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Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic
FULLY UPDATED THIRD EDITION, NOW WITH NEW POSTSCRIPT BY ALI ANSARI'If you were to read only one book on present-day Iran you could not do better than this' Ervand Abrahamian, Times Higher EducationFor some 40 years the Islamic Republic has resisted widespread condemnation, sanctions, and sustained attacks by Iraq in an eight-year war. Many policy-makers today share a weary wish that Iran would somehow just disappear as a problem. But with Iran's continuing commitment to a nuclear programme and its reputation as a trouble-maker in Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon and elsewhere, this is unlikely any time soon. An unending stream of assertions about the revolution's finally running down continue to be defied by events, and Iran's institutions are still formidable.This is the definitive history of this subject, from one of the world's principal experts.
546 pages, Kindle Edition
First published January 1, 2013
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About the author
Michael Axworthy
9 books81 followersMichael George Andrew Axworthy was a British academic, author, and commentator. He was the head of the Iran section at the British Foreign & Commonwealth Office between 1998 and 2000.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 117 reviews
July 7, 2021
This is essential reading to help understand the Islamic revolution of 1979 and the politics of Iran today. Published in 2013, it is recent enough to include most events leading up to the nuclear deal of 2015 (JCPOA). The author traveled to Iran from an early age, and served in Tehran as head of the British Foreign Office from 1998-2000. He now directs the center for Iranian studies at Exeter University and provides consulting on Iran for government and business interests.
It is a balanced account of the revolution, and includes many other relevant events before and after. In the US opinions are strong when topics of Iranian history and politics are raised. For US foreign policy few countries have greater importance in 2018. Recently US continued participation in the JCPOA has been questioned, and Iran's role in regional conflicts has been criticized in the UN.
Michael Axworthy begins by asking how the leadership of the revolution fell to the clergy in 1979. Since the Safavid Dynasty in 1501, a hierarchy of Shia clerics held power alongside the royalty of Iran. The Shia sect defines Islam in Iran, in contrast to the mainly Sunni middle east. Shia have fought dynastic rule from the death of Muhammad's grandson Husayn at the hand of the caliphate in 680.
In the early 20th C. Iran's first movement to replace the monarchy with a constitutional democracy was endorsed by the clergy. Economic pressures from Britain and Russia's 'great game' had weakened the royal dynasty and caused widespread unrest. The new constitution recognized Sharia and Shi'ism and limited the power of the Shah. But as the elected legislative body began to modernize the state, support from the clergy wained and royalists rallied to regain power.
A survey through the seven decades preceding the second revolution follows. Oil was found, WWI was waged, and the Pahlavi dynasty was created with the help of British intercession. In the 20's and 30's Reza Shah remade the military and educational systems, and attempted to secularize society. Reform turned into repression, until he was deposed for not cooperating with the Allies during WWII.
The 50's brought further exploitation of oil by foreign powers, and the rise of nationalism (anti-imperialist, anti-monarchist and anti-clerical). Democratically elected Prime Minister Mosaddegh was partly backed by left-wing pro-Russian elements. He was toppled by the CIA and MI6 in cold war Operation Ajax, with the clergy conspiring to oust him. Shah Reza Pahlavi, who had replaced his father at the behest of the British, also cooperated with the plot and was now seen to be an instrument of US foreign policy.
The new Shah oversaw a tremendous expansion of oil-based wealth. But a quarter-century of autocratic rule followed before enough pressure had built for the dam to burst. The Shah had stamped out all opposition with the exception of the clergy, who were protected by their faith-based following. After the revolution, the story continues with the first supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini, the hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq war, Iran-Contra affair, Rushdie fatwa and on through the nineties and new millennium.
Coverage of the more recent years leads through a labyrinth of interparty political struggles that tend toward tedium. As we approach the 30th year since the second supreme leader Ali Khamenei's ascension to power (and his 80th birthday) one can't help but wonder what will happen next, especially in view of the massive protests of late 2017-early 2018, and entanglements with international insurgencies.
Some questions will inevitably arise: Is this book Pro-Iran or Anti-Iran? Is it Pro-West or Anti-West? Axworthy is on the side of better understanding and improved relations between the West and Iran. He is critical of foreign interventions in the region, as well as authoritarian aspects of recent regimes. The book clearly presents modern Iran through current events, and poses the dilemmas now faced.
It is a balanced account of the revolution, and includes many other relevant events before and after. In the US opinions are strong when topics of Iranian history and politics are raised. For US foreign policy few countries have greater importance in 2018. Recently US continued participation in the JCPOA has been questioned, and Iran's role in regional conflicts has been criticized in the UN.
Michael Axworthy begins by asking how the leadership of the revolution fell to the clergy in 1979. Since the Safavid Dynasty in 1501, a hierarchy of Shia clerics held power alongside the royalty of Iran. The Shia sect defines Islam in Iran, in contrast to the mainly Sunni middle east. Shia have fought dynastic rule from the death of Muhammad's grandson Husayn at the hand of the caliphate in 680.
In the early 20th C. Iran's first movement to replace the monarchy with a constitutional democracy was endorsed by the clergy. Economic pressures from Britain and Russia's 'great game' had weakened the royal dynasty and caused widespread unrest. The new constitution recognized Sharia and Shi'ism and limited the power of the Shah. But as the elected legislative body began to modernize the state, support from the clergy wained and royalists rallied to regain power.
A survey through the seven decades preceding the second revolution follows. Oil was found, WWI was waged, and the Pahlavi dynasty was created with the help of British intercession. In the 20's and 30's Reza Shah remade the military and educational systems, and attempted to secularize society. Reform turned into repression, until he was deposed for not cooperating with the Allies during WWII.
The 50's brought further exploitation of oil by foreign powers, and the rise of nationalism (anti-imperialist, anti-monarchist and anti-clerical). Democratically elected Prime Minister Mosaddegh was partly backed by left-wing pro-Russian elements. He was toppled by the CIA and MI6 in cold war Operation Ajax, with the clergy conspiring to oust him. Shah Reza Pahlavi, who had replaced his father at the behest of the British, also cooperated with the plot and was now seen to be an instrument of US foreign policy.
The new Shah oversaw a tremendous expansion of oil-based wealth. But a quarter-century of autocratic rule followed before enough pressure had built for the dam to burst. The Shah had stamped out all opposition with the exception of the clergy, who were protected by their faith-based following. After the revolution, the story continues with the first supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini, the hostage crisis, Iran-Iraq war, Iran-Contra affair, Rushdie fatwa and on through the nineties and new millennium.
Coverage of the more recent years leads through a labyrinth of interparty political struggles that tend toward tedium. As we approach the 30th year since the second supreme leader Ali Khamenei's ascension to power (and his 80th birthday) one can't help but wonder what will happen next, especially in view of the massive protests of late 2017-early 2018, and entanglements with international insurgencies.
Some questions will inevitably arise: Is this book Pro-Iran or Anti-Iran? Is it Pro-West or Anti-West? Axworthy is on the side of better understanding and improved relations between the West and Iran. He is critical of foreign interventions in the region, as well as authoritarian aspects of recent regimes. The book clearly presents modern Iran through current events, and poses the dilemmas now faced.
August 9, 2019
Quite illuminating
February 2, 2020
a little too generous towards the shah for my taste. also gets bad around when the iraq war starts and the author takes the time to castigate the iranian government for celebrating the deaths of victims of the war, except by victims he means western soldiers who were invading the country at the time for literally no reason. sorry michael, i dont really care that a british lieutenant who was "just one year out of sandhurst" got blown up by an ied that may or may not have possibly been somewhat linked to iranian funded militias when iraqis were dying in their tens of thousands at the same time.
January 31, 2015
A key guide to this most-misunderstood country, covering its history and politics right from the Shah's time, through the 1979 revolution, and well after the aftermath of the disputed 2009 elections. The conclusions are spot on and one hopes the West seeks the correct way out rather than the discredited way of pressure, sanctions and threats seeking a regime change - haven't the lessons of their tries in both of Iran's neighbours been enough?
July 9, 2019
به نظرم حتی یک ایرانی هم نمیتونه اینقدر منصفانه درباره وضعیت فعلی و تاریخ ایران قضاوت کنه. نویسنده هم از تعصبات ایرانیان نسبت به کشورشون دور بود و هم هیچ ایرانی هراسی ای نداشت که همه چیز رو بد جلوه بده. با وجود اینکه آشکارا نظام جمهوری اسلامی رو نقد میکنه، در اکثر مواقع اون رو یک دموکراسی حتی بهتر از دموکراسی غربی میدونه و مشکلات و بدکاریهای نظام رو هم تابع فشارهای بیرونی میبینه که اگر منصف باشیم تا حدی میتونه درست باشه؛ البته در سطح بینالمللی و نه در مقابل مردم ایران.
لذت بردم.
لذت بردم.
November 13, 2021
"A new and definitive account" - this is what I read on the back of this book. Well, it is not new anymore, but it certainly can be called definitive. This book does not start with the Revolution, but starts much earlier: the pre-revolutiinary timeline is given its due attention before we see Ayatollah Khomenei's rise to power.
Khomenei is given short attention, the Iran - Iraq war and the subsequent events as well. This book shall give the reader with no background in Iranian politics a good introduction, but never succeeds in an in-depth analysis. For that the reader shall need to check other books from this period.
All in all 2.5 stars.
Khomenei is given short attention, the Iran - Iraq war and the subsequent events as well. This book shall give the reader with no background in Iranian politics a good introduction, but never succeeds in an in-depth analysis. For that the reader shall need to check other books from this period.
All in all 2.5 stars.
February 7, 2021
I like Axworthy's style. He gives a comprehensive, honest, emotionally powerful account of Iran's revolution up to 2012. At every point he paints the situation with a fine grasp of detail and context. But beneath the unfolding events he also shows the deeper human drama, in a way that connects with our universal struggles over freedom, morality, security, sexuality, justice, and religion.
