The Russian Origins of the First World War

by Sean McMeekin

In a major reinterpretation, Sean McMeekin rejects the standard notion of the war’s beginning as either a Germano-Austrian pre-emptive strike or a miscalculation. The key to the outbreak of violence, he argues, lies in St. Petersburg. Russian statesmen unleashed the war through policy decisions based on imperial ambitions in the Near East.

Genres: History, Russia, World War I, War, Nonfiction, Military History, European History

344 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 30, 2011

About the author

Sean McMeekin is an American historian, focused on European history of the early 20th century. His main research interests include modern German history, Russian history, communism, and the origins of the First and Second World Wars and the roles of Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

He has authored eight books, along with scholarly articles which have appeared in journals such as Contemporary European History, Common Knowledge, Current History, Historically Speaking, The World Today, and Communisme. He is currently Francis Flournoy Professor of European History and Culture at Bard College.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.”
- Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, on the eve of Great Britain’s entrance into World War I

Do you want to play a game? The game is called Who Started World War I? It is very simple. This is how it is played:

First, meet me at the bar. Second, buy me a beer. Third, repeat step two. Fourth, we argue about who started World War I. Finally, after retuning to step two a few more times, you call me a cab. I assure you, it will be fun.

Forget what your parents might have told you. It matters who started it. Whatever the context, the aggressor is typically the more culpable party, morally, ethically, and legally. The responding party is given a certain benefit, for being thrust into a situation not of their making.

World War I was the 20th century’s epochal moment. It not only set the stage for the convulsions of World War II, but it arranged the map of the world in ways that still bedevil us today. Thus, it matters who is to blame for lighting the fuse that set off the powder keg that blew the peace and stability of the world into little pieces that we are still trying to fuse together.

The standard line, adhered to by most historians, is that we should lay responsibility at the feet of the Germans. There is much to recommend this line of thinking. At every turn, they were as German as possible. When the situation called for subtlety, they blustered; when tact was required, they responded with aggressiveness. They never met a person they couldn’t alienate. Germany’s questionable leadership did not help, with an unstable Kaiser and a chief of staff on the verge of breakdown. Also, that full-heel turn in the 1930s sort of makes it hard to view Germany as anything but belligerent.

Sean McMeekin wants to change this. The Russian Origins of the First World War is a sweeping reinterpretation of German war guilt. It posits, first and foremost, that Russia bears the onus of war. Sure, the Germans played a role, as did Serbia, Austria-Hungary, France, and Great Britain. But McMeekin argues – rather convincingly – that Russia wanted war as much as anyone.

The chief accusation against Germany in 1914 is that they were just looking for a reason to unleash the hounds. Situated in the middle of the continent, surrounded by hostile powers, the Germans feared encirclement. When Gavrilo Princip killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, the Germans – it is said – used their treaty obligations to Austria-Hungary as a reason to act before it became too late.

McMeekin isn’t buying it. His central argument is that Russian aims drove the outbreak of war. For centuries, the tsars had dreamt of Constantinople and the Straits, which would provide Russia access to the sea. (They also hungrily eyed Galicia, a tantalizing piece of Austria-Hungary that drew a great deal of Russian attention, even as France begged them to focus on Germany). When Serbia squared off with Austria-Hungary, the Russians eagerly backed their Serbian ally, sensing that a conflict presented them with an opportunity – backed by France – to achieve their goals.

The title of this book is a bit misleading in the sense that it seems to refer to the beginning of the war in 1914. However, that is only part of it. Indeed, the bulk of these 243 pages of text is devoted to events occurring after the actual beginning of hostilities.

McMeekin uses this space to reevaluate the course of the war by looking at it from a Russian perspective. (Though battles are mentioned, McMeekin is more interested in diplomacy than battlefield strategy). Thus, in one chapter, he presents a revisionist view of the Dardanelles operation. Instead of hammering Churchill for embarking on a foolish gambit, he points an accusing finger at the Russians. McMeekin believes the Russians (spearheaded by foreign minister Sergey Sazonov) essentially tricked the Allies into attacking at Gallipoli, extracted promises that they would be given Constantinople, and then sat back and let the British and New Zealand troops do all the bloodletting. In another chapter, McMeekin takes us through the Armenian Genocide, arguing that Russia set the stage for tragedy by arming Armenian irredentist groups, and using them as human pawns in their geopolitical chess match. There is also a fascinating chapter on Sykes-Picot and the surgical dissection of the Ottoman Empire that gives an excellent primer on a topic with modern-day relevance.

McMeekin presents a forcefully argued and clearly presented argument. The problem, of course, is that revisionist histories tend to overstate their cases. Was Edward Grey really as gullible and ineffectual as McMeekin presents him? Was Sazonov really that brilliant? I can’t answer that. I’m not an expert. Yet, as I read, I had to keep reminding myself not to swallow everything hook, line, and sinker. McMeekin is not unbiased, he just has different biases than previous author/historians. Certainly, he has a few axes to grind, namely Russia and Great Britain. (France comes off only marginally better; Germany is barely critiqued; Austria-Hungary and Serbia are almost nonexistent).

