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Mind, Language And Society: Philosophy In The Real World
John Searle's summation of earlier writings is not just an essential tie-up volume for existing readers; it is also a perfect introduction to the work of one of the clearest heads in the philosophy of mind. Searle's book is a riposte to all those academics who make a career out of contradicting and complicating such default positions as the existence of an external reality, the reality of personal consciousness, and the reasonable fit of language to the perceived world. Certainly, we should examine these positions! But the first duty of philosophy, Searle argues, is that it should attempt to accommodate what is known. As far as we can tell, for example, consciousness is a biological product, but there is a long-running contention between the materialists--whose reductive descriptions of consciousness arrive, finally, at an embarrassed denial that consciousness exists at all--and the dualists, who cannot describe consciousness without evoking some supernatural involvement. Neither position is tenable--each offers some corrective to the other. The good explanation is in there somewhere, but the sheer intractability of the debate won't let it be expressed. In situations like this, Searle argues, it is always the terms that are wrong. Terms, mind you, that in this case include "matter," "mind," "physical," and "mental"! Searle--married as he is to common sense--is of necessity one of our most iconoclastic and creative thinkers. --Simon Ings, Amazon.co.uk
189 pages, Kindle Edition
First published December 15, 1998
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About the author
John Rogers Searle
96 books373 followersJohn Rogers Searle (born July 31, 1932 in Denver, Colorado) is an American philosopher and was the Slusser Professor of Philosophy and Mills Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley). Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and social philosophy, he was the first tenured professor to join the Free Speech Movement at UC Berkeley. He received the Jean Nicod Prize in 2000, and the National Humanities Medal in 2004.
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May 5, 2015
I learned a great deal from this book. It is a classic in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. I had a chance to listen to Searle years ago when I was employed in AI experiments. he was a visiting professor and was friends with several of my professors. We were able to sit down and talk about his Chinese room argument. While I wanted to be as delicate as I could, I suggested that, first, language was only a general agreement on what things should mean. I used the early Hebrew and Greek alphabets as an example, early characters referring directly to things. He agreed with this much so I pushed further and suggested that languages develop because two or more people accept certain characters to mean certain things and, of course, they broaden or change of periods of time, synthesizing words into others and sometimes losing base meanings or etymologies, for better or worse.
After a while, our discussion seemed to have attracted the rest of those present, perhaps some 20 people and it had become somewhat heated, although I knew that in front of everyone, I could not afford that luxury. if nothing else, they were the arbiters of my success or failure.
Finally, exasperated, Searle said, "Young lady, I cannot understand for the life of me whether you are in agreement with my position or you are not!" There was a silence and a few giggles.
I responded that I had been trying to explain why I thought his "Chinese Room" example was misleading in the ways of language, but that I agreed, in principle in that I did not believe in AI. I was going to complicate that statement, but I had enough sense to shut up.
He looked at me closely for a second and then smiled wryly like he had now captured my queen and pinned a bishop. He said, "Well, in that case,given that you are working on an AI project at the moment,(which I told him when I had sat down,) I should think that nothing of your argument is anything but a self-contradiction."
I blinked and then smiled, avoiding calling him a sonofabitch and instead thanked him for his time. Around the both of us, there was a smattering of applause and Searle acknowledged it for himself. My opinion of him as a thinker never grew from that point, certainly, not because he dismissed what I had to say with a non sequitur, but because I discovered that he often dismisses things in like fashion.
In this volume and any I have read of his, he is a very clear writer. However, more than anything, I found his arguments to be primarily straw men. While I would line up to take pot shots at psychological theories all day long, especially those which are more rigid and allow for no growth or variation. I cannot see that doing so makes a stronger argument for what one does, in fact, believe.
One sees a great deal of the man in the outcome of the Derrida-Searle debates about language where he refused to allow his responses to be published in Derrida's writings, referring them as unintelligible and not even philosophy. Searle committed to the debates, so why not leave it to posterity to judge? As one who fostered the Free-Speech Movement years ago, one would think he might be more accommodating to alternative opinions. To be fair, he does accommodate them, but only when he can deride them. As I suggested in the beginning of my review, he often does this by setting up straw men, positions he attributes to others who would not have accepted his description of their position. To be even more forgiving, this is unfortunately the way a great amount of scholarship is often done in various scholastic fields.
When Searle disagrees with something or other, one finds him dismissing the counter-argument quite easily. This reminds me of a review I wrote on an A.J. Ayer book and a commenter wrote that I had been mistaken and had ought to return to my first (undergraduate level) understanding of Ayer's arguments. Sometimes even when you explain how and why you have come to see things differently, (and God knows that just because it comes later does not mean it is more accurate!) there are others who simply will not accept certain thinking as part of "legitimate" philosophy. Searle's rule ridden philosophy of language might better be referred to something like "I, Robot," except for the fact that Searle isn't a believer in conscious robots! Frankly, I am not entirely sure that Searle believes in a conscious mind.
In fairness, however in A Rediscovery of the Mind, Searle does say, consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain. We shudder to think what might happen should we become bereft of his precious materialism.
Searle asks, "How is it possible that a world consisting entirely of material particles in fields of force can contain systems that are conscious?"
In Searle's opinion, it is by getting rid of language like physical and mental and making things so terribly confusing that it borders on the ridiculous that things can finally make sense. As an example, he might say " ..consciousness is caused by neurophysiological processes but cannot be seen as simply neurophysiological. Um what? He doesn't exactly explain things very well either.
This book is only 160 pages and yet it tackles Searle's thought of over four decades. It will inevitably come up short in many arguments. However, I believe that Searle could explain his pseudo-materialist arguments all day and still not come up with anything which would stand up against the real problems of philosophy, one of which is NOT calling Descartes a dualist.
After a while, our discussion seemed to have attracted the rest of those present, perhaps some 20 people and it had become somewhat heated, although I knew that in front of everyone, I could not afford that luxury. if nothing else, they were the arbiters of my success or failure.
Finally, exasperated, Searle said, "Young lady, I cannot understand for the life of me whether you are in agreement with my position or you are not!" There was a silence and a few giggles.
I responded that I had been trying to explain why I thought his "Chinese Room" example was misleading in the ways of language, but that I agreed, in principle in that I did not believe in AI. I was going to complicate that statement, but I had enough sense to shut up.
