Kegel argues that the Maryland and Gettysburg campaigns were part of a single campaign with a single, coherent strategy essentially formulated by Jackson as early as October 1861. I don’t think the strong version of this thesis is convincing, but Kegel admirably shows how Southern thinking about an invasion of the North evolved and how Jackson contributed to that thinking. Most interesting is the suggestion that closing Pennsylvanian mines—or even lighting them on fire—was a key Confederate objective.
There are some provocative ideas here, but it’s neither a good intro nor a final word on Southern strategy during these campaigns. No replacement for the criminally underrated Confederate Tide Rising
I found parts of the book interesting, and I liked how Kegel included letters and messages between key players on both sides of the war. However, I found reading the book more laborious than enjoyable. This is due to formatting of individual sections that made the reading choppy and lacking flow.