To be fair, I do think McMeekin has the evidence to make a case. Certainly, he has the resume. He is a professor in Turkey, and claims to have done all the French, German, Russian, and Turkish translations on his own. His endnotes are impressive and well-annotated, giving the interested reader many other titles for later perusal.

There are times, though, where it felt like maybe he was trying a bit hard to impress. Or perhaps he was trying to assure himself that his argument holds water. For instance, there are pictures in the book of Russian memoranda that McMeekin has found in various archives. According to McMeekin, these pages represent newly discovered evidence to bolster his point. To me, with absolutely no facility with the Cyrillic alphabet, they are just nonsense. It could be the menu for the Russian House of Pancakes and I would not know the difference. Their inclusion is telling, as though McMeekin is preemptively engaging with the historians who will attack his thesis.

In the interest of full disclosure, I am predisposed to buy what McMeekin is selling. It’s not just my contrarian nature, either. Rather, ever since I began my literary journey through World War I, I’ve been bothered by how the Great Powers acted and reacted to the Sarajevo assassination. The mechanistic view, that each of these nations had treaty obligations that they had to execute, only makes sense in a vacuum. In reality, every nation involved in the outbreak of World War I decided, at some point, that war was in their best interest. The idea that the massive Russian Empire would get dragged into a fight by little Serbia, against its will, is preposterous. The Russians wanted to rumble, because they saw a benefit to themselves (Constantinople and the Straits). Similarly, France cheered them on, because they saw a benefit (Alsace-Lorraine). You can pick any of the nations involved in the war’s outbreak – Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Russia, France, and Great Britain – and lucidly argue for their culpability.

The reality, though, is that no nation is fully and singularly to blame. This is a matter of comparative fault. It took the combined mistakes of a lot of different people to trigger World War I.

The Russian Origins of the First World War definitely oversells its argument. In fact, I’m pretty sure McMeekin recognized this himself. In July 1914, published two years after this book, he presents a more fully formed picture of the critical month when Europe abandoned peace. He still lays heavy criticism on Russia, but he does a better job developing the flaws in Germany as well.

I think McMeekin’s perspective – whether you ultimately agree or not – is an important one to recognize if you’re interested in World War I. My advice is to read July 1914 first (it’s my favorite book in the vast sub-genre of titles devoted to the July Crisis). Once you’ve finished that, The Russian Origins of the First World War is an excellent follow-up. It gives you all the ammunition you need to be the guy at the cocktail party who surprises everyone by saying that Germany’s role in causing World War I has been grossly exaggerated, and that for a full accounting of this terrible event, one must look to the East.

[Dimitri · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Russian origins of the war have been further integrated by the author into the story of July 1914: Countdown to War. A great alternative is Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia by Dominic Lieven.

[Bryan Alexander · Rating 4 out of 5]

An engaging, provocative revision of WWI history, Russian Origins of the First World War assigns a great deal of agency to Russia's role in that conflict. It's a welcome change from the usual, hoary debate over Germany war guilt.

McMeekin wants us to consider WWI by focusing less on the Western front, and more on the Russo-Turkish conflict. The Russians wanted to conquer chunks of the declining Ottoman empire, most notably Constantinople, or a would-be "Tsargrad." A variety of problems and forces appear under this header, from the Armenians to naval politics to south Balkan ambitions and Persia. Russia's desire to conquer in this realm was more important than its war with Germany or Austria-Hungary. "For Russia, the war of 1914 was always, ultimately, about Turkey." (101) "Russia's war... was fought not for Serbia, but to achieve control of Constantinople and the Straits." (239)

Russian participation in and exploitation of European alliances made sure this was a continental catastrophe, rather than a local one. Provocatively, McMeekin offers a new label for the Great War: "the War of the Ottoman Succession" (4). He also wants us to imagine that "[t]he war of 1914 was Russia's war even more than it was Germany's" (5).

The main protagonist is Russia's foreign minister Sergei Sazanov. He appears as a masterful, even Machiavellian manipulator, leading France and especially Britain into following Russia's schemes. London comes across as very clueless in the diplomatic world ("British leaders, for their own possibly misguided strategic purposes, one by one declared themselves willing to accept imaginary horses for real ones" (122). In contrast Russia's minister just keeps running the table, arranging things for his nation's maximum benefit, a "diplomatic revolution" (124).

Sasanov had brilliantly arranged the enemy coalition in what was arguably Russia's best war-fighting scenario since the eighteenth century. (77)

McMeekin goes on to argue that the 1916 Sykes-Picot pact owed a great deal to Sazanov (the author wants it known as the Sykes-Picot-Sazanov Pact instead, 210). "Out of Russian diplomatic blackmail was born the French end of the notorious Sykes-Picot blueprint" (131).