He looked at me closely for a second and then smiled wryly like he had now captured my queen and pinned a bishop. He said, "Well, in that case,given that you are working on an AI project at the moment,(which I told him when I had sat down,) I should think that nothing of your argument is anything but a self-contradiction."
I blinked and then smiled, avoiding calling him a sonofabitch and instead thanked him for his time. Around the both of us, there was a smattering of applause and Searle acknowledged it for himself. My opinion of him as a thinker never grew from that point, certainly, not because he dismissed what I had to say with a non sequitur, but because I discovered that he often dismisses things in like fashion.
In this volume and any I have read of his, he is a very clear writer. However, more than anything, I found his arguments to be primarily straw men. While I would line up to take pot shots at psychological theories all day long, especially those which are more rigid and allow for no growth or variation. I cannot see that doing so makes a stronger argument for what one does, in fact, believe.
One sees a great deal of the man in the outcome of the Derrida-Searle debates about language where he refused to allow his responses to be published in Derrida's writings, referring them as unintelligible and not even philosophy. Searle committed to the debates, so why not leave it to posterity to judge? As one who fostered the Free-Speech Movement years ago, one would think he might be more accommodating to alternative opinions. To be fair, he does accommodate them, but only when he can deride them. As I suggested in the beginning of my review, he often does this by setting up straw men, positions he attributes to others who would not have accepted his description of their position. To be even more forgiving, this is unfortunately the way a great amount of scholarship is often done in various scholastic fields.
When Searle disagrees with something or other, one finds him dismissing the counter-argument quite easily. This reminds me of a review I wrote on an A.J. Ayer book and a commenter wrote that I had been mistaken and had ought to return to my first (undergraduate level) understanding of Ayer's arguments. Sometimes even when you explain how and why you have come to see things differently, (and God knows that just because it comes later does not mean it is more accurate!) there are others who simply will not accept certain thinking as part of "legitimate" philosophy. Searle's rule ridden philosophy of language might better be referred to something like "I, Robot," except for the fact that Searle isn't a believer in conscious robots! Frankly, I am not entirely sure that Searle believes in a conscious mind.
In fairness, however in A Rediscovery of the Mind, Searle does say, consciousness is a real subjective experience, caused by the physical processes of the brain. We shudder to think what might happen should we become bereft of his precious materialism.
Searle asks, "How is it possible that a world consisting entirely of material particles in fields of force can contain systems that are conscious?"
In Searle's opinion, it is by getting rid of language like physical and mental and making things so terribly confusing that it borders on the ridiculous that things can finally make sense. As an example, he might say " ..consciousness is caused by neurophysiological processes but cannot be seen as simply neurophysiological. Um what? He doesn't exactly explain things very well either.
This book is only 160 pages and yet it tackles Searle's thought of over four decades. It will inevitably come up short in many arguments. However, I believe that Searle could explain his pseudo-materialist arguments all day and still not come up with anything which would stand up against the real problems of philosophy, one of which is NOT calling Descartes a dualist.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
December 20, 2012
Originally published on my blog here in September 2001.
In this book, John Searle sets out a defence of what he calls the "default" positions in philosophy, the assumptions that are likely to be made by someone who has never encountered the sort of speculation that philosophers indulge in (such as the existence of the real world). He ignores the term "naive realism", probably because it would psychologically undermine his arguments before he starts, but that is basically what the default assumptions amount to.
According to Searle, the book is intended for those who know nothing about philosophy, but he quite frequently lapses from his stated ideal of not using any unexplained technical terms. The arguments he uses are also quite complex, thought perhaps not compared to, say, Sartre's philosophical writing. The major virtue of the book is Searle's writing style, much clearer than many philosophers. (In the twentieth century, philosophers have begun to want to come across as scientific rather than mystical, and this has made their writing much easier to read than nineteenth century equivalents.)
The book's major flaw is Searle's assumption that he is always right and that the philosophers who have disagreed with him are wrong; his writing loses interest as soon as he fails to convince the reader of a point in his argument. (In my case, this was about when he argues that introspection about the nature of consciousness is impossible.) The book becomes more sketchy towards the end, with far less on language and society than on mind, and this does not help - despite the sub-title, Mind, Language and Society has little to do with the real world. There are still interesting sections (that on the boundary between philosophy and science, for example), but I would say that he certainly fails to deliver an integrated account of the three elements of the title, his stated aim.
Overall, Mind, Language and Society is thought provoking if not as important as it thinks it is, and clear if not as non-technical as Searle thinks it is. Worth reading if you have an interest in philosophy.
In this book, John Searle sets out a defence of what he calls the "default" positions in philosophy, the assumptions that are likely to be made by someone who has never encountered the sort of speculation that philosophers indulge in (such as the existence of the real world). He ignores the term "naive realism", probably because it would psychologically undermine his arguments before he starts, but that is basically what the default assumptions amount to.
According to Searle, the book is intended for those who know nothing about philosophy, but he quite frequently lapses from his stated ideal of not using any unexplained technical terms. The arguments he uses are also quite complex, thought perhaps not compared to, say, Sartre's philosophical writing. The major virtue of the book is Searle's writing style, much clearer than many philosophers. (In the twentieth century, philosophers have begun to want to come across as scientific rather than mystical, and this has made their writing much easier to read than nineteenth century equivalents.)
The book's major flaw is Searle's assumption that he is always right and that the philosophers who have disagreed with him are wrong; his writing loses interest as soon as he fails to convince the reader of a point in his argument. (In my case, this was about when he argues that introspection about the nature of consciousness is impossible.) The book becomes more sketchy towards the end, with far less on language and society than on mind, and this does not help - despite the sub-title, Mind, Language and Society has little to do with the real world. There are still interesting sections (that on the boundary between philosophy and science, for example), but I would say that he certainly fails to deliver an integrated account of the three elements of the title, his stated aim.
Overall, Mind, Language and Society is thought provoking if not as important as it thinks it is, and clear if not as non-technical as Searle thinks it is. Worth reading if you have an interest in philosophy.
