Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk 10 July-10 September 1941: The German Offensives on the Flanks and the Third Soviet Counteroffensive, 25 August–10 September 1941

Barbarossa Derailed #2

by David M. Glantz

At dawn on 10 July 1941, massed tanks and motorized infantry of German Army Group Center's Second and Third Panzer Groups crossed the Dnepr and Western Dvina Rivers, beginning what Adolf Hitler, the Führer of Germany's Third Reich, and most German officers and soldiers believed would be a triumphal march on Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union. Less than three weeks before, on 22 June Hitler had unleashed his Wehrmacht's [Armed Forces] massive invasion of the Soviet Union code-named Operation Barbarossa, which sought to defeat the Soviet Union's Red Army, conquer the country, and unseat its Communist ruler, Josef Stalin. Between 22 June and 10 July, the Wehrmacht advanced up to 500 kilometers into Soviet territory, killed or captured up to one million Red Army soldiers, and reached the western banks of the Western Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, by doing so satisfying the premier assumption of Plan Barbarossa that the Third Reich would emerge victorious if it could defeat and destroy the bulk of the Red Army before it withdrew to safely behind those two rivers. With the Red Army now shattered, Hitler and most Germans expected total victory in a matter of weeks.

The ensuing battles in the Smolensk region frustrated German hopes for quick victory. Once across the Dvina and Dnepr Rivers, a surprised Wehrmacht encountered five fresh Soviet armies. Despite destroying two of these armies outright, severely damaging two others, and encircling the remnants of three of these armies in the Smolensk region, quick victory eluded the Germans. Instead, Soviet forces encircled in Mogilev and Smolensk stubbornly refused to surrender, and while they fought on, during July, August, and into early September, first five and then a total of seven newly-mobilized Soviet armies struck back viciously at the advancing Germans, conducting multiple counterattacks and counterstrokes, capped by two major counteroffensives that sapped German strength and will. Despite immense losses in men and materiel, these desperate Soviet actions derailed Operation Barbarossa. Smarting from countless wounds inflicted on his vaunted Wehrmacht, even before the fighting ended in the Smolensk region, Hitler postponed his march on Moscow and instead turned his forces southward to engage "softer targets" in the Kiev region. The 'derailment" of the Wehrmacht at Smolensk ultimately became the crucial turning point in Operation Barbarossa.

This groundbreaking new study, now significantly expanded, exploits a wealth of Soviet and German archival materials, including the combat orders and operational of the German OKW, OKH, army groups, and armies and of the Soviet Stavka, the Red Army General Staff, the Western Main Direction Command, the Western, Central, Reserve, and Briansk Fronts, and their subordinate armies to present a detailed mosaic and definitive account of what took place, why, and how during the prolonged and complex battles in the Smolensk region from 10 July through 10 September 1941. The structure of the study is designed specifically to appeal to both general readers and specialists by a detailed two-volume chronological narrative of the course of operations, accompanied by a third volume, and perhaps a fourth, containing archival maps and an extensive collection of specific orders and reports translated verbatim from Russian. The maps, archival and archival-based, detail every stage of the battle.

Genres: World War II, History, Military History, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, War

1068 pages, Kindle Edition

First published April 10, 2012

About the author

David M. Glantz is an American military historian and the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies.

Glantz received degrees in history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Defense Language Institute, Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies, and U.S. Army War College. He entered active service with the United States Army in 1963.

He began his military career in 1963 as a field artillery officer from 1965 to 1969, and served in various assignments in the United States, and in Vietnam during the Vietnam War with the II Field Force Fire Support Coordination Element (FSCE) at the Plantation in Long Binh.

After teaching history at the United States Military Academy from 1969 through 1973, he completed the army’s Soviet foreign area specialist program and became chief of Estimates in US Army Europe’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (USAREUR ODCSI) from 1977 to 1979. Upon his return to the United States in 1979, he became chief of research at the Army’s newly-formed Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from 1979 to 1983 and then Director of Soviet Army Operations at the Center for Land Warfare, U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 1983 to 1986. While at the College, Col. Glantz was instrumental in conducting the annual "Art of War" symposia which produced the best analysis of the conduct of operations on the Eastern Front during the Second World War in English to date. The symposia included attendance of a number of former German participants in the operations, and resulted in publication of the seminal transcripts of proceedings. Returning to Fort Leavenworth in 1986, he helped found and later directed the U.S. Army’s Soviet (later Foreign) Military Studies Office (FMSO), where he remained until his retirement in 1993 with the rank of Colonel.

In 1993, while at FMSO, he established The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, a scholarly journal for which he still serves as chief editor, that covers military affairs in the states of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the former Soviet Union.

A member of the Russian Federation’s Academy of Natural Sciences, he has written or co-authored more than twenty commercially published books, over sixty self-published studies and atlases, and over one hundred articles dealing with the history of the Red (Soviet) Army, Soviet military strategy, operational art, and tactics, Soviet airborne operations, intelligence, and deception, and other topics related to World War II. In recognition of his work, he has received several awards, including the Society of Military History’s prestigious Samuel Eliot Morrison Prize for his contributions to the study of military history.