While masterful, Russian strategy is often terribly cruel and costly. McMeekin presents several cases whereby Petrograd delays helping allies with seeming deliberation, resulting in massive death tolls: Gallipoli and Armenia being the leading cases. Several times Allied forces made major plays and suffered from a lack of Russian assistance. Russia's focus on fighting Turkey and Austria-Hungary instead of Germany makes strategic sense, but obviously had awful effects on France and, to a lesser extent, Britain. (I'm reminded of Stalin's Warsaw uprising delay)

McMeekin is on difficult ground when he discusses the Armenian genocide. He makes a good case for the importance of Russian manipulation in supporting Armenians against the Ottomans, but plays to Turkish denialists too often. He plays the "both sides committed atrocities" card (ex: 169), puts genocide in quotes, and downplays Ottoman initiative. Perhaps the author's current posting in Bilkent has biased him.

The Russian Origins of the First World War offers many insights and details to gladden any WWI buff. Its description of Russia's conquest of most of Persia is important, given how underappreciated is that campaign (chapter 7). That makes for a useful addition to understanding Britain's Iraqi campaigns, as well as an essential component to Russian's successful invasion of Anatolia.

The book's focus on Russia's Turkish goals also offers useful context for the 1917 Kerensky offensive.

As a student of America's Progressive era, I was struck by the sense of national renewal with which some Russians anticipated war. If they conquered Tsargrad,

Such a crowning strategic triumph... might also "bring healing to our internal life, [and] would give the government and society those achievements and that enthusiasm which could unite them in the service of a matter of indisputable pan-national importance." (26)

I'm reminded of the hopes (rarely discussed since) many progressives had for American entry into WWI.

Like Norman Stone's essential book on WWI's eastern front (my review), this book ends with 1917 and those revolutions, nicely setting up the Soviet state's foreign policy. It also gives us a fine introduction to the Civil War's Whites, since so many of their leading generals and leaders participated in Russia's southern campaigns.

Overall, Russian Origins of the First World War is an intriguing, challenging, and stimulating book for WWI readers. It should also be useful to anyone reading on Russia in the 20th century.

[Day · Rating 2 out of 5]

Although this a book which is interesting in the way that many books which advance radically different arguments tend to be, McMeekin flubs it early and hard in his assertion that the idea that Russia went to war for Serbia's sake is naïve. It's a fairly facile argument, as should be immediately obvious given that the author himself discusses Russia's prestige issues in the run up to WWI - and, even, uses these prestige issues as support for his own argument. Quite frankly, even if Russia didn't have much in the way of personal sentiment toward the Serbian people, to have abandoned Serbia to its fate would've been taken as an admission of weakness which Russia could not countenance when the other Great Powers were already questioning Russia's own status as a power player. Then, too, by this point Serbia was Russia's only ally in the Balkans, as Bulgaria had soured on them when Russia didn't back them up in the Second Balkan War, and then pressured them to give territorial concessions to Romania. Ultimately, the idea that Russia could've discarded Serbia without batting an eye is the sort of thing which, while it might seem sensible from a 21st century perspective, doesn't hold any water upon even the slightest bit of serious examination.

It's a flaw which sets the tone for what else follows, to the great detriment of the author's careful efforts to portray everything from 1914 to 1918 as Russia's fault. And I should've been a fairly sympathetic audience, as I do find the Entente's plotting to slice and dice the Ottoman Empire fairly distasteful. Alas, though - facts do actually matter. And the author makes some other errors along the way which do not do much to endear one to his message. Quite frankly, I found his attempt to characterize requirements in the Ottoman Navy for its officers to be able to swim as something indicative of the poor quality of their Navy hilarious. Regardless of the fact that their Navy was hardly world-class, a requirement for swimming skills is absolutely meaningless in this context - other navies were introducing such rules in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the reason for the change had to do with changes in ideas about the value of sailors and the usefulness of keeping them alive. It's the sort of thing which may seem a niggling detail, but it reveals either ignorance on the part of the author, or expectation by the author that his readers will themselves be ignorant. Neither of these says something particularly good.

Perhaps his biggest sin, though, may be his intellectually dishonest contention that the fact that most Armenians died enroute while being deported moots the entire thing as genocide. I honestly cannot believe that the author actually believes what he has written in this case, as I cannot believe that someone of his academic training could accomplish such a feat of clearly disingenuous thinking. But McMeekin was employed by a Turkish university at the time of publication, so perhaps we can't fault him for understanding which side his bread was buttered on.

And, in the end, while McMeekin may succeed on making a decent argument for Russia bearing some of the blame for the conflict, he hardly manages to create a convincing case for Russia being the sole guilty party. The book is still probably worth a read for WWI buffs, so long as they engage it with a saltshaker clamped firmly in hand, as it is nearly always worthwhile to examine things from new angles, but absolutely not a place to start if one is an amateur.

[J. Kirkland · Rating 1 out of 5]

This did nothing to change the basic, widely-known interpretation of the war origins (i.e. Austrian/German). He supposedly "proves" Russian catalyst, but it simply reduces to him saying "Russia should have backed down!" .... Why not Germany? Or Austria?