November 28, 2016
يقدم سيرل الكتاب كخلاصة لأفكاره، يقدمه لقارئ غير متعمق في البحث الفلسفي
يحاول سيرل أن يربط موضوعات متعددة في سلسلة واحدة،
يفعل ذلك بشكل يركز ويبرز منهجيته والتي أراها مميزة جدا
يستطيع القارئ ذو الخلفية الفلسفية البسيطة أن يتتبع موضوعات الكتاب بوضوح
وأظن أن عزاء القارئ المنخرط في البحث المتعلق بفلسفة العقل واللغة
يكمن في أن هذا الكتاب يُمثل بصورة ما خطاطة لعمل سيرل الفلسفي
فهو قد تناول موضوعات الكتاب بشكل أكثر تفصيلا في كتب ومحاضرات أخرى
المترجم سعد الغانمي، لا أعرف ما مشكلته بالضبط . .
هو يترجم
consciousness
بالشعور . . وهي ترجمة في رأيي مضللة مربكة
أفقدت جزء كبير من الكتاب خصوصيته
ولم ينقل الجزء الخاص بالمراجع في نهاية الكتاب
ولم ينقل الجزء الذي خصصه سيرل بترشيحاته للكتب؛ لمن يريد التعمق في المسائل المطروحة
وصراحة لم أطلع على ترجمة صلاح إسماعيل، وأتمنى أن تكون أفضل . .
February 22, 2008
Searle is a bit of a god - I think he is the guy who came up with the Chinese Room. Anyway, he is direct, to the point and deals with very complex concepts of philosophy in a clear and relatively easy style. The Hume of the 20th century, perhaps. With chapters called How Language Works, or How the Mind Works - well, how could that not be interesting?
December 10, 2008
Clearly written. Tackles the big issues that flit across the mind now and then (mostly then)--how do the acoustic blasts from the hole in my face acquire intelligible meaning? Searle is good on readability, taking pains to conjure up clear, thought-provoking illustrations for the more counterintuitive ideas he raises.
June 18, 2022
ما الرابط بين العقل واللغة و المجتمع؟
سؤال كان يبدو جذابًا بما يكفي ليعيدني لمكتبتي المهجورة لكن النتيجة لم تك كما توقعت.
سيرل يحاول تفسير كيف نتنقل من العقل (أو الوعي) إلى العالم الواقعي من خلال وسيلة "اللغة" لكن تفسيره لم يكن مقنعًا.
سيرل يري أن وجود العالم الخارجي و قدرتنا على استشعاره بحواسنا "موقفًا مهملًا" .. أي أنه أمر مسلم به.. ومن هنا يبدأ تفسيره.
من البداية لم أقتنع بنقد سيرل لنظريتي الوعي المادية و الثنائية ورأيه أن الوعي ظاهرة "بيولوجية" وفي هذا يقول:
"لا أظن أننا مجبرون على الثنائية أو المادية. والنقطة الخليقة بالتذكر هى أن الوعي ظاهرة بيولوجية مثل أي ظاهرة أخرى. ومن الصحيح أن له ملامج خاصة كما أدركنا وأبرز هذه الملامح هو ملمح الذاتية ولكن هذا لا يمنع من أن يكون ملمحًا أعلى للمخ بنفس الطريقة التي يكون بها الهضم ملمحًا من مستوى أعلى للمعدة أو السيولة ملمحًا من مستوى أعلى لنظام من الجزيئات التي تؤلف دمنا.
وخلاصة القول أن طريقة الرد على المادية هى بيان أنها تتجاهل الوجود الحقيقي للوعي. أما طريقة إبطال الثنائية فهى ببساطة رفض قبول نسق المقولات التي تصور الوعي باعتباره شيئًا غير بيولوجي ولا يمثل جزءًا من العالم الطبيعي"
عدم اقتناعي يرجع لأن "الوعي" اسم لكيان "هلامي" إن جاز التعبير. لا نستطيع - أو أنا لا أستطيع على وجهة الخصوص - أن أتخيل كينونته. كلمة "بيولوجية" التي استخدمها سيرل تتطلب وجود وسيلة ما للقياس لإثبات وجود مثل هذا الوعي لكن لا توجد أي وسيلة معيارية للقياس الكمي أو الكيفي للوعي فكيف أؤمن بأنه كيان بيولوجي؟ الهضم يمكن قياسه بيولوجيًا فعن طريق قياس مستوى الانزيمات و كذلك التغير الحادث في الطعام نفسه. السيؤلة يمكن قياسها بمعدل السريان لكن كيف يمكن قياس الوعى كملمح اعلى للمخ؟ لا أستطيع.. لهذا فالبناء الذي سار عليه الكتاب بأكمله بناء متهاوِ في نظري.
بسبب عدم اقتناعي بالتفسير البيولوجي للوعي فقد فقدت اهتمامي في بقية الكتاب لكن تابعته عله يحوي شيئًا مفيدًا.
في بقية الكتاب يتحدث سيرل عن دور اللغة. الوعي بالعالم يتطلب وجود وسيلة للتواصل معه و الوسيلة هى اللغة. اللغة قد تكون معبرة عن العالم الواقعي (كما في حالات الإقرار أو التأكيد) أو متسببة في تغيير هذا العالم (كما في حالات الوعد أو الإعلان أو التصريح) وهنا يتحدث سيرل عن دور القصدية في اللغة.
هذا الجزء بأكمله لم أجده مفيدًا أو شيقًا لي..
في النهاية يتحدث سيرل عن علاقات المجتمع المحيطة و كيف تتكون بناءًا على الكلمات المنطوقة. هنا سيرل يقول أن كل العلاقات الاجتماعية والمؤسسية هى في حقيقتها "اتفاق جماعى بالكلمات" على مضمون تلك العلاقات فنحن نتفق أن قطعة الورق الملونة هذا تعتبر نقودًا فنقبلها كمجتمع لكن قطعة الورق املونة تلك بحد ذاتها ليس لديها أي قيمة بل أنها قد تكون أي شيء آخر لو اتفقنا أن تكونه.
هذا الجزء يبدو مقبولًا لكنه لم يأت بجديد.
في النهاية الكتاب يتحدث في موضوعات لا أعد أعيرها الأهمية ولا أعتقد أنني سأعود إليه ثانية
سؤال كان يبدو جذابًا بما يكفي ليعيدني لمكتبتي المهجورة لكن النتيجة لم تك كما توقعت.
