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The Battle for the Falklands
The Falklands War was one of the strangest in British history – 28,000 men sent to fight for a tiny relic of empire 8,000 miles from home. At the time, many Britons saw it as a tragic absurdity, but the British victory confirmed the quality of British arms and boosted the political fortunes of the Conservative government. But it left a chequered aftermath; it was of no wider significance for British interests and taught no lessons. It has since been overshadowed by the two Gulf Wars, however, its political ramifications cannot be overestimated. Max Hastings’ and Simon Jenkins’ account of the conflict is a modern classic of war reportage and the definitive book on the war. Republished as part of the Pan Military Classics series, The Battle for the Falklands is a vivid chronicle of a call to arms and a thoughtful and informed analysis of an astonishing chapter in the history of our times. ‘Skilfully woven with Simon Jenkins’ sharp political passages are Max Hastings’ wonderful dispatches’ Sunday Times
529 pages, Kindle Edition
First published February 14, 1983
130 people are currently reading
2484 people want to read
About the author
Max Hastings
112 books1,704 followersSir Max Hugh Macdonald Hastings, FRSL, FRHistS is a British journalist, editor, historian and author. His parents were Macdonald Hastings, a journalist and war correspondent, and Anne Scott-James, sometime editor of Harper's Bazaar.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
Hastings was educated at Charterhouse School and University College, Oxford, which he left after a year.After leaving Oxford University, Max Hastings became a foreign correspondent, and reported from more than sixty countries and eleven wars for BBC TV and the London Evening Standard.
Among his bestselling books Bomber Command won the Somerset Maugham Prize, and both Overlord and The Battle for the Falklands won the Yorkshire Post Book of the Year Prize.
After ten years as editor and then editor-in-chief of The Daily Telegraph, he became editor of the Evening Standard in 1996. He has won many awards for his journalism, including Journalist of The Year and What the Papers Say Reporter of the Year for his work in the South Atlantic in 1982, and Editor of the Year in 1988.
He stood down as editor of the Evening Standard in 2001 and was knighted in 2002. His monumental work of military history, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 was published in 2005.
He is also a Fellow of the Royal Society of Literature.
Sir Max Hastings honoured with the $100,000 2012 Pritzker Military Library Literature Award for Lifetime Achievement in Military Writing.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 161 reviews
July 19, 2025
Max Hastings never writes a bad book! I knew nothing about this conflict and it was recommended to me. This war was fought over a group of small islands off the coast of Argentina. The Falkland Islands were officially colonized by the British in 1833 and seen as a British territoy when colonial administration was implemented in 1842. Following that tensions mounted from one head of government to the next between the Argentines and the British over who possessed legitimate ownership of the islands. In 1982 the Argentine military invaded the islands and forcefully expelled the small British garrison. The British military responded with a show of force with combined naval, aircraft, and readied amphibious assault forces. This maneuvering quickly escalated into full-scale combat between the two nations in open warfare on land, air, and sea. The war lasted 10 weeks and eneded with British victory.
The war was highly-televised and supported by each nation's general population. The Argentines believed they were reclaiming land lost to the British and the British believed they were defending their territory along with its people. "The British were going to war as they had always gone, in haste and some confusion but with confidence and great pride." (pg 96)
Max Hastings explained everything clearly and the material was very informative. He did a fantastic job of accounting the discovery and history of the Falklands, setting the stage for hostility, and accounting the miltary engagements between the two nations. I thoroughly enjoyed this book as I have enjoyed The Korean War and Catastrophe 1914. Thanks!
The war was highly-televised and supported by each nation's general population. The Argentines believed they were reclaiming land lost to the British and the British believed they were defending their territory along with its people. "The British were going to war as they had always gone, in haste and some confusion but with confidence and great pride." (pg 96)
Max Hastings explained everything clearly and the material was very informative. He did a fantastic job of accounting the discovery and history of the Falklands, setting the stage for hostility, and accounting the miltary engagements between the two nations. I thoroughly enjoyed this book as I have enjoyed The Korean War and Catastrophe 1914. Thanks!
August 14, 2023
By all appearances, the Falkland Islands seem hardly worth fighting over. An archipelago located in the south Atlantic, its cold and rainy climate is conducive to little more than raising sheep. From the 17th century onward, however, control over the islands became a point of contention, first between Spain and Great Britain, then from the 1820s between Britain and the newly independent nation of Argentina. What was an intermittent diplomatic dispute became a war in April 1982 when Argentinian forces occupied the islands and expelled the small Royal Marines garrison stationed there after a brief battle. This began what came to be known as the Falklands War, a 74-day-long conflict which resulted in the deaths of hundreds, the collapse of one struggling regime, and the triumph of another.
In the age of modern media the Falklands War galvanized the world’s attention, with journalists providing extensive coverage of developments on a daily basis. If this, as the saying goes, provided the first draft of the conflict’s history, then Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins’s account of the Falklands War is version 1.5. As, respectively, a reporter for the London Evening Standard newspaper and the political editor of the Economist magazine, both men were at the heart of the coverage of events. Their book provides a history of the war, one in which the narrative of events is supplemented by interviews and other investigations that fill in some of the gaps and provide a perspective on events that benefits from hindsight.
One of the first things that comes across in their book is the even-handedness they bring towards their subject. This is evident from the first two chapters, in which they provide a history of the dispute that features the claims made by both sides and identifies the strengths and weaknesses in the arguments advanced by them. While they show that both sides have legitimate claims to the islands, those of the British were superior on two key points: they were the country that possessed them, and the descendants of the Scottish and Welsh settlers who occupied them were nearly unanimous in their preference for British over Argentinian rule. These factors made it impossible during negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s to reach a settlement that would accommodate all parties.
Nevertheless, the Argentinians possessed an advantage: namely, the increasing fiscal intolerability of supporting a territory 8,000 miles away from Britain that possessed little economic or strategic value. With the advent of Margaret Thatcher’s parsimonious government in 1979, the British military faced a new round of cutbacks which would not only have led to the decommissioning of the ice survey vessel that served as the Royal Navy’s patrol craft in the region, but the scrapping and sale of major warships, all of which suggested that the British were no longer willing to defend their distant territories. Frustrated by Britain’s intransigence in the negotiations and facing growing domestic opposition to their harsh economic program, the brutal military junta ruling Argentina plotted to take advantage of this by seizing the islands in a coup de main in the autumn of 1982. When a group of Argentinian scrap merchants raised the Argentine flag on nearby South Georgia island on March 19 prompted the British to reinforce their presence in the region, the Argentinians advanced their plans and seized the islands in a matter of hours.
Faced with a fait accompli, Thatcher’s government debated what to do. Here the authors argue that the intervention by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, proved key to the turn to war. His declaration that the Royal Navy was prepared to sail south prompted the bellicose Thatcher to authorize an expedition to the South Atlantic. Comprised of Royal Marines and other elite forces, this came together with remarkable speed and was dispatched in a matter of days. The plan by the task force commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward, to defeat Argentinian air power prior to the arrival of the invasion force, however, was frustrated by the refusal of the Argentinians to engage fully with the British fleet, forcing the British to land troops without securing the skies. While Argentinian planes exacted a heavy toll on the British warships around the Falklands, this was not enough to stop the invasion, which after consolidating the beachhead at San Carlos on the East Falkland island, broke out and retook Port Stanley, the islands’ capital. With the surrender of the remaining Argentinian forces on the islands and the recapture of the South Sandwich Islands a few days later the war came to an end as abruptly as it began.
In the foreword to their book the authors describe the Falklands War as “a freak of history, almost certainly the last colonial war that Britain will ever fight.” This contributes to the ongoing fascination for many with the war, and explains the numerous books that have been written about it since. Yet none of these have completely eclipsed Hastings and Jenkins’s work, which for its clear prose and the acuity of judgments endures as the standard history of the conflict. While understandably focused on the British (given the greater amount of access the authors had to the personnel involved) it is almost scrupulously fair in its treatment of the Argentinians while simultaneously celebrating the bravery of the British soldiers, sailors, and pilots involved. Though readers seeking a fuller treatment of the war would do well to follow this up with Lawrence Freedman’s The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. 2: War and Diplomacy, and Ezequiel Merceau’s The Falklands War: An Imperial History, for a starting point on the war this remains the book to read.
In the age of modern media the Falklands War galvanized the world’s attention, with journalists providing extensive coverage of developments on a daily basis. If this, as the saying goes, provided the first draft of the conflict’s history, then Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins’s account of the Falklands War is version 1.5. As, respectively, a reporter for the London Evening Standard newspaper and the political editor of the Economist magazine, both men were at the heart of the coverage of events. Their book provides a history of the war, one in which the narrative of events is supplemented by interviews and other investigations that fill in some of the gaps and provide a perspective on events that benefits from hindsight.
One of the first things that comes across in their book is the even-handedness they bring towards their subject. This is evident from the first two chapters, in which they provide a history of the dispute that features the claims made by both sides and identifies the strengths and weaknesses in the arguments advanced by them. While they show that both sides have legitimate claims to the islands, those of the British were superior on two key points: they were the country that possessed them, and the descendants of the Scottish and Welsh settlers who occupied them were nearly unanimous in their preference for British over Argentinian rule. These factors made it impossible during negotiations in the 1960s and 1970s to reach a settlement that would accommodate all parties.