So, the decision of the Czar to mobilize was the decisive element? He was a staunch ally of Serbia. Why should he back down? McMeekin makes the case that the Russian Czar's obsession with the Dardanelles Straits and his desire for Constantinople 2.0 (to use a modern parlance) is what drove him to mobilize, thus catalyzing the war. But, again, Russia had its allies. As did Germany and Austria, France, etc. Why pick one side and pin it disproportionately on them? By that logic, you could just as easily say "Germany INSISTED on supporting its Austrian allies and their unreasonable ultimatum! They should have backed down!"

Like "Stalin's War", McMeekin proves he is a polemicist and rhetorician FIRST, analyst SECOND. None of this makes any real sense, but he doesn't let that get in the way. He seems to have a borderline creepy obsession with the "Russia (or the USSR later on) is devious and they always trick and abuse the West" theory. It comes up again and again in his work.

[Erskine · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting thesis.

McMeekin maintains that Russia has escaped criticism for its role in causing the First World War because of the convulsions the country went through during the revolution. He exams the events of the time, and Russian war aims, and finds that they played an active and critical role in beginning the hostilities. While Germany is usually criticized for being the first to mobilize, McMeekin shows that Russia, knowing they could not fully mobilize as fast as the Germans, began to mobilize in secret a week before them, and that German mobilization was triggered by discovering what the Russians were doing.

I don't know enough about the history to fully endorse his conclusion, but it's worth looking at in depth. I recommend the book, if you're interested in the history of World War I.

[Justin · Rating 3 out of 5]

As with any traumatic event in human history, much of the scholarly work following the First World War focused on which nation was to blame for the carnage that had been wrought upon Europe. While the war technically began with Austria-Hungary’s initial declaration of war on Serbia following Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination in June 1914, the Versailles Treaty and its War Guilt clause would primarily pin Germany as the instigator of the war. The effects of this public denouncement of Germany as the main aggressor would have a significant impact on the course of European history, and while there is a complex web of reasons that would explain exactly why the First World War occurred when it did most scholarly opinion does tend to reiterate this idea. History, though, is rarely so simple, and in his book The Russian Origins of the First World War, historian Sean McMeekin argues that the role of the Russian Empire in provoking the war has been greatly understated. Citing a wealth of previously underutilized documents made available after the collapse of the Soviet Union and by highlighting the consistent imperialist aims of men like Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazonov, McMeekin reshapes the narrative concerning Russian involvement in the First World War. While imperial expansion remains at the core of theories ascertaining Germany’s guilt in starting the war and to a lesser extent France’s willingness to join in the fight, McMeekin’s book effectively argues that the same was true for Imperial Russia, though his work leaves some additional questions left to be answered.

Early on, McMeekin draws attention to the fact that Russia’s role in the First World War is often downplayed or misremembered. Acknowledging the difficulty of accessing archival materials due to both the difficulties of translation as well as Soviet reluctance to publish work on military history, McMeekin nonetheless posits the importance of Russian involvement in the war. In reference to the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement which essentially divvied up the post-war map of the Middle East between western powers, McMeekin notes that curious lack of attention paid to Russia’s involvement in dictating this policy, adding that to neglect this aspect is “like writing a history of the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 without reference to American foreign policy (McMeekin 3).”

In discussing the strategic imperatives for Russia in 1914, particular emphasis is again given to Russia’s interests in the Ottoman Empire. Imperial Germany’s fear of encirclement by the Triple Entente has often been cited as a factor in its decision to go to war in 1914, and McMeekin illustrates how the Russian Empire had similar concerns in mind that guided their actions. Despite the postwar importance of the Sykes-Picot agreement, McMeekin notes that England and France were largely unconcerned by the various crises both in the Balkans as well as those poised by the predicted collapse of the Ottoman Empire: England already controlled the Suez Canal, and French investment in the Ottomans virtually assured their continued influence in the area.

In contrast to this, McMeekin looks to both the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire as the key areas of Russian interest leading up to 1914. The capture of Constantinople had long tantalized Russian leaders, and additionally by McMeekin’s estimate “the Russians had a better case than the Germans to complain of Einkreisung (McMeekin 13),” given its borders with at least five hostile or recently hostile nations. While Russia had expanded its frontiers into Russian Persia, these borders were destabilized by a variety of anti-Russian groups and Russian access to the Mediterranean ultimately relied on the whims of the Ottoman leaders.  In search of a solution to these problems, as early as 1910 Russian military leaders were looking to somehow capture Constantinople and the Dardanelles not only because of its historical significance but also to relieve the perceived encirclement and precarious strategic footing of the Russian Empire. McMeekin illustrates this with copious amounts of evidence from internal memorandums and records of meetings that illustrate just how crucial Russian leadership considered the acquisition of Constantinople to be. This is additionally supported via discussion of the 1914 conference in Petersburg allocating funds for an increased Black Sea Fleet specifically to aid in taking the Dardanelles from the Ottomans, another sign of just how precarious the Russian position was in 1914 and how that helped dictate their foreign policy. McMeekin dismisses the popular view that the Russians entered the war solely in support of Serbia by illustrating how Russian fears about access to the Mediterranean and stabilization of its border with the Ottoman Empire influenced Russian foreign policy mirrored German concerns.