سيرل يحاول تفسير كيف نتنقل من العقل (أو الوعي) إلى العالم الواقعي من خلال وسيلة "اللغة" لكن تفسيره لم يكن مقنعًا.
سيرل يري أن وجود العالم الخارجي و قدرتنا على استشعاره بحواسنا "موقفًا مهملًا" .. أي أنه أمر مسلم به.. ومن هنا يبدأ تفسيره.
من البداية لم أقتنع بنقد سيرل لنظريتي الوعي المادية و الثنائية ورأيه أن الوعي ظاهرة "بيولوجية" وفي هذا يقول:
"لا أظن أننا مجبرون على الثنائية أو المادية. والنقطة الخليقة بالتذكر هى أن الوعي ظاهرة بيولوجية مثل أي ظاهرة أخرى. ومن الصحيح أن له ملامج خاصة كما أدركنا وأبرز هذه الملامح هو ملمح الذاتية ولكن هذا لا يمنع من أن يكون ملمحًا أعلى للمخ بنفس الطريقة التي يكون بها الهضم ملمحًا من مستوى أعلى للمعدة أو السيولة ملمحًا من مستوى أعلى لنظام من الجزيئات التي تؤلف دمنا.
وخلاصة القول أن طريقة الرد على المادية هى بيان أنها تتجاهل الوجود الحقيقي للوعي. أما طريقة إبطال الثنائية فهى ببساطة رفض قبول نسق المقولات التي تصور الوعي باعتباره شيئًا غير بيولوجي ولا يمثل جزءًا من العالم الطبيعي"
عدم اقتناعي يرجع لأن "الوعي" اسم لكيان "هلامي" إن جاز التعبير. لا نستطيع - أو أنا لا أستطيع على وجهة الخصوص - أن أتخيل كينونته. كلمة "بيولوجية" التي استخدمها سيرل تتطلب وجود وسيلة ما للقياس لإثبات وجود مثل هذا الوعي لكن لا توجد أي وسيلة معيارية للقياس الكمي أو الكيفي للوعي فكيف أؤمن بأنه كيان بيولوجي؟ الهضم يمكن قياسه بيولوجيًا فعن طريق قياس مستوى الانزيمات و كذلك التغير الحادث في الطعام نفسه. السيؤلة يمكن قياسها بمعدل السريان لكن كيف يمكن قياس الوعى كملمح اعلى للمخ؟ لا أستطيع.. لهذا فالبناء الذي سار عليه الكتاب بأكمله بناء متهاوِ في نظري.
بسبب عدم اقتناعي بالتفسير البيولوجي للوعي فقد فقدت اهتمامي في بقية الكتاب لكن تابعته عله يحوي شيئًا مفيدًا.
في بقية الكتاب يتحدث سيرل عن دور اللغة. الوعي بالعالم يتطلب وجود وسيلة للتواصل معه و الوسيلة هى اللغة. اللغة قد تكون معبرة عن العالم الواقعي (كما في حالات الإقرار أو التأكيد) أو متسببة في تغيير هذا العالم (كما في حالات الوعد أو الإعلان أو التصريح) وهنا يتحدث سيرل عن دور القصدية في اللغة.
هذا الجزء بأكمله لم أجده مفيدًا أو شيقًا لي..
في النهاية يتحدث سيرل عن علاقات المجتمع المحيطة و كيف تتكون بناءًا على الكلمات المنطوقة. هنا سيرل يقول أن كل العلاقات الاجتماعية والمؤسسية هى في حقيقتها "اتفاق جماعى بالكلمات" على مضمون تلك العلاقات فنحن نتفق أن قطعة الورق الملونة هذا تعتبر نقودًا فنقبلها كمجتمع لكن قطعة الورق املونة تلك بحد ذاتها ليس لديها أي قيمة بل أنها قد تكون أي شيء آخر لو اتفقنا أن تكونه.
هذا الجزء يبدو مقبولًا لكنه لم يأت بجديد.
في النهاية الكتاب يتحدث في موضوعات لا أعد أعيرها الأهمية ولا أعتقد أنني سأعود إليه ثانية
May 28, 2019
Thought-provoking account, and nice to see a philosopher willing to make an attempt at synthesis and provide an overall world view, rather than hiding safe in technical details and rabbit holes. I am not convinced that this provides the answers, but I think it could possibly orientate us more in the right direction. Affective neuro science and its recent advances could be seen for instance to be an extension of this more considered approach of how the mind is related to the brain and the human organism.
It is an easy temptation to create a dichotomy between mind and matter on some ground, but maybe his approach in this book of keeping it open when we have these dichotomies and not coming down on one side but delaying judgment could be a good approach. I think there are a few gaps in his account in relation to how we get from the physical ontology of matter in motion to intentionality for instance. I also don't have his same trust in this scientific ontology combined with contingently related phenomena through random natural selection. I think we can accept the preeminence of realism without being committed to this ontology, which to be frank represents a kind of late 19th century scientific vision of ontology more than it does current science or any other thing.
So I see no reason why we could not question this as our basis on many grounds. Still, with the premises Searle chooses to work from, he follows it through very reasonably and consistently and comes up with some interesting concepts along the way. The notion of direction of fit, in speech acts, word to world in one type of speech acts and world to word in another type and how this can connect up with intentionality as a cause of our actions in the world and society is a fascinating suggestion for how we could combine a natural science world, with a social understanding that does not reduce humans to zombies or bots without free will, but retains that free will in line with a notion of intentional causation and reasonable motivations for action.
It is an easy temptation to create a dichotomy between mind and matter on some ground, but maybe his approach in this book of keeping it open when we have these dichotomies and not coming down on one side but delaying judgment could be a good approach. I think there are a few gaps in his account in relation to how we get from the physical ontology of matter in motion to intentionality for instance. I also don't have his same trust in this scientific ontology combined with contingently related phenomena through random natural selection. I think we can accept the preeminence of realism without being committed to this ontology, which to be frank represents a kind of late 19th century scientific vision of ontology more than it does current science or any other thing.
So I see no reason why we could not question this as our basis on many grounds. Still, with the premises Searle chooses to work from, he follows it through very reasonably and consistently and comes up with some interesting concepts along the way. The notion of direction of fit, in speech acts, word to world in one type of speech acts and world to word in another type and how this can connect up with intentionality as a cause of our actions in the world and society is a fascinating suggestion for how we could combine a natural science world, with a social understanding that does not reduce humans to zombies or bots without free will, but retains that free will in line with a notion of intentional causation and reasonable motivations for action.