Nevertheless, the Argentinians possessed an advantage: namely, the increasing fiscal intolerability of supporting a territory 8,000 miles away from Britain that possessed little economic or strategic value. With the advent of Margaret Thatcher’s parsimonious government in 1979, the British military faced a new round of cutbacks which would not only have led to the decommissioning of the ice survey vessel that served as the Royal Navy’s patrol craft in the region, but the scrapping and sale of major warships, all of which suggested that the British were no longer willing to defend their distant territories. Frustrated by Britain’s intransigence in the negotiations and facing growing domestic opposition to their harsh economic program, the brutal military junta ruling Argentina plotted to take advantage of this by seizing the islands in a coup de main in the autumn of 1982. When a group of Argentinian scrap merchants raised the Argentine flag on nearby South Georgia island on March 19 prompted the British to reinforce their presence in the region, the Argentinians advanced their plans and seized the islands in a matter of hours.
Faced with a fait accompli, Thatcher’s government debated what to do. Here the authors argue that the intervention by the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Leach, proved key to the turn to war. His declaration that the Royal Navy was prepared to sail south prompted the bellicose Thatcher to authorize an expedition to the South Atlantic. Comprised of Royal Marines and other elite forces, this came together with remarkable speed and was dispatched in a matter of days. The plan by the task force commander, Admiral Sandy Woodward, to defeat Argentinian air power prior to the arrival of the invasion force, however, was frustrated by the refusal of the Argentinians to engage fully with the British fleet, forcing the British to land troops without securing the skies. While Argentinian planes exacted a heavy toll on the British warships around the Falklands, this was not enough to stop the invasion, which after consolidating the beachhead at San Carlos on the East Falkland island, broke out and retook Port Stanley, the islands’ capital. With the surrender of the remaining Argentinian forces on the islands and the recapture of the South Sandwich Islands a few days later the war came to an end as abruptly as it began.
In the foreword to their book the authors describe the Falklands War as “a freak of history, almost certainly the last colonial war that Britain will ever fight.” This contributes to the ongoing fascination for many with the war, and explains the numerous books that have been written about it since. Yet none of these have completely eclipsed Hastings and Jenkins’s work, which for its clear prose and the acuity of judgments endures as the standard history of the conflict. While understandably focused on the British (given the greater amount of access the authors had to the personnel involved) it is almost scrupulously fair in its treatment of the Argentinians while simultaneously celebrating the bravery of the British soldiers, sailors, and pilots involved. Though readers seeking a fuller treatment of the war would do well to follow this up with Lawrence Freedman’s The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Vol. 2: War and Diplomacy, and Ezequiel Merceau’s The Falklands War: An Imperial History, for a starting point on the war this remains the book to read.
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May 16, 2012My only memory of the Falklands War is of pretending that a puddle was the south Atlantic and throwing rocks at it with my dad, simulating the British attack. But I'm fascinated with this war because the matchup is so weird--it has the international appeal of a world cup match. Maybe Italy fighting Brazil would have the same level of geopolitical implausibility. And because the odds of victory were more or less even: the British were 6,000 miles from home, operating at the end of a long supply chain, with no land based airpower (besides a couple of Vulcan bombers operating at the extreme range of what was possible), and the Argentines had a substantial air force and navy patrolling close to home.
I had no idea how long it took for the British to sail to the warzone, or how inept the American attempts to intervene diplomatically were, or how heavy the British naval losses were. I knew about the sinking of the Coventry, but the Atlantic Conveyor, the Ardent, Antelope, Sir Galahad, Sheffield? And the Argentines were incredibly well equipped: I knew they had French Super Etendards and Exocets, but they also had modern German subs and even a couple of British type 42 destroyers, which is what the British themselves were fighting with! It also became very clear why every contemporary warship is equipped with radar-aimed close-in gattling guns, which were conspicuously lacking from British ships. They were trying to bring down low flying Skyhawks and Mirage IIIs with GP machineguns and (manually aimed?) bofors cannons instead.
A couple details that make it clear that you're dealing with a very British war written about from a very British viewpoint:
p.188: On the passage south, the British commando force band played the 1812 Overture "with orchestration from her bofors guns, at the direction of the ship's delightfully picaresque captain".
p.85: Describing the preparation for the invasion: "One of the most remarkable figures immediately summoned to duty was winkled out of a London flat where he was staying after a Cruising Club dinner. Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour was an exuberant romantic...With his white hair resembling a slight swell in mid-Atlantic, his infectious charm and enthusiasm, he was a familiar celebrity among Royal Marines. The son of a colonel commandant of the corps, he was commissioned in 1960 after Pangbourne Nautical College and Grenoble University. He boasted proudly that, in the ensuing twenty-two years, he had spent only two in an office; this had done little for his chances of promotion, but had enabled him to sail halfway around the world---he was a superb helmsman and ocean racer---speak and write Arabic, paint watercolors of seabirds, explore the wildest corners of Arabia, and, above all, to know the Falklands".
That almost matches the kind of characters the British had running around in the Greek Isles capturing German generals in WWII (Patrick Leigh Fermor, e.g.).
Watch some incredible footage of the amphibious landing and air attacks on the fleet from the comfort of your chair on youtube:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c-_l3e...
I had no idea how long it took for the British to sail to the warzone, or how inept the American attempts to intervene diplomatically were, or how heavy the British naval losses were. I knew about the sinking of the Coventry, but the Atlantic Conveyor, the Ardent, Antelope, Sir Galahad, Sheffield? And the Argentines were incredibly well equipped: I knew they had French Super Etendards and Exocets, but they also had modern German subs and even a couple of British type 42 destroyers, which is what the British themselves were fighting with! It also became very clear why every contemporary warship is equipped with radar-aimed close-in gattling guns, which were conspicuously lacking from British ships. They were trying to bring down low flying Skyhawks and Mirage IIIs with GP machineguns and (manually aimed?) bofors cannons instead.
A couple details that make it clear that you're dealing with a very British war written about from a very British viewpoint:
p.188: On the passage south, the British commando force band played the 1812 Overture "with orchestration from her bofors guns, at the direction of the ship's delightfully picaresque captain".
p.85: Describing the preparation for the invasion: "One of the most remarkable figures immediately summoned to duty was winkled out of a London flat where he was staying after a Cruising Club dinner. Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour was an exuberant romantic...With his white hair resembling a slight swell in mid-Atlantic, his infectious charm and enthusiasm, he was a familiar celebrity among Royal Marines. The son of a colonel commandant of the corps, he was commissioned in 1960 after Pangbourne Nautical College and Grenoble University. He boasted proudly that, in the ensuing twenty-two years, he had spent only two in an office; this had done little for his chances of promotion, but had enabled him to sail halfway around the world---he was a superb helmsman and ocean racer---speak and write Arabic, paint watercolors of seabirds, explore the wildest corners of Arabia, and, above all, to know the Falklands".
That almost matches the kind of characters the British had running around in the Greek Isles capturing German generals in WWII (Patrick Leigh Fermor, e.g.).
Watch some incredible footage of the amphibious landing and air attacks on the fleet from the comfort of your chair on youtube:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c-_l3e...
October 30, 2025
The Last Hurrah
When I was considering going to Dartmouth to join the Royal Navy I was told to study the Falklands War, as it was the RN’s last major conflict and test. I quickly became interested in a period of history I hadn’t usually been drawn to. I found that of the best books on the period is The Battle for the Falklands by British journalists Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, of whom the former was who actually there on the front line. It is a detailed and authoritative account of the 1982 war and remains one of the most comprehensive early studies of the war between Britain and Argentina over the remote South Atlantic islands.
Hastings, who as I have said above, reported from the front lines during the conflict, brings a vivid immediacy to the narrative. His descriptions of the harsh conditions, the bravery and hardship of the troops, and the confusion of combat are gripping and humanizing. Jenkins, a political journalist, provides valuable analysis of the political and diplomatic dimensions, particularly the decision-making in London and Buenos Aires. Together, their dual perspectives, military and political make the book both dramatic and insightful.
The Battle for the Falklands has journalistic clarity and balance, which comes from both authors and their respective experiences. Hastings and Jenkins avoid the triumphalism that often colors accounts of British military victories. They are critical where appropriate for example, of military planning failures, logistical problems, and political misjudgments, while still recognising the professionalism and resilience of the soldiers and sailors involved. The inclusion of Argentine perspectives, rare in early English-language accounts, also gives the book a more rounded understanding of the war.
Stylistically, the writing is crisp, direct, and engaging. The authors weave together eyewitness testimony, official reports, and their own experiences into a narrative that is both accessible to general readers and valuable to historians. Though later works have benefited from declassified materials and longer hindsight, The Battle for the Falklands remains a definitive contemporary chronicle of the conflict.
In the end The Battle for the Falklands is a compelling, well-researched, and fair-minded account of the Falklands War. Hastings and Jenkins combine frontline reportage with political insight to produce a book that is both exciting and illuminating. Despite its age, it continues to stand as an essential read for anyone interested in modern military history or British foreign policy.