While Russian military policy seemingly demanded some sort of effort to take Constantinople, men like Sazonov and Vladimir Sukhomlinov knew that such a task could not be achieved alone. This necessitates from McMeekin a stringent discussion of Sazonov’s actions during the July Crisis that are eye opening to say the least. Conventional narratives place emphasis on Germany’s blank cheque that fueled Austria-Hungary’s stiff ultimatum to Serbia and other elements that show how both nations exploited the July Crisis. In similar fashion McMeekin draws attention to the lack of documentation relating to both French President Henri Poincaré’s visit to Russia and the gaps in the dispatches of Maurice Paléologue during the height of the July Crisis. McMeekin lays out a solid case that the two nations worked to exploit the situation just as much as historians have claimed Germany did while not jumping to the conclusion that France and Russia effectively agreed to declare war the minute it was a viable option. This is supported in part by documentation of Sazonov’s political maneuvering, including his decision with Krivoshein to mobilize units not just near Serbia but also ones that would be able to move on Constantinople. McMeekin thus does away not just with the traditional narrative of Russia mobilizing to defend Russia, but also of the view of Russia as yet another nation drawn into the war due to the aggressive action taken by Germany and Austro-Hungary.

Russia had her allies once Germany had entered the fray, especially after the violation of Belgian neutrality, but McMeekin does not rely on the traditional narrative of Russia’s sacrifice and eventual downfall on behalf of its allies. McMeekin sets about destroying this popular understanding of Russia’s role in the war, noting that not only did Moltke barely weaken his western armies to face Russia’s initial advances but that from the start “the expectation in both Paris and Petersburg was that France would have to do the bulk of the heavy lifting against Germany (McMeekin 79),” with French envoys failing to even guarantee that Russia would primarily focus on attacking Germany. McMeekin’s analysis of Franco-Russian military agreements reorient the traditional understanding of the two nations’ relationship, stating that “Russia could basically do whatever it wanted,” while demonstrating effectively how the incredibly vague agreement allowed Russia much tactical freedom, ultimately resulting in the conclusion that “once the dust had settled on the early battles, Russia could then offer to fight on, or threaten to sign a separate peace with the Central Powers (McMeekin 80).” This superior leverage afforded to Russia becomes an effective tool in demonstrating just how active Russia was in the war rather than being the forgotten third party of the Triple Entente.

One of the strongest arguments in the book is that the ill-fated Gallipoli campaign came about largely because of this leverage, with Sazonov and his compatriots essentially utilizing their nation’s influence in Persia to push the British to essentially capture the Dardanelles “whether or not [Russia] contributed in any way (McMeekin 124).” Further strengthening his case is the examination of Russian involvement in Persia, an area of study hitherto largely unexamined due to lack of documentation. In every case McMeekin illustrates just how often Sazonov was able to guide the decisions of British and French foreign policy throughout the war in various theatres, undermining the traditional notion of Russian sacrifice for the greater allied cause and instead showing how it was often the case that Russia’s allies instead spent money and lives to further Russian imperial aims.

McMeekin’s arguments in all these cases cast Russia’s actions in a new light. This new analysis of Russian actions during the war provides context for some of the seemingly bizarre decisions made by the Triple Entente by revealing it to be outgrowths of Russian foreign policy. McMeekin’s analysis does raise further questions though. His attempts to split the blame for the Armenian genocide between the Ottomans and Russia might have been better served in its own chapter, though the lack of documents concerning the event might hamper that. Additionally, Turkish policy towards Russia is hardly discussed. While the Ottoman Empire was faltering, their maneuvering in the leadup to war might help to provide even more context for the events discussed in the book.

Ultimately though, these issues that might require more examination do not undermine the work as a whole. McMeekin’s insistence that Russian history between 1914 and 1917 not be categorized as merely a predecessor to the Bolshevik Revolution has merit, and The Russian Origins of the First World War effectively stakes out a strong case for the importance of a closer analysis of Russian history than is typically afforded.

[David Nichols · Rating 4 out of 5]

To those of us who have accepted uncritically the German-war-guilt explanation of the First World War's origins, a thesis persuasively advanced by David Fromkin and Lawrence Stone, author Sean McMeekin offers this thoughtful corrective. RUSSIAN ORIGINS argues that the Russian government (Tsar and ministry) jumped into the 1914 Balkan crisis not to save the Serbs but to grab, with its Western allies' support, the Bosporus and Dardanelles and the city of Constantinople. Early in the war, after securing part of its western flank in Galicia, Russia focused on fighting the Turks in the Caucasus, in support of which campaign Russian agents ignited a rebellion among Armenians in Turkey. Russia then fecklessly failed to support the Armenians, and the Ottoman offensive against Armenian civilians (which McMeekin regrettably declines to call a genocide) resulted. That same year, Russian demands and Churchill's adventurism led to the disastrous Gallipoli campaign, to which the Russians, whose resupply depended on the operation's success, contributed little. Even as the Eastern Front collapsed in 1915-16, Britain and France continued to honor Russia's demand for Ottoman territory, probably to ensure that their crippled and beleaguered ally did not make a separate peace. The Sykes-Picot agreement authorized Russia's postwar occupation of Anatolia, Britain's of Mesopotamia, and France's acquisition of Syria as a buffer between the other powers' new colonies. As late as 1917, the provisional government that succeeded Nicholas II planned an offensive against Constantinople, which only the Bolshevik revolution cut short. That revolution caused historians retroactively to remember and portray Tsarist Russia as a bumbling, anachronistic basket-case stumbling into war with no clear aims, and Germany as a predator keen for war with all of Europe. Just because Wilhelmine Germany was militaristic and the Bolsheviks ruthless expansionists, however, doesn't mean their imperial Russian rivals and predecessors weren't exactly the same sort of people.