April 1, 2025
2025 review:
Searle began his philosophical work focused on language. He developed John Austin’s speech act theory and then moved into the philosophy of mind with his critique of functionalism and his Chinese Room argument. Later, he began to look at how social institutions are created and concluded their origins c an be found in a specific speech act, the declarative.
This book is a brief introduction to his work. It begins with a look at arguments against metaphysical realism and his defense of it.
He then moves onto philosophy of mind and takes the position that the mind is a biological phenomenon. He takes on the mind-body problem. He discusses the irreducibility of consciousness to physical processes. He offers a kind of Emergentism though he does not use that terminology. He moves onto a discussion of intentionality.
He discusses social institutions, such as money, marriage, representative government and how we create social reality.
He then goes through the basics of speech act theory. He sees the philosophy of language as a part of the philosophy of mind.
This is a tight little book. It covers a lot of ground. He does not cover the biological origins of intentionality.
2010 review:
Re-read it. I do enjoy chapter one, where he points out how much knowledge we have accumulated since Descartes. I agree fundamentally with him on the subject of consciousness, though he has not really added to the vocabulary in such a way as to aid in accepting his position. His discussion of social reality is very good. I am comfortable with his notion of collective intentionality. I think he is too focused on fiat money here I think. Money did start as a commodity, a real, physical holder of value all recognized. They did not will it to happen. Fiat money came later and does look like a matter of will. It took no notion of will for all of us to agree on what an iPod is. It took someone naming it.
Searle began his philosophical work focused on language. He developed John Austin’s speech act theory and then moved into the philosophy of mind with his critique of functionalism and his Chinese Room argument. Later, he began to look at how social institutions are created and concluded their origins c an be found in a specific speech act, the declarative.
This book is a brief introduction to his work. It begins with a look at arguments against metaphysical realism and his defense of it.
He then moves onto philosophy of mind and takes the position that the mind is a biological phenomenon. He takes on the mind-body problem. He discusses the irreducibility of consciousness to physical processes. He offers a kind of Emergentism though he does not use that terminology. He moves onto a discussion of intentionality.
He discusses social institutions, such as money, marriage, representative government and how we create social reality.
He then goes through the basics of speech act theory. He sees the philosophy of language as a part of the philosophy of mind.
This is a tight little book. It covers a lot of ground. He does not cover the biological origins of intentionality.
2010 review:
Re-read it. I do enjoy chapter one, where he points out how much knowledge we have accumulated since Descartes. I agree fundamentally with him on the subject of consciousness, though he has not really added to the vocabulary in such a way as to aid in accepting his position. His discussion of social reality is very good. I am comfortable with his notion of collective intentionality. I think he is too focused on fiat money here I think. Money did start as a commodity, a real, physical holder of value all recognized. They did not will it to happen. Fiat money came later and does look like a matter of will. It took no notion of will for all of us to agree on what an iPod is. It took someone naming it.
July 21, 2014
Mostly good, although, thinking back (and I kind of thought this going into the account [although Searle somehow charmed me out of it]), his dismissal of Idealism is pretty shit, and his account of reality as being beholden to this lame of-course-this-is-how-it-is is certainly productive but it could be mistaken and it is certainly impoverished. {On second thought, it is in the spirit of good old Empiricism (Locke, Hume, et.al.)}, and adds to Searle's own assertion of adding to an Enlightenment vision.
I am sure I'm missing a lot of historical precedents leading up to this, and the section on external reality reads more like a dismissal of Derrida & Friends than a real attempt at a proper or even a summation of a treatise or area of thought. {see above}
He's also unclear on intentionality. What is intentionality? It is a mysterious force: it is the brain just doing what it does. It is vectored thought, it is something produced by the brain's parts (a higher function stemming from physical activity) producing thought "directed" towards an external object sensed via sense organs or a priori objects (was that in there?). I'll have to look back; maybe I missed something.
I am sure I'm missing a lot of historical precedents leading up to this, and the section on external reality reads more like a dismissal of Derrida & Friends than a real attempt at a proper or even a summation of a treatise or area of thought. {see above}
He's also unclear on intentionality. What is intentionality? It is a mysterious force: it is the brain just doing what it does. It is vectored thought, it is something produced by the brain's parts (a higher function stemming from physical activity) producing thought "directed" towards an external object sensed via sense organs or a priori objects (was that in there?). I'll have to look back; maybe I missed something.
July 13, 2012
Fantastic exposition of speech-act theory & Searle's "Biological Naturalism" as an approach to the philosophy of mind (and more specifically, the mind-body problem). Searle believes that the monist/dualist category is a large catalyst for the mind-body problem. Instead of accepting the categories, Searle rejects them and claims that consciousness is a biological phenomenon caused by the brain. Not only is consciousness a biological phenomenon, but Searle goes further to claim that it is also irreducible with a subjective ontology. A very good read if you're looking for an introduction to philosophy of mind, language and social constructivism. Very easy to read with very little jargon (whatever jargon Searle uses is usually explained beforehand).
December 20, 2021
A primer on the relationship between mind, language, and society. Having read a lot recently from philosophers who claim that all, or mostly all, reality is a social construction, it is nice to swing back in the direction of objective reality.
January 6, 2011
I read it in Arabic edition ..
It's worth reading ..
It's worth reading ..
November 6, 2021
مدخل عظيم لفلسفة چون سيرل، فيلسوف الواقعية التنويرية..
أنوي إتمام قراءة مشروع هذا الرجل في يوم من الأيام.
أنوي إتمام قراءة مشروع هذا الرجل في يوم من الأيام.
March 15, 2011
This book gives a good introduction to Searle's contribution to philosophy.
