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Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account
In a gripping memoir that reads like a spy novel, one man recounts his personal experience with Operation Phoenix, the program created to destroy the Vietcong’s shadow government, which thrived in the rural communities of South Vietnam.
Stuart A. Herrington was an American intelligence advisor assigned to root out the enemy in the Hau Nghia province. His two-year mission to capture or kill Communist agents operating there was made all the more difficult by local officials who were reluctant to cooperate, villagers who were too scared to talk, and VC who would not go down without a fight. Herrington developed an unexpected but intense identification with the villagers in his jurisdiction–and learned the hard way that experiencing war was profoundly different from philosophizing about it in a seminar room.
Stuart A. Herrington was an American intelligence advisor assigned to root out the enemy in the Hau Nghia province. His two-year mission to capture or kill Communist agents operating there was made all the more difficult by local officials who were reluctant to cooperate, villagers who were too scared to talk, and VC who would not go down without a fight. Herrington developed an unexpected but intense identification with the villagers in his jurisdiction–and learned the hard way that experiencing war was profoundly different from philosophizing about it in a seminar room.
314 pages, Kindle Edition
First published August 1, 1997
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Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews
August 16, 2023
This is a phenomenal book about the power of intelligence in warfare, as well as the significant biases we as an American fighting force take with us into a combined effort with other nations. Herrington does a masterful job sharing his experience that would help anyone in the military understand how much we can get in our own way when we try to make every fight go the way we want it to. As a former Soldier who worked with Afgans and with Koreans I can say I wish I had read this book before both experiences so that I may have brought much more empathy to those experiences. Strongly recommend for anyone serving in the military, especially leaders, or anyone working alongside other cultures and nations.
August 14, 2022
This book will make you sad and angry at the same time. Evidently, we have learned nothing from out defeat in Vietnam about combatting a counterinsurgency, as evidenced by our defeat in Afghanistan.
February 8, 2025
Superb description of a superb young officer's activities in one of the most effective units of the Vietnam War.
July 5, 2013
Thisis not only one of the more interesting personal accounts of the war I have read it is also one of the most insightful. Perhaps the author's early position of sceptical opposition to the war as probably unwinnable may have given him a clearer view unobscured by that gung ho "America is the greatest" attitude that prevailed among much of the regular US military, particularly in the early days.
I am familiar with the ground having served for a short time in Tay ninh province in 1971 and in eastern parts of Cambodia in 1972. I saw the ARVN 25th Division in action and I had heard of the professionalism of RF?PF in the province because it was so atypiacl.
I gained from this book an insight into the nature of Communist operation at village level that I had sensed but had not defined. I was also fascinated yet again by the professional and intelligent application of military nous at junior level that was astonishingly successful in the face of so much ineptitude in more traditional quarters, known at senior level yet somehow just dismissed as incidental by a group of general officers on the ground and in Washington who were wedded to a doctrine and just couldn't draw on the flexibility to follow a proven course. The American conduct of much of the war set me in mind of the idiocy of general officers on the western front during WW1 who just continued to throw masses of men at barbed wire and machine guns because it was all they knew.
I found the assessments of the impact of the 1968 Tet offensive telling and poignant given that now it seems clear that the defeat inflicted on the Communists then was a turning point and the advantage was lost in the States at a psychological level.Giap himself said he was well satisfied as he watched the pillar of North Vietnamese strategy, the belief that the US didn't have the stomach for an extended war in Asia come to pass as the vocal opposition to the war in the US gathered momentum.
The author's assessment at the end of the book, written as it was in 1972 was right on the knocker. Trained as an intelligence officer he brought great insight to those notes based on his experience. I shared his affection for the common ARVN soldier and his admiration for our enemy. A great read and a good primary source on counter revolutionary warfare. Pity some of the commanders in the filed in Afghaistan and Iraq didn't come across it,since it is clear that the Americans have learned little from the Vietnam debacle.
I am familiar with the ground having served for a short time in Tay ninh province in 1971 and in eastern parts of Cambodia in 1972. I saw the ARVN 25th Division in action and I had heard of the professionalism of RF?PF in the province because it was so atypiacl.
I gained from this book an insight into the nature of Communist operation at village level that I had sensed but had not defined. I was also fascinated yet again by the professional and intelligent application of military nous at junior level that was astonishingly successful in the face of so much ineptitude in more traditional quarters, known at senior level yet somehow just dismissed as incidental by a group of general officers on the ground and in Washington who were wedded to a doctrine and just couldn't draw on the flexibility to follow a proven course. The American conduct of much of the war set me in mind of the idiocy of general officers on the western front during WW1 who just continued to throw masses of men at barbed wire and machine guns because it was all they knew.
I found the assessments of the impact of the 1968 Tet offensive telling and poignant given that now it seems clear that the defeat inflicted on the Communists then was a turning point and the advantage was lost in the States at a psychological level.Giap himself said he was well satisfied as he watched the pillar of North Vietnamese strategy, the belief that the US didn't have the stomach for an extended war in Asia come to pass as the vocal opposition to the war in the US gathered momentum.
The author's assessment at the end of the book, written as it was in 1972 was right on the knocker. Trained as an intelligence officer he brought great insight to those notes based on his experience. I shared his affection for the common ARVN soldier and his admiration for our enemy. A great read and a good primary source on counter revolutionary warfare. Pity some of the commanders in the filed in Afghaistan and Iraq didn't come across it,since it is clear that the Americans have learned little from the Vietnam debacle.
April 16, 2007
An interesting look at one man's efforts to win the Vietnam War. Herrington was a American adviser in one of the most contested districts of Vietnam. Pushed by senior leadership for results, Herrington and several other junior level advisers created new ways of questioning Viet Cong prisoners and defectors that yielded surprisingly effective results. One wonders how these programs might fare when employed in modern Iraq, instead of Abu Ghraib style treatment. I suppose the biggest problem there would be to take one of the alive.
March 19, 2017
Not exactly what I was looking for.
This book is a scholarly treatise on the ins and outs of the Phoenix program in the Viet Nam war from the perspective of one who was there. I found it to be dry and scholarly. It does not discuss any involvement by the Green Berets or the Navy SEALS.
This book is a scholarly treatise on the ins and outs of the Phoenix program in the Viet Nam war from the perspective of one who was there. I found it to be dry and scholarly. It does not discuss any involvement by the Green Berets or the Navy SEALS.
August 1, 2013
Required reading for a West Point history course. But very enjoyable and educational about the difficulties in Vietnam.
September 1, 2015
gives the Vietnamese perspective of the war
July 1, 2017
An excellent read.
I also served in the Phoenix program and Mr. Harrington's account brings back memories of the bitter sweet complexities and frustrations of that era..
I also served in the Phoenix program and Mr. Harrington's account brings back memories of the bitter sweet complexities and frustrations of that era..
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March 16, 2018Read for an OSU class on the Vietnam War. Currently re-reading it for its value in understanding what happended. I will be in Vietnam next week.
Displaying 1 - 10 of 10 reviews