When I was considering going to Dartmouth to join the Royal Navy I was told to study the Falklands War, as it was the RN’s last major conflict and test. I quickly became interested in a period of history I hadn’t usually been drawn to. I found that of the best books on the period is The Battle for the Falklands by British journalists Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, of whom the former was who actually there on the front line. It is a detailed and authoritative account of the 1982 war and remains one of the most comprehensive early studies of the war between Britain and Argentina over the remote South Atlantic islands.
Hastings, who as I have said above, reported from the front lines during the conflict, brings a vivid immediacy to the narrative. His descriptions of the harsh conditions, the bravery and hardship of the troops, and the confusion of combat are gripping and humanizing. Jenkins, a political journalist, provides valuable analysis of the political and diplomatic dimensions, particularly the decision-making in London and Buenos Aires. Together, their dual perspectives, military and political make the book both dramatic and insightful.
The Battle for the Falklands has journalistic clarity and balance, which comes from both authors and their respective experiences. Hastings and Jenkins avoid the triumphalism that often colors accounts of British military victories. They are critical where appropriate for example, of military planning failures, logistical problems, and political misjudgments, while still recognising the professionalism and resilience of the soldiers and sailors involved. The inclusion of Argentine perspectives, rare in early English-language accounts, also gives the book a more rounded understanding of the war.
Stylistically, the writing is crisp, direct, and engaging. The authors weave together eyewitness testimony, official reports, and their own experiences into a narrative that is both accessible to general readers and valuable to historians. Though later works have benefited from declassified materials and longer hindsight, The Battle for the Falklands remains a definitive contemporary chronicle of the conflict.
In the end The Battle for the Falklands is a compelling, well-researched, and fair-minded account of the Falklands War. Hastings and Jenkins combine frontline reportage with political insight to produce a book that is both exciting and illuminating. Despite its age, it continues to stand as an essential read for anyone interested in modern military history or British foreign policy.
May 19, 2022
I read this book in 1985 or 1986. Max Hastings is a very good historian.
March 13, 2018
I vividly remember that spring morning in 1982 when my father opened the curtains with the declaration "Wake up boys — we're at war!". The Falklands was the first conflict I have any clear memory of. I can remember the crowds cheering the carriers off to sea, I can remember the talk of the awesome power of the new, untried Harrier jump jets, I remember the controversy of the exclusion zone and the infamous 'GOTCHA!' headline of the Sun newspaper. I can remember the whispered playground tales of the SAS, and the stories of the Argies turning tail when they saw the flash of the Ghurka's Kukri knives — said to demand the appeasement of blood once drawn from the scabbard.
So it was of great interest to me to read an account which separated the apocrypha from the truth. This book was written contemporaneously with the conflict, so it has the urgency of a first-hand report. Surprisingly, there seems to have been little else published about this most curious campaign since.
And curious it certainly was. I remember my Dad telling me at the time that this would in all probability be the last colonial war Britain ever fought, and I fancy he has surely been proved right. This is a very good account of that war. Written entirely, it is true, from the British perspective, but interestingly none the less biased for that. The summation of the diplomatic case is entirely even handed — in fact if anything the authors come down narrowly on the side of the Argentinians. The main point of the book though is that this was a war that could have been so easily avoided; it's as much a tale of the failure of diplomacy as the success of arms. Of a long-running, often bitter argument, over a wind-swept cluster of rocks in the unforgiving south atlantic. The opening lines sum it up very neatly:
"The Falkland Islands' misfortune has always been to be wanted more than they are loved"
As recent events have shown. The conflict resolved nothing. The arguments persist, and the unloved islands remain as wanted as ever.
So it was of great interest to me to read an account which separated the apocrypha from the truth. This book was written contemporaneously with the conflict, so it has the urgency of a first-hand report. Surprisingly, there seems to have been little else published about this most curious campaign since.
And curious it certainly was. I remember my Dad telling me at the time that this would in all probability be the last colonial war Britain ever fought, and I fancy he has surely been proved right. This is a very good account of that war. Written entirely, it is true, from the British perspective, but interestingly none the less biased for that. The summation of the diplomatic case is entirely even handed — in fact if anything the authors come down narrowly on the side of the Argentinians. The main point of the book though is that this was a war that could have been so easily avoided; it's as much a tale of the failure of diplomacy as the success of arms. Of a long-running, often bitter argument, over a wind-swept cluster of rocks in the unforgiving south atlantic. The opening lines sum it up very neatly:
"The Falkland Islands' misfortune has always been to be wanted more than they are loved"
As recent events have shown. The conflict resolved nothing. The arguments persist, and the unloved islands remain as wanted as ever.
January 7, 2012
It is now 30 years since the Falklands War. I was in the UK at the time, as well as being in New York having dinner with an Argentinian colleague when the announcement was made of H.M.S. Sheffield being sunk. Emotional times.
It was an unnecessary war (aren't they all?) caused by the failure of successive governments in the UK to deal with the problem of sovereignty. The invasion was rash, and the response (sending a "task force") rasher. But "we" (the Brits) overcame the odds and I suppose that being the more war-like nation, had better discipline. The Argentinians would not back down because of machismo, and the Brits would not back down because of principle.
So they fought, and after some near-defeats by the loss of ships, the Brits got ashore and fought against an unprepared and inexperienced enemy. It could have gone so wrong: If the Argentinians knew how to fuse their bombs correctly, if their navy had come out to sink the carriers with Exocets, if Harriers had not been available.
The result was a victory for the UK, especially for Margaret Thatcher. It restored pride internally in Britain, but it was not a victory in the same way as at the end of WWII.
I should have read this in 1983. I didn't, and I am happy I have read it now.
It was an unnecessary war (aren't they all?) caused by the failure of successive governments in the UK to deal with the problem of sovereignty. The invasion was rash, and the response (sending a "task force") rasher. But "we" (the Brits) overcame the odds and I suppose that being the more war-like nation, had better discipline. The Argentinians would not back down because of machismo, and the Brits would not back down because of principle.
So they fought, and after some near-defeats by the loss of ships, the Brits got ashore and fought against an unprepared and inexperienced enemy. It could have gone so wrong: If the Argentinians knew how to fuse their bombs correctly, if their navy had come out to sink the carriers with Exocets, if Harriers had not been available.
The result was a victory for the UK, especially for Margaret Thatcher. It restored pride internally in Britain, but it was not a victory in the same way as at the end of WWII.
I should have read this in 1983. I didn't, and I am happy I have read it now.
January 14, 2013
An in-depth and comprehensive view of the 1982 Falklands War, almost entirely from the British perspective (and to the authors' credit, they make it clear up front they never pretended it would be anything else). By turns fascinating and disheartening. The authors congratulate the UK armed forces and the Thatcher government for their very real achievements, but also pull no punches in revealing the layers of shoddy miscommunication, bad intelligence, and plain poor diplomacy (including the starkly embarrassing attempted mediation of the Reagan administration) that led to the by-no-means-inevitable shooting war. An Argentinian junta rode off to war desperate to prop itself up, and Margaret Thatcher's government rode out of it eager to parlay it into electoral popularity for as long as they could. The mists of popular memory are already closing around this fight, thirty years on. It doesn't hurt to be reminded what a ramshackle, close, and at times desperate affair it was.
April 9, 2013
In 82' I was preoccupied with the task of being young as well as finishing my education in the merchant navy.
In those days - when at sea - the daily news were compiled and 'edited' by the radio officer and distributed on a single sheet of A4 paper pinned to the bulletin board in the mess. And to be honest, you would not find me in front of that reading it.
(To the youngsters: Once upon a time the internet did not exist. Amazingly we survived to tell the tale ;-)
So the 'big picture' of the state of the world was not all that clear to me.
To to read about the course of events in this - in many respects - strange war has been very interesting. And put more than a few things in perspective.
For me this book was a very good read
In those days - when at sea - the daily news were compiled and 'edited' by the radio officer and distributed on a single sheet of A4 paper pinned to the bulletin board in the mess. And to be honest, you would not find me in front of that reading it.
(To the youngsters: Once upon a time the internet did not exist. Amazingly we survived to tell the tale ;-)
So the 'big picture' of the state of the world was not all that clear to me.
To to read about the course of events in this - in many respects - strange war has been very interesting. And put more than a few things in perspective.
For me this book was a very good read
May 10, 2019
Excellent account published soon after the war. Told mostly from the British side by necessity, but not a flag-waving jingo kind of book. Dives pretty deeply into the domestic (British) political situation that at times was a bit hard for a Yank like me to follow.
June 13, 2025
This is a well-written and persuasive book, penned shortly after the end of the war in the Falklands, and which has aged fairly well since then. I think it helps that it was co-authored, with Simon Jenkins focusing on the political background to and aspects of the Falklands conflict, and Max Hastings focusing on the military expedition itself.
It is undoubtedly written from a British perspective, but is nonetheless very balanced and does not smack of propaganda. Jenkins and Hastings acknowledge that the question of sovereignty is somewhat ambiguous, with the islanders' right to self-determination the only strong argument in favour of the British claim; equally, they are critical (indeed, scathing) of the British political approach to the Falklands question in the decades preceding the Argentine invasion.