August 31, 2024
SEARLE DISCUSSES THESE TOPICS, TO "SHOW HOW THEY ALL HANG TOGETHER"
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He has written many other books, such as 'The Mystery of Consciousness,' 'The Rediscovery of the Mind,' 'Mind: A Brief Introduction,' 'Mind, Language And Society: Philosophy In The Real World,' 'Minds, Brains and Science,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1998 book, "[In this book] I try to explain, at least in summary form, some of my views on mind, language, and society, and to explain how they relate to each other, and how they fit into our overall contemporary conception of the universe... they are approached by way of an analysis of mind that rejects both dualism and materialism. I set out to write a book about mind, language and society, and now that it is finished, I discover that a disproportionately large part of it is about the mind... I have shamelessly borrowed from my earlier writings." (Pg. ix-x)
He states, "I do not believe that we live in two worlds, the mental and the physical---much less in three worlds, the mental, the physical, and the cultural---but in one world, and I want to describe the relations between some of the many parts of that one world... Specifically, I want to explain certain structural features of mind, language, and society, and then show how they all fit together." (Pg. 6) Later, he adds, "I have so far tried to give an account of the mind that is consistent with the fact that the mind is essentially a biological phenomenon and that therfore its two most important interrelated features, consciousness and intentionality, are also biological." (Pg. 111-112)
He asserts, "In earlier generations, books like this one would have had to contain either an atheistic attack on or a theistic defense of traditional religion. Or at the very least, the author would have had to declare a judicious agnosticism... Nowadays nobody even bothers, and it is considered in slightly bad taste to even raise the question of God's existence. Matters of religion ... are not to be discussed in public, and even the abstract questions are discussed only by bores... I believe that something much more radical than a decline in religious faith has taken place... we no longer take the mysteries we see in the world as expressions of supernatural meaning... For us, if it should turn out that God exists, that would have to be a fact of nature like any other... [This] shows not so much that we are all becoming atheists but that we have moved beyond atheism to a point where the issues have a different meaning for us." (Pg. 34-36)
He argues, "Consciousness is an inner, subjective, first-person, qualitative phenomenon. Any account of consciousness that leaves out these features is not an account of consciousness but of something else... Both dualism and materialism rest on a series of false assumptions... that if consciousness is really a subjective, qualitative phenomenon, then it cannot be part of the material, physical world." (Pg. 50)
He suggests, "epiphenomenalism... would be miraculous, unlike anything that ever occurred in biological history, if something in biology as elaborate, rich, and structured as human and animal consciousness made no causal difference to the real world." (Pg. 58) He observes, "consciousness is not just an important feature of reality. There is a sense in which it is THE most important feature of reality because all other things have value, importance, merit, or worth only in relation to consciousness." (Pg. 83)
He admits, "Among the many relevant issues that I have not discusses are those of rationality, human freedom, and social value. I think, in fact, that these are not three separate topics, but different aspects of the same topic." (Pg. 157)
He concludes on the note, "In this book, I want not just to explain a lot of diverse phenomena but to show how they all hang together. Thus, my aim... has been to try to make progress toward getting an adequate GENERAL theory." (Pg. 161)
Searle's books are some of the most important in contemporary philosophy, particularly as they relate to the philosophy of mind.
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He has written many other books, such as 'The Mystery of Consciousness,' 'The Rediscovery of the Mind,' 'Mind: A Brief Introduction,' 'Mind, Language And Society: Philosophy In The Real World,' 'Minds, Brains and Science,' etc.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1998 book, "[In this book] I try to explain, at least in summary form, some of my views on mind, language, and society, and to explain how they relate to each other, and how they fit into our overall contemporary conception of the universe... they are approached by way of an analysis of mind that rejects both dualism and materialism. I set out to write a book about mind, language and society, and now that it is finished, I discover that a disproportionately large part of it is about the mind... I have shamelessly borrowed from my earlier writings." (Pg. ix-x)
He states, "I do not believe that we live in two worlds, the mental and the physical---much less in three worlds, the mental, the physical, and the cultural---but in one world, and I want to describe the relations between some of the many parts of that one world... Specifically, I want to explain certain structural features of mind, language, and society, and then show how they all fit together." (Pg. 6) Later, he adds, "I have so far tried to give an account of the mind that is consistent with the fact that the mind is essentially a biological phenomenon and that therfore its two most important interrelated features, consciousness and intentionality, are also biological." (Pg. 111-112)
He asserts, "In earlier generations, books like this one would have had to contain either an atheistic attack on or a theistic defense of traditional religion. Or at the very least, the author would have had to declare a judicious agnosticism... Nowadays nobody even bothers, and it is considered in slightly bad taste to even raise the question of God's existence. Matters of religion ... are not to be discussed in public, and even the abstract questions are discussed only by bores... I believe that something much more radical than a decline in religious faith has taken place... we no longer take the mysteries we see in the world as expressions of supernatural meaning... For us, if it should turn out that God exists, that would have to be a fact of nature like any other... [This] shows not so much that we are all becoming atheists but that we have moved beyond atheism to a point where the issues have a different meaning for us." (Pg. 34-36)
He argues, "Consciousness is an inner, subjective, first-person, qualitative phenomenon. Any account of consciousness that leaves out these features is not an account of consciousness but of something else... Both dualism and materialism rest on a series of false assumptions... that if consciousness is really a subjective, qualitative phenomenon, then it cannot be part of the material, physical world." (Pg. 50)
He suggests, "epiphenomenalism... would be miraculous, unlike anything that ever occurred in biological history, if something in biology as elaborate, rich, and structured as human and animal consciousness made no causal difference to the real world." (Pg. 58) He observes, "consciousness is not just an important feature of reality. There is a sense in which it is THE most important feature of reality because all other things have value, importance, merit, or worth only in relation to consciousness." (Pg. 83)
He admits, "Among the many relevant issues that I have not discusses are those of rationality, human freedom, and social value. I think, in fact, that these are not three separate topics, but different aspects of the same topic." (Pg. 157)
He concludes on the note, "In this book, I want not just to explain a lot of diverse phenomena but to show how they all hang together. Thus, my aim... has been to try to make progress toward getting an adequate GENERAL theory." (Pg. 161)
Searle's books are some of the most important in contemporary philosophy, particularly as they relate to the philosophy of mind.
August 7, 2022
Some interesting points are raised in the book, and I have to admit that some of his defense against his stance is witty and admirable, but my main issue with the book is Searle's argument for realism (which strikes me as less analytic-philosophical than old-man wisdom that gets your life going) and his denial of a chasm (with little neuroscientific evidence to back it up or to explain the transition from body to mind).
