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Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence
Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives.
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 8, 2003
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
December 10, 2022
As with any collection of essays, this one was a mixed bag, but more along the lines of 50/50 with half of them getting a "meh" reaction from me. There were two, though, that were worth the price of the book.
The first, "FORTITUDE in Context: The Evolution of British Military Deception in Two World Wars, 1914-1945" was an excellent review and assessment of operational and strategic deception, not just by the British, but also with brief comparative reviews of German, Japanese, and Russian deception ops. I found the story of how the evolving integration of HUMINT (Double-Cross) and SIGINT (ULTRA) into deception planning and ops played such a significant role in MINCEMEAT and FORTITUDE of particular interest. The author also did a decent job of highlighting internal interagency turf conflicts and the effect of personality on Brit deception. A really good read and worth the purchase of the book by itself.
But there was also a very good brief piece, "Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: The Case of Yom Kippur" that is well worth the read. Yes, shelves are full of a variety of books on the '73 war, but this one takes a different tack. This 18-page essay focuses specifically on the significant impact that the views of two senior intelligence officials had on Israeli preparedness for the outbreak of war. The author describes in very clear terms the influence that the estimates of LTC Yona Bandman of AMAN and DMI MG Eli Zeira had on national leadership prior to the outbreak of war and assesses in detail the cognitive failings that resulted in their flawed estimates despite an overwhelming amount of processed intelligence information that indicated they were wrong. A very good short read.
The first, "FORTITUDE in Context: The Evolution of British Military Deception in Two World Wars, 1914-1945" was an excellent review and assessment of operational and strategic deception, not just by the British, but also with brief comparative reviews of German, Japanese, and Russian deception ops. I found the story of how the evolving integration of HUMINT (Double-Cross) and SIGINT (ULTRA) into deception planning and ops played such a significant role in MINCEMEAT and FORTITUDE of particular interest. The author also did a decent job of highlighting internal interagency turf conflicts and the effect of personality on Brit deception. A really good read and worth the purchase of the book by itself.
But there was also a very good brief piece, "Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: The Case of Yom Kippur" that is well worth the read. Yes, shelves are full of a variety of books on the '73 war, but this one takes a different tack. This 18-page essay focuses specifically on the significant impact that the views of two senior intelligence officials had on Israeli preparedness for the outbreak of war. The author describes in very clear terms the influence that the estimates of LTC Yona Bandman of AMAN and DMI MG Eli Zeira had on national leadership prior to the outbreak of war and assesses in detail the cognitive failings that resulted in their flawed estimates despite an overwhelming amount of processed intelligence information that indicated they were wrong. A very good short read.
November 15, 2021
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Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
Betts was born and raised in Eaton, Pennsylvania graduating from Newton High School in 1965. He went on to attend and graduate from Harvard University earning a bachelor's, master's, and eventually doctorate in government in 1965, 1971 and 1975 respectively.
His dissertation, under the direction of Samuel P. Huntington was on the role of military advice in decisions to resort to force, which later became his first book, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.
His dissertation was awarded the Sumner Prize, for best dissertation in international relations. While a student at Harvard, Betts served as a teaching fellow from 1971 to 1975 and a lecturer for the 1975–1976 academic year. He served as a professional staff member on the Church Committee.
In 1976 Betts joined the Brookings Institution where he served as a research associate and later in 1981 a senior fellow until 1990. While at Brookings, Betts was a professional lecture at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Harvard, and Columbia University.
Additionally, he was a staff member on the National Security Council in 1977 and on the foreign policy staff of Walter Mondale presidential campaign in 1984.
In 1990, Betts joined the faculty at Columbia University. There, he led the international security policy program at the School of International and Public Affairs, became the director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies.
A staple of the faculty, Betts taught the introductory course war, peace, and strategy for over 25 years, a requirement for all international relations students at the university.
Betts has been an occasional consultant to the National Intelligence Council and Central Intelligence Agency.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews