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Twentieth-Century Battles
Battle of Surigao Strait
“[Tully] paints Admiral Nishimura's high-speed run into history with an entirely fresh palette of detail.” —James D. Hornfischer, New York Times–bestselling author of Neptune’s Inferno Surigao Strait in the Philippine Islands was the scene of a major battleship duel during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Because the battle was fought at night and had few survivors on the Japanese side, the events of that naval engagement have been passed down in garbled accounts. Anthony P. Tully pulls together all of the existing documentary material, including newly discovered accounts and a careful analysis of US Navy action reports, to create a new and more detailed description of the action. In several respects, Tully's narrative differs radically from the received versions and represents an important historical corrective. Also included in the book are a number of previously unpublished photographs and charts that bring a fresh perspective to the battle. “By giving a fuller view of the Japanese side, Tully's work forces a substantial revision of the traditional picture of the battle. Battle of Surigao Strait is not only military history based on scrupulous use of a plethora of new source materials, but is a spanking good read. Highly recommended.” —War in History “Tully has managed to trace the complicated flow of and reason for events on the nights of 24-25 October with a skill and aplomb that forces one to reconsider previously held views.” —Naval History
352 pages, Kindle Edition
First published March 23, 2009
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110 people want to read
About the author
Anthony P. Tully
4 books11 followersA graduate of Texas Tech University, Anthony P. Tully is an independent scholar and historian of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
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Displaying 1 - 24 of 24 reviews
January 6, 2023
When you mention Leyte Gulf to most people, they know something about the battle off Samar, but little about Ozawa's successful effort to lure Third Fleet away from San Bernardino Strait or the complex battles in Surigao Strait. This book makes a determined effort to explain most of what happened between Admiral Oldendorf's forces, and the two Japanese forces under Nishimura and Shima in the rather confined southern approaches to Leyte Gulf. Unhappily, the maps provided did little to help the reader.
Having read quite a bit about the overall battle, I knew the basics, but this book added a great deal to my knowledge and appreciation for the skill and bravery of the Japanese sailors, who were sent out in an effort to prevent the Americans from completing their successful landing by attacking the shipping in Leyte Gulf.
The trouble was, as they did at Midway, the Japanese devised a complicated plan, which needed good timing, skill, and luck. Amazingly, it almost worked because Section 3 under Nishimura sacrificed itself so that Kurita's Central Force, along with Ozawa's diversion, could have their chance.
Part of the problem with the battle plan was the fact that it relied on the cooperation of Nishimura and Shima, who was in command of 2nd Striking Force. Unfortunately, cooperation was sorely lacking as well as communication and adequate radar. In fact, there was considerable confusion about which ships were even fighting at times.
On the other side, the Americans threw everything into the battle starting with PT-boats, then destroyers and even 6 battleships. Some mistakes were made, but they had the resources and superior technology to compensate. By this point in the war, the Japanese could not hope to do more than delay the inevitable, but the great battles to come, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, were on land not at sea. Leyte Gulf had put an end to that.
Having read quite a bit about the overall battle, I knew the basics, but this book added a great deal to my knowledge and appreciation for the skill and bravery of the Japanese sailors, who were sent out in an effort to prevent the Americans from completing their successful landing by attacking the shipping in Leyte Gulf.
The trouble was, as they did at Midway, the Japanese devised a complicated plan, which needed good timing, skill, and luck. Amazingly, it almost worked because Section 3 under Nishimura sacrificed itself so that Kurita's Central Force, along with Ozawa's diversion, could have their chance.
Part of the problem with the battle plan was the fact that it relied on the cooperation of Nishimura and Shima, who was in command of 2nd Striking Force. Unfortunately, cooperation was sorely lacking as well as communication and adequate radar. In fact, there was considerable confusion about which ships were even fighting at times.
On the other side, the Americans threw everything into the battle starting with PT-boats, then destroyers and even 6 battleships. Some mistakes were made, but they had the resources and superior technology to compensate. By this point in the war, the Japanese could not hope to do more than delay the inevitable, but the great battles to come, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, were on land not at sea. Leyte Gulf had put an end to that.
August 23, 2022
Though only one component of the massive naval clash known as the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the battle of Surigao Strait has long attracted attention for its status as the “last big-gun naval battle” in which battleships fought against one another. Unlike the other battles associated with Leyte Gulf, it was a straight ship-to-ship action involving battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and even PT boats, who engaged each other in the early hours of October 25, 1944. It was there in Surigao Strait, to the south of the main landing beaches on Leyte, that the warships of Admiral Jesse Oldendorf’s Task Force 77.2 sank those of the Third Section under Admiral Shōji Nishimura, in an effort crowned by the successful execution of the classic naval warfare tactic of “crossing the T.”
For this reason, Surigao Strait has enjoyed its place in studies of the combat in Leyte Gulf, as well as in works centering on the battle itself. As Anthony Tully argues in his preface, however, there has been no comprehensive treatment of Surigao Strait written since the late 1950s. His book seeks to rectify this by recounting the events leading up to the battle, as well as a detailed description of the fighting itself. Tully is well equipped for this task: as an independent naval historian and co-author with Jonathan Parshall of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, he is familiar with the Japanese records of the campaign. These he uses to good effect, providing a careful reconstruction of the events that seeks to clear through the fog of battle and reconcile to the greatest extent possible the confusing and at times contradictory accounts of the fighting from both sides.