[Sam Schulman · Rating 5 out of 5]

A frontal assault on the origiins of WWI. According to this presumably Irish historian teaching at a Turkish University, it was Russia for whom 1914 was the year to war against Turkey - or never again, which had well-defined war aims worth a world war (passage thru Bosphorus via ownership of Straits, old Constantinople), and a fairly supple set of diplomats who outmaneuvered Brtish (shooting fish in barrel) French (more impressive) + German diplomacy to mobilize first. Proceeded to ignore Franco/British demands for fighting Germany not Austria or Turkey, demand Britain institute Gallipoli purely for their benefit - without landing a single spy on the southern shore of the Black Sea, turn Brits in Persia into fans of Russia's anti-Iran policy, lure the Armenians into becoming a 5th column in eyes of Turks, and then standing by as they were massacred, and in general effing up their allies before they effect up themselves (trying repeatedly to sell out the Serbs, e.g., who were the gallant little Belgium of the East.) Overwhelmingly original, filled with new info, and raising questions of self-delusion (Churchill himself [whose history of the war McMeekin admires] clearly somehow forgets after 1916 that he was lured into the Gallipoli adventure by the Russians who then broke every promise to him and stood by in safety. McMeekin's cynicism is breathtaking, the implications for his book - if true - are profound, and one emerges with less respect for almost everyone - Kurds, Young Turks, Armenian leaders, and human nature itself.
Steel yourself for some bathetic "breezy" journalese deployed intrusively, and keep a bridge scoring pad handy to count the number of times the author says that military history writing has become fashionable in Russia today.

[Mary · Rating 4 out of 5]

Deeply, broadly, archivally researched. McMeekin puts together the puzzle of WWI in a very convincing way, almost idiosyncratic, but I think he's mostly correct. As he sees it, the Russian secret pre-mobilization (before declaring war as their prior wargaming indicated that they were no match for the speed of the Schlieffen Plan) was to inevitably provoke Austria-Hungary and Germany into a war. This war had nothing to do with pan-Slavic feelings for Serbia. Furthermore, Russia had documented a long dreamed-of acquisition plan for Constantinople and the Straights motivated by religion, politics and economics. McMeekin points out where the actors in this drama are lying and exaggerating. The duplicitous Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Sazanov, manipulated Russia's allies over and over. The most famous example was Gallipoli, where the Russians got her allies to fight her battle for the Straights but didn't bother to show up to assist. Even Churchill declined to mention this in his memoirs. The horror of the Russian Revolution seems to have softened the historic take on Russia's role in WWI, or, as McMeekin refers to it, the War of Ottoman Succession. He also points out that the Russians were actively promoting an Armenian Fifth Column in Turkey but failed to offer protection or back up when Turkey caught on and began to annihilate them. Plus ca change, plus c'est la meme chose. While Russia remains in a class above in getting its version of events (maskirovka) out there, we struggle mightily. 1 star withheld for author's inability to call what happened to the Ottoman Armenians a genocide and because he has a penchant for long sentences. Highly recommended nevertheless.

[Rayrumtum · Rating 5 out of 5]

This fascinating history of World War I from the Russian perspective seeks to lay to rest the canard that all the responsibility for the war falls on the Germans and makes the counter case that the Russians are equally culpable. Many former WWI studies do not make use of Russian archival material.

One myth laid to rest that the Russians bled to death on behalf of their Western allies was baloney. In point of fact, the Russians operated in their own interest throughout and uses France and England's fear of a separate German peace as leverage to extract increasingly outrageous concessions. The Serbs were of interest to Russia only as a pretext rather than sacred honor. Instead Russia's true aims were all about partitioning Austria-Hungary and more importantly the Ottoman Empire especially Constantinople and the straits. There is nothing wrong for looking after one's own interest but by no means commend them for their self sacrifice.

The book also goes into the creation of the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement along with the Russians. In essence this created the boundaries in the present Middle East that are so problematic today. In essence they divided the Middle East with absolutely no effort to find the views of the inhabitants.

[CASPER HILEMAN · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an interesting addition to the many books on the outbreak of the First World War. I find a lot of merit in the argument that Russia was a prime influencer in the rapid deterioration of the widespread peace on the European Continent. Diplomacy if you could call it that was weaponized and used as a tool of aggression. Professor McMeekin sheds new light on the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian Empire and the fuse it helped light.