Concerning the politicians, they conclude simply that, "The Falklands dispute should never have led to hostilities. That it did so was the result of a series of miscalculations by both sides: by the British, that Argentina would not resort to force to assert its claim to the islands; by the Argentinians, that Britain would not go to war to regain them." The UN merely "referred the issue back to the two parties on terms which evaded the central issue of self determination." In considering the role of the Foreign Office, they scathingly conclude that, "A compromise solution settlement was never achieved because the British Foreign Office proved far more competent at negotiating with another government than with its own. Successive cabinets regarded the political price of compromise as always just too high...Diplomats failed to mobilise any constituency of political opinion for a compromise over the Falklands. Their ministers, whose responsibility they believed this to be, were never in office long enough or were never sufficiently interested to do the job for them...Diplomacy without politics is ultimately impotent."
Following the invasion, a task force was hastily assembled and sent south: "The British were going to war as they had always done, in haste and some confusion but with confidence and great pride." Everyone hoped that a mere show of force would be enough, but this proved not to be the case, and after a rapid re-seizure of South Georgia, the British forces landed unopposed at San Carlos Bay. Following that, the facts of the campaign are easily recounted: after several days of intense air attacks against British shipping, 2 Para attacked and took the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green. After that, the British advanced unopposed across West Falkland until they approached Port Stanley. Special forces took Mount Kent, and the troop ship Sir Galahad was sunk on 8th June with a large loss of life. Meanwhile, the British main force fought battles to take Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Mount Longdon. Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown fell next, after which Argentinian resistance quickly crumbled, and all Argentinian forces surrendered on the 14th of June 1982.
Some of the author's commentary on this is particularly noteworthy, and shows the wider relevance of and lessons to be learned from the Falklands War. Goose Green is characterised as a perfect example of a political battle. The objective was of no strategic value in terms of the campaign, but it was the most convenient place to get British troops into action and demonstrate some sort of progress to the public and the House of Commons. In the end, it did result in the surrender of a significant number of Argentinian soldiers who would otherwise have formed a reserve during the advance to Port Stanley, but this wasn't to be known when the attack was ordered, as it was characterised as a large-scale raid. The authors comment that, "The attack on Goose Green reflected haste and underestimation of the enemy by those who set it in motion, redeemed only by the brilliant performance of 2 Para. With the possible exception of South Georgia, the battle was the one instance in the campaign of 'back-seat driving' from London. The politicians and service chiefs, deeply alarmed by the losses in San Carlos, demanded urgent action from the land force for political as well as military reasons. After the event, their reasoning and their decision may well have seemed justified. But this episode was a classic demonstration of the risks and complications which can set in when a military operation is being conducted to serve an urgent political purpose."
Similarly, their analysis of the sinking of Sir Galahad provides some important insights: "The Fitzroy tragedy must be seen in the context of a campaign that generally went brilliantly well for the British. Among many calculated risks, this one went wrong. The view of the Royal Navy was expressed by a senior officer on Fearless that night: 'We must accept full responsibility for hazarding the landing ships at Fitzroy. We cannot accept responsibility for the fact that there was anybody still aboard Galahad when she was attacked.' The naval staff reproached themselves chiefly for failing to impress on the troops aboard Galahad the importance of disembarking rapidly after dawn...In every campaign of every significant war, mishaps incomparably more culpable and more bloody have taken place, which have passed without notice. But the Galahad episode reminded ministers and services chiefs of the hazards of fighting a war under the public glare. The difficulty of persuading the civilian public at home to accept the horrific realities of war caused Sir Robin Day to ask, in a lecture some years ago, whether in the post-Vietnam age any western democracy with a free press and television can hope to sustain national support for any war, however necessary."
Their overall analysis of the conduct of the war has an overwhelmingly British perspective, but seems solid: "The accident of history which had made the Royal Marines a specialist arctic-warfare force, trained in Norway, contributed decisively to victory in the Falklands. While Argentina's conscripts, mostly shipped from the country's arid northern region, suffered in the alien Falklands landscape, the marines possessed precisely the training and equipment to prosper in it. They won the land campaign as cheaply and as quickly as was reasonably possible with their resources. There was probably no point at which the Argentinians could have defeated them, but a less competent British force could have become bogged down in a disastrous stalemate in the mountains. This was the best outcome that the government in Buenos Aires aspired to, once the British beachhead was secure. It would be wrong to pretend that, even at Goose Green or on Mount Longdon, the enemy offered the kind of resistance that might have been expected from a better-motivated, better-trained European force. Although the Para's battle losses were severe by the standards of limited conflicts, they would have been considered very light for an action in north-west Europe in 1944. The chief enemies the British forces had to contend with were Argentine air power, supply difficulties and the weather...This was a campaign mirroring a host of others that British forces have conducted throughout their history: launched with high hopes, considerable muddle and inadequate resources; redeemed and finally carried through to victory by remarkable service efficiency, some outstanding weapons systems (which did extra duty for those that failed), and the quality and courage of the men who fought the battles by land, sea and air."
The Argentinians, on the other hand, "possessed better equipment and heavier firepower than the British ashore. But their tactics, fieldcraft and motivation were lamentable. Every conversation with captured officers and men after the war emphasised that their morale and determination never recovered from the discovery that the British proposed to fight."
This was a very enjoyable piece of military history, and provides a fine overview of and insights into a strange little war that is likely to be the last colonial conflict Britain is involved in.
It is undoubtedly written from a British perspective, but is nonetheless very balanced and does not smack of propaganda. Jenkins and Hastings acknowledge that the question of sovereignty is somewhat ambiguous, with the islanders' right to self-determination the only strong argument in favour of the British claim; equally, they are critical (indeed, scathing) of the British political approach to the Falklands question in the decades preceding the Argentine invasion.
Concerning the politicians, they conclude simply that, "The Falklands dispute should never have led to hostilities. That it did so was the result of a series of miscalculations by both sides: by the British, that Argentina would not resort to force to assert its claim to the islands; by the Argentinians, that Britain would not go to war to regain them." The UN merely "referred the issue back to the two parties on terms which evaded the central issue of self determination." In considering the role of the Foreign Office, they scathingly conclude that, "A compromise solution settlement was never achieved because the British Foreign Office proved far more competent at negotiating with another government than with its own. Successive cabinets regarded the political price of compromise as always just too high...Diplomats failed to mobilise any constituency of political opinion for a compromise over the Falklands. Their ministers, whose responsibility they believed this to be, were never in office long enough or were never sufficiently interested to do the job for them...Diplomacy without politics is ultimately impotent."
Following the invasion, a task force was hastily assembled and sent south: "The British were going to war as they had always done, in haste and some confusion but with confidence and great pride." Everyone hoped that a mere show of force would be enough, but this proved not to be the case, and after a rapid re-seizure of South Georgia, the British forces landed unopposed at San Carlos Bay. Following that, the facts of the campaign are easily recounted: after several days of intense air attacks against British shipping, 2 Para attacked and took the settlements of Darwin and Goose Green. After that, the British advanced unopposed across West Falkland until they approached Port Stanley. Special forces took Mount Kent, and the troop ship Sir Galahad was sunk on 8th June with a large loss of life. Meanwhile, the British main force fought battles to take Mount Harriet, Two Sisters and Mount Longdon. Wireless Ridge and Mount Tumbledown fell next, after which Argentinian resistance quickly crumbled, and all Argentinian forces surrendered on the 14th of June 1982.
Some of the author's commentary on this is particularly noteworthy, and shows the wider relevance of and lessons to be learned from the Falklands War. Goose Green is characterised as a perfect example of a political battle. The objective was of no strategic value in terms of the campaign, but it was the most convenient place to get British troops into action and demonstrate some sort of progress to the public and the House of Commons. In the end, it did result in the surrender of a significant number of Argentinian soldiers who would otherwise have formed a reserve during the advance to Port Stanley, but this wasn't to be known when the attack was ordered, as it was characterised as a large-scale raid. The authors comment that, "The attack on Goose Green reflected haste and underestimation of the enemy by those who set it in motion, redeemed only by the brilliant performance of 2 Para. With the possible exception of South Georgia, the battle was the one instance in the campaign of 'back-seat driving' from London. The politicians and service chiefs, deeply alarmed by the losses in San Carlos, demanded urgent action from the land force for political as well as military reasons. After the event, their reasoning and their decision may well have seemed justified. But this episode was a classic demonstration of the risks and complications which can set in when a military operation is being conducted to serve an urgent political purpose."
Similarly, their analysis of the sinking of Sir Galahad provides some important insights: "The Fitzroy tragedy must be seen in the context of a campaign that generally went brilliantly well for the British. Among many calculated risks, this one went wrong. The view of the Royal Navy was expressed by a senior officer on Fearless that night: 'We must accept full responsibility for hazarding the landing ships at Fitzroy. We cannot accept responsibility for the fact that there was anybody still aboard Galahad when she was attacked.' The naval staff reproached themselves chiefly for failing to impress on the troops aboard Galahad the importance of disembarking rapidly after dawn...In every campaign of every significant war, mishaps incomparably more culpable and more bloody have taken place, which have passed without notice. But the Galahad episode reminded ministers and services chiefs of the hazards of fighting a war under the public glare. The difficulty of persuading the civilian public at home to accept the horrific realities of war caused Sir Robin Day to ask, in a lecture some years ago, whether in the post-Vietnam age any western democracy with a free press and television can hope to sustain national support for any war, however necessary."