Such an effort is not easy, given the fragmentary sources on the Japanese side. As Tully notes throughout the book, most of the logs and other documentary materials went down with the ships that were sunk in the battle. Survivors were few, with many who did escape their sinking ships killed by Filipinos once they reached the shore. Nonetheless, Tully makes remarkable strides in reconstructing what he presents as a “gallant sacrificial diversion.” Nishmura’s force was one part of a complex effort with a simple goal: to smash the American invasion fleet then anchored of Leyte. While the main striking force advanced from the north, Nishimura’s ships would pass at night through the Surigao Strait, arriving at dawn to sink the vulnerable transports.
The plan required surprise and luck to succeed, and Nishimura enjoyed neither. Detected by American carrier planes, his ships came under aerial attack on the morning of October 24. This gave Oldendorf time to prepare his response. When Third Section reached the strait, they faced an initial gauntlet of PT boat attacks, then a far more formidable one of torpedo-firing destroyers that took out the battleship Fuso and three Japanese destroyers. Because of this, it was Fuso’s sister ship Yamashiro that faced virtually alone the six battleships and eight cruisers of Oldendorf’s force, which in less than twenty minutes reduced her to a flaming wreck. With Yamashiro’s sinking the southern attack was abandoned, with the retreating ships subjected to additional losses as they withdrew.
Tully’s book provides a detailed recounting of events, one that focuses primarily on the often-overshadowed Japanese perspective of the battle. His correction of mistranslations and incorporation of overlooked accounts from survivors recorded soon after the battle helps him to address misconceptions and provide a better understanding of decisions that have often seemed incomprehensible or simply wrongheaded. Yet for all of the value of his efforts, Tully’s narrative is often weighed down by the sheer mass of detail, and his efforts to liven up the drama of the battle with conjectural depictions of people’s reactions and frequent usage of exclamation points only highlights this problem. The result is a book that, though indispensable for its revisionist reconstruction of the details of the battle, can prove something of a slow read for anyone seeking a gripping account of the fighting.
For this reason, Surigao Strait has enjoyed its place in studies of the combat in Leyte Gulf, as well as in works centering on the battle itself. As Anthony Tully argues in his preface, however, there has been no comprehensive treatment of Surigao Strait written since the late 1950s. His book seeks to rectify this by recounting the events leading up to the battle, as well as a detailed description of the fighting itself. Tully is well equipped for this task: as an independent naval historian and co-author with Jonathan Parshall of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway, he is familiar with the Japanese records of the campaign. These he uses to good effect, providing a careful reconstruction of the events that seeks to clear through the fog of battle and reconcile to the greatest extent possible the confusing and at times contradictory accounts of the fighting from both sides.
Such an effort is not easy, given the fragmentary sources on the Japanese side. As Tully notes throughout the book, most of the logs and other documentary materials went down with the ships that were sunk in the battle. Survivors were few, with many who did escape their sinking ships killed by Filipinos once they reached the shore. Nonetheless, Tully makes remarkable strides in reconstructing what he presents as a “gallant sacrificial diversion.” Nishmura’s force was one part of a complex effort with a simple goal: to smash the American invasion fleet then anchored of Leyte. While the main striking force advanced from the north, Nishimura’s ships would pass at night through the Surigao Strait, arriving at dawn to sink the vulnerable transports.
The plan required surprise and luck to succeed, and Nishimura enjoyed neither. Detected by American carrier planes, his ships came under aerial attack on the morning of October 24. This gave Oldendorf time to prepare his response. When Third Section reached the strait, they faced an initial gauntlet of PT boat attacks, then a far more formidable one of torpedo-firing destroyers that took out the battleship Fuso and three Japanese destroyers. Because of this, it was Fuso’s sister ship Yamashiro that faced virtually alone the six battleships and eight cruisers of Oldendorf’s force, which in less than twenty minutes reduced her to a flaming wreck. With Yamashiro’s sinking the southern attack was abandoned, with the retreating ships subjected to additional losses as they withdrew.
Tully’s book provides a detailed recounting of events, one that focuses primarily on the often-overshadowed Japanese perspective of the battle. His correction of mistranslations and incorporation of overlooked accounts from survivors recorded soon after the battle helps him to address misconceptions and provide a better understanding of decisions that have often seemed incomprehensible or simply wrongheaded. Yet for all of the value of his efforts, Tully’s narrative is often weighed down by the sheer mass of detail, and his efforts to liven up the drama of the battle with conjectural depictions of people’s reactions and frequent usage of exclamation points only highlights this problem. The result is a book that, though indispensable for its revisionist reconstruction of the details of the battle, can prove something of a slow read for anyone seeking a gripping account of the fighting.
April 3, 2010
I have found it difficult to write about Anthony Tully’s Battle of Surigao Strait because I wanted to like the book but find myself unable to look past the books multiple flaws that distract and distort Tully’s well intentioned book and perhaps the historical record. What is obvious is that Tully has a great passion for naval history and has done meticulous research however that is only a quarter of being a History scholar. His writing is does not follow basic historical standards for writing. What he is missing are the well thought out conclusions that were present in Shattered Sword that he co wrote with Jonathan Parshall, good clear solid writing that isn’t speculative (Tully often speculates what some of the Japanese were thinking which cannot be substantiated, this is not acceptable for a scholarly work but acceptable for fictional work) and often he was out of his element in describing the movements of ships.
Tully has a large online following who feel that Tully is a scholar of History (they claim over and over that he is a scholar and his mini biography states he is a free lance scholar). However based on my training as an Historian Tully’s effort falls short of scholarly academic work because he doesn’t follow the basic components of beginning writing a History piece, which is to have a question that is clear and significant, identifying where the author discovered their facts (Tully has many facts but is inconsistent in using end notes for his sources) and deciding what pieces of the research supports or rejects the significant question. Tully’s book is unfocused, often has unsubstantiated feelings of participants and the writing gets lost in minutiae of trivial facts. In short he has a lot of information but a lack of focus in what his book was about. My fear is that readers new to naval history will use this book as the premier work when it needs to be approached with a very carefully trained eye on the actual pertinent facts of this battle and any future interpretations of this battle.
Writing a historical piece is very much like conducting an experiment with the Scientific Method. First the historian is compelled to do research by a compelling reason. They create a hypothesis or a theory. Then the historian conducts exhaustive research and determines during the research if the information supports their theory or if the initial theory was valid in the first place. Next they organize their research and decide what is important, what is trivial and what must be reconciled because the available information might be contradictory. Then they must interpret their information to decide once and for all if their theory is still valid and if not decide if there is a compelling reason to write or develop a new theory. Then the historian writes their theory (old or new) in clear, dispassionate tones that are easy to read and for the historian to defend. Next the historian must source their sources so that the reader if so inclined can go back to the sources and develop either a complementary or a contradictory set of interpretations based on the same material. This is where the true fun for historians come academic scholarly debate. Tully has written a descriptive history which is nice but not very scholarly. A scholarly work would have a thesis or a few supporting thesis like his Shattered Sword with John Parshall.
First his theory is still unclear about the battle, was he trying to determine what sank the battleship Fuso or why Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura took his task force unsupported into Surigao Strait when he knew the Americans were waiting in force. It is not until Chapter 6 that any sense of a thesis begins to even be formulated even then not articulated. In the Nishimura question the answer of why Nishimura led his Task Force is answered by he did not know that Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s force was delayed and he felt he had an advantage over the Americans. However Tully never makes a strong argument for this theory. It is a weak and diffused argument that is behind speculation of what Nishimura thought. It is not the place of the historian to speculate what a participant felt unless they have documented evidence by the participant.
Was the purpose of the book Tully’s theory of how the Fuso sank? In this he lets the reader develop their own theory. This is not a scholarly effort. The scholar will take a stand and feels confident in their theory to defend it. If not don’t write about the event. Tully does a wonderful job figuring out how the Fuso was attacked but can’t support how it was sunk. Did the damage cause catastrophic damage to sink her immediately? Did she break in two? Did she suffer a long prolonged sinking? It seems based on Tully’s evidence that the Fuso suffered some watertight bulkhead damage which allowed for progressive flooding to happen until the bow was flooded and the undamaged stern broke off (ala Titanic) at the machinery spaces or engine rooms.
What is also striking was that the first sixty three pages was all introduction to a rather one sided battle and that is not in dispute to victor, causes etc. (The amazing thing is that this battle he is describing has never been in much dispute by professional historians.) He spends far too much time describing the senior Japanese admirals and how they interacted before page sixty eight but after page sixty eight he only spends time discussing two admirals, Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura and Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. This left me wondering why he bothered with long descriptions of Kurita or Toyoda because after issuing the sortie orders they have relatively minor roles in Surigao Strait. Not once in those sixty three pages is any sort of reason for the book strongly demonstrated it is not until the eighty sixth page that any coherent thesis appears and at that it is unclear and disjointed.
Tully has a lack of focus of where he wants to go with his book or what information is relevant to his significant question or if he has a theory. Often he describes events that have no bearing on Nishimura or Shima or even the sinking of the Fuso. A very good example is his description of the destroyer of Michishio on page 67 for lack of focus. Tully describes an air attack on Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s fleet by Task force 38 airplanes. Tully took space to describe how the Michishio missed the air raid warning by signal flags from the battleship Yamashiro. Immediately I sensed a foreshadowing of the Michishio’s sinking by TF 38 aircraft instead the destroyer survives unscathed. I was left with why did Tully bother with this information? How does it help understand his focus? If anything I felt sympathy for the signalman of the watch on the Michishio because it was his duty to see the signal and warn the ship, if he was negligent (there are multiple scenarios where the signalman could have been attending to other duties) he would have been beaten in the Imperial Japanese Navy and felt that Tully was needlessly exposing an embarrassing moment for a watch section that really is not for public consumption that did not add to the historical record. This recounting of a non event is confusing and shows a lack of scholarship.
Tully’s writing style is one of over identification with his subjects which is not again scholarly. Far too often is refers to Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf as Oley. I wonder if Mr. Tully served under Admiral Oldendorf or is personally related to or close friends with Radm. Oldendorf because those are the only times (and then questionable) to refer to a person’s nickname without their full name and title in close proximity such as Rear Admiral Jesse B. “Oley” Oldendorf. Tully does this with ships nick names such as “Big Ben for U.S.S. Franklin CV-13, Wee Vee for U.S.S. West Virginia. Unless he has served on those ships or was writing about those ships in a book where they are the main subject their nicknames are inappropriate and irrelevant. He continues this by using the nicknames of the PT Boats used in the battle. These are commissioned vessels in the US Navy and he is using nick names as if he was a participant. Is this a memoir or a “scholarly” work investigating a battle? I was left to wonder if Tully wanted to use these names to prove to the reader that he was far more knowledgeable than the reader or the false sense of Tully’s authenticity. I hope that it was neither and just a mistake in style after all it is the scholar’s duty to inform their readers about their theory of the topic not their mastery of trivia.