[Alex Habibi · Rating 5 out of 5]

Most secondary accounts of the origins of the First World War focus on the rise of nationalism in the Balkans, the decay of Austria-Hungary, and the expansionism of Germany. While the author doesn’t attribute sole blame to Tsarist Russia for starting the war (no serious historian could oversimplify the outbreak of the war like this), he clearly demonstrates how Russia used the war to pursue centuries-old geopolitical goals such as seizing control of the Straits and expanding further into the Caucus and Anatolian heartland.
I was never satisfied with explanations of Russia’s actions leading up to the war being grounded on a desire to protect Serbia and to protect Southern Slavs. Slavic solidarity didn’t stop Bulgaria and Serbia from fighting over territory the Ottomans lost. The author shows how Russian anxiety concerning access and passage through the Straits was a constant theme in government meetings leading up to the war. Eventually, these developed into plans that involved not only opening up the Straits to Russian ships, but the unilateral seizure of Constantinople and the occupation of Armenia and even supposedly neutral Iranian territory. I recommend this book to readers that already have a solid foundation in knowledge of World War One. This book shows Imperial Russian war aims and shows how the war for Russia was more global in aims than just protecting Serbia.

[Eric · Rating 4 out of 5]

Based on official Russian records, Sean McMeekin makes a persuasive case that Russia viewed the impending war as a vehicle to fulfill it cultural impetus to control the Straights and Constantinople. The Russians are cast as deceitful, and skillful. If McMeekin is correct, German War Guilt has to be set aside (again), and the war laid at the footsteps of Russian cultural drives rather than even French Revanchism. Furthermore, there is no plausible reason why Putin and Russia would not still desire control of the Straights. Current American political leaders should at least factor into Russian relations the potential for this issue to still be affecting Russian intentions and goals.

McKeegan notes that Russian archives are now available for use. Any historian or researcher who does not use this resource would seem to render his or her work incomplete or maybe even suspect.

[Spencer Willardson · Rating 4 out of 5]

A really fascinating look at the little-known history of Russian aims in the First World War. Russian imperial ambition in the Ottoman empire drove a lot of decisions and the Russian government was involved in the plan to carve up that empire from the early days of the war. The Russian revolution and the changes in the government - along with the fact that the new Soviet government dissolved the treaty obligations of the Tsar - meant that this role has been understudied until now.

This book does much to reinforce the truism that it is impossible to understand international relations over the past three centuries without understanding Russia's role.

A great book for those interested in world history, international relations, the Middle East, Russian history, or WWI history. It has a bit for lots of us!

[Hang On · Rating 5 out of 5]

Russian archives have revealed that the Russians have very much to answer for in starting World War I. Don't take The Guns of August as being the final word on the start of World War I. The meeting between Poincaré and the Russians in St. Petersburg is all of one sentence in The Guns of August. That's because the minutes of the meeting were "lost" at least the French lost them. There was a copy in Russian archives and McMeekin gets them. This book is worth reading for that alone. The Russians were mobilizing already and were planning on war so they could carve up Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans.

[Norbert S · Rating 2 out of 5]

If I had no other source of information than this book, I would get away believing that Russia is largely to blame for World War I, in conflict to what most other historians think is true. A problem with McMeekin's historical interpretation is that he sees political conspiracies and plots everywhere and elevates them as driving force behind the official national policies. He writes more like a prosecutor than a historian. One good outcome after reading this book is that one feels an urge to consult alternative historical sources.

[Thomas · Rating 2 out of 5]

The author's style is aggressive and in my view this weakened the book considerably. Historical figures are frequently described as "foolish", "incompetent", "stupid". He takes particular aim at Sazanov, the Russian foreign minister. Anger and hatred simmer throughout his prose as it appears he has an axe to grind. I had hoped for a balanced discussion but this is absent from this book. Sleepwalkers by Christopher Clark, which I read a few weeks back, is far superior.

[Dave the Rave · Rating 2 out of 5]

Interesting idea poorly rendered

The author has written much of this elsewhere and often in a much better manner. Repetitious to the point of being boring , it is much easier to put down than it is to read.

[Scott Brody · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting take. Actually explains a lot about why that war really started.

[Ave Mets · Rating 5 out of 5]

exciting

[Richard T · Rating 5 out of 5]

very provocative ideas of Russia's role in starting WWI, confirmed by Averill Harriman on World At War

[Andreas Schriefer · Rating 5 out of 5]

A book to learn what happened on russian side at world war one.

What were the russian goals back then and who controlled things behind the curtins?