February 15, 2026
Introduction
Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic was written by Michael Axworthy just prior to the Iran nuclear deal, 13 years ago, but it remains the most up-to-date and thorough account of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). It is overall very informative and well-written, aimed at the general public without being dumbed down.
The author's political views are fairly clear throughout the book, and a quick look will show you he worked for the FCDO and has consulted for various western finance capitalist firms. Still, he is balanced enough (with a few exceptions) that the book remains both useful and enjoyable. The most frustrating lack of balance comes not from his writing on the Islamic Republic, but on the left-wing forces that were present in Iranian politics particularly pre-1979. He is constantly making these infuriating liberal swipes any time left-wing groups/individuals/politics comes up that add nothing to the book but show his general acidic view of socialist politics. It's so annoying but, I guess, not that relevant to the rest of the book. Beyond that, there's a bit of rhetorically slanted bias (beyond just 'concluding that this is good and that is bad, which is fine, of course--I don't mean you have to be neutral) regarding the Islamic Republic figures (particularly anti-Khamenei and pro-Khatami), but I will talk more on that later. In any case, the biases are either understandable, better justified, and lighter in intensity.
Finally, in terms of general notes, the citations are a bit light sometimes, and there are a few factual errors, e.g., it is wrong (not even just an oversimplification) to say Sistani occupies the same theological line of thought regarding political participation as Khoei. No, he is not a political partisan like Sadr (all three of them), but his theory of religion and politics is not quietist as Khoei's was.
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Pre-Revolutionary Iran
The first part of the book focuses on the pre-revolutionary period. While it's certainly fine (and necessary) to have a section like this explaining the context of the revolution and its causes, I felt this section was definitely too long. It spent too much time focusing on events that weren't massively relevant to the revolution and/or gave far more details than necessary for those that did matter. Still, it was enjoyable and high-quality. I just didn't want around 40% of the book to pass before we even get to the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period!
To avoid just repeating the whole book and going way over the characer limit, I will skip forward to the two Pahlavi Shahs: Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The former (1878-1944, r.1925-1941) rose from a humble background to become a Brigadier-General in the Cossack Brigade, whence he marched on Tehran and installed himself into power until his forced abdication under British occupation. The latter (1919-1980, r.1941-1979) took over from his father until his overthrow in the Iranian Revolution.
The two Shahs were different in character, but shared the same goal as Reza Shah's role model, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Both Ataturk and the Shahs enacted land reform, both were secular, both sought to proletarianise and industrialise the country, both sought to make their countries a regional power, both sought to create a nationalist identity separate from religion, both implemented western-style education, both sought to marginalise the ulema, both rationalised the state bureaucracy and legal system, and both restricted public religiosity (e.g., women’s head coverings).
The latter Shah, Reza Mohammed, was not a complete fool, and he lacked neither vision, work ethic, nor commitment. Though lacking his father’s political talents, he shared the uncompromising ‘modernising’ (a problematic term, but I digress), secularising, and reforming instincts of Ataturk. Why, then, were their fates so different? Ataturk did not restore democracy (that was his successor, Inonu), but he died and remains a hero for the Turkish people—it is still illegal to insult him or his memory in Turkey. Particularly before Erdogan, but still now, he has dominated political life and established a national identity that still defines Turkishness today—even though the CHP has seldom seen power. Reza Mohammed was overthrown in a popular revolution that led to an Islamic Republic that represented the anathema of his worldview, and today he and Reza Shah are detested by (non-diaspora) Iranians.
Axworthy gives his own ideas as to why the Pahlavis failed where Ataturk succeeded. Ataturk was more successful at achieving economic sovereignty, and though Axworthy acknowledges that Turkey had no equivalent of the oil industry held by foreign powers, Ataturk's military achievements against the Europeans were far greater than anything Reza Shah achieved, and it was not like Turkey between its two treaties with the European powers (Sevres and Lausanne) had an easy go of things. Ataturk, while autocratic, never lapsed into the same paranoia as both Shahs, retaining a level of representative government, albeit in a one-party state (note: I think Axworthy very much overstates the level of Ataturk's commitment to representativeness!). The Shahs, Axworthy opines, never understood the use of civilian politics to siphon and pacify political dissent. The most interesting hypothesis Axworthy returns to multiple times is that Shia Islam is particularly 'set up' to resist unjust hierarchy and tyranny, and has a particular politics of resistance and rebellion that imbues a more restless spirit in the people than in, say, Sunni Islam. Testing this would require a proper comparative analysis, which I will not do here.
But probably more important is what he doesn't mention. First, while Iran and Turkey are perhaps the closest to comparative peers the other has, Reza Shah inherited Iran in a far worse situation than Ataturk inherited Turkey. This is because of what is called the [i]Tanzimat[/i], a period of reform in 19th Century Ottoman Turkey (though the beginning of the wider reform period is sometimes put at 1789 with the accession of Selim III) that, to oversimplify, 'modernised' the Ottoman state and contributed to both imperial fragmentation and governing centralisation and capacity, setting the scene for a strong Turkish nationalist identity furthered by the Young Turks. So, too, did this process finally rein in the overmighty Janissaries, while various 'elite' and autonomous units in Iran, like the Cossacks from which Reza Shah took power, remaining overpowered. Iran had no equivalent Tanzimat or Reform process in the 19th Century, with the state famously decaying under the Qajars ([i]why[/i] there was no Tanzimat is for another time).
Another factor relates to the economic structures of Turkey and Iran, and the way through which the respective states guided development and the emergence of capitalism. As always, we must return to the question of LAND TENURE (hurray!). For various reasons I won't get into now, land tenure differed greatly between the Persian and Turkish empires. In the Ottoman Empire, land ownership was highly fragmented, with no great feudal lords owning huge swathes of land and challenging the state (note--Mehmed Ali was NOT a feudal lord). This isn't universally so, but for our current purposes, it is true enough. By contrast, there were no shortages of overmighty feudal and tribal lords in Qajar Iran which persisted into the 20th Century. Hence, even before the Tanzimat, creating a strong central state (and thus transforming the country to a greater extent) was simply more viable in pre-capitalist Turkey than pre-capitalist Iran. No matter, both attempted capitalist transformations, and how each went about development and the nurturing of a capitalist class also mattered. For Reza Shah's attempts to get rid of the capitulations, he was still devoted to America, and relied wholly on foreign contractors, advisors, and developers to build infrastructure. This retarded the creation of an actual Iranian bourgeoisie (and, of later importance, reproduced the economic strength of the Bazaari class) and maintained a structural dependency that would hamper the country's attempts at standing on its own two feet. By contrast, Ataturk and his successors were devoted to creating an indigenous bourgeoisie, were more aware of the importance of agricultural modernisation (whereas Reza Shah was urban-centric to a fault), and understood the need to develop Turkish human capital that could then self-reproduce, rather than relying on foreigners to do the job for them.
I'll leave it there for now, but I could go on, and Axworthy misses a lot of things as to why the Shahs failed where Ataturk, say, succeeded.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution
What caused the Iranian Revolution, who carried it out, and who came to lead it? The whole period is narrated very well. It's gripping, exciting, and brings a vivid set of imagery to your mind. The book goes into great detail how, after the Shah fled, Khomeini consolidated power despite facing so many obstacles. It was never inevitable, and it didn't even go the way Khomeini had foreseen even if he navigated the revolutionary waves with great skill.
We're introduced to Khomeini early on, and he is given a lot of space in the book, as is deserved. Rather than just his actions, or just a one-dimensional reduction of him as a fundamentalist, fanatic, or dictator, Axworthy's portrayal of Khomeini is sophisticated, balanced, and deep insofar as he is very familiar with Khomeini's actual philosophy and way of viewing the world, linking it to his astute understanding of 'doing' politics. To save space, I won't go into it here.
Why did the revolution happen, and who was responsible for it beyond Khomeini? Axworthy sounds a lot like post-79 Skocpol when he talks of an alliance between the clergy and the Bazaari classes in the organising of the revolution, and the urban poor making up the numbers carrying out the mass demonstrations and rallies. He prioritises cultural over economic explanations, talking of the dislocation faced by the new urban poor (often migrants from the countryside) seeing these westernised, secular, liberal cities with girls in short skirts and American movies in the cinema. The frustration coming from the contradiction between this elite world and the traditionalism of the (poorer) newcomers were, Axworthy writes, a big part of the revolutionary grievances. I think Axworthy under-theorises the economic/class side of things so obviously simmering below the surface in this analysis, and while he talks of poverty, it's all a bit analytically shallow. Thus came together the three elements of the revolutionary alliance (worsened by the migration spurred on by the White Revolution), just as "the economy was overheating" with investments outpacing import- and labour-capacity.
Overall, Axworthy has plenty of praise for the achievements of the Shahs, and not all of that is false, but he doesn't apologise for them nor hide/minimise their egregious mistakes. I thought it was perhaps too positive, but not to the extent that it ruined the book in any serious way.
The theorisation of the Bazaari class is good in the pre-revolutionary period (there is already a lot of literature on this, I suppose, e.g., Skocpol’s re-positioning on revolution after 1979 among others), but they seem to fall by the wayside in Axworthy’s analysis afterwards. However, it’s not clear whether they had actually been cut down to size as a class (if so, this would have to be theorised and explicated) or if Axworthy has just ignored them (which seems unjustified). Though he talks about the inequalities of the post-revolutionary period and, albeit too briefly, about the political impact they sometimes had, class as a whole is sadly neglected, leaving the political-organisational (and sometimes social) blocs discussed a bit debased from society itself, as if they are floating in space, with politics an arena apart from the social world it operates within—this is obviously not the case.
I suppose this is just because (A) it’s aimed at the general public, at least to an extent (though, as aforementioned, it is still respectable scholarship), and (B) because he is a liberal for whom class is poorly conceptualised and, beyond broad notions of rich/poor/middle, not among the primary categories of his analysis.