Far too often Tully moves into conjecture on how the Japanese admirals were feeling or “perhaps” thinking. This is a very dangerous slope for Historians to go on. Historians practice a science in their research and an art in their writing but their writing must be technical to show a clear unbiased view of events to allow for scholarly debate. By projecting his views on to the participants of the event Tully is muddying the historical record with conjecture and honestly it shows he doesn’t understand the mentality of sailors of any nation very well. In the future providing conjecture on a participant’s feelings should be reserved for historical fiction not scholarly work. Without end notes and properly sourcing his material Tully’s work when he delves into a participant’s feelings is conjecture and not needed. Some examples are (p. 244) “On Abukuma, with his ship dead in the water to transfer the flag, Captain Hanada must have blanched and thought, “Not again!”” Tully provides no support on how he came about this information into Capt. Hanada’s state of mind unless Tully is projecting what he would feel at that moment and this is unacceptable.
Yet another example of conjecture is from page 65 is “On Yamashiro’s fantail Air WO Tanaka Hiroshi and his six men were busy in preparations to catapult her two Jakes aloft as well, uneasily looking skyward at times.” How does Tully know they weren’t focused on their job? After all if he had practical seamanship knowledge he would know that Tanaka’s men would be working with focus to get the aircraft off of the fantail and leave the looking around to the lookouts whose duty it was to provide warning of any incoming aircraft attack. Warrant Officer Tanaka would have dealt with any sky larker harshly rather than permit it because the sky larking would put the working party in danger. Mr. Tully does the reader a disservice by providing a false insight that an Imperial Japanese Navy Warrant Officer up from the enlisted ranks where the enlisted personnel were treated brutally (It is well documented that the Imperial Japanese Navy used physical assaults on recruits, enlisted men and midshipmen to insure there was instant and unquestioned obedience to a superior officer. Tameichi Hara’s excellent book Japanese Destroyer Captain discusses the abuse at Eta Jima the Japanese Annapolis.) would allow his men to question his authority looking to the sky and endangering their ship by having a fully fueled and armed aircraft still on the catapult that could cause a serious fire and threat to the ship in hit by a bomb or a bomb’s concussion. I’m not buying Warrant Officer Tanaka would put up with sky larking at all. This projecting Tully’s own feelings is nothing more than irresponsible writing on Mr. Tully’s part.
On page 180 “At 0337, with Yamashiro back to 18 knots, Nishimura likely nodded with satisfaction, and with growing resolve and perhaps confidence, ordered course set for the final run-in to Leyte Gulf” and on page 190 “His eyesight back to normal, Oldendorf lit a cigarette (why Oldendorf would do this after just getting his night vision back from being close to the flash of a cruisers main battery is nothing but silliness on Tully’s part) and strode confidently into the flag bridge and sat down in a chair in the corner of it to watch the spectacle erupting outside the windows.” How does Tully know what these men were doing or thinking or even acting? This must be him transferring his feelings of how they felt. For a fact Nishimura didn’t leave any writings behind reflecting mood, emotions since he didn’t survive the battle. This can only be Tully projecting his own emotions.
Perhaps the most egregious conjecture was on page 198. “Inside the pagoda, Nishimura bit his lip and remained resolute as his flagship began to quake under repeated hits. The forward turrets, their gunners undaunted by the concussions…” Where did Tully get this information? He sources a junior officer, but how close was the very junior officer (recently commission paymaster or supply officer ensign) too see Nishimura bite his lip or that the gunners who were 120 feet or so down and approximately 200 feet forward encased in heavy steel were undaunted by the concussions. This passage screams of blatant hero worship or at worst fictionalizing the battle to suit his theory. Either way it is not scholarly work.
Tully does not understand that a History scholar must be economical in his words and let prose be the realm of novelists and poets. A historian must ensure that their words are clear and factual. Tully wants to be descriptive which again paints for the reader a false understanding of the event. Unless Mr. Tully was there and recording the events as they unfolded leave the prose to those who write from their imagination rather than those of us who want to be based in fact and defensible comments. To rely on prose again muddies the historical record and does not help future historians who might use this work as a resource.
Another issue Tully has is he doesn’t interpret the information so it is useful to his readers. He switches between two different measurement systems. Whenever he is writing about the Japanese he utilizes the metric system and for the parts about the US Navy he uses the Imperial units. Anyone used to doing the conversions should not have any issues but to a reader unused to the conversions would be confused. This seems that he just used the numbers based on the information he had and did not seem to understand it is his responsibility to pick one and go with it. If he had done the conversions and left the conversion in a bracket next to the unit of measurement such as Fuso was 192 m (630ft) he would do his readers and perhaps future historians a service. Even if he picked a system and said for the reader’s convenience I have chosen this measurement system he would have been on defensible ground.
Tully’s has a lack of knowledge of seamanship. This maybe he has never had to stand a watch or been at sea in a storm. It is clear on a few occasions his has a very limited knowledge of ship handling. At one point he addressed the large pagoda like super structures on the Fuso being very tall and affecting the stability of the ship. The super structures were according to page 35 44 meters (144 feet) tall. My first thought was what was the ships’ metacenter or how far could she roll before capsizing. Tully instead of discussing the metacenter Tully calls the stability of the ship, “excessively “tender” (I have been around ships and never heard this term for a ship that has a stability issue), that is, prone to capsize. None were more surprised than Fuso’s own sailors.” (page 36). I am sure they looked at the Fuso and knew she had a high metacenter or lower degree of roll before she capsized. In the book the tests stopped at 8.1 but during the battle she took a 14 degree heel and this caused chaos. Mr. Tully should know about metacenter if he is writing about stability issues that should have been part of his research.
