Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. In the past, most philosophers have ignored the topic, vaguely supposing that conspiracy theories are obviously irrational and that they can be easily dismissed. The current philosophical interest in the subject results from a realisation that this is not so. Some philosophers have taken up the challenge of identifying and explaining the flaws of conspiracy theories. Other philosophers have argued that conspiracy theories do not deserve their bad reputation, and that conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. This book represents both sides of this important debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history. It represents a significant contribution to the growing interdisciplinary debate about conspiracy theories.
There is more than one author in the Goodreads catalog with this name. This entry is for David ^ Coady.
David Coady is Deputy Division Chief of the Expenditure Policy Division at the Fiscal Affairs Department (FAD) of the IMF. Prior to that, he was a Research Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute and a lecturer in economics in the University of London. He earned his Ph.D. in economics from the London School of Economics in 1992.
A collection of essays about practical epistemology centered around conspiracy. It's really only in the philosophical domain that someone can respectably defend conspiracy theorising because contrary to popular imagination entering into this discourse requires the highest amount of epistemic rigour.
Two relevant essays follow the publication of this book. I might say that their treatment of the topic is superior, owing to the maturity in thought you could get away with only reading the two below.
Pidgin 'Conspiracy Theories and the Conventional Wisdom Revisited' Dentith 'Conspiracy Theories on the Basis of the Evidence'