The Iran-Iraq War section was good, and I won't go into detail here as I have little to add. It could've done with some maps. I had to refer back to Pierre Razoux's superb Iran-Iraq War book (with amazing maps) to remind me of some of the locations. Still, it was very good, and really made clear the horror, futility, mistakes, waste, and, at times, heroism of the war, as well as the immense difficulties and stresses faced by the leadership, including Khomeini himself who was emotionally destroyed by the war; the failure to win went sharply against the rest of his life heretofore and his whole understanding of himself, his relationship with God, and the processes of worldly events (I am reminded by the despondence of Oliver Cromwell after his failures of statebuilding in the 1650s and his army's defeat by the Spanish in the Caribbean).
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continued below.
Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic was written by Michael Axworthy just prior to the Iran nuclear deal, 13 years ago, but it remains the most up-to-date and thorough account of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). It is overall very informative and well-written, aimed at the general public without being dumbed down.
The author's political views are fairly clear throughout the book, and a quick look will show you he worked for the FCDO and has consulted for various western finance capitalist firms. Still, he is balanced enough (with a few exceptions) that the book remains both useful and enjoyable. The most frustrating lack of balance comes not from his writing on the Islamic Republic, but on the left-wing forces that were present in Iranian politics particularly pre-1979. He is constantly making these infuriating liberal swipes any time left-wing groups/individuals/politics comes up that add nothing to the book but show his general acidic view of socialist politics. It's so annoying but, I guess, not that relevant to the rest of the book. Beyond that, there's a bit of rhetorically slanted bias (beyond just 'concluding that this is good and that is bad, which is fine, of course--I don't mean you have to be neutral) regarding the Islamic Republic figures (particularly anti-Khamenei and pro-Khatami), but I will talk more on that later. In any case, the biases are either understandable, better justified, and lighter in intensity.
Finally, in terms of general notes, the citations are a bit light sometimes, and there are a few factual errors, e.g., it is wrong (not even just an oversimplification) to say Sistani occupies the same theological line of thought regarding political participation as Khoei. No, he is not a political partisan like Sadr (all three of them), but his theory of religion and politics is not quietist as Khoei's was.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pre-Revolutionary Iran
The first part of the book focuses on the pre-revolutionary period. While it's certainly fine (and necessary) to have a section like this explaining the context of the revolution and its causes, I felt this section was definitely too long. It spent too much time focusing on events that weren't massively relevant to the revolution and/or gave far more details than necessary for those that did matter. Still, it was enjoyable and high-quality. I just didn't want around 40% of the book to pass before we even get to the revolutionary and post-revolutionary period!
To avoid just repeating the whole book and going way over the characer limit, I will skip forward to the two Pahlavi Shahs: Reza Shah and Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The former (1878-1944, r.1925-1941) rose from a humble background to become a Brigadier-General in the Cossack Brigade, whence he marched on Tehran and installed himself into power until his forced abdication under British occupation. The latter (1919-1980, r.1941-1979) took over from his father until his overthrow in the Iranian Revolution.
The two Shahs were different in character, but shared the same goal as Reza Shah's role model, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Both Ataturk and the Shahs enacted land reform, both were secular, both sought to proletarianise and industrialise the country, both sought to make their countries a regional power, both sought to create a nationalist identity separate from religion, both implemented western-style education, both sought to marginalise the ulema, both rationalised the state bureaucracy and legal system, and both restricted public religiosity (e.g., women’s head coverings).
The latter Shah, Reza Mohammed, was not a complete fool, and he lacked neither vision, work ethic, nor commitment. Though lacking his father’s political talents, he shared the uncompromising ‘modernising’ (a problematic term, but I digress), secularising, and reforming instincts of Ataturk. Why, then, were their fates so different? Ataturk did not restore democracy (that was his successor, Inonu), but he died and remains a hero for the Turkish people—it is still illegal to insult him or his memory in Turkey. Particularly before Erdogan, but still now, he has dominated political life and established a national identity that still defines Turkishness today—even though the CHP has seldom seen power. Reza Mohammed was overthrown in a popular revolution that led to an Islamic Republic that represented the anathema of his worldview, and today he and Reza Shah are detested by (non-diaspora) Iranians.
Axworthy gives his own ideas as to why the Pahlavis failed where Ataturk succeeded. Ataturk was more successful at achieving economic sovereignty, and though Axworthy acknowledges that Turkey had no equivalent of the oil industry held by foreign powers, Ataturk's military achievements against the Europeans were far greater than anything Reza Shah achieved, and it was not like Turkey between its two treaties with the European powers (Sevres and Lausanne) had an easy go of things. Ataturk, while autocratic, never lapsed into the same paranoia as both Shahs, retaining a level of representative government, albeit in a one-party state (note: I think Axworthy very much overstates the level of Ataturk's commitment to representativeness!). The Shahs, Axworthy opines, never understood the use of civilian politics to siphon and pacify political dissent. The most interesting hypothesis Axworthy returns to multiple times is that Shia Islam is particularly 'set up' to resist unjust hierarchy and tyranny, and has a particular politics of resistance and rebellion that imbues a more restless spirit in the people than in, say, Sunni Islam. Testing this would require a proper comparative analysis, which I will not do here.
But probably more important is what he doesn't mention. First, while Iran and Turkey are perhaps the closest to comparative peers the other has, Reza Shah inherited Iran in a far worse situation than Ataturk inherited Turkey. This is because of what is called the [i]Tanzimat[/i], a period of reform in 19th Century Ottoman Turkey (though the beginning of the wider reform period is sometimes put at 1789 with the accession of Selim III) that, to oversimplify, 'modernised' the Ottoman state and contributed to both imperial fragmentation and governing centralisation and capacity, setting the scene for a strong Turkish nationalist identity furthered by the Young Turks. So, too, did this process finally rein in the overmighty Janissaries, while various 'elite' and autonomous units in Iran, like the Cossacks from which Reza Shah took power, remaining overpowered. Iran had no equivalent Tanzimat or Reform process in the 19th Century, with the state famously decaying under the Qajars ([i]why[/i] there was no Tanzimat is for another time).
Another factor relates to the economic structures of Turkey and Iran, and the way through which the respective states guided development and the emergence of capitalism. As always, we must return to the question of LAND TENURE (hurray!). For various reasons I won't get into now, land tenure differed greatly between the Persian and Turkish empires. In the Ottoman Empire, land ownership was highly fragmented, with no great feudal lords owning huge swathes of land and challenging the state (note--Mehmed Ali was NOT a feudal lord). This isn't universally so, but for our current purposes, it is true enough. By contrast, there were no shortages of overmighty feudal and tribal lords in Qajar Iran which persisted into the 20th Century. Hence, even before the Tanzimat, creating a strong central state (and thus transforming the country to a greater extent) was simply more viable in pre-capitalist Turkey than pre-capitalist Iran. No matter, both attempted capitalist transformations, and how each went about development and the nurturing of a capitalist class also mattered. For Reza Shah's attempts to get rid of the capitulations, he was still devoted to America, and relied wholly on foreign contractors, advisors, and developers to build infrastructure. This retarded the creation of an actual Iranian bourgeoisie (and, of later importance, reproduced the economic strength of the Bazaari class) and maintained a structural dependency that would hamper the country's attempts at standing on its own two feet. By contrast, Ataturk and his successors were devoted to creating an indigenous bourgeoisie, were more aware of the importance of agricultural modernisation (whereas Reza Shah was urban-centric to a fault), and understood the need to develop Turkish human capital that could then self-reproduce, rather than relying on foreigners to do the job for them.
I'll leave it there for now, but I could go on, and Axworthy misses a lot of things as to why the Shahs failed where Ataturk, say, succeeded.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution
What caused the Iranian Revolution, who carried it out, and who came to lead it? The whole period is narrated very well. It's gripping, exciting, and brings a vivid set of imagery to your mind. The book goes into great detail how, after the Shah fled, Khomeini consolidated power despite facing so many obstacles. It was never inevitable, and it didn't even go the way Khomeini had foreseen even if he navigated the revolutionary waves with great skill.
We're introduced to Khomeini early on, and he is given a lot of space in the book, as is deserved. Rather than just his actions, or just a one-dimensional reduction of him as a fundamentalist, fanatic, or dictator, Axworthy's portrayal of Khomeini is sophisticated, balanced, and deep insofar as he is very familiar with Khomeini's actual philosophy and way of viewing the world, linking it to his astute understanding of 'doing' politics. To save space, I won't go into it here.
Why did the revolution happen, and who was responsible for it beyond Khomeini? Axworthy sounds a lot like post-79 Skocpol when he talks of an alliance between the clergy and the Bazaari classes in the organising of the revolution, and the urban poor making up the numbers carrying out the mass demonstrations and rallies. He prioritises cultural over economic explanations, talking of the dislocation faced by the new urban poor (often migrants from the countryside) seeing these westernised, secular, liberal cities with girls in short skirts and American movies in the cinema. The frustration coming from the contradiction between this elite world and the traditionalism of the (poorer) newcomers were, Axworthy writes, a big part of the revolutionary grievances. I think Axworthy under-theorises the economic/class side of things so obviously simmering below the surface in this analysis, and while he talks of poverty, it's all a bit analytically shallow. Thus came together the three elements of the revolutionary alliance (worsened by the migration spurred on by the White Revolution), just as "the economy was overheating" with investments outpacing import- and labour-capacity.
Overall, Axworthy has plenty of praise for the achievements of the Shahs, and not all of that is false, but he doesn't apologise for them nor hide/minimise their egregious mistakes. I thought it was perhaps too positive, but not to the extent that it ruined the book in any serious way.