Searle seems to be unable to fathom true meaning when people say "the reality comprehensible to a creature is but a mental construct inside the creature's head" and that "true, unaltered reality, if it does exist, cannot be understood as itself". It seems to me that, in order to make sense of something we often use concepts which are mental tools inside our heads. Without those concepts, it seems impossible for one to make sense of anything. Hence the impression we have of a "true reality" seems not to be a faithful portrait, if "true reality" does exist. Searle, however, insists in multiple points in the book that mass and forces "exists", completely neglecting the fact that these concepts were created by human beings to explain a particular pattern observed. The phenomenon that these notions aim to describe and predict may exist, but they don't necessarily exist AS "mass" or "force", nor in that particular pattern. Another system with other notions, focusing on another pattern may be used to describe and predict the same phenomenon like our science does. Mass and forces are not the objective reality as Searle so likes to claim. They're still mental constructs.
Because I'm unfamiliar with Searle, there are multiple occasions in the book that I thought he has committed equivocation when it comes to consciousness, especially when it comes to Searle's main attack on materialism - which is focused on the materialistic claim that "consciousness" does not exist, when our intuition says otherwise. For one, arguing by intuition seems insufficient. For another, it seems quite possible to me that when those materialists claim that "consciousness" does not exist, they simply have redefined "consciousness". "Consciousness", as a set of neuronal processes that allows perception, obviously exists to materialists. But "consciousness", as something that exists independently of the body, something that is not caused by the body, and something that can exert causal power on the body, does not exist to materialists.
While Searle's attack on materialism is majorly on their "denial of consciousness", his attack on dualism is mainly about mind-body chasm. I feel as though Searle played down how hard the hard problem of consciousness truly is. It is one thing to find neural correlate of "consciousness", it's another to explain how "consciousness" is subjective. Neural correlates are objective third person ontology. "Consciousness" has a distinctly subjective first person ontology, as Searle himself defines. How does neurological processes which exists objectively translate into something with a subjective existence? That's the chasm, and Searle has downplayed it. Of course it is not definite that mind-body chasm can never be bridged like the dualists believe. Perhaps one day it'll be shown that all is material, and materialism, on a certain level, has won. Or the gap is never bridged and dualism will still be right, until they're proven wrong. When there isn't sufficient evidence, it's better to be a skeptic and not someone who sticks to the default position just because it is convenient. That's not philosophy, that's old-man wisdom - not what I had expected from this book.
The later parts are more agreeable to me when the relationship between intentionality and language is discussed. There is still a lot unsaid though, because this is a "popular philosophy" book and not an academic one, so while I found the later parts easier to read, I also kinda lost my interest. Overall I wasn't exactly amazed by the structure of mind, language and society the book presents.
Searle seems to be unable to fathom true meaning when people say "the reality comprehensible to a creature is but a mental construct inside the creature's head" and that "true, unaltered reality, if it does exist, cannot be understood as itself". It seems to me that, in order to make sense of something we often use concepts which are mental tools inside our heads. Without those concepts, it seems impossible for one to make sense of anything. Hence the impression we have of a "true reality" seems not to be a faithful portrait, if "true reality" does exist. Searle, however, insists in multiple points in the book that mass and forces "exists", completely neglecting the fact that these concepts were created by human beings to explain a particular pattern observed. The phenomenon that these notions aim to describe and predict may exist, but they don't necessarily exist AS "mass" or "force", nor in that particular pattern. Another system with other notions, focusing on another pattern may be used to describe and predict the same phenomenon like our science does. Mass and forces are not the objective reality as Searle so likes to claim. They're still mental constructs.
Because I'm unfamiliar with Searle, there are multiple occasions in the book that I thought he has committed equivocation when it comes to consciousness, especially when it comes to Searle's main attack on materialism - which is focused on the materialistic claim that "consciousness" does not exist, when our intuition says otherwise. For one, arguing by intuition seems insufficient. For another, it seems quite possible to me that when those materialists claim that "consciousness" does not exist, they simply have redefined "consciousness". "Consciousness", as a set of neuronal processes that allows perception, obviously exists to materialists. But "consciousness", as something that exists independently of the body, something that is not caused by the body, and something that can exert causal power on the body, does not exist to materialists.
While Searle's attack on materialism is majorly on their "denial of consciousness", his attack on dualism is mainly about mind-body chasm. I feel as though Searle played down how hard the hard problem of consciousness truly is. It is one thing to find neural correlate of "consciousness", it's another to explain how "consciousness" is subjective. Neural correlates are objective third person ontology. "Consciousness" has a distinctly subjective first person ontology, as Searle himself defines. How does neurological processes which exists objectively translate into something with a subjective existence? That's the chasm, and Searle has downplayed it. Of course it is not definite that mind-body chasm can never be bridged like the dualists believe. Perhaps one day it'll be shown that all is material, and materialism, on a certain level, has won. Or the gap is never bridged and dualism will still be right, until they're proven wrong. When there isn't sufficient evidence, it's better to be a skeptic and not someone who sticks to the default position just because it is convenient. That's not philosophy, that's old-man wisdom - not what I had expected from this book.
The later parts are more agreeable to me when the relationship between intentionality and language is discussed. There is still a lot unsaid though, because this is a "popular philosophy" book and not an academic one, so while I found the later parts easier to read, I also kinda lost my interest. Overall I wasn't exactly amazed by the structure of mind, language and society the book presents.
April 25, 2025
John Searle, in this summary of his previous work, attempts to defend the Enlightenment vision of naive realism. Although he doesn't mention Thomas Reid by name, it seems at though that's what he's defending, with some caveats towards J.L. Austin towards the end. He starts to explain that there is a world that exists outside of us and that if one were to deny this, it would affect all other fields of rational inquiry (see what postmodernism has done), he works his way through the mind as being an independent phenomenon without appealing to either dualism or materialism, citing that there are higher and lower orders of biological phenomenon, before moving towards the development of the mind's ability to form words and put those words into action, recalling Austin. His example of fiat currency implies that certain things (and I've made a criticism of society's position on this in an essay of mine) like fiat money do not have value in of themselves but because society has assigned them meaning through the use of language. He describes how people making meaning through Austin's "speech act" concept through his notion that intentionality of statements are proof that completely material accounts of the mental are false, in that language and the words that come from society and the person's interaction creates meaning, through either commands, statements of fact or personal opinion. These facts are institutionalized throughout society but he fails to account for the authority of where these statements come from (there is a meme going around the internet about Searle's infamous meeting with Foucault, and while French philosophers are known for talking nonsense, Foucault would fill in the area of knowledge where Searle is missing) so I took one star off for that. Good book though, otherwise.
