Acting on Principle: An Essay on Kantian Ethics

by Onora O'Neill

'Two things', wrote Kant, 'fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and the starry heavens above and the moral law within'. Many would argue that since Kant's day, the study of the starry heavens has advanced while ethics has stagnated, and in particular that Kant's ethics offers an empty formalism that tells us nothing about how we should live. In Acting on Principle Onora O'Neill shows that Kantian ethics has practical as well as philosophical importance. First published in 1975, the book is regarded as a classic account and defence of the Kantian ethical position. It addresses Kant's account of reasoning about action, in particular his controversial claim that the Categorical Imperative guides action and is basic to ethics and justice. This second edition offers a substantial new introduction and updated bibliography, and will be valuable for a wide readership in Kant studies and those studying ethics.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

300 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 30, 2013

About the author

Onora Sylvia O'Neill, Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve CH CBE FBA FRS (born 23 August 1941) is a philosopher and a crossbench member of the House of Lords.

The daughter of Sir Con Douglas Walter O'Neill, she was educated partly in Germany and at St Paul's Girls' School, London before studying philosophy, psychology and physiology at Oxford University. She went on to complete a doctorate at Harvard University, with John Rawls as supervisor. During the 1970s she taught at Barnard College, the women's college in Columbia University, New York City. In 1977 she returned to Britain and took up a post at the University of Essex; she was Professor of Philosophy there when she became Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge in 1992.

She is an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, a former President of the British Academy 1988–1989 and chaired the Nuffield Foundation 1998–2010. In 2003, she was the founding President of the British Philosophical Association (BPA). In 2013 she held the Spinoza Chair of Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. Until October 2006, she was the Principal of Newnham College, Cambridge, and she currently chairs the Equality and Human Rights Commission.

(from Wikipedia)

Reviews

[Kramer Thompson · Rating 2 out of 5]

I think this book probably developed my understanding of Kant's ethics, but only slightly. Significant sections of the book dealt with older ethical theories, and I found most of the book quite onerous to read. Some parts were useful, especially O'Neill's explication of contradictions in conception and will. Still, this is probably a good introductory read for my deeper studies of Kant's ethics.

[Erik · Rating 2 out of 5]

It is rare enough for an author to mount a defense of Kant’s categorical imperative test (CI) for maxims or principles (reasons) of action. Most readers simply ask: “how can a reason for action motivate me? Are not all reasons simply desires?” This is a basic confusion between a reason and a motivation. But if motivations are not reasons (as they are not) then why expect reasons to be motivations (as they are not). As O’Neill correctly points out, it is of the nature of a reason to be a reason for any rational being and thus any rational being will be compelled by correct reasons that apply to everyone in a community of rational beings. This is the basic idea behind Kant’s idea of a categorical imperative. Utilitarians interpret Kant’s CI as “what if everybody did that?’ and evaluate the consequences, something Kant explicitly says not to do. They also think that maxims like “If your name is Erik Banks, then you can rob banks” are universalizable without contradiction. The true generalization is For All x, if your name is x then x may rob banks. O’Neill shows how these downright silly objections to the CI based on partial generalizations fail and how generalizations like I will buy model trains but not sell them and I will sell model trains and not buy them are faulty because both the generalization and its contradiction fail the CI test thus implying that neither is an obligatory duty, either to do or to refrain from doing. Her solution to the infamous "murderer at the door" objection is to argue that the maxim “Always tell the truth even when others’ lives are at stake” if generalized would lead to a Hobbesian state of nature in which no-one would tell the truth. The proper maxim to generalize is therefore (she says) “tell the truth unless doing so would lead to loss of life.” But if that were the maxim the murderer would not believe you and you would not save the life of the victim either. She is right that some suitable generalization of a very complex set of maxims with proper overrides built in is perhaps one correct answer to the problem. But would this even be a generalization with so much dependent on specific overrides? Once we start "bargaining" with rights and justice, I wonder if we are no better than utilitarians. I prefer the idea that lies told under those kinds of circumstances are not, in fact, lies, or actually intended lies, since they are not conditions where free and rational action are even possible under the circumstances. The freest possible action is to divert the murderer from his murder, since this is the only way (given the constraints) that all agents (me, him, the victim) remain as free as possible. As far as intentions are concerned, least worst intentions are not convertible to first best intentions anyway and there is thus no contradiction with duty. To intend not to do x is not logically equivalent with intending to do not-x. I still think a better job could be done on Kant’s ethics. The universalization test is the worst form of the CI because it invites misunderstandings. The generalization test is only a way of revealing self-contradictions in the will, whether or not you generalize. The same test would hold true on a desert island. The rational autonomy-heteronomy of the will is the proper form which includes the two others.