The theorisation of the Bazaari class is good in the pre-revolutionary period (there is already a lot of literature on this, I suppose, e.g., Skocpol’s re-positioning on revolution after 1979 among others), but they seem to fall by the wayside in Axworthy’s analysis afterwards. However, it’s not clear whether they had actually been cut down to size as a class (if so, this would have to be theorised and explicated) or if Axworthy has just ignored them (which seems unjustified). Though he talks about the inequalities of the post-revolutionary period and, albeit too briefly, about the political impact they sometimes had, class as a whole is sadly neglected, leaving the political-organisational (and sometimes social) blocs discussed a bit debased from society itself, as if they are floating in space, with politics an arena apart from the social world it operates within—this is obviously not the case.
I suppose this is just because (A) it’s aimed at the general public, at least to an extent (though, as aforementioned, it is still respectable scholarship), and (B) because he is a liberal for whom class is poorly conceptualised and, beyond broad notions of rich/poor/middle, not among the primary categories of his analysis.
The Iran-Iraq War section was good, and I won't go into detail here as I have little to add. It could've done with some maps. I had to refer back to Pierre Razoux's superb Iran-Iraq War book (with amazing maps) to remind me of some of the locations. Still, it was very good, and really made clear the horror, futility, mistakes, waste, and, at times, heroism of the war, as well as the immense difficulties and stresses faced by the leadership, including Khomeini himself who was emotionally destroyed by the war; the failure to win went sharply against the rest of his life heretofore and his whole understanding of himself, his relationship with God, and the processes of worldly events (I am reminded by the despondence of Oliver Cromwell after his failures of statebuilding in the 1650s and his army's defeat by the Spanish in the Caribbean).
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Continued below.
January 10, 2020
The author's quote that best summarizes the book:
Again and again, the usual kind of reporting and comment in the West stresses how strange, how alien, how irrational and how disturbing Iran and Iranian politics are. One of my tasks in this book is to show that Iranian concerns, values, problems, actions and reactions are wholly explicable and rational when seen in their own proper context... quite open to sympathy, and even familiar.
December 12, 2014
A balanced, comprehensive and useful account of the recent history of Iran.
February 28, 2019
I must say anyone who wants to understand the history and politics of Iran Post 1979 should read this. I felt like the author really showed an understanding of the country and the various geopolitical games that were being played in the background between the USA, Israel and Iran. I also enjoyed the various references of Iranian viewpoints. Can be a bit dry at some points. Get a pen and paper ready as there are a lot of names to digest. Such a Left-leaning political parties, reformists and the religious right.
I wish more people would read this. They could really appreciate the intricacies of the "middle east" and not lump everyone as being the same.
I wish more people would read this. They could really appreciate the intricacies of the "middle east" and not lump everyone as being the same.
January 3, 2018
A very well written and comprehensive history of 20th century Iran. The author uses diverse sources including personal and literary accounts to paint a vivid narrative of especially the 1979 revolution, the events that led to it, and its aftermath.
May 7, 2025
A sober and thorough account of Iran from the early 20th century fall of the Qajar dynasty through to 2018. Axworthy provides a comprehensive and largely objective account of recent Iranian history, building an understanding of the players in Iranian politics well in a way where the undercurrents all the way from the Constitutional Revolution through to the Ruhani administration - the role of the MKO, of the ulema, the bazaaris, and of course the Pahlavi Shahs.
The Iranian relationship with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union is essential in understanding it's unique geopolitical character and it's role in the Middle East more broadly. Questions are raised about the intentions of US treatment of Iran, at numerous points the Americans' general mistreatment of Iranian attempts at outreach and reconciliation is made very obvious. Notably, when Iran worked closely with the US in toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, only to be designated as part of the "Axis of Evil" by George W Bush immediately afterwards. Although it is important to be wary, as this may be the only angle in the book in which Axworthy might display a pro-Iran bias, he manages to present enough proof where it is clear that the demonisation of Iran is primarily caused by foreign powers rather than internal Iranian actions. I say this not to excuse the actions the Islamic Republic has taken, but rather to emphasise that geopolitics can never be black and white. Foreign powers have a long history of meddling in Iran and Iran's fierce independence is understandable - see the removal of Mossadeq by the US and the UK to defend their oil interests.
An excellent book and essential in understanding the modern Middle East and the unique government which is the Islamic Republic.
The Iranian relationship with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union is essential in understanding it's unique geopolitical character and it's role in the Middle East more broadly. Questions are raised about the intentions of US treatment of Iran, at numerous points the Americans' general mistreatment of Iranian attempts at outreach and reconciliation is made very obvious. Notably, when Iran worked closely with the US in toppling the Taliban in Afghanistan, only to be designated as part of the "Axis of Evil" by George W Bush immediately afterwards. Although it is important to be wary, as this may be the only angle in the book in which Axworthy might display a pro-Iran bias, he manages to present enough proof where it is clear that the demonisation of Iran is primarily caused by foreign powers rather than internal Iranian actions. I say this not to excuse the actions the Islamic Republic has taken, but rather to emphasise that geopolitics can never be black and white. Foreign powers have a long history of meddling in Iran and Iran's fierce independence is understandable - see the removal of Mossadeq by the US and the UK to defend their oil interests.
An excellent book and essential in understanding the modern Middle East and the unique government which is the Islamic Republic.
July 21, 2021
A primer of sorts, necessarily quick and condensed, but still an exquisite one at that. It is beautifully written, balanced, critical of Iranian regime but setting straight a lot of gross misperceptions, disinterpretations and outright cartoonish demonization of the regime in the West (see Bush's idiotic "Axis of Evil"). Iran is certainly not fundamentalist and it is not theocracy. It is not quite dictatorship, but it is also not quite democracy. It's a strange mixture - with Islam, above all, providing checks on both democratic elements and authoritarian elements, with debates and strifes having at the same time theological, cultural and political bent. Moreover, the particular brand of Shi'a political Islam in Iran (which is, btw, entirely modern phenomenon, and not "medieval" - coincidentally, "medieval" was a slur directed at Shah's regime by Islamic revolutionaries) is likewise reinforced by national pride - so damaged by perceptions of Western colonialism and Western interference, with 1953 coup being the ultimate trauma (and that's actually why, for example, Khomeini confidently situated himself on the side of Palestinians, despite the latter being Sunni, which was pointed out to him emphatically by more conservative Iranian clerics) - and by accomodating the sideway challenge of socialism and Marxism (there were even the likes of Sayyid Taleqani or Ali Shariati among revolutionary ideologues, openly combining Islam with Marxism), thereby positing itself as defender of the poor, whom Islam is supposed to liberate and emancipate. As for the latter, it's true that theologically speaking one needs not to go that far for justification of some "left-leaning" political application, and that to some degree the social politics of Islamic Republic were successful - within the context of sanctions, relative political isolation and crippling war with Iraq, of course. And even to all this, one may add a bit of Third-Worldism and cultural opposition to "the West" - the latter expressed in Jalal Al-e Ahmad's famous notion of gharbzadegi - "Westoxication". What ultimately makes Iran so resilient - and what made Islamic revolutionaries ultimately prevail over Leftist and secular ones - is precisely its rootedness in Islam, something known and shared by people, a unifying element that kept them together and made them comrades, made them a community, rather than individuals fighting all for themselves; and the questions it poses - the function of the religion in society and politics, the religion as ground, the situation of its absence and God's retreat from the world - are universal.
So it's really a very complex mixture and this book will not make you understand it - rather it will shake up your conviction, stemming from simplistic widspread accounts of Iran in the West. In a way, you will understand Iran less than you thought you do before, but that's how it should be.
What Axworthy displays unambiguously, though, is admiration for Iranian people, for their courage and resilience, and the fascination for the culture and politics - whatever the final judgment is. This admiration, and this fascination, is contagious, and it's a long time I unambiguously simply enjoyed reading a book this much.
So it's really a very complex mixture and this book will not make you understand it - rather it will shake up your conviction, stemming from simplistic widspread accounts of Iran in the West. In a way, you will understand Iran less than you thought you do before, but that's how it should be.
What Axworthy displays unambiguously, though, is admiration for Iranian people, for their courage and resilience, and the fascination for the culture and politics - whatever the final judgment is. This admiration, and this fascination, is contagious, and it's a long time I unambiguously simply enjoyed reading a book this much.
June 28, 2025
This was a very informative read
July 30, 2019
Iran is seen as the bad boy of International diplomacy but as the author points out, this moniker is highly unjustified. Neither the centre of the world, as Iranians like to perceive themselves, nor the "axis of evil", as some perceive them, their history, to put it mildly, is complicated. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 marked them out forever in the eyes of the international community as a fundamentalist nut-job while ignoring the long-term colonial intervention that had brought it about. Even when the Pahlavis managed to bring a modicum of stability, prosperity and respect for Iran in western eyes, the extreme economic disparity between a tiny westernized elite and the disenfranchised poor, coupled with the attempts at secularization of society, made the ground fertile for some form of revolution. The situation was exacerbated by the economic pressures of the late 1970s. The opportunity was milked to its full potential by Ayatollah Khomeini who emerged as the de-facto leader of the revolution.
According to the author, Khomeini initially didn’t want to take over the reins of government and planned to give up power after the revolution to secular politicians, much like clerics had done in the past in Iran. But circumstances proved otherwise. Khomeini’s biggest advantage was that he never spelled out what an Islamic government meant. This meant people could see what they wanted to in this new government. Coupled with his decades long unflinching opposition to the Shah of Iran, he was the only person who could really pull all the disparate elements of Iranian politics together. Thus, was established the Islamic Republic of Iran which endures to this day.
The author spells out the history of Iran from the revolution onwards to the current day. Its complicated relationship with the US, the effects of the Iran-Iraq war on the trajectory of the new nation, the complicated politics of the Iranian system, and so on. While never demonizing Iran he also never shies away from discussing atrocities committed by it on its own citizen. However, the author does point out that most of the criticisms for Iran emerge out of bad PR. He keeps pointing towards Saudi Arabia to prove his point. That other country in the Middle East, which is seen as a steadfast ally of the US, while being far more fundamentalist in its approach and the parent of many of the Islamic terrorist groups in the world.