Their overall analysis of the conduct of the war has an overwhelmingly British perspective, but seems solid: "The accident of history which had made the Royal Marines a specialist arctic-warfare force, trained in Norway, contributed decisively to victory in the Falklands. While Argentina's conscripts, mostly shipped from the country's arid northern region, suffered in the alien Falklands landscape, the marines possessed precisely the training and equipment to prosper in it. They won the land campaign as cheaply and as quickly as was reasonably possible with their resources. There was probably no point at which the Argentinians could have defeated them, but a less competent British force could have become bogged down in a disastrous stalemate in the mountains. This was the best outcome that the government in Buenos Aires aspired to, once the British beachhead was secure. It would be wrong to pretend that, even at Goose Green or on Mount Longdon, the enemy offered the kind of resistance that might have been expected from a better-motivated, better-trained European force. Although the Para's battle losses were severe by the standards of limited conflicts, they would have been considered very light for an action in north-west Europe in 1944. The chief enemies the British forces had to contend with were Argentine air power, supply difficulties and the weather...This was a campaign mirroring a host of others that British forces have conducted throughout their history: launched with high hopes, considerable muddle and inadequate resources; redeemed and finally carried through to victory by remarkable service efficiency, some outstanding weapons systems (which did extra duty for those that failed), and the quality and courage of the men who fought the battles by land, sea and air."
The Argentinians, on the other hand, "possessed better equipment and heavier firepower than the British ashore. But their tactics, fieldcraft and motivation were lamentable. Every conversation with captured officers and men after the war emphasised that their morale and determination never recovered from the discovery that the British proposed to fight."
This was a very enjoyable piece of military history, and provides a fine overview of and insights into a strange little war that is likely to be the last colonial conflict Britain is involved in.
December 6, 2020
Published not long after the conclusion of what is likely to be Britain's last colonial war, despite subsequent updating Max Hastings' eyewitness accounts are beneficial but there is an over-emphasis on detail, so that the contemporaneous nature of the narrative never quite seems to convey the momentum of what was a relatively brief but tense conflict. Simon Jenkins' informed charting of the political battles between the British and Argentinian governments largely saves this extensive account and makes it likely to be authoritative.
February 12, 2020
I remember the Falklands War clearly and was amazed at the logistical challenge of taking a Task Force all that way to the South Atlantic and the subsequent war that took place. I agreed that this was needed to be done and admired Prime Minister Thatcher for her leadership in doing this.
This book by Max Hastings is a very accurate account of the conflict and it is well written by this author who is a great historian who also was a journalist who went to the Falklands with the Task Force.
As I read this book I recognised the names of all the leaders who led the troops into Battle and during my time of reading I complemented this by reading on line more about them which built my background detail of the events. I learned so much more by reading this book and realised how close we were to being over-run by the Argentinians at Goose Green.....and of the horror of the attacks on the ships which were lost. This book for me brought out clearly the courage of the soldiers who marched across East Falkland in freezing wet conditions and fought so bravely to reach Port Stanley even in hand to hand combat.
Some say why did the UK agree to go so far to defend the occupation of such a small island population.....but I never felt that in 1982 and after reading this accurate account in the Max Hastings book I know that this was a necessary action that was so well deployed and completed.....we remember and respect those who lost their lives of course during this conflict.
This book by Max Hastings is a very accurate account of the conflict and it is well written by this author who is a great historian who also was a journalist who went to the Falklands with the Task Force.
As I read this book I recognised the names of all the leaders who led the troops into Battle and during my time of reading I complemented this by reading on line more about them which built my background detail of the events. I learned so much more by reading this book and realised how close we were to being over-run by the Argentinians at Goose Green.....and of the horror of the attacks on the ships which were lost. This book for me brought out clearly the courage of the soldiers who marched across East Falkland in freezing wet conditions and fought so bravely to reach Port Stanley even in hand to hand combat.
Some say why did the UK agree to go so far to defend the occupation of such a small island population.....but I never felt that in 1982 and after reading this accurate account in the Max Hastings book I know that this was a necessary action that was so well deployed and completed.....we remember and respect those who lost their lives of course during this conflict.
February 24, 2017
War and is just another sport. That's probably why every army encourages its soldiers to play so much sports. Governments behave exactly like kids fighting in the playground. Kids operate in gangs, complete with bullies, rebels and the righteous. Whispering, coaxing and gesturing sometimes erupt in violent fist fights which result in restructuring gangs.
This particular book has been written from a very British angle. British negotiations, diplomacy, war preparations and campaign details are well documented, but there is little detail available from the Argentinian end.
I found the detailed description of the actual campaign very tedious, but found the summaries very informative. I don't think the Brits will ever want to carry out any future campaigns on their own, especially against armies with similar arsenal. Future wars are going to depend much more on technology rather than machismo.
I have always considered the whole affair as insignificant, before reading this book, and unfortunately the same impression is there after having read this detailed political and militaristic account of the episode.
This particular book has been written from a very British angle. British negotiations, diplomacy, war preparations and campaign details are well documented, but there is little detail available from the Argentinian end.
I found the detailed description of the actual campaign very tedious, but found the summaries very informative. I don't think the Brits will ever want to carry out any future campaigns on their own, especially against armies with similar arsenal. Future wars are going to depend much more on technology rather than machismo.
I have always considered the whole affair as insignificant, before reading this book, and unfortunately the same impression is there after having read this detailed political and militaristic account of the episode.
November 1, 2019
If you’re curious about this obscure modern war then this is a useful book. However it is quite biased to the view of the colonialist perspective.
May 17, 2022
Reading it for the first time 39 years after its publication, this book is well worth its reputation as an authoritative and objective history of a war that both sides almost unwittingly stumbled into. The depth and accuracy of the research that went into it is demonstrated by the fact that none of the accounts of major actions or the background political machinations have been refuted, even following the release of the UK's state secrets in 2012. While it is not entirely free of flag waving on the side of the UK, it is frank in the assessment of both Argentina's and the UK's respective political and military leadership. Indeed, it pays great respect to the Argentine pilots who successfully harassed the Royal Navy's task force, and paid a great price in the process, and shows sympathy to the Argentine Army conscripts who suffered through Antarctic weather on islands they had never heard of. It is mostly critical of the politicians, and mostly complimentary of the combatants who showed little real animosity toward each other. Highly recommended to students of military history.
March 29, 2018
An excellent book, written almost contemporaneously by two fine journalists, Hastings embedded with British forces and Jenkins providing the political analysis. Published only 7 months after the war ended, 35 years later it stands as a great piece of military history. the poor communications which led to the Galahad tragedy caused me great disquiet, and the mention in the final chapter of the Queen and Royal family attending the memorial service at St.Pauls reminded me I watched them all out of my office window in Dean Court. A moving book.
August 25, 2020
Comprehensive in its historical-politico-military scope and compelling both in its treatment of the buildup and the war itself. Horrible print quality of tiny fonts on maps makes those hard to use but doesn’t spoil the overall impact. A thorough introduction, backed by first-hand reporting and many scores of interviews.
August 13, 2022
Being born on 2 Apr 1982 I’ve always had a strong affinity with the Falklands and reading Hastings’s account has bolstered by knowledge.
It’s an impressive document that will stand as an historical account of the battle. It balances the military operations with the political diplomacy to create a compelling read that any military historians or keen follower will find insightful and important.
It’s an impressive document that will stand as an historical account of the battle. It balances the military operations with the political diplomacy to create a compelling read that any military historians or keen follower will find insightful and important.
May 29, 2021
A superb one stop shop - thorough but well written and good pace.
Key lesson: unexpected things will happen!
Key lesson: unexpected things will happen!
January 6, 2024
Best account of the Falklands Campaign, and many lessons learned for amphibious warfare, and the balance between political, military, and diplomatic measures.
December 31, 2023
CHOICE NOTES
The 1982 southern Atlantic War was viewed by most in Britain as an absurdity, dispatching 20,000 troops 8,000 miles away to control an island of limited strategic importance was only possible after a colossal political balls up. The Franks enquiry afterwards carefully exonerated the government but was unconvincing.
After the war the Tory government who's pitical fortunes were buoyed by the war were forced to defend against Argentine belligerence with 2billion worth of fortifications, an airbase and a garrison. These measures gave the islands a strategic importance that had been denied in the previous negotiations with Argentina.
The result in argentina was benign. The Buenos Aires Junta collapse and a fledging democracry developed. As often in war the vanquished gained as much as from the conflict ad the victor. The conflict was probably the beat thing to happen to Argentina in 50 years.
The leadership has suffered from Hindsight, the noticed complete victory of the British led to questions about methods and an exaggerated idea from the lay person about how military units act in combat. Wars rarely go according to plan. If wars are lost every decision was a mistake, if they are won then every excess is a barbarity.