Glantz is regarded by many as one of the best western military historians of the Soviet role in World War II.[1] He is perhaps most associated with the thesis that World War II Soviet military history has been prejudiced in the West by its over-reliance on German oral and printed sources, without being balanced by a similar examination of Soviet source material. A more complete version of this thesis can be found in his paper “The Failures of Historiography: Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941-1945).” Despite his acknowledged expertise, Glantz has occasionally been criticized for his stylistic choices, such as inventing specific thoughts and feelings of historical figures without reference to documented sources.

Glantz is also known as an opponent of Viktor Suvorov's thesis, which he endeavored to rebut with the book Stumbling Colossus.

He lives with his wife Mary Ann Glantz in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Glantzes' daughter Mary E. Glantz, also a historian, has written FDR And The Soviet Union: The President's Battles Over Forei

Reviews

[Luka Novak · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a second book in "Smolensk" series which concludes analysis of fighting around this soviet city.

As in first book Glantz relies on Soviet documents (orders and AARs) to describe Soviet strategy and actual fighting. This makes book hard to read but an excellent study. However book suffers from poor maps and seeing how orders go in great length and detail it makes it hard to see what Soviets were trying to achieve and were actually doing. Glantz promised separate book with maps later so this might change.

Overall, even if book is hard to digest it offers a good and fresh perspective on fighting around Smolensk and how this affected Barbarossa. Both in "forcing" Germans to choose path of least resistance (resulting in Kiev encirclement), attrition suffered by army Group Centre (reducing their capability during typhoon offensive). But most important part is analysis of Soviet actions, which were far more ambitious and even effective as previously given credit for.

While most of these counter actions fell short of their objectives they on one hand caused serious casualties among Germans, however they suffered even worse in return. Both this had later impact on Typhoon.

I think that in the end this book should bury the old Moscow-or-Kiev debate that is raging almost since Barbarossa failed at the gates of Moscow. Glantz makes it clear that in August and September Moscow was not a viable option because of state AGC was in and state Soviet forces in front of them were in.

As is usually the case with such books there is significant controversy over casualties. Soviets are notoriously silent or evasive on the subject. And here Glantz makes a curious step by relying heavily on Krivosheev's work (Seal of secrecy removed). While this work has been praised Glantz was among first and most vocal critics of it, claiming Soviet casualty numbers are underreported. And yet in the book which was supposed to shed more light on hidden episode he relies on it unquestionably.

A good and detailed study but not for casual reader.

[Lloyd · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book details the events during the second phase of the German invasion of Russia in the summer of 1941. Specifically, the capture of Smolensk by the Germans and the Russian’s efforts to counter-attack and retake Smolensk. This book goes into great and very specific detail of the tactical orders the Russia Army’s received in their efforts to stop and perhaps even reverse the German blitzkrieg. This would be a great volume to use has a research work if you were planning to write about the more strategic level of activities. This book is written at the tactical level, especially Russian tactics. It seems short on overall strategic concepts, once again on the Russian side. The author, David Glantz, does seem to cover the Germans from the strategic side especially how the drive towards Moscow was stopped intentionally after the capture of Smolensk. Shoring up Army Group Center’s northern and southern flanks was always part of Hitler’s plan. But, the strategic plans for the Soviets is not so clear. Were the brutal (to both sides) Soviet counter-attacks intended to stop the Wehrmacht, or just a delaying action until additional armies and supplies could be mustered defend the approaches to Moscow? It wasn’t clear to me from this book if Stalin and the Russian army chiefs really believed in the possibility of success for these counter-attacks (retake Smolensk and push the Germans back even further) or were they efforts to just bleed the Germans dry to prevent an assault of Moscow. The author strongly suggests that these counter offenses sufficiently damaged Army Group Center so that Operation Typhoon later failed in its efforts to capture Moscow. However, he also notes that the counter offenses did not stop the Germans or retake any significant portions of territory and he strongly suggests these counter-attacks so weakened the Russians that Operation Typhoon’s initial efforts to advance on Moscow were actually made easier against this weakened foe. So, if you are looking for detailed tactical plans for the Soviet regarding orders given, received and the number of men, their supplies and leadership this is your book. If you’d like something that is at a higher level and strategic analysis of this part of Operation Barbarossa, I would not suggest reading this book. It is too deep in the weeds of what specific orders the Russians received, not why and how those orders fit into the overall strategic plan to derail Operation Barbarossa.

[Brett C · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a continuation of the first volume that detailed the second half of the German offensives, and the Soviet counteroffensive. David Glantz continued the dense, heavy-handed details & day-to-day maneuvering, combat, and outcomes. As previously reviewed there were extensive tables of organizations and equipment, orders of battle, and some rough maps. These books are relatively expensive but worth a glance-through if you can get your hands on a copy. Recommended for Eastern Front war enthusiasts. Thanks!!

[Keith True · Rating 4 out of 5]

Amazing Detail

To drill down and understand why the Soviets won and the Nazi's lost there's no better resource than this series of books.