I particularly liked the author’s discussion of the accommodations between conservative and radical ideas that the revolution entailed, as well as the question of women’s rights in Iran. Contrary to wide perception, the revolution was not a return to medieval practices and major accommodations were made with modernity, ranging from democracy to the need for upliftment of the lower social classes, while at the same time protecting the sanctity of the household from western influences. This spilled out into the sphere of women’s rights as well. Again, Iran is not a monster when it comes to empowering its women (just look at Saudi Arabia). They have allowed women to work and heavily invested in their education (a result of the Iran-Iraq war and the clerics believe in education for its own sake, considering their own profession), which over time have allowed attitude towards women to soften. An illuminating example is the view of the arch Iranian conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati (who believes in compulsory Hijab) who criticised the Taliban in 1996 for not letting women go to schools or work thereby limiting their rights and defaming Islam (when the whole world was ignoring the Taliban the Iranians were the only country to fight them. One of the reasons being the massacre of the Shia Hazara of Afghanistan by the Taliban but a major justification given was the Taliban oppression of women).
According to the author, Khomeini initially didn’t want to take over the reins of government and planned to give up power after the revolution to secular politicians, much like clerics had done in the past in Iran. But circumstances proved otherwise. Khomeini’s biggest advantage was that he never spelled out what an Islamic government meant. This meant people could see what they wanted to in this new government. Coupled with his decades long unflinching opposition to the Shah of Iran, he was the only person who could really pull all the disparate elements of Iranian politics together. Thus, was established the Islamic Republic of Iran which endures to this day.
The author spells out the history of Iran from the revolution onwards to the current day. Its complicated relationship with the US, the effects of the Iran-Iraq war on the trajectory of the new nation, the complicated politics of the Iranian system, and so on. While never demonizing Iran he also never shies away from discussing atrocities committed by it on its own citizen. However, the author does point out that most of the criticisms for Iran emerge out of bad PR. He keeps pointing towards Saudi Arabia to prove his point. That other country in the Middle East, which is seen as a steadfast ally of the US, while being far more fundamentalist in its approach and the parent of many of the Islamic terrorist groups in the world.
I particularly liked the author’s discussion of the accommodations between conservative and radical ideas that the revolution entailed, as well as the question of women’s rights in Iran. Contrary to wide perception, the revolution was not a return to medieval practices and major accommodations were made with modernity, ranging from democracy to the need for upliftment of the lower social classes, while at the same time protecting the sanctity of the household from western influences. This spilled out into the sphere of women’s rights as well. Again, Iran is not a monster when it comes to empowering its women (just look at Saudi Arabia). They have allowed women to work and heavily invested in their education (a result of the Iran-Iraq war and the clerics believe in education for its own sake, considering their own profession), which over time have allowed attitude towards women to soften. An illuminating example is the view of the arch Iranian conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati (who believes in compulsory Hijab) who criticised the Taliban in 1996 for not letting women go to schools or work thereby limiting their rights and defaming Islam (when the whole world was ignoring the Taliban the Iranians were the only country to fight them. One of the reasons being the massacre of the Shia Hazara of Afghanistan by the Taliban but a major justification given was the Taliban oppression of women).
December 29, 2017
This book was written in 2013, before the ramping up of sanctions against Iran; the spread of the civil war in Syria; the rise of new terror groups in the Middle East; and the further breakdown of nations caught in the middle due to the actions of larger powers in the region (e.g. Saudi Arabia and the GCC, Russia, the US, the EU, etc.). Thus, reading Mr Axworthy's extensive, but not complete, account of the Iranian Revolution from 1979 up to the current day does seem careful and not ready to make any concrete predictions for the future.
It was, and is impossible, to know what will happen in the future, and many Americans (and Westerners) would do themselves a favour in reading this book, IF ONLY AS A STARTING POINT. Axworthy admits right at the get-go in the introduction that his book is by no means an exhaustive account or narrative — as a British historian on Iran, he readily shows his hand in his outsider perspective. It is something to keep in mind while reading, as well as the fact that there are many many many more perspectives to keep in mind.
That said, this is a hell of a read, and filled in gaps in my own knowledge I had no clue were missing. Of course I thought I had some idea of the events prior to, during, and immediately after the revolution. Axworthy points out that this revolution, like others before it, heralded massive change in Iranian society and international relations. And it did, by any account.
However, what this narrative of the 1979 revolution also shows is that it, like other revolutions, can fall prey to the individual and collective ambitions of the actors in the middle of it all, and the power of small moves that lead to a monumental shift in what people had hoped, or thought, would happen.
It was, and is impossible, to know what will happen in the future, and many Americans (and Westerners) would do themselves a favour in reading this book, IF ONLY AS A STARTING POINT. Axworthy admits right at the get-go in the introduction that his book is by no means an exhaustive account or narrative — as a British historian on Iran, he readily shows his hand in his outsider perspective. It is something to keep in mind while reading, as well as the fact that there are many many many more perspectives to keep in mind.
That said, this is a hell of a read, and filled in gaps in my own knowledge I had no clue were missing. Of course I thought I had some idea of the events prior to, during, and immediately after the revolution. Axworthy points out that this revolution, like others before it, heralded massive change in Iranian society and international relations. And it did, by any account.
However, what this narrative of the 1979 revolution also shows is that it, like other revolutions, can fall prey to the individual and collective ambitions of the actors in the middle of it all, and the power of small moves that lead to a monumental shift in what people had hoped, or thought, would happen.
September 21, 2016
Michael axworthy's Revolutionary Iran is a condensed narration of the period between the constitutional revolution of 1906 until the islamic revolution of 1979, followed by a more detailed analysis of the islamic regime and it's functioning that tries to hold the seemingly centrifugal principles of Islam and democracy together and has so far, with some considerable hiccups, and a great degree of turbulence, held.
The narrative isn't partisan in terms of an ideology outlook, but is an account that would lean towards sympathy for the Iranian regime for western readers, though an attempt can be seen to remain ostensibly fair, and heaps of criticism are laid at Iran's door. Axworthy's account of the shah's regime displays both, admiration and scorn, and he generally maintains a very positive outlook towards the citizenry. His focus though, is on the revolutionary regime, a story that is, according to Axworthy, best explained not through ideologies, but the interpersonal relationships of the important personalities of the revolution, and Khomeini's personal charisma and vision for the velayat-e-fiqh, alongside his wish to moderate power between leftists and conservatives and maintain stability. The eight year Iran Iraq war is another central event in the book, discussed in strategic, military and political terms. The conclusion focuses, predictably, on the nuclear question. By the time the book went into the presses, Ruhani had not yet been elected president. Although there is an added epilogue that acknowledges this, it is perhaps time for a second edition, in view of the groundbreaking breakthrough with the Obama administration over uranium enrichment.
The narrative isn't partisan in terms of an ideology outlook, but is an account that would lean towards sympathy for the Iranian regime for western readers, though an attempt can be seen to remain ostensibly fair, and heaps of criticism are laid at Iran's door. Axworthy's account of the shah's regime displays both, admiration and scorn, and he generally maintains a very positive outlook towards the citizenry. His focus though, is on the revolutionary regime, a story that is, according to Axworthy, best explained not through ideologies, but the interpersonal relationships of the important personalities of the revolution, and Khomeini's personal charisma and vision for the velayat-e-fiqh, alongside his wish to moderate power between leftists and conservatives and maintain stability. The eight year Iran Iraq war is another central event in the book, discussed in strategic, military and political terms. The conclusion focuses, predictably, on the nuclear question. By the time the book went into the presses, Ruhani had not yet been elected president. Although there is an added epilogue that acknowledges this, it is perhaps time for a second edition, in view of the groundbreaking breakthrough with the Obama administration over uranium enrichment.
October 4, 2018
An overly academic analysis on the history of Iran from the beginning of the 20th century up to 2014. Michael Axworthy follows the major political and clerical figures as they increased in power leading up to the 1979 revolution and continued to be in power in the years that followed. Although there are a lot of details, names, and dates the book reads more like an academic text book then material for a general audience.
August 19, 2019
This is an odd book, which should perhaps be unsurprising since it deals with an odd phenomenon: the Iranian Revolution. It’s also a “whataboutist” book. It plays down the inherent evil of Iran’s regime by noting the obvious truth that other countries have done bad things too. It avoids delineating the regime’s inherent nature (unique in the world today), because to do this would be to highlight its evil, and the book’s central thrust is that the regime is not beyond redemption. The book does not exactly apologize for the regime’s excesses, but it conveys the sense that the regime can be “saved.” In other words, the book claims, the Iranian Revolution did have decent aims; it just didn’t live up to its potential.
The cover seems deliberately misleading. The young woman pictured has her whole face covered except for her eyes, and the only other visible skin is her hands and wrists. One might be forgiven for thinking she is sporting a niqab, the traditional Islamic clothing for females designed to convey “modesty,” and to portray its wearers – likened by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to “letterboxes” – as leaving most of their physical features to the imagination. In other words, this woman could be one of the hundreds of thousands of pious Muslims who turned out to protest against the previous Iranian regime in the 1970s.
Yet the graphic image actually derives from a photo of someone participating in something more recent: the so-called “Green Revolution” in Iran in 2009, thirty years after the Revolution itself.
The “Green Revolution” was not a real revolution. It was, rather, a series of demonstrations and protests against the results of a presidential election that year, which witnessed the reelection of hardline Islamist Makhmoud Ahmadinejad in a poll widely viewed as rigged. The actual photograph appears inside the book, with the following caption:
The cover is only one example of how this book attempts to blur the distinction between genuine revolution and mere protest. The author as much as admits that the election of 2009 did not offer the Iranian electorate a substantial choice. Ahmadinejad’s main opponent, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, did not advocate replacing the theocracy or instituting fundamental change. He was, rather, an architect of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a member of the old guard. He had presided over the mass execution of thousands of dissidents in Iranian prisons in 1988, and he had headed the government throughout the atrocity-filled Iran-Iraq War. Any “revolutionary” instincts Mousavi had in 2009 were rooted in the principles of the revolution of 1979, not in principles attendant to election protests.