In previous wars it has been judged humane to allow loved ones to consider that their loved ones died from enemy action, rather than friendly fire. This might no longer be a sustainable policy but is still a moral one. It does not necessary imply a cover up.
The British leadership had to pretend invicibility and also take every step to give Britain the greatest chance of success. American analysts did not believe that the UK would win the war and were arguing about whether or not to assist in the failure.
The British leadership had to sustain a belief in british invicibility and also take every step to improve the odds. American analysts did not believe that the UK could win the war and were arguing about whether or not to assist in the failure and if it was polically feasible.
The author hopes that in time Chris Keeble of 2 para will stop dining out on the story of his embedded correspondent falling asleep in the battle of wireless ridge.
Three islands were spotted, they also saw a remarkable number of penguins. 1600. The Falklands fate has always been to be wanted more than they are loved.
Consequence of Harold Wilson's government front bench insecurity wa sto remove foreign defence debate from public scrutiny into the Foreign Office mod defences. "In this nether region of the British Constitution policy could be made with the minimum of public scrutiny or outcry"
Satellite photos were so poor in the Falklands that the USA showed them to Argentina to prove they weren't helping the British.
Due to house of commons debate it was becoming politically impossible to deny the submarines but military suicide to confirm it. The climate of the commons ruled out non provocation.
James Callahan revealed the state secret of the 1977 task force, "whilst I don't ask the minister to confirm I assume its the same sort of thing" Due to house of commons debate it was becoming politically impossible to deny the submarines but military suicide to confirm it. The climate of the commons ruled out non provocation.
After saying avoid casualties invading the Falklands the commandos used phosphorous and automatic fire on what turned out to be empty barracks.
A bewildered Argentine Officer Complained to the SAS "you've walked through my minefield" unawares.
Tories opposition to Falkalnds. Summarasied by lord Whig "I have no confidence in improvised military adventures in pursuit of undefined objectives." Foreign Office, treasury and cabinet Office were all against the war. It would be wrong to think Britain were united behind the idea of Naval glory.
The task force bluff had been treated as such by Buenos Aires but rather than letting the fleet turn ignominiously home it had to continue to war. Was it really a bluff in that case?
Argentina was seeing as having European Arrogance compared to the Organisation of American States OAS which were seen as more mixed Latin American population.
The Argentinians could not move in negotiations on a matter of pride and the British couldn't move on a matter of principle.
Sought permission from the government to sink the Belgrano 40 miles outside of the total exclusion zone.
Mirage jets only had 3 minutes of dogfight time to engage the Harriers. After which they'd be vulnerable trying to return home.
Debate if the Belgrano could have been saved with proper water defences, if compartments had been locked with water tight doors etc. The escorts either steamed to attack at random where the Submarine Conqueror might have been or made their escape paint the crew that survived in the water for 30 hours
Unprepared for sea skimming missiles because "Russians don't have Exocet. This war has shown how dangerous it is for our military capabilities to become too scenario based"
It was politically u thinkablr for the british government to withdraw. They essentially doubled up on all their bets and to ignore the rules established of amphibious landings and challenge the Argentinians to do their worst on the day.
Argentinians were unused to washing, cleaning, changing clothes, keeping dry and looking after each other in the field. "That sort of thing is not macho" was given as the reason. They had good arms and training but not the field experience.
Kirkpatrick the ambassador in the UN vetoed the ceasefire and then was told by the US office to say she would have abstained if she'd gotten the communication in time. This offended everyone. Asked by reporters she stated "you don't understand it? I don't understand it" no one told Regan about this before he sat down with Thatcher in Venice and he was left to the mercy of reporters clearly unbriefed on the "flip flop"
Had daylight lasted and the enemy persisted they could have gotten within our landing ships with disastrous consequences.
Naval officers questioned why they were expected to endure daily punishment whilst the Beachhead force didn't go anywhere.
British government worried that a ceasefire would get through the UN and Britain would be left holding only the San Carlos beachhead. The second reason they needed an attack wad that all press coverage of lost ships was being negative in parliament.
After 4 days of bad news the Britisj government direct an engagement. Goose Green was only 13 miles from the Beachhead at San Carlos although it was seen as militarily unimportant, "if Port Stanley falls then Goose Green will also as a matter of necessity, this is not true the other way around" "If ever there were a politicians battle it was Goose Green"
"Within a generation of its inception the massed parachute drop formation was obsolete. Despite this paratrooper units hold a prestigious place in all militaries across the world."
People have suggested there should have been 2 battalions at Goose Green, however the intelligence of the time suggested that Arfentininas had only a weak battalion at the base and it was difficult to move 450 members of 2 para to the location.
BBC report that action would soon happen at Goose Green meant that Argentinian units supported the battalion. H threatened to sue the Secretary of Defence for this lapse of op sec if any of his men died.
BBC report that action would soon happen at Goose Green meant that Argentinian units supported the battalion. H threatened to sue the Secretary of Defence for this lapse of op sec if any of his men died.
Some men took shelter in shell holes on Goose Green only to find out later they were mine holes that cows had detonated and they were in an active minefield.
Keeble having expected 80 men to surrender and had 160 turn out. On inspection he noticed they were all wearing air force uniforms, when asking about the army a column of 900 men marched out towards their position.
Feeling after 2 para had fought for goose green they couldn't abandon it. Whilst conceived as a "major raid" it ended as a decisive action.
5 brigade, a mixture of Welsh Guards and Ghurkas, was not mentally and physically attuned as 3 commando brigade. Trained to fight from APCs one officer stated "we are not bergen soldiers" their role was intended to be one of a garrison rather than on par with the paratroopers or marines.
Naval staff reproached themselves for not impressing on 5th battalion on the Galahad that they needed to disembark after dawn immediately. They were too used to working with Marines. Other failures such as the loss of Harrier cover, the lack of deployment of the missile system would have lost the ship. But the miscommunication of men wanting to stay on the ship as a taxi to elsewhere cost lives.
In every war mistakes on the level of the Gallahad can be found. Having the British Public accept this is a different story. Can any democracy with free press maintain a war however just?
Once the English attacked the Argentinians worried about their weapons. A soldier on Wireless Ridge said he didn't know where he was until after the war. Soldiers given 2days of ammo ran out in 2 hours.
Without aircraft cameras or satellite support the tactical intelligence was gained by men's courage on foot.
An argentine stretcher bearer stated that the soldiers looked for their officers in the night (who retreated when fighting began) and couldn't see them so retreated themselves. "It was only logical that if the professionals weren't there what were the conscripts expected to do!?"
Argentinians were conditioned by America training to expect vehicular and material support and were unnerved when they found the British were going to fight without them.
Argentinian op sec, dispersing the pilots to prevent them knowing the scale of losses, also prevented them learning tacticald and debriefing. Including how to "lob" bombs so they had time to "fuse"
Menendez told gautieri that a fight in Port Stanley would be a failure and a massacre, Gautieri told him to father all his troops and counterattack. Menendez ignoring this order was seen as one of the most courageous actions of the war
The 1982 southern Atlantic War was viewed by most in Britain as an absurdity, dispatching 20,000 troops 8,000 miles away to control an island of limited strategic importance was only possible after a colossal political balls up. The Franks enquiry afterwards carefully exonerated the government but was unconvincing.
After the war the Tory government who's pitical fortunes were buoyed by the war were forced to defend against Argentine belligerence with 2billion worth of fortifications, an airbase and a garrison. These measures gave the islands a strategic importance that had been denied in the previous negotiations with Argentina.
The result in argentina was benign. The Buenos Aires Junta collapse and a fledging democracry developed. As often in war the vanquished gained as much as from the conflict ad the victor. The conflict was probably the beat thing to happen to Argentina in 50 years.
The leadership has suffered from Hindsight, the noticed complete victory of the British led to questions about methods and an exaggerated idea from the lay person about how military units act in combat. Wars rarely go according to plan. If wars are lost every decision was a mistake, if they are won then every excess is a barbarity.
In previous wars it has been judged humane to allow loved ones to consider that their loved ones died from enemy action, rather than friendly fire. This might no longer be a sustainable policy but is still a moral one. It does not necessary imply a cover up.
The British leadership had to pretend invicibility and also take every step to give Britain the greatest chance of success. American analysts did not believe that the UK would win the war and were arguing about whether or not to assist in the failure.
The British leadership had to sustain a belief in british invicibility and also take every step to improve the odds. American analysts did not believe that the UK could win the war and were arguing about whether or not to assist in the failure and if it was polically feasible.
The author hopes that in time Chris Keeble of 2 para will stop dining out on the story of his embedded correspondent falling asleep in the battle of wireless ridge.
Three islands were spotted, they also saw a remarkable number of penguins. 1600. The Falklands fate has always been to be wanted more than they are loved.
Consequence of Harold Wilson's government front bench insecurity wa sto remove foreign defence debate from public scrutiny into the Foreign Office mod defences. "In this nether region of the British Constitution policy could be made with the minimum of public scrutiny or outcry"
Satellite photos were so poor in the Falklands that the USA showed them to Argentina to prove they weren't helping the British.
