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257 pages, Kindle Edition
First published August 7, 2012
”With the sage guidance of Hồ Chí Minh and [political leader] Trường Chinh, Giáp developed a highly nuanced and sophisticated understanding of how to use socio-political activity—organization, mobilization, and thought control or “consciousness-raising”—to focus the energies of the entire population under Vietminh control on achieving the Revolution’s objectives. Taken together, these techniques of political dau tranh allowed Giáp to mobilize an astonishing amount of on-going human activity, choreographed in minute detail, toward (1) building an alternative society and government, marked by revolutionary fervor, high morale, and unity of purpose as defined by the senior leadership; and (2) the breakdown of the legitimacy of the colonial puppet government in the eyes of the entire country. Thus, political dau tranh was at once a constructive and a corrosive activity.” (p. 57)
"[General Võ Nguyên Giáp] brilliantly applied what historian Douglas Pike calls the “two pincers” of revolutionary power, political struggle and armed struggle, placing greater emphasis on one form over the other at various stages of the Revolution. Perhaps Giáp’s most important contributions to protracted warfare were his flexible integration of three types of forces (local militia in the villages, regional forces, and full-time main force units), and his creative use of various “fighting forms”—guerilla warfare, mobile independent operations by battalions, conventional set-piece battles, and political mobilization."(from the Introduction, p. x)Interestingly, although Giáp started with a military organization that looked like the American one with four core functional divisions (e.g., personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics), in the later stages of the war it was reorganized along the lines of the Chinese PLA with overlapping Party and military responsibilities. As Warren says, the structure was “more byzantine and redundant” and I would add, organic and impenetrable. Elsewhere Warren adds that the redundancies of authority and overlapping responsibilities…ensured smooth functioning even when association leaders were killed or captured. (p. 25)
"A unique feature of PAVN’s approach to war concerned its extensive logistical preparation. Western forces on the offensive are typically supplied via motorized vehicles from the rear, or from the air. PAVN supply officers, however, developed ingenious ways of preparing a battlefield and its approaches with supplies and fortifications before the arrival of maneuver forces. This required superb planning and highly disciplined bunker and supply depot construction units, often working under sustained time pressure.”"(p.55)
"The Eisenhower Administration in 1954…used its resources unsparingly to construct in southern Vietnam a viable, non-communist nation that would stand as ‘the cornerstone of the Free World in Southeast Asia.’…Had it looked all over the world, the United Sates could not have chosen a less promising place for an experiment in nation-building."How horrifyingly familiar.
"Giáp never doubted that the power of his soldiers’ and citizens’ commitment to the Vietnamese revolutionary vision would compensate for the inferiority of their military forces…[He presented] the Communist revolution as the only way to give the people power to shape their own history and destiny. Whether this was true or not in some objective sense…hardly mattered. What did matter was that the people and the soldiers loyal to the Revolution believed it was true.
When all is said and done, Giáp’s enduring importance lies in recognizing that he was a successful general largely because he could see with extraordinary clarity all the factors and forces that shaped the trajectory of the wars in which he fought, and how each element related to all the others. He understood that the relative importance of each element was constantly in a state of flux, and one’s strategy, and one’s tactics, must be constantly recalibrated in light of those changes." (p. 217)