Another example of lack of seamanship is how he would constantly refer to ships. Tully may love ships from afar and online but ships aren’t pieces of machines bolted together they seem to have a soul and temperament all to themselves. Tully on just the times I cared to take note of on page 235 he calls the Japanese destroyer Shigure “it” and on page 83 calls the U.S.S. Houston “it”. If Tully was any sort of sailor he would know to use the loving term she. Every ship is a lady Mr. Tully and deserves to be treated like one.
Tully has an annoying tendency to make up his own acronyms. Throughout the book he has used the acronym TROM. I was at first puzzled because it seemed to be a log, perhaps the Japanese Navy called their logs TROM’s. However I googled TROM and found the only uses of TROM emanated from Tully’s own website. A TROM according to Tully is a Tabulated Record of Movement, to people who have actually been in the Navy and have degrees in Naval History or work in Naval History called Tully’s TROM a chronology of the ship or a summary of the ship’s history. It seems the chronology is a better term since it is more accurate. Yet another new acronym is on page 103 of AR which according to his own published abbreviations is AR=Action Report, historians use the accurate abbreviation AAR or After Action Report. It seems if you are to call yourself an expert and a scholar you would use the accepted norms of your expertise and not feel the need to make up abbreviations. It seems Tully wants the reader to think he is more superior to other historians. Tully’s constant usage of abbreviations of DD for destroyers and BB for battleship is again an attempt it seems to be taken seriously, it seems stretched and trying to hard to be accepted.
While I was investigating this new acronyms Tully has seemingly created I was puzzled by many of Tully’s inaccurate naming of compartments onboard ships. For example on page 225 he calls the anchor windlass room the forward anchor windlass room unless the ship has anchors in the bow and the stern this is a redundant name. Also on page 225 he calls the steering room steering room aft, the proper term is aft steering. While describing damage on page 74 he says “Fortunately the gash in the shell was above the waterline…” One must assume he was discussing a ship rather than an egg therefore most people remotely knowledgeable about ships would use the term hull rather than shell. On page 168 once again Tully shows a lack of knowledge of terminology onboard ships calling main battery plot where the fire control equipment is located to fire control station for main batteries. On the very next page he insinuates that the U.S.S. Hutchins had the first Combat Information Center but in all realities CIC’s had been around since 1942 not an immediate development brought to the battle by the Hutchins. By October 1944 most US warships had some version of a CIC, some were modifications some were purpose built but the US destroyers had CIC’s as far back as November 1942 if not August 1942. The most humorous misnaming is the pilot room on page 201, either he was slavish to his translators or he doesn’t know the compartment where the ships wheel is located is the pilothouse not the pilot room.
Continued in comment section
Tully has a large online following who feel that Tully is a scholar of History (they claim over and over that he is a scholar and his mini biography states he is a free lance scholar). However based on my training as an Historian Tully’s effort falls short of scholarly academic work because he doesn’t follow the basic components of beginning writing a History piece, which is to have a question that is clear and significant, identifying where the author discovered their facts (Tully has many facts but is inconsistent in using end notes for his sources) and deciding what pieces of the research supports or rejects the significant question. Tully’s book is unfocused, often has unsubstantiated feelings of participants and the writing gets lost in minutiae of trivial facts. In short he has a lot of information but a lack of focus in what his book was about. My fear is that readers new to naval history will use this book as the premier work when it needs to be approached with a very carefully trained eye on the actual pertinent facts of this battle and any future interpretations of this battle.
Writing a historical piece is very much like conducting an experiment with the Scientific Method. First the historian is compelled to do research by a compelling reason. They create a hypothesis or a theory. Then the historian conducts exhaustive research and determines during the research if the information supports their theory or if the initial theory was valid in the first place. Next they organize their research and decide what is important, what is trivial and what must be reconciled because the available information might be contradictory. Then they must interpret their information to decide once and for all if their theory is still valid and if not decide if there is a compelling reason to write or develop a new theory. Then the historian writes their theory (old or new) in clear, dispassionate tones that are easy to read and for the historian to defend. Next the historian must source their sources so that the reader if so inclined can go back to the sources and develop either a complementary or a contradictory set of interpretations based on the same material. This is where the true fun for historians come academic scholarly debate. Tully has written a descriptive history which is nice but not very scholarly. A scholarly work would have a thesis or a few supporting thesis like his Shattered Sword with John Parshall.
First his theory is still unclear about the battle, was he trying to determine what sank the battleship Fuso or why Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura took his task force unsupported into Surigao Strait when he knew the Americans were waiting in force. It is not until Chapter 6 that any sense of a thesis begins to even be formulated even then not articulated. In the Nishimura question the answer of why Nishimura led his Task Force is answered by he did not know that Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita’s force was delayed and he felt he had an advantage over the Americans. However Tully never makes a strong argument for this theory. It is a weak and diffused argument that is behind speculation of what Nishimura thought. It is not the place of the historian to speculate what a participant felt unless they have documented evidence by the participant.
Was the purpose of the book Tully’s theory of how the Fuso sank? In this he lets the reader develop their own theory. This is not a scholarly effort. The scholar will take a stand and feels confident in their theory to defend it. If not don’t write about the event. Tully does a wonderful job figuring out how the Fuso was attacked but can’t support how it was sunk. Did the damage cause catastrophic damage to sink her immediately? Did she break in two? Did she suffer a long prolonged sinking? It seems based on Tully’s evidence that the Fuso suffered some watertight bulkhead damage which allowed for progressive flooding to happen until the bow was flooded and the undamaged stern broke off (ala Titanic) at the machinery spaces or engine rooms.