Due to house of commons debate it was becoming politically impossible to deny the submarines but military suicide to confirm it. The climate of the commons ruled out non provocation.
James Callahan revealed the state secret of the 1977 task force, "whilst I don't ask the minister to confirm I assume its the same sort of thing" Due to house of commons debate it was becoming politically impossible to deny the submarines but military suicide to confirm it. The climate of the commons ruled out non provocation.
After saying avoid casualties invading the Falklands the commandos used phosphorous and automatic fire on what turned out to be empty barracks.
A bewildered Argentine Officer Complained to the SAS "you've walked through my minefield" unawares.
Tories opposition to Falkalnds. Summarasied by lord Whig "I have no confidence in improvised military adventures in pursuit of undefined objectives." Foreign Office, treasury and cabinet Office were all against the war. It would be wrong to think Britain were united behind the idea of Naval glory.
The task force bluff had been treated as such by Buenos Aires but rather than letting the fleet turn ignominiously home it had to continue to war. Was it really a bluff in that case?
Argentina was seeing as having European Arrogance compared to the Organisation of American States OAS which were seen as more mixed Latin American population.
The Argentinians could not move in negotiations on a matter of pride and the British couldn't move on a matter of principle.
Sought permission from the government to sink the Belgrano 40 miles outside of the total exclusion zone.
Mirage jets only had 3 minutes of dogfight time to engage the Harriers. After which they'd be vulnerable trying to return home.
Debate if the Belgrano could have been saved with proper water defences, if compartments had been locked with water tight doors etc. The escorts either steamed to attack at random where the Submarine Conqueror might have been or made their escape paint the crew that survived in the water for 30 hours
Unprepared for sea skimming missiles because "Russians don't have Exocet. This war has shown how dangerous it is for our military capabilities to become too scenario based"
It was politically u thinkablr for the british government to withdraw. They essentially doubled up on all their bets and to ignore the rules established of amphibious landings and challenge the Argentinians to do their worst on the day.
Argentinians were unused to washing, cleaning, changing clothes, keeping dry and looking after each other in the field. "That sort of thing is not macho" was given as the reason. They had good arms and training but not the field experience.
Kirkpatrick the ambassador in the UN vetoed the ceasefire and then was told by the US office to say she would have abstained if she'd gotten the communication in time. This offended everyone. Asked by reporters she stated "you don't understand it? I don't understand it" no one told Regan about this before he sat down with Thatcher in Venice and he was left to the mercy of reporters clearly unbriefed on the "flip flop"
Had daylight lasted and the enemy persisted they could have gotten within our landing ships with disastrous consequences.
Naval officers questioned why they were expected to endure daily punishment whilst the Beachhead force didn't go anywhere.
British government worried that a ceasefire would get through the UN and Britain would be left holding only the San Carlos beachhead. The second reason they needed an attack wad that all press coverage of lost ships was being negative in parliament.
After 4 days of bad news the Britisj government direct an engagement. Goose Green was only 13 miles from the Beachhead at San Carlos although it was seen as militarily unimportant, "if Port Stanley falls then Goose Green will also as a matter of necessity, this is not true the other way around" "If ever there were a politicians battle it was Goose Green"
"Within a generation of its inception the massed parachute drop formation was obsolete. Despite this paratrooper units hold a prestigious place in all militaries across the world."
People have suggested there should have been 2 battalions at Goose Green, however the intelligence of the time suggested that Arfentininas had only a weak battalion at the base and it was difficult to move 450 members of 2 para to the location.
BBC report that action would soon happen at Goose Green meant that Argentinian units supported the battalion. H threatened to sue the Secretary of Defence for this lapse of op sec if any of his men died.
BBC report that action would soon happen at Goose Green meant that Argentinian units supported the battalion. H threatened to sue the Secretary of Defence for this lapse of op sec if any of his men died.
Some men took shelter in shell holes on Goose Green only to find out later they were mine holes that cows had detonated and they were in an active minefield.
Keeble having expected 80 men to surrender and had 160 turn out. On inspection he noticed they were all wearing air force uniforms, when asking about the army a column of 900 men marched out towards their position.
Feeling after 2 para had fought for goose green they couldn't abandon it. Whilst conceived as a "major raid" it ended as a decisive action.
5 brigade, a mixture of Welsh Guards and Ghurkas, was not mentally and physically attuned as 3 commando brigade. Trained to fight from APCs one officer stated "we are not bergen soldiers" their role was intended to be one of a garrison rather than on par with the paratroopers or marines.
Naval staff reproached themselves for not impressing on 5th battalion on the Galahad that they needed to disembark after dawn immediately. They were too used to working with Marines. Other failures such as the loss of Harrier cover, the lack of deployment of the missile system would have lost the ship. But the miscommunication of men wanting to stay on the ship as a taxi to elsewhere cost lives.
In every war mistakes on the level of the Gallahad can be found. Having the British Public accept this is a different story. Can any democracy with free press maintain a war however just?
Once the English attacked the Argentinians worried about their weapons. A soldier on Wireless Ridge said he didn't know where he was until after the war. Soldiers given 2days of ammo ran out in 2 hours.
Without aircraft cameras or satellite support the tactical intelligence was gained by men's courage on foot.
An argentine stretcher bearer stated that the soldiers looked for their officers in the night (who retreated when fighting began) and couldn't see them so retreated themselves. "It was only logical that if the professionals weren't there what were the conscripts expected to do!?"
Argentinians were conditioned by America training to expect vehicular and material support and were unnerved when they found the British were going to fight without them.
Argentinian op sec, dispersing the pilots to prevent them knowing the scale of losses, also prevented them learning tacticald and debriefing. Including how to "lob" bombs so they had time to "fuse"
Menendez told gautieri that a fight in Port Stanley would be a failure and a massacre, Gautieri told him to father all his troops and counterattack. Menendez ignoring this order was seen as one of the most courageous actions of the war
June 22, 2023
Borrow.
Served its purpose of shedding light on a war I knew precious little about, but suffers critically from a complete lack of Argentine sources.
Served its purpose of shedding light on a war I knew precious little about, but suffers critically from a complete lack of Argentine sources.
November 5, 2024
Who would have thought this would be such a page turner?
Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins are a combo in the ranks of Scorsese and DeNiro. Simon Jenkins gives an insightful account of the decision taking processes in Great Britain. Meanwhile Max Hastings was invited along the forces to first-hand witness the battle on the Malvinas. As both do a fantastic job, this book transitions smoothly from report to a "military classic".
Clearly this book was written from a British perspective - but not without fairly laying out the Argentinian case. Furthermore, the authors incisively pitch the question of British moral reasoning for the war. In a similar fashion, they pinpoint a series of diplomatic blunders which opened up the path to a weird and entirely avoidable war. Claiming moral questions are beyond the scope of the book, Hastings and Jenkins confine themselves to telling the unravelling of events. Thus, the book is a minutious telling both on the Malvinas as well as in Britain.
Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins are a combo in the ranks of Scorsese and DeNiro. Simon Jenkins gives an insightful account of the decision taking processes in Great Britain. Meanwhile Max Hastings was invited along the forces to first-hand witness the battle on the Malvinas. As both do a fantastic job, this book transitions smoothly from report to a "military classic".
Clearly this book was written from a British perspective - but not without fairly laying out the Argentinian case. Furthermore, the authors incisively pitch the question of British moral reasoning for the war. In a similar fashion, they pinpoint a series of diplomatic blunders which opened up the path to a weird and entirely avoidable war. Claiming moral questions are beyond the scope of the book, Hastings and Jenkins confine themselves to telling the unravelling of events. Thus, the book is a minutious telling both on the Malvinas as well as in Britain.
May 21, 2013
This is an excellent and enjoyably readable account of the Falklands War between Britain and Argentina in 1982. It is predominantly a British perspective, but the authors provide an admirable - albeit relatively limited - account of events from the Argentine perspective along the way. Although sympathetic to the British side of the conflict, they do not shirk from criticizing British mistakes and errors of decision making any more than they do regarding Argentine errors and misjudgments. This was a thoroughly unnecessary and avoidable conflict that was made necessary and unavoidable by the series of political, diplomatic and strategic actions and blunders over the 17-plus years preceding actual conflict. To cite but one example on each side, the British assumed that Argentina would move through three identifiable stages of increasing confrontation as a precursor to any actual invasion - then believed that assumption was real when it was not. When the Argentines actually invaded without having engaged in ANY of the assumed prerequisite stages, the British were unprepared - militarily, diplomatically and politically. On the other hand, the Argentines convinced themselves that Britain would not react with force at all, and Britain supported that misapprehension with its own political and diplomatic missteps. There were
The authors lay it out bluntly even as they narrate with admiration the daunting military challenges that the British faced and overcame - more or less successfully. And those challenges were severe - so severe that with more reflection Britain might not have even tried to retake the Falklands. She had no aircraft carriers - no air search radar - ineffective and unreliable communications - ineffective fleet air defense - insufficient air lift. It is a remarkable story of overcoming adversity and prevailing over materiel and capability limitations, horrendous weather conditions, and unforeseen weapon system deficiencies - although the inexplicable Argentine reluctance to take advantage of its own strengths and resources contributed mightily. It could have been a far more 'iffy' proposition for the British than it was had the Argentine Army and Navy shown half as much courage, determination and fighting spirit as did the Argentine air force.
