of how certain effects follow given facts, though she acknowledged that an evaluation is something going "beyond" acceptance of certain facts. No one needs to accept an apparent conclusion just because one accepts certain facts. Here, it seems she accepts the fact/value distinction.
In "Goodness and Choice", she treated the concept of "good" in terms of functionality of that which to be called "good", such as a good knife's goodness being based on the knife functioning as a knife. This essay provides a good discussion of various considerations of good making properties in an era before the concept of supervenience.
Also featured in this collection of essay is The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect. This essay is one of the seminal essays of the trolley car dilemma. She provided many interesting examples to highlight the difference between 'oblique intention' and 'direct intention' in moral decisions, especially the difference in evaluative assessment with respect to direct action, toleration, and, omission.
May 24, 2020
If there is a field in philosophy that I am not interested in it is Ethics. (Unless it is aesthetics.) But I thought I should read this one. I found her treatment of euthanasia and abortion quite okay. But as it gets more abstract I am at a loss. I cannot understand how one can seriously discuss the question whether it is possible that injustice is a good thing. Even if this is supposedly an ancient problem. A different question would be to take a look of what is considered just at different times or in different societies.
Or consider this statement: The primary criterion of goodness in a knife is its ability to cut well. (p. 135) Hm, really? Of course, it is, I am tempted to say. Isn’t it totally obvious that what defines a good mother is to some degree a universal property and to some degree dependent on society? And rather boring it is as well.
Finally, I do not like to see Nietzsche treated, at least to some extent, apologetically.
Or consider this statement: The primary criterion of goodness in a knife is its ability to cut well. (p. 135) Hm, really? Of course, it is, I am tempted to say. Isn’t it totally obvious that what defines a good mother is to some degree a universal property and to some degree dependent on society? And rather boring it is as well.
Finally, I do not like to see Nietzsche treated, at least to some extent, apologetically.
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October 14, 2019"This conclusion may, as I said, appear dangerous and subversive of morality. We are apt to panic at the thought that we ourselves, or other people, might stop caring about the things we do care about, and we feel that the categorical imperative gives us some control over the situation. But it is interesting that the people of Leningrad were not struck by the thought that only the contingent fact that other citizens shared their loyalty and devotion to the city stood between them and the Germans during the terrible years of the siege. Perhaps we should be less troubled than we are by fear of defection from the moral cause; perhaps we should even have less reason to fear it if people thought of themselves as volunteers banded together to fight for liberty and justice and against inhumanity and oppression." ("Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives")
December 19, 2019
Foot's philosophy is crucial to the aretaic turn, even if some of the points she raises are shaky at best. Overall, this books provides some relevant reflections on morality and virtue ethics.
October 30, 2022
Review to follow.
November 28, 2023
Philippa FOtt is just not for me I guess.
Want to Read
August 10, 2016Foot's thoughts—at least as expressed in her writings so far—don't map well onto mine. If that was hard for you to comprehend, then you know what i'm going thru here.
Also, i have become overly concerned with her decisions about where to use (or not use) commas.
And that pushed me onto a slippery slope downward into the swampy distinction between that and which.
Her short essay about free will and "determination" (according to the back cover blurb!) failed to reignite the fire initially sparked by the supernaturally fecund throwaway idea of the Trolley Problem.
Thus and so, i give up on this book. At least for now (13 June 2016).
Also, i have become overly concerned with her decisions about where to use (or not use) commas.
And that pushed me onto a slippery slope downward into the swampy distinction between that and which.
Her short essay about free will and "determination" (according to the back cover blurb!) failed to reignite the fire initially sparked by the supernaturally fecund throwaway idea of the Trolley Problem.
Thus and so, i give up on this book. At least for now (13 June 2016).
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