What is also striking was that the first sixty three pages was all introduction to a rather one sided battle and that is not in dispute to victor, causes etc. (The amazing thing is that this battle he is describing has never been in much dispute by professional historians.) He spends far too much time describing the senior Japanese admirals and how they interacted before page sixty eight but after page sixty eight he only spends time discussing two admirals, Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura and Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima. This left me wondering why he bothered with long descriptions of Kurita or Toyoda because after issuing the sortie orders they have relatively minor roles in Surigao Strait. Not once in those sixty three pages is any sort of reason for the book strongly demonstrated it is not until the eighty sixth page that any coherent thesis appears and at that it is unclear and disjointed.
Tully has a lack of focus of where he wants to go with his book or what information is relevant to his significant question or if he has a theory. Often he describes events that have no bearing on Nishimura or Shima or even the sinking of the Fuso. A very good example is his description of the destroyer of Michishio on page 67 for lack of focus. Tully describes an air attack on Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s fleet by Task force 38 airplanes. Tully took space to describe how the Michishio missed the air raid warning by signal flags from the battleship Yamashiro. Immediately I sensed a foreshadowing of the Michishio’s sinking by TF 38 aircraft instead the destroyer survives unscathed. I was left with why did Tully bother with this information? How does it help understand his focus? If anything I felt sympathy for the signalman of the watch on the Michishio because it was his duty to see the signal and warn the ship, if he was negligent (there are multiple scenarios where the signalman could have been attending to other duties) he would have been beaten in the Imperial Japanese Navy and felt that Tully was needlessly exposing an embarrassing moment for a watch section that really is not for public consumption that did not add to the historical record. This recounting of a non event is confusing and shows a lack of scholarship.
Tully’s writing style is one of over identification with his subjects which is not again scholarly. Far too often is refers to Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf as Oley. I wonder if Mr. Tully served under Admiral Oldendorf or is personally related to or close friends with Radm. Oldendorf because those are the only times (and then questionable) to refer to a person’s nickname without their full name and title in close proximity such as Rear Admiral Jesse B. “Oley” Oldendorf. Tully does this with ships nick names such as “Big Ben for U.S.S. Franklin CV-13, Wee Vee for U.S.S. West Virginia. Unless he has served on those ships or was writing about those ships in a book where they are the main subject their nicknames are inappropriate and irrelevant. He continues this by using the nicknames of the PT Boats used in the battle. These are commissioned vessels in the US Navy and he is using nick names as if he was a participant. Is this a memoir or a “scholarly” work investigating a battle? I was left to wonder if Tully wanted to use these names to prove to the reader that he was far more knowledgeable than the reader or the false sense of Tully’s authenticity. I hope that it was neither and just a mistake in style after all it is the scholar’s duty to inform their readers about their theory of the topic not their mastery of trivia.
Far too often Tully moves into conjecture on how the Japanese admirals were feeling or “perhaps” thinking. This is a very dangerous slope for Historians to go on. Historians practice a science in their research and an art in their writing but their writing must be technical to show a clear unbiased view of events to allow for scholarly debate. By projecting his views on to the participants of the event Tully is muddying the historical record with conjecture and honestly it shows he doesn’t understand the mentality of sailors of any nation very well. In the future providing conjecture on a participant’s feelings should be reserved for historical fiction not scholarly work. Without end notes and properly sourcing his material Tully’s work when he delves into a participant’s feelings is conjecture and not needed. Some examples are (p. 244) “On Abukuma, with his ship dead in the water to transfer the flag, Captain Hanada must have blanched and thought, “Not again!”” Tully provides no support on how he came about this information into Capt. Hanada’s state of mind unless Tully is projecting what he would feel at that moment and this is unacceptable.
Yet another example of conjecture is from page 65 is “On Yamashiro’s fantail Air WO Tanaka Hiroshi and his six men were busy in preparations to catapult her two Jakes aloft as well, uneasily looking skyward at times.” How does Tully know they weren’t focused on their job? After all if he had practical seamanship knowledge he would know that Tanaka’s men would be working with focus to get the aircraft off of the fantail and leave the looking around to the lookouts whose duty it was to provide warning of any incoming aircraft attack. Warrant Officer Tanaka would have dealt with any sky larker harshly rather than permit it because the sky larking would put the working party in danger. Mr. Tully does the reader a disservice by providing a false insight that an Imperial Japanese Navy Warrant Officer up from the enlisted ranks where the enlisted personnel were treated brutally (It is well documented that the Imperial Japanese Navy used physical assaults on recruits, enlisted men and midshipmen to insure there was instant and unquestioned obedience to a superior officer. Tameichi Hara’s excellent book Japanese Destroyer Captain discusses the abuse at Eta Jima the Japanese Annapolis.) would allow his men to question his authority looking to the sky and endangering their ship by having a fully fueled and armed aircraft still on the catapult that could cause a serious fire and threat to the ship in hit by a bomb or a bomb’s concussion. I’m not buying Warrant Officer Tanaka would put up with sky larking at all. This projecting Tully’s own feelings is nothing more than irresponsible writing on Mr. Tully’s part.