April 29, 2025
This is was very informative and approachable introduction into a more biological naturalistic approach to consciousness. Although at time it felt a bit tedious, this is not at all a problem with the author’s writing and more so the nature of discussions on consciousness itself. In the end I remained somewhat unconvinced of Searle’s assertions, not for lack of effort though. I would probably recommend this book to someone working through Chomsky and Wittgenstein for the first time.
Throughout this book I questioned the general use-value of this type of argument and it wasn’t until I finished that I realized in the age where trillions are being poured into the making of “artificial intelligence” that an examination of the mind is not only important but very timely, regardless of one’s agreement or disagreement on Searle’s claims
Throughout this book I questioned the general use-value of this type of argument and it wasn’t until I finished that I realized in the age where trillions are being poured into the making of “artificial intelligence” that an examination of the mind is not only important but very timely, regardless of one’s agreement or disagreement on Searle’s claims
January 16, 2022
Searle’s short book “Mind, Language, and Society” is an ambitious book that seeks to share with a wider audience Searle’s thoughts on consciousness and how these thoughts can be applied to further topics on language and social reality. I loved loved loved the first chapter on the ambitions of the Enlightenment vision and the harsh realities to this vision that were brought to attention by Kuhn, Einstein, Gödel, Wittgenstein, and others. Searle often confuses me with his theory of intentionality and later in the book, I was a bit perplexed when he applied intentionality to social situations. Overall, I mostly really liked this book though there were some elements that I don’t still fully grasp. 4*
September 10, 2018
The only part of this book I enjoyed was the first chapter dealing with truth, which was very good. The remaining chapters were basically dealing with various other phenomena but from a naturalistic perspective. Annoyingly he never argues for such a perspective, he merely presupposes it. It’s amusing to see how he attempts to deal with various philosophical problems with his presuppositions. For example, his way of supposedly resolving the mind-body problem is by simply restating the problem (along with a variety of naturalistic presuppositions added in) while maintaining that there’s nothing to be explained. This book simply leaves you with more questions than when you started.
June 11, 2017
A worthwhile foray into one of the rare attempts at a "general philosophy" in the analytic tradition. While Searle's work has always been controversial and justifiably disputed, his common sense approach bypasses much of the confusion that academics have uncovered by losing track of the obvious. Perhaps most importantly, Searle's brief but valuable exposition concerning direct realism provides a glimpse into the moves philosophers of the future must make if they aim to avoid the dead ends of past centuries concerning our relationship to the world.
November 4, 2017
يحاول المؤلف في هذا الكتاب حل غموض بعض الظواهر وهي ,كيف يمكن وجود العقل في عالم مؤلف من بني فزيائية
(وكيف يمكن للعقل ان يوجه ذاته للعالم من حوله (القصدية ,وكيف يمكن للعقول ان تبدع واقعا اجتماعيا موضوعيا
بالاضافة للتواصل اللغوي وكيف يمكن للظواهر الفزيائية )الصوت القدرة علي خلق واقع من خلال حمله للبني المعنوية
وكما قال الكتاب فانه لم يناقش المواضيع بخلفيتها كامله وانما تطرق الي بعض الاسئلة المعضله وحاول بالتحليل الفلسفي
ازاحتها والمضي عليها , لذا فانا بحاجه للالمام بتلك الخلفية حتي ادرك ما قام به سرل جيدا
(وكيف يمكن للعقل ان يوجه ذاته للعالم من حوله (القصدية ,وكيف يمكن للعقول ان تبدع واقعا اجتماعيا موضوعيا
بالاضافة للتواصل اللغوي وكيف يمكن للظواهر الفزيائية )الصوت القدرة علي خلق واقع من خلال حمله للبني المعنوية
وكما قال الكتاب فانه لم يناقش المواضيع بخلفيتها كامله وانما تطرق الي بعض الاسئلة المعضله وحاول بالتحليل الفلسفي
ازاحتها والمضي عليها , لذا فانا بحاجه للالمام بتلك الخلفية حتي ادرك ما قام به سرل جيدا
April 16, 2025
A remarkabel feat… This is the Book for anyone who wants to learn about the big philosophical questions, (about the view of our most important philosophers) …(Owen Flanagan, James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy, Duke University) In its short length, John Searle has brought together and elucidated forty years of brilliant work on Mind, Language and Society… (Jerome Bruner, Research Professor of Psychology, New York University) – All that I want to say: It is a brilliant overview and summary.
May 22, 2018
I didn't read much about the topic before this book. Searle has interesting points that leads to some good mental exercises. It's just like mentioned in the book, it doesn't elaborate enough about the societal and linguistic side of things. But overall, I liked it as an introductory read for his thoughts.
May 30, 2022
I quite enjoyed this little book. The author quickly dispenses prior philosophical arguments with ones of his own that incorporate learnings from biology (like neuroscience) into his theory of the mind. From there, it's fairly efficient to explain observations on how society and language work.
I'll probably keep this one for awhile and reread at some point.
I'll probably keep this one for awhile and reread at some point.
October 20, 2018
Türkçe çevirisini okudum, göze batan bir sıkıntı yok. İçerik açısından değerlendirmek gerekirse, yazarın açıklığını, örneklerini ve tartışmacılığını beğendim ancak hızlı geçtiği bazı noktalarda indirgemecilik sezdim.
July 22, 2023
Searle wants to understand consciousness and mind and how each influences and even defines the other. But that's not all. There are quite a few philosophical issues here, from reality and truth to intentionality.
November 24, 2017
Small but intellectually heavy book on the relationship of mind, language, and society. I particularly like the discussion on money, as to how it is a socially reconstructed phenomenon.
November 11, 2019
يحتاج لقراءة ثانية
November 12, 2019
لتحميل كتاب العقل واللغة والمجتمع pdf
لينك التحميل من موقعنا https://www.eltanweeer.com/2019/11/PD...
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