The 2009 election protests snowballed into the “Green Revolution,” a mass movement calling for “reform” of the Iranian political system. In reaction to it, “Supreme Leader” Ali Khamenei cracked down on the protesters, and the movement quickly fizzled and died. But for Axworthy the “revolution” was full of hope. He mourns the dashing of young hopes, but endows the street protests with a “dynamism” they never really had. As an enthusiast for reform in Iran, he conflates the protests with revolution on the very cover of his formidable history, pleading that if only the “Green Revolution” had succeeded in bringing about reform, Iranians might have been delivered from the “hardliners” and lived happily ever after. Just as Iranians had turned out in huge numbers in 1979 to effect change, so they might have done in 2009 – to achieve reform. But reform and revolution should never be conflated – either in cause or effect – and this is where this book falls short.
Historians will recognize the great revolutions of the modern age. None of them should ever be identified or equated with uprisings or regime changes, such as the trivial “color revolutions” in the ex-USSR in the early 21st-century, the “Euro-Maidan Revolution” in Ukraine in 2014, the “Ba’athist Revolution” in Iraq, or innumerable other examples of rebellion, insurrection and coup d’etat. In fact, in many instances, the so-called “revolution” could more accurately be labeled “counterrevolution” for attempting or bringing about a reversal of the achievements of earlier revolutions. But they are not real revolutions.
A real revolution fundamentally changes the constitutional and legal traditions or customs of a state. The state may readopt aspects of the prerevolutionary order later, but the revolutionary change is lasting. Revolution is rightly associated with the left wing of the political spectrum: it is invariably directed at something perceived as reactionary, such as absolute monarchy or papal supremacy. The German Revolution ended the power of Roman Catholic priests to intercede between God and the individual. This ultimately brought about the demise of the papacy as the supreme political power in Europe. In other words, over four centuries ago, the West swept theocracy aside. The infallibility of priests has long been an archaic notion. Successive pre-20th-century revolutions (American and French) championed separation of powers and democracy.
The Iranian Revolution “feels” like a real revolution in hindsight. But what principle does it represent? Aesthetically, it has the same ghastly quality that the Russian and Chinese Revolutions had. It feels “dogmatic.” At the same time, oddly, it has never offered the world anything “new.” Its Russian and Chinese counterparts proposed Communism, something never tried before. The Iranian Revolution offered rule by clerics, something Europe hadn’t witnessed as a legal-constitutional system since the first half of the second millennium AD.
In 1979, Iranians from across the political spectrum were apparently filled with genuine hope that the overthrow of their autocrat-monarch – the secular Westernizer, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi – would bring real freedom. Even Iranians on the extreme left did not (apparently) widely disdain the Iranian clerical class – colloquially referred to as “the mullahs.” When the Shah was finally ousted, the leader of the revolution – the Shi'a Muslim cleric Ruhollah Khomeini – established a system whereby “men of the cloth” would rule and interpret all things spiritual for the people at large. Khomeini himself was to be the “Supreme Leader,” sitting atop a “Guardian Council.” He would not only be “interpreter of last instance” for any religious belief or practice; he would also exercise ultimate political and military power. He was “dictator-cleric.”
In the most Orwellian passage of his book, Axworthy writes:
Nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution was a real revolution, and as Axworthy notes, in common with previous 20th-century revolutions, it did not improve human rights. Prison conditions seriously worsened, with prisoners subjected to incessant propaganda from loudhailers. During the time of SAVAK [the Shah of Iran’s security and intelligence service] there had been torture, but usually to gain information. Under the mullahs, torture was directed at obtaining confessions, recorded on camera. While torture was formally abolished under the revolutionary constitution, in fact it was simply renamed “corporal punishment.”
Executions intensified and increased markedly:
In July 1988, Khomeini decreed that any MKO prisoner who had not recanted would be “condemned to execution,” without exception. He entrusted implementation of the decree to religious judges, prosecutors and security officials, proclaiming that: “The decisiveness of Islam before the enemies of God is among the unquestionable tenets of the Islamic regime.” Estimates of the number executed as a result of Khomeini’s decree vary. The MKO claimed 30,000 in total, while Axworthy claimed “the reality is probably nearer 4-5,000.”
The execution of thousands of prisoners in the space of only 2-3 months resembles the excesses of Communist revolutionary regimes. For some, this extreme brutality is chalked up to an “abandonment of God” – i.e., unrestrained by divine conscience, fanatics liquidate thousands of people to fulfill “revolutionary imperatives” – and to wipe out political opponents to consolidate power. But in Iran there was by definition no “abandonment of God”: the regime itself was founded on “divine” precepts. Superficially, it looks as if the most “revolutionary” aspect of the Iranian Revolution was mass executions by decree.
What about the Iranian Revolution’s character at a deeper level? Formalist historians stress the positive aspects of even the most violent and destructive revolutions for the course of law, economy and society, whereby even the “socialist revolutions” bequeathed humane legal and social institutions to the world, such as Social Security and the NHS. But what, exactly, could the Iranian Revolution have bequeathed to the world that was of any utility or worth?
It is here that Axworthy reveals his personal fetish for the Islamic Republic of Iran. He notes various social achievements, such as mandatory universal education (such as it was), healthcare, etc., and it is apparently these things that cause him to demonstrate a certain defensiveness on the theocracy’s behalf versus Iran’s contemporary critics. He dismisses accusations that the Iranian regime is particularly violent abroad, or that its terrorist activities amount to serious concerns for the world. He ridicules the charge by the Obama White House (the most indulgent toward post-1979 Iran of any US administration) that Iranian agents plotted to murder the Saudi ambassador to Washington in 2011, even though the case was substantiated by Obama’s FBI, and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security had a history of assassination and bombings in Western countries. He does not afford any credibility whatsoever to the notion of a “Shi’a Crescent” connecting Iran politically and militarily to the Mediterranean via militias in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Transparently, he does not even fall into the category of historians and observers who see moral equivalence between Iran and Saudi Arabia, viewing the Kingdom as far more pernicious than the Islamic Republic. He sees Iran – mystifyingly – as morally defensible despite the many ghastly events that he chronicles in this work as examples of revolutionary Iranian misdeeds.
As a piece of historical scholarship, Revolutionary Iran is a substantial achievement and a compelling read. It is also a useful resource as a chronology of important events. But the reader should not expect a serious analysis of how the Iranian Revolution fits into the historical paradigm of history’s great revolutions. Not being an expert on the Middle East, I suspect that the revolution’s real import or significance lies in its impact within the troubled Islamic world, but that Westerners cannot see or interpret this clearly and thus cannot engage in the usual formalistic approach to analyzing positive, long-term consequences of revolution. Of the great revolutions of history, Iran's is perhaps the only one with no trace of Western influence. Even the Communist revolutions of Eurasia were inspired by a European: Karl Marx. Axworthy does deal with ancient Iran and the origins of Shi’ism. But he does not tackle the historical or philosophical implications of a revolution that, at its core, is fundamentally non-Western. Perhaps, as a Westerner, he felt the task too daunting.
Any theocracy that is both de jure and de facto is an outrage. It is at best weird; at worst, insane. It is fraught with danger, and a natural menace to its neighbors and the world at large. Sadly, after reading Revolutionary Iran, I was left asking: where is the outrage? I could find little if any in it.
The Iranian Revolution might one day be seen as having a constructive legacy. Generations hence, formalist historians may treat it the way they now treat the French Revolution: horrific at the time, but historically just. Today, however, the Iranian Revolution can be seen as having bequeathed almost nothing – if anything – of worth to humanity at all. Revolutionary Iran would have been greatly served by pointing this out.
The cover seems deliberately misleading. The young woman pictured has her whole face covered except for her eyes, and the only other visible skin is her hands and wrists. One might be forgiven for thinking she is sporting a niqab, the traditional Islamic clothing for females designed to convey “modesty,” and to portray its wearers – likened by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to “letterboxes” – as leaving most of their physical features to the imagination. In other words, this woman could be one of the hundreds of thousands of pious Muslims who turned out to protest against the previous Iranian regime in the 1970s.
Yet the graphic image actually derives from a photo of someone participating in something more recent: the so-called “Green Revolution” in Iran in 2009, thirty years after the Revolution itself.
The “Green Revolution” was not a real revolution. It was, rather, a series of demonstrations and protests against the results of a presidential election that year, which witnessed the reelection of hardline Islamist Makhmoud Ahmadinejad in a poll widely viewed as rigged. The actual photograph appears inside the book, with the following caption:
‘Where’s my vote?’ Hope turned to anger after the Presidential elections of June 2009. Note that this demonstrator has covered the lower part of her face to conceal her identity from the authorities – not for religious reasons.
The cover is only one example of how this book attempts to blur the distinction between genuine revolution and mere protest. The author as much as admits that the election of 2009 did not offer the Iranian electorate a substantial choice. Ahmadinejad’s main opponent, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, did not advocate replacing the theocracy or instituting fundamental change. He was, rather, an architect of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a member of the old guard. He had presided over the mass execution of thousands of dissidents in Iranian prisons in 1988, and he had headed the government throughout the atrocity-filled Iran-Iraq War. Any “revolutionary” instincts Mousavi had in 2009 were rooted in the principles of the revolution of 1979, not in principles attendant to election protests.
The 2009 election protests snowballed into the “Green Revolution,” a mass movement calling for “reform” of the Iranian political system. In reaction to it, “Supreme Leader” Ali Khamenei cracked down on the protesters, and the movement quickly fizzled and died. But for Axworthy the “revolution” was full of hope. He mourns the dashing of young hopes, but endows the street protests with a “dynamism” they never really had. As an enthusiast for reform in Iran, he conflates the protests with revolution on the very cover of his formidable history, pleading that if only the “Green Revolution” had succeeded in bringing about reform, Iranians might have been delivered from the “hardliners” and lived happily ever after. Just as Iranians had turned out in huge numbers in 1979 to effect change, so they might have done in 2009 – to achieve reform. But reform and revolution should never be conflated – either in cause or effect – and this is where this book falls short.