On page 180 “At 0337, with Yamashiro back to 18 knots, Nishimura likely nodded with satisfaction, and with growing resolve and perhaps confidence, ordered course set for the final run-in to Leyte Gulf” and on page 190 “His eyesight back to normal, Oldendorf lit a cigarette (why Oldendorf would do this after just getting his night vision back from being close to the flash of a cruisers main battery is nothing but silliness on Tully’s part) and strode confidently into the flag bridge and sat down in a chair in the corner of it to watch the spectacle erupting outside the windows.” How does Tully know what these men were doing or thinking or even acting? This must be him transferring his feelings of how they felt. For a fact Nishimura didn’t leave any writings behind reflecting mood, emotions since he didn’t survive the battle. This can only be Tully projecting his own emotions.
Perhaps the most egregious conjecture was on page 198. “Inside the pagoda, Nishimura bit his lip and remained resolute as his flagship began to quake under repeated hits. The forward turrets, their gunners undaunted by the concussions…” Where did Tully get this information? He sources a junior officer, but how close was the very junior officer (recently commission paymaster or supply officer ensign) too see Nishimura bite his lip or that the gunners who were 120 feet or so down and approximately 200 feet forward encased in heavy steel were undaunted by the concussions. This passage screams of blatant hero worship or at worst fictionalizing the battle to suit his theory. Either way it is not scholarly work.
Tully does not understand that a History scholar must be economical in his words and let prose be the realm of novelists and poets. A historian must ensure that their words are clear and factual. Tully wants to be descriptive which again paints for the reader a false understanding of the event. Unless Mr. Tully was there and recording the events as they unfolded leave the prose to those who write from their imagination rather than those of us who want to be based in fact and defensible comments. To rely on prose again muddies the historical record and does not help future historians who might use this work as a resource.
Another issue Tully has is he doesn’t interpret the information so it is useful to his readers. He switches between two different measurement systems. Whenever he is writing about the Japanese he utilizes the metric system and for the parts about the US Navy he uses the Imperial units. Anyone used to doing the conversions should not have any issues but to a reader unused to the conversions would be confused. This seems that he just used the numbers based on the information he had and did not seem to understand it is his responsibility to pick one and go with it. If he had done the conversions and left the conversion in a bracket next to the unit of measurement such as Fuso was 192 m (630ft) he would do his readers and perhaps future historians a service. Even if he picked a system and said for the reader’s convenience I have chosen this measurement system he would have been on defensible ground.
Tully’s has a lack of knowledge of seamanship. This maybe he has never had to stand a watch or been at sea in a storm. It is clear on a few occasions his has a very limited knowledge of ship handling. At one point he addressed the large pagoda like super structures on the Fuso being very tall and affecting the stability of the ship. The super structures were according to page 35 44 meters (144 feet) tall. My first thought was what was the ships’ metacenter or how far could she roll before capsizing. Tully instead of discussing the metacenter Tully calls the stability of the ship, “excessively “tender” (I have been around ships and never heard this term for a ship that has a stability issue), that is, prone to capsize. None were more surprised than Fuso’s own sailors.” (page 36). I am sure they looked at the Fuso and knew she had a high metacenter or lower degree of roll before she capsized. In the book the tests stopped at 8.1 but during the battle she took a 14 degree heel and this caused chaos. Mr. Tully should know about metacenter if he is writing about stability issues that should have been part of his research.
Another example of lack of seamanship is how he would constantly refer to ships. Tully may love ships from afar and online but ships aren’t pieces of machines bolted together they seem to have a soul and temperament all to themselves. Tully on just the times I cared to take note of on page 235 he calls the Japanese destroyer Shigure “it” and on page 83 calls the U.S.S. Houston “it”. If Tully was any sort of sailor he would know to use the loving term she. Every ship is a lady Mr. Tully and deserves to be treated like one.
Tully has an annoying tendency to make up his own acronyms. Throughout the book he has used the acronym TROM. I was at first puzzled because it seemed to be a log, perhaps the Japanese Navy called their logs TROM’s. However I googled TROM and found the only uses of TROM emanated from Tully’s own website. A TROM according to Tully is a Tabulated Record of Movement, to people who have actually been in the Navy and have degrees in Naval History or work in Naval History called Tully’s TROM a chronology of the ship or a summary of the ship’s history. It seems the chronology is a better term since it is more accurate. Yet another new acronym is on page 103 of AR which according to his own published abbreviations is AR=Action Report, historians use the accurate abbreviation AAR or After Action Report. It seems if you are to call yourself an expert and a scholar you would use the accepted norms of your expertise and not feel the need to make up abbreviations. It seems Tully wants the reader to think he is more superior to other historians. Tully’s constant usage of abbreviations of DD for destroyers and BB for battleship is again an attempt it seems to be taken seriously, it seems stretched and trying to hard to be accepted.
While I was investigating this new acronyms Tully has seemingly created I was puzzled by many of Tully’s inaccurate naming of compartments onboard ships. For example on page 225 he calls the anchor windlass room the forward anchor windlass room unless the ship has anchors in the bow and the stern this is a redundant name. Also on page 225 he calls the steering room steering room aft, the proper term is aft steering. While describing damage on page 74 he says “Fortunately the gash in the shell was above the waterline…” One must assume he was discussing a ship rather than an egg therefore most people remotely knowledgeable about ships would use the term hull rather than shell. On page 168 once again Tully shows a lack of knowledge of terminology onboard ships calling main battery plot where the fire control equipment is located to fire control station for main batteries. On the very next page he insinuates that the U.S.S. Hutchins had the first Combat Information Center but in all realities CIC’s had been around since 1942 not an immediate development brought to the battle by the Hutchins. By October 1944 most US warships had some version of a CIC, some were modifications some were purpose built but the US destroyers had CIC’s as far back as November 1942 if not August 1942. The most humorous misnaming is the pilot room on page 201, either he was slavish to his translators or he doesn’t know the compartment where the ships wheel is located is the pilothouse not the pilot room.