This is yet another lesson in the inefficiencies, ignorance and incompetence of political and diplomatic functions that over time accumulate effects that ultimately ordain violent events that need not have happened. That is a lesson that never seems to take permanent hold. In an event, this is a superb starting point for anybody interested in the Falklands War and how it precipitated.
The authors lay it out bluntly even as they narrate with admiration the daunting military challenges that the British faced and overcame - more or less successfully. And those challenges were severe - so severe that with more reflection Britain might not have even tried to retake the Falklands. She had no aircraft carriers - no air search radar - ineffective and unreliable communications - ineffective fleet air defense - insufficient air lift. It is a remarkable story of overcoming adversity and prevailing over materiel and capability limitations, horrendous weather conditions, and unforeseen weapon system deficiencies - although the inexplicable Argentine reluctance to take advantage of its own strengths and resources contributed mightily. It could have been a far more 'iffy' proposition for the British than it was had the Argentine Army and Navy shown half as much courage, determination and fighting spirit as did the Argentine air force.
This is yet another lesson in the inefficiencies, ignorance and incompetence of political and diplomatic functions that over time accumulate effects that ultimately ordain violent events that need not have happened. That is a lesson that never seems to take permanent hold. In an event, this is a superb starting point for anybody interested in the Falklands War and how it precipitated.
June 3, 2008
This was the first Hastings book that I read... it was interesting at the time but, since reading other, is certainly not his best.
Because of the contemporary nature of the conflict, and his role as a journalist, this book always struck me as being rather like a series of newspaper articles - and sort of.... unfinished.
I am sure that the recent 25th anniversary of the conflict has meant a reprint or two... and that many copes have been sold - but there are far better narratives of the conflict.
My laytest favourite is Forgotten Voices of the Falklands by Hugh McManners
Because of the contemporary nature of the conflict, and his role as a journalist, this book always struck me as being rather like a series of newspaper articles - and sort of.... unfinished.
I am sure that the recent 25th anniversary of the conflict has meant a reprint or two... and that many copes have been sold - but there are far better narratives of the conflict.
My laytest favourite is Forgotten Voices of the Falklands by Hugh McManners
August 7, 2015
Audio - I enjoyed these authors telling of events that were front page news during my senior year of high school. I found one author's inclusion of himself (Hastings) as an observer in the battles (as a journalist) to bring a chuckle. Overall an interesting study of what seemed so strange then and so odd now.
July 26, 2021
Uncanny reading about a war conflict between two countries I do not relate to but the story is still told from one perspective - the UK's. Gives a good overview of what happened and why, namedrops a bunch of people from Thatcher's government that I did not know by heart so some parts flew past me for sure.
August 8, 2022
A very well researched and written book.
Un-biased, acccurate and thoughtful.
Un-biased, acccurate and thoughtful.
April 28, 2025
Being 17 years old at the time of the Falklands War, I remember it, and the jingoism surrounding it, very well. It is hard to believe that these events are now over 40 years in the rear view mirror. This book is interesting in that it was written just a year after the conflict itself which means the events were fresh in the memory, but means it is impossible to look at the war in the context of what happened subsequently.
Hastings is a highly accomplished journalist and writer, and he has come up with a detailed account of both the diplomatic and political manoeuvring the preceded the shooting war that lasted barely a few weeks. It is a fairly straightforward telling of events, but asks the question implicitly throughout, and specifically in the closing chapters: Was it worth it and could it have been avoided? I shall return to this below.
It's important to note, as Hastings does in his foreword, that this is a book written from a British point of view. I think this is probably by necessity, given when it was penned. I am sure that access to information from the unstable and defeated country of Argentina wasn't readily available in 1983. That isn't to say that there is no information about Argentina, its military junta and its politics of the time. It's rather that this is what was widely known and in the public domain (the diplomatic relationship with the US, Galtieri as a leader, the celebrations in the streets after the invasion etc.) I am sure that such a book written now would provide a much more nuanced and in depth coverage of the Argentinian side.
The book also narrates a well thought out story of the conflict that blends the operational aspects of the war with the experiences of those fighting it, as well as the view from back home. The latter is covered relatively sparingly, and the vile coverage from The Sun newspaper is noted, but not dwelt upon. I also very much appreciated the closing chapters which examined the role of Thatcher in all of this, as well as the insipid and useless, not to say vacillating impact of the United States. The US foreign policy on this issue, in common with much of Reagan's vastly overrated administration, was basically a mess as they couldn't decide which side they were on for too long and then basically just argued that it was uncomfortable for them to have two allies at war. As always, the US is looking at how to serve its short term needs, now to expand and keep its empire and basically make money.
As I say, I appreciated Hastings's in-depth look at the aftermath of this war which was very balanced in my view. I was all for the conflict in my callow youth, when every issue was straightforward and black or white to me. Obviously the world isn't like that. It is clear that there were many mistakes made that led to the invasion and the liberation. Since the UK remains firm on not discussing sovereignty with Argentina unless the islanders themselves agree (and they votes overwhelmingly to remain British in 2013) there seems to be no prospect of this changing soon. There was much talk about "fortress Falklands" in the immediate aftermath and there seems to be a much more robust presence there now, and the military capability of Argentina seems much diminished. It therefore seems unlikely much will change in the short to medium term.
Was it worth it? Who knows? There are a lot of factors at play. It is patently absurd that this is still, basically, an outpost of Empire. The islands are 8000 miles from the mother country which makes supporting them difficult and expensive. It is a valid and salient point, made Hastings, that it is honorable to give the islanders their say on sovereignty, but the UK didn't always do that with other outposts of Empire eg Rhodesia so there is some hypocrisy in the position. However, can one realistically allow armed aggression to go unchallenged? This is a great question these days as Russia invades Ukraine and the US is talking about annexing Greenland, the Panama Canal and even Canada.
It's pretty clear that this type of operation wouldn't be possible today, either from Argentina in offense, or from the UK in defense. It was a remarkable feat to eject a defending force with fewer numbers and despite the horrors and the losses, the number of casualties was historically quite light. It was interesting to read about after all this time.
Hastings is a highly accomplished journalist and writer, and he has come up with a detailed account of both the diplomatic and political manoeuvring the preceded the shooting war that lasted barely a few weeks. It is a fairly straightforward telling of events, but asks the question implicitly throughout, and specifically in the closing chapters: Was it worth it and could it have been avoided? I shall return to this below.
It's important to note, as Hastings does in his foreword, that this is a book written from a British point of view. I think this is probably by necessity, given when it was penned. I am sure that access to information from the unstable and defeated country of Argentina wasn't readily available in 1983. That isn't to say that there is no information about Argentina, its military junta and its politics of the time. It's rather that this is what was widely known and in the public domain (the diplomatic relationship with the US, Galtieri as a leader, the celebrations in the streets after the invasion etc.) I am sure that such a book written now would provide a much more nuanced and in depth coverage of the Argentinian side.
The book also narrates a well thought out story of the conflict that blends the operational aspects of the war with the experiences of those fighting it, as well as the view from back home. The latter is covered relatively sparingly, and the vile coverage from The Sun newspaper is noted, but not dwelt upon. I also very much appreciated the closing chapters which examined the role of Thatcher in all of this, as well as the insipid and useless, not to say vacillating impact of the United States. The US foreign policy on this issue, in common with much of Reagan's vastly overrated administration, was basically a mess as they couldn't decide which side they were on for too long and then basically just argued that it was uncomfortable for them to have two allies at war. As always, the US is looking at how to serve its short term needs, now to expand and keep its empire and basically make money.
As I say, I appreciated Hastings's in-depth look at the aftermath of this war which was very balanced in my view. I was all for the conflict in my callow youth, when every issue was straightforward and black or white to me. Obviously the world isn't like that. It is clear that there were many mistakes made that led to the invasion and the liberation. Since the UK remains firm on not discussing sovereignty with Argentina unless the islanders themselves agree (and they votes overwhelmingly to remain British in 2013) there seems to be no prospect of this changing soon. There was much talk about "fortress Falklands" in the immediate aftermath and there seems to be a much more robust presence there now, and the military capability of Argentina seems much diminished. It therefore seems unlikely much will change in the short to medium term.
Was it worth it? Who knows? There are a lot of factors at play. It is patently absurd that this is still, basically, an outpost of Empire. The islands are 8000 miles from the mother country which makes supporting them difficult and expensive. It is a valid and salient point, made Hastings, that it is honorable to give the islanders their say on sovereignty, but the UK didn't always do that with other outposts of Empire eg Rhodesia so there is some hypocrisy in the position. However, can one realistically allow armed aggression to go unchallenged? This is a great question these days as Russia invades Ukraine and the US is talking about annexing Greenland, the Panama Canal and even Canada.
It's pretty clear that this type of operation wouldn't be possible today, either from Argentina in offense, or from the UK in defense. It was a remarkable feat to eject a defending force with fewer numbers and despite the horrors and the losses, the number of casualties was historically quite light. It was interesting to read about after all this time.
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