[Andrew Daniels · Rating 5 out of 5]

Exceptional book

Probably not suitable if you don't know a bunch about WWI already, you should know about the Western Front, the causes of the war in great detail

[Matthew Thomas · Rating 5 out of 5]

Required reading for anyone looking for a contrarian view on who was responsible for bringing Europe to the brink in 1914.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sean McMeekin's interesting and skillfully written study of The Russian Origins of the First World War offers a plausible array of evidence delineating the motives and long term ambitions of the Russian Imperial government for encouraging the onset of the First World War. Whereas the theories of Fritz Fischer and A. J. P. Taylor fixing the primary guilt for starting the slaughter on either German/Austrian strategies for pre-emptive war (in Fischer's case) or on the military strategists on both sides for setting up a chain reaction of doomsday scenarios impelling civilian governments to mobilize or face destruction, McMeekin shows how the all consuming ambition of the Russian power structure for control of Constantinople and the Middle East impelled them towards a war in which their cynical calculation was to use France and Britain to assist in achieving these objectives. The evidence presented is impressive, but not terribly convincing. It was, after all, the Austrians who fired the first shots and pushed the matter of Sarajevo from incident to international crisis. While downplaying the motivation of Russian power brokers in protecting their Serb brothers from Austrian attack, McMeekin insists that the major concerns of Russian planners was the danger from Turkey in the Black Sea and the ultimate dream of controlling the Bosphorous with the opportunity of using British and French power to secure the prize. McMeekin's thesis fails to emphasize sufficiently the fact that Russian military forces on land and sea had suffered a catastrophic disaster only nine years before in the war with Japan and that the revolts in 1905 and subsequent strikes right up to 1914 could not have failed to cause hesitation on the part of the Tsar's government when it came to jumping into war. While it is evident that Russia did have territorial objectives and preferences and employed their western allies with considerable skill during 1914-17, the fragile and tenuous situation facing the Russian ruling class could not have escaped any of the planners of the time. --- McMeekin's study is, nevertheless, important and adds a dimension of understanding that partially redefines many of the assumptions held about the causes of the First World War. It is extremely well-written and presented, and should be an essential acquisition for any libraries featuring collections on European history.

[Eric · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a fascinating reinterpretation of the origins of the First World War that places the onus of the conflict's outbreak squarely on an actor that many in the West consider to be of secondary importance, Imperial Russia. The Great War's Eastern Front is one that is often given little more than footnote status in many histories of the Great War despite being much more dynamic than the four years of stalemate and attrition endured in the west. Often, the Eastern Front is only linked tangentially to goings on in the West, ie the Battle of Tannenberg perhaps fatally siphoning two corps from the push to Paris in August 1914 or Russian capitulation in 1917 freeing up enough German units to launch the nearly successful Spring Offensive in 1918. The author shifts this focus, giving the Eastern Front prime billing as the theater of primary importance in understanding the war.

To achieve this end, the author makes extensive use of primary source documentation (almost entirely composed of Russian governmental documents, diplomatic cables and diary entries of Russia's leading statesmen) to demonstrate that it was Russia much more so than Germany that agitated for war in order to achieve long standing imperial aspirations in Eastern Europe and on the Bosporus. His writing takes on an almost exasperated tone at times as he makes use of document after document to demonstrate Russia's aggression and efforts to mobilize long before the other powers. This tone stood out to me as a reflection of the author's frustration with established historians that have all but ignored these critical resources in order to toe the conventional historical narrative of complete German war guilt.

Regardless of where you stand on the issue as to who lit the fuse in the summer of 1914, this book provides a new and refreshing perspective into the ambitions and aspirations of the Russian Empire's twilight years.

[Andreas · Rating 4 out of 5]

First of all let me say I really enjoyed reading the book but it was not really about the Russian origins of the First World War. The first third of the book dealt with what I expected from its title, the rest dealt with the beginning of the war, followed by the Gallipoli campaign, next with the the very successful Russian campaigns in Asia Minor and it ended with Russia leaving the war and the October Revolution.
What the book did though, is that it changed my view on Russia's role as the victim of Anglo-French interests. The role of Russia being the victim of French ambition was reversed to a large degree. I think McMeekin painted a vivid picture of the imperialistic interests that drove Russia to choose war in 1914. And he clearly shows that it had nothing to do with aiding the bullied Slavic Serbian little. brother. Russia wanted Galicia and the Straits but only if the support of France and England was secured. It was secured in 1914 with a bellicose Poincare ready to avenge the defeat of 1871.

[Matthew Griffiths · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent book that goes a long way towards demolishing conventionally held dogma about WW1 being started by Germany which shows just how culpable the Russian's were in moving along the July crisis to its historical conclusion. This account of events provides damning evidence that not only were the Russian's responsible for the crisis that gripped Europe over the next four years but that they actually desired this in order to fulfil certain imperial ambitions. If you read anything about world war 1 this year as the centenary of this event is remembered then I urge you to give this a try as this is very much a neglected yet vitally important part of the historical chain of events.

[Bill Baar · Rating 5 out of 5]

I had the feeling the Iraq war marked the end of the war started in 1914. McMeekin writes WW1 better called the War of Ottoman Succession and agrees the worlds still dealing with the outcomes. Important chapters on Russia's failures to aid the allies in Gallopoli, and the siege of Kut. The chapter on diplomatic history was tough going for me, but then diplomatic history always is. Must read for anyone interested in WW1.