Continued in comment section
January 4, 2023
Tully is one of the coauthors of the fantastic Shattered Sword on the Battle of Midway, so you know his account of the Battle of Surigao Strait is going to be solid. Surigao Strait was the final battleship versus battleship fight, a key component of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history, and one of the most one-sided stomps since the Battle of Tsushima, with heroism, tragedy, and farce in equal measure.
In response to the American invasion of the Philippines, Japan activated Sho-Go-1, a final throw of this dice to achieve a Mahanian decisive battle. The plan was complex and required precise timing. IJN carriers, bereft of striking power since the Marianas Turkey shoot, would serve to lure away the American fleet. Surface battle groups would approach the landing at Leyte through the northern San Bernadino Strait and the southern Surigao Strait, find the transports, and destroy them. It almost worked, and likely would have succeeded without the desperate heroism of the escort group Taffy 3, as documented in the incredible Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors.
That's the context. Tully focuses on the two southern groups, a pair of obsolete battleships and escorts under Vice Admiral Nishimura, and a more modern cruiser force under Vice Admiral Shima. For all that the Japanese knew that the invasion was coming, if not the precise details, the initial plan was chaotic. Shima's cruisers were not properly integrated with Nishimura's battleships. Land base airpower was squandered against preliminary attacks from Halsey's carriers.
Around midnight on October 25, Nishimura's battleships entered the strait, with Shima's cruisers an hour behind. American Admiral Oldendorf knew that the Japanese were coming, and had lined the strait with PT boats, and then an escalating series of destroyer attacks, cruiser groups, and finally his six battleships. The PT boat attacks were ineffective, but the following destroyer attack scored multiple torpedo hits. Fuso caught fire and sank (Tully makes a convincing argument the ship did not break into two sections as commonly reported), and as the scattered Japanese ships entered into gunfire range of the American heavies, they were subject to a devastating bombardment that sunk Yamashiro Nishimure's force was annihilated, Shima's cruisers launched an ineffective torpedo strike before withdrawing, and were whittled down on return to base.
While the operation had succeeded in drawing off and engaging Oldendorf's fleet, and the northern deception had pulled away Halsey, the main striking force centered around the battleship Yamato failed to capitalize on the sacrifice of the deception forces and the main American fleet and transports survived.
Tully makes an argument that but Nishimure and Shima were competent professionals, and that in particular Nishimure was fully away that his obsolete 1911 vintage battleships had no combat value, but that a chance at victory required their sacrifice. Given the confused nature of a night engagement, the few survivors, and losses of sunken ship logs, Tully ably reconstructs what happened, though many of the conclusions must remain speculative. He has a palpable excitement for the topic, writing with adjectives and exclamation marks, though this enthusiasm leads him into some minor unprofessionalism.
In response to the American invasion of the Philippines, Japan activated Sho-Go-1, a final throw of this dice to achieve a Mahanian decisive battle. The plan was complex and required precise timing. IJN carriers, bereft of striking power since the Marianas Turkey shoot, would serve to lure away the American fleet. Surface battle groups would approach the landing at Leyte through the northern San Bernadino Strait and the southern Surigao Strait, find the transports, and destroy them. It almost worked, and likely would have succeeded without the desperate heroism of the escort group Taffy 3, as documented in the incredible Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors.
That's the context. Tully focuses on the two southern groups, a pair of obsolete battleships and escorts under Vice Admiral Nishimura, and a more modern cruiser force under Vice Admiral Shima. For all that the Japanese knew that the invasion was coming, if not the precise details, the initial plan was chaotic. Shima's cruisers were not properly integrated with Nishimura's battleships. Land base airpower was squandered against preliminary attacks from Halsey's carriers.
Around midnight on October 25, Nishimura's battleships entered the strait, with Shima's cruisers an hour behind. American Admiral Oldendorf knew that the Japanese were coming, and had lined the strait with PT boats, and then an escalating series of destroyer attacks, cruiser groups, and finally his six battleships. The PT boat attacks were ineffective, but the following destroyer attack scored multiple torpedo hits. Fuso caught fire and sank (Tully makes a convincing argument the ship did not break into two sections as commonly reported), and as the scattered Japanese ships entered into gunfire range of the American heavies, they were subject to a devastating bombardment that sunk Yamashiro Nishimure's force was annihilated, Shima's cruisers launched an ineffective torpedo strike before withdrawing, and were whittled down on return to base.
While the operation had succeeded in drawing off and engaging Oldendorf's fleet, and the northern deception had pulled away Halsey, the main striking force centered around the battleship Yamato failed to capitalize on the sacrifice of the deception forces and the main American fleet and transports survived.
Tully makes an argument that but Nishimure and Shima were competent professionals, and that in particular Nishimure was fully away that his obsolete 1911 vintage battleships had no combat value, but that a chance at victory required their sacrifice. Given the confused nature of a night engagement, the few survivors, and losses of sunken ship logs, Tully ably reconstructs what happened, though many of the conclusions must remain speculative. He has a palpable excitement for the topic, writing with adjectives and exclamation marks, though this enthusiasm leads him into some minor unprofessionalism.
did-not-finish
May 22, 2024DNF at chapter 4 - way more detail than I'm interested in.
May 19, 2021
The battle of Surigao Strait was a component of the larger battle of Leyte Gulf. It is famous for being the last battleship-on-battleship action in naval history. The way the story is usually told, the Japanese launched a poorly coordinated and tactically inept attack that was