Historians will recognize the great revolutions of the modern age. None of them should ever be identified or equated with uprisings or regime changes, such as the trivial “color revolutions” in the ex-USSR in the early 21st-century, the “Euro-Maidan Revolution” in Ukraine in 2014, the “Ba’athist Revolution” in Iraq, or innumerable other examples of rebellion, insurrection and coup d’etat. In fact, in many instances, the so-called “revolution” could more accurately be labeled “counterrevolution” for attempting or bringing about a reversal of the achievements of earlier revolutions. But they are not real revolutions.
A real revolution fundamentally changes the constitutional and legal traditions or customs of a state. The state may readopt aspects of the prerevolutionary order later, but the revolutionary change is lasting. Revolution is rightly associated with the left wing of the political spectrum: it is invariably directed at something perceived as reactionary, such as absolute monarchy or papal supremacy. The German Revolution ended the power of Roman Catholic priests to intercede between God and the individual. This ultimately brought about the demise of the papacy as the supreme political power in Europe. In other words, over four centuries ago, the West swept theocracy aside. The infallibility of priests has long been an archaic notion. Successive pre-20th-century revolutions (American and French) championed separation of powers and democracy.
The Iranian Revolution “feels” like a real revolution in hindsight. But what principle does it represent? Aesthetically, it has the same ghastly quality that the Russian and Chinese Revolutions had. It feels “dogmatic.” At the same time, oddly, it has never offered the world anything “new.” Its Russian and Chinese counterparts proposed Communism, something never tried before. The Iranian Revolution offered rule by clerics, something Europe hadn’t witnessed as a legal-constitutional system since the first half of the second millennium AD.
In 1979, Iranians from across the political spectrum were apparently filled with genuine hope that the overthrow of their autocrat-monarch – the secular Westernizer, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi – would bring real freedom. Even Iranians on the extreme left did not (apparently) widely disdain the Iranian clerical class – colloquially referred to as “the mullahs.” When the Shah was finally ousted, the leader of the revolution – the Shi'a Muslim cleric Ruhollah Khomeini – established a system whereby “men of the cloth” would rule and interpret all things spiritual for the people at large. Khomeini himself was to be the “Supreme Leader,” sitting atop a “Guardian Council.” He would not only be “interpreter of last instance” for any religious belief or practice; he would also exercise ultimate political and military power. He was “dictator-cleric.”
In the most Orwellian passage of his book, Axworthy writes:
In doing what he did … Khomeini had moved justification for the Islamic republic on to very different ground. In the name of maintaining an Islamic state, principles of religion had been wholly subordinated to the requirements of power. To say that power corrupts is a commonplace – but perhaps misleading if taken too literally. There is corruption in the Islamic republic, as there was in the time of the Shah, and as there is in many other countries. But corruption in its narrow sense is not the worst that power has done. As in other revolutionary states, power has eaten up almost everything else; subjected every other principle to its own purposes. Rather than saying that power has corrupted, one might say that it has purified, by destroying or coopting everything that has stood in its way, in order more nearly to approach a point of perverse perfection at which power alone is worshipped, power only is enhanced, supported, facilitated and upheld.
Nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution was a real revolution, and as Axworthy notes, in common with previous 20th-century revolutions, it did not improve human rights. Prison conditions seriously worsened, with prisoners subjected to incessant propaganda from loudhailers. During the time of SAVAK [the Shah of Iran’s security and intelligence service] there had been torture, but usually to gain information. Under the mullahs, torture was directed at obtaining confessions, recorded on camera. While torture was formally abolished under the revolutionary constitution, in fact it was simply renamed “corporal punishment.”
Electricity was not used, but there was an innovation, the Coffin – a 50 × 80 × 140 cm box in which a prisoner might be kept for months. Some went mad in it. The prisons were also much more overcrowded than in the time of the Shah, and several had to be rebuilt to accommodate new wings for extra prisoners. Evin, which had been designed for 1,200, held 15,000 by 1983. The overcrowding resulted in conditions that were effectively torture anyway – insanitary and unhealthy. Some cells held so many prisoners that sleeping time had to be rationed to three hours in twenty-four for want of enough floor space for more to lie down. Many inmates acquired serious illnesses.
Executions intensified and increased markedly:
By 1988 several thousand prisoners had been executed already – the majority of them MKO [People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran]. A reasonable estimate suggests a total of just under 8,000 between June 1981 and June 1985, of whom just under 6,500 were MKO. So those still in prison in July 1988 were the survivors.
In July 1988, Khomeini decreed that any MKO prisoner who had not recanted would be “condemned to execution,” without exception. He entrusted implementation of the decree to religious judges, prosecutors and security officials, proclaiming that: “The decisiveness of Islam before the enemies of God is among the unquestionable tenets of the Islamic regime.” Estimates of the number executed as a result of Khomeini’s decree vary. The MKO claimed 30,000 in total, while Axworthy claimed “the reality is probably nearer 4-5,000.”
In Tehran the bodies were disposed of in unmarked mass graves in cemeteries at Behesht-e Zahra and Khavaran/ Khavarestan. Relatives were discouraged from going there to mourn; indeed discouraged from marking the passing of the victims in any way at all. Many of them only found out what had happened to their sons and daughters when the authorities forwarded small parcels containing the personal belongings the victims had taken into prison with them.
The execution of thousands of prisoners in the space of only 2-3 months resembles the excesses of Communist revolutionary regimes. For some, this extreme brutality is chalked up to an “abandonment of God” – i.e., unrestrained by divine conscience, fanatics liquidate thousands of people to fulfill “revolutionary imperatives” – and to wipe out political opponents to consolidate power. But in Iran there was by definition no “abandonment of God”: the regime itself was founded on “divine” precepts. Superficially, it looks as if the most “revolutionary” aspect of the Iranian Revolution was mass executions by decree.
What about the Iranian Revolution’s character at a deeper level? Formalist historians stress the positive aspects of even the most violent and destructive revolutions for the course of law, economy and society, whereby even the “socialist revolutions” bequeathed humane legal and social institutions to the world, such as Social Security and the NHS. But what, exactly, could the Iranian Revolution have bequeathed to the world that was of any utility or worth?
It is here that Axworthy reveals his personal fetish for the Islamic Republic of Iran. He notes various social achievements, such as mandatory universal education (such as it was), healthcare, etc., and it is apparently these things that cause him to demonstrate a certain defensiveness on the theocracy’s behalf versus Iran’s contemporary critics. He dismisses accusations that the Iranian regime is particularly violent abroad, or that its terrorist activities amount to serious concerns for the world. He ridicules the charge by the Obama White House (the most indulgent toward post-1979 Iran of any US administration) that Iranian agents plotted to murder the Saudi ambassador to Washington in 2011, even though the case was substantiated by Obama’s FBI, and Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security had a history of assassination and bombings in Western countries. He does not afford any credibility whatsoever to the notion of a “Shi’a Crescent” connecting Iran politically and militarily to the Mediterranean via militias in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Transparently, he does not even fall into the category of historians and observers who see moral equivalence between Iran and Saudi Arabia, viewing the Kingdom as far more pernicious than the Islamic Republic. He sees Iran – mystifyingly – as morally defensible despite the many ghastly events that he chronicles in this work as examples of revolutionary Iranian misdeeds.
As a piece of historical scholarship, Revolutionary Iran is a substantial achievement and a compelling read. It is also a useful resource as a chronology of important events. But the reader should not expect a serious analysis of how the Iranian Revolution fits into the historical paradigm of history’s great revolutions. Not being an expert on the Middle East, I suspect that the revolution’s real import or significance lies in its impact within the troubled Islamic world, but that Westerners cannot see or interpret this clearly and thus cannot engage in the usual formalistic approach to analyzing positive, long-term consequences of revolution. Of the great revolutions of history, Iran's is perhaps the only one with no trace of Western influence. Even the Communist revolutions of Eurasia were inspired by a European: Karl Marx. Axworthy does deal with ancient Iran and the origins of Shi’ism. But he does not tackle the historical or philosophical implications of a revolution that, at its core, is fundamentally non-Western. Perhaps, as a Westerner, he felt the task too daunting.
Any theocracy that is both de jure and de facto is an outrage. It is at best weird; at worst, insane. It is fraught with danger, and a natural menace to its neighbors and the world at large. Sadly, after reading Revolutionary Iran, I was left asking: where is the outrage? I could find little if any in it.
The Iranian Revolution might one day be seen as having a constructive legacy. Generations hence, formalist historians may treat it the way they now treat the French Revolution: horrific at the time, but historically just. Today, however, the Iranian Revolution can be seen as having bequeathed almost nothing – if anything – of worth to humanity at all. Revolutionary Iran would have been greatly served by pointing this out.
April 12, 2018
Although I got this primarily to write an undergraduate essay on the 1979 revolution, I decided to push to the end anyway. I'm very glad I did! Reading about the movements of F-14 Tomcats in the Iran-Iraq War sections wasn't exactly enthralling, but once I got to the 1990s it really picked up. I was unaware of Khatami's shock victory in the elections of 1997, and just how tantalisingly close Iran came to reform (before the Trump-esque absurdity of Ahmadinejad). And talking of Trump, I have to address the Epilogue... being published in 2014, it's full of wonderful optimism for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This has now of course been greatly threatened by Trump — such are the vicissitudes of US/Iran relations, as this book shows. Axworthy is very keen to point out that animosities that sometimes seem eternal are relatively recent, and cites this as hope for a better future. This book has put me in a position which will allow me to better understand Iranian politics as it evolves.
June 8, 2015
A thoroughly researched book, I have read Iran before, I have read middle east before and I have read History before, what stands out about this book, it bring best of all those books and even more in terms of insights. I did last 250 pages in a binge reading session and I usually don't do that but for this one I made an exception. Now enough of good things, What I disliked about this book was at time it changed topic so abruptly that I was forced to go back and to check what exactly is happening.
