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Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant du Picq was a French Army officer and military theorist of the mid-nineteenth century whose writings, as they were later interpreted by other theorists, had a great effect on French military theory and doctrine.
This book and a few other works were mentioned in an American TV series with a funny gentleman thief, an FBI agent and a well-read genius in the background. (I think it was called "White Collar".) In the series, the genius probably used it to plot the various robberies.
En väldigt intressant genomgång av moral och dess koppling till fältkonst i stor och liten skala. Jag är ganska säker på att dess råd är applicerbara i fredstida situationer, vilket ökar dess värde. Det intressanta är att boken börjar i den enskilda människans psykologi, och riskaversion, med en analys som är helt grundad i moral och risk för krigströtthet.
Parts of this military analysis were fascinating, but other parts were off the mark. Du Picq, a French officer who later died during the Franco-Prussian war, made excellent points about the effects of morale on combat, but dismissed the then-recent American Civil War as not really teaching any lessons, even though several of the battles there supported his point. Unlike most of his counterparts during that ill-fated war, Du Picq did not view the traditional French forms of warfare as innately superior, or even suited to modern needs. He correctly judged that they could in for a rude awakening, as they were in 1870 and again in 1914 and yet again in 1940...the French army apparently just doesn't learn well, historically. This book consists of several essays and fragments written by Du Picq which were not collected and published in this form until after his death. If he had been read and understood by the French military leaders, a lot of lives could have been saved and history might have gone differently in any of those three wars. Even though Germany eventually lost two of the three, the cost to France in each was devastating.
Battle Studies by Ardant Du Picq is a work that deserves more recognition in the military community, particularly for those seeking a culture change in their particular branch of service. Ardant recognized the French army's operational deficiencies and intellectual bankruptcy. He sought to illustrate those shortfalls in this work and readers are left to wonder what impact he would have had on French military thought in the run up to World War I if he had survived Sedan.
This book is a historical watershed - the first to look at the behavior of men in combat as an emotional response rather than as a mechanical set of tactics or of just technology. Uses examples from ancient times to the 19th century, when it was written.
Logically, it's a little out-dated, talking of 'modern battles' as WO1 and "cavalry" are still horses. In addition, it's a bit parochial in always drawing conclusions on the French. Yet, I liked the idea of shaping organisations and tactics to the moral capacity of coping with terror/stress/battle of man. If not, theory will never make it into effective practice. As in "Men against fire" of S.L.A Marshall it discusses the effect of battle on the morale of men, but the author here goes further to also discuss the effect in attack. Talking about the mechanical and the moral shock. It adds to my understanding of "massing effects instead of forces". Overall, I was disappointed though.
If you've never read it yourself, you probably have the wrong impression about du Picq. Does this sound like a guy who's advocating l'offensive à outrance?
"Battle is the final objective of armies and man is the fundamental instrument of battle. Nothing can wisely be prescribed in an army--its personnel, organization, discipline and tactics, things which are connected like the fingers of a hand--without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat...
"With us very few reason or understand reason, very few are cool. Their effect is negligible in the disorder of the mass; it is lost in numbers. It follows that we above all need a method of combat, sanely thought out in advance. It must be based on the fact that we are not passively obedient instruments, but very nervous and restless people, who wish to finish things quickly and to know in advance where we are going. It must be based on the fact that we are very proud people, but people who would all skulk if we were not seen, and who consequently must always be seen, and act in the presence of our comrades and of the officers who supervise us. From this comes the necessity for organizing the infantry company solidly...
"If you only use combat methods that require leaders without fear, of high intelligence, full of good sense, of esprit, you will always make mistakes ... Man is always man. He does not always possess ability and resolution. The commander must make his choice of methods, depending on his troops and on himself.
"The essential of tactics is: the science of making men fight with their maximum energy. This alone can give an organization with which to fight fear. This has always been true."
This is a short book by a French officer in the mid-19th century about how battle should best be understood. Du Picq argues that any tactic or maneuver on the battlefield should be evaluated primarily for its moral effect. He says that soldiers on the battlefield seek victory, not necessarily combat. They will seek victory and usually avoid pitched combat. Discipline and unity can hold them together for a while, but they will struggle against the tendency in human nature for self-preservation. Commanders who treat soldiers merely as numbers or units will find their plans falling apart because of various human factors.
This book is pretty uneven, with a first draft kind of feeling. It's a very poor man's Clausewitz. I can only assume that Du Picq would have developed these ideas further if he hadn't been killed in the Franco-Prussian War. I recommend it only for military historians and 19th century French historians. Pretty narrow interest.
Shows the forethought of one great thinker. What would WWI look like had the French heard du Picq's message instead of using his writings as the basis of the offensive school - a school that contributed to enormous casualties of the First World War.
For how well this book is recommended among military circles I was expecting more. Still an important read from a military history and strategy perspective.