It is one of those books, where multiple timelines go on in parallel and when author jumps from one to another, without proper handholding, reader sometime get left on earlier one and hence loses his/her focus. But that was not a deal breaker, Over all style was good so a big recommendation for some one needs good bit of info about Iran, and its influence on Middle east and world politics.
It is one of those books, where multiple timelines go on in parallel and when author jumps from one to another, without proper handholding, reader sometime get left on earlier one and hence loses his/her focus. But that was not a deal breaker, Over all style was good so a big recommendation for some one needs good bit of info about Iran, and its influence on Middle east and world politics.
June 25, 2024
Deeper than most Western sources and more balanced than most Iranian ones, this book starts out with the buildup to the Constitutional Revolution of the early 20th century and ends with the aftermath of the Green Movement of 2009.
Published in 2013, the events and the turmoil of that decade have already made it obsolete. Because of that for me it loses a star through no fault of its own.
The loss of another star is because the closer we get to the present the more it comes through that it has been written with a Western audience in mind. It seems like in an attempt to counteract the aggressive stance of the Western Right, he goes a bit soft on the Islamic Regime in general and the Khamenei clique in particular, downplaying their near-total loss of popular support, iron-fist style rule and financial corruption.
Published in 2013, the events and the turmoil of that decade have already made it obsolete. Because of that for me it loses a star through no fault of its own.
The loss of another star is because the closer we get to the present the more it comes through that it has been written with a Western audience in mind. It seems like in an attempt to counteract the aggressive stance of the Western Right, he goes a bit soft on the Islamic Regime in general and the Khamenei clique in particular, downplaying their near-total loss of popular support, iron-fist style rule and financial corruption.
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May 17, 2013Incisive look at Iranian history since 1979 informed by the author's deep respect and fascination with Persian culture. Highly recommended to anyone who seeks a better understanding of what is happening in that country.
March 17, 2020
85/100
Very dense but insightful history of Iran from 1900s - 2014. Gives good analysis of modern events (such as Khatami government) but could be a bit better for historical events. Liked that it looked at culture and society as well.
Very dense but insightful history of Iran from 1900s - 2014. Gives good analysis of modern events (such as Khatami government) but could be a bit better for historical events. Liked that it looked at culture and society as well.
November 10, 2015
I will re-read "iran under the Pahlavis" in a new light
July 12, 2025
2025, the 12-Day War between Iran and Israel.
After a few days with no sleep at all, during one of the sirens in the middle of the night, as my group and I returned from the metro shelter to our appartments, I wondered aloud as we climbed the stairs, exhausted: "A sovereign country, with a stock exchange, with an economy, with markets and culture and history, fires ballistic missiles aimed at grandmas civilians, what the actual F". My group could only laugh at this comical existential conundrum, but for so long they have been trying to convince us that the Iranian people are wise and intelligent and full of a rich history, and yet, they are celebrating their spectacular achievement in this war — the murder of a 95-year-old Holocaust survivor sitting in her home, among other innocent civilians. whole building blocks of civilians taken out, and for what? It was at this moment when I realized that I should really read a book on the whole thing.
This book was published in 2012, during the happy days of Ahmadinejad. Surprisingly, in those days I was a young journalist who, for entire ENDLESS night shifts, was busy with exactly the peaks that this book talks about. But those peaks, oh... a lot of water has flowed in the river since then, and who could’ve imagined what newer peaks are ahead. In this post October 7th world, in this trump’s world… half of this book is almost irrelevant, certainly everything related to the nuclear program. But this author should be given a second chance writing the whole thing afresh.
Still, it was interesting to read the author's comparison between the Islamic Revolution and the French Revolution, the October Revolution, and more. There is an insistence here that there is a certain degree of democracy in Iranian politics, which would’ve been reliable at least until they literally stole an election, and so it is obvious that this is an autocratic military dictatorship, and it's on these lines that the Iranian inner conflict is played upon. Their mind set — I just don’t get it. We used to be friends. Religion, etc, it’s all in here.
My main conclusion from the book is quite simple — anyone who thought that overthrowing the regime in Iran would be a walk in the park is so very wrong. At best, it will create a bloody civil war, in which no one will have a clue how it will turn out.
After a few days with no sleep at all, during one of the sirens in the middle of the night, as my group and I returned from the metro shelter to our appartments, I wondered aloud as we climbed the stairs, exhausted: "A sovereign country, with a stock exchange, with an economy, with markets and culture and history, fires ballistic missiles aimed at grandmas civilians, what the actual F". My group could only laugh at this comical existential conundrum, but for so long they have been trying to convince us that the Iranian people are wise and intelligent and full of a rich history, and yet, they are celebrating their spectacular achievement in this war — the murder of a 95-year-old Holocaust survivor sitting in her home, among other innocent civilians. whole building blocks of civilians taken out, and for what? It was at this moment when I realized that I should really read a book on the whole thing.
This book was published in 2012, during the happy days of Ahmadinejad. Surprisingly, in those days I was a young journalist who, for entire ENDLESS night shifts, was busy with exactly the peaks that this book talks about. But those peaks, oh... a lot of water has flowed in the river since then, and who could’ve imagined what newer peaks are ahead. In this post October 7th world, in this trump’s world… half of this book is almost irrelevant, certainly everything related to the nuclear program. But this author should be given a second chance writing the whole thing afresh.
Still, it was interesting to read the author's comparison between the Islamic Revolution and the French Revolution, the October Revolution, and more. There is an insistence here that there is a certain degree of democracy in Iranian politics, which would’ve been reliable at least until they literally stole an election, and so it is obvious that this is an autocratic military dictatorship, and it's on these lines that the Iranian inner conflict is played upon. Their mind set — I just don’t get it. We used to be friends. Religion, etc, it’s all in here.
My main conclusion from the book is quite simple — anyone who thought that overthrowing the regime in Iran would be a walk in the park is so very wrong. At best, it will create a bloody civil war, in which no one will have a clue how it will turn out.
June 17, 2022
A very good primer on modern Iranian history. Axworthy's (long!) introduction includes a flyover history of Iran before that point which is very helpful for the general reader, but naturally the main focus is on the post-1979 period.
This is a rich book with a few recurring themes, primarily: The tension between Iran's twin heritages of constitutionalism and Islam; The manner in which its aspirations of security against outside interference have been frustrated by a reliance on the same outsiders (who themselves are frequently burdened by misconceptions of the country) to buy its oil and to provide expertise, weapons, and investment; The persistence of a civil society and political compromises with it even during the periods of tightest repression, both under the Shah and the Islamic Republic. The analysis 'works' and different historical approaches (military, cultural, social, etc) are brought together in a neat bundle. Set piece events—the 1979 Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the Green Movement—are handled very well, often bringing out surprising details and first-hand accounts as well as developments at the high-political level.
Two small gripes. Firstly, the book takes a while to get going. It effectively has three introductory chapters: A general one which uses 2009 as a jumping-off point; A ticking-clock account of the 1979 Revolution; And the long outline chapter I mentioned above. This would be less of a problem if it didn't account for almost a quarter of the book! Secondly, while the Islamic Republic being something of a Men's Club makes it hard to bring women into the historical frame in the high-political domain, I was still left feeling like opportunities were missed to incorporate female voices into the narrative. Otherwise, this is a very good book and I strongly recommend it for anyone interested in Iranian history, or the history of the Middle East generally.
This is a rich book with a few recurring themes, primarily: The tension between Iran's twin heritages of constitutionalism and Islam; The manner in which its aspirations of security against outside interference have been frustrated by a reliance on the same outsiders (who themselves are frequently burdened by misconceptions of the country) to buy its oil and to provide expertise, weapons, and investment; The persistence of a civil society and political compromises with it even during the periods of tightest repression, both under the Shah and the Islamic Republic. The analysis 'works' and different historical approaches (military, cultural, social, etc) are brought together in a neat bundle. Set piece events—the 1979 Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the Green Movement—are handled very well, often bringing out surprising details and first-hand accounts as well as developments at the high-political level.
Two small gripes. Firstly, the book takes a while to get going. It effectively has three introductory chapters: A general one which uses 2009 as a jumping-off point; A ticking-clock account of the 1979 Revolution; And the long outline chapter I mentioned above. This would be less of a problem if it didn't account for almost a quarter of the book! Secondly, while the Islamic Republic being something of a Men's Club makes it hard to bring women into the historical frame in the high-political domain, I was still left feeling like opportunities were missed to incorporate female voices into the narrative. Otherwise, this is a very good book and I strongly recommend it for anyone interested in Iranian history, or the history of the Middle East generally.
August 24, 2020
A hugely informative account of politics in a self-made land, traumatized by aggression for at least three-quarters of a century. The book’s portrayals of many dozens of public figures' backgrounds and inter-personal relations are especially detailed and insightful. Personal rivalries and vendettas can explain a lot. The author admits, however, that some of the “complexities, paradoxes and incomprehensibilities of Iranian behaviour are hard to grasp”. Indeed. Perhaps a bit more political sociology and political economy would have helped? The book’s clear prose, chronological approach, maps, photographs, accessible footnotes, bibliography, index and glossary make it quite reader-friendly.
In the final chapter, the author pauses to observe: “Our response to Iran says as much about ourselves as about Iran…. And our problems with Iran to some extent reflect problems with our own, Western model of development.” Good points, and ones I’m now inspired to pursue further.
In the final chapter, the author pauses to observe: “Our response to Iran says as much about ourselves as about Iran…. And our problems with Iran to some extent reflect problems with our own, Western model of development.” Good points, and ones I’m now inspired to pursue further.
September 26, 2024
Biased but I learned a lot and it was so detailed until it got to like 2000 then it glossed over things a lot I feel. But I’ll allow it as it’s probably hard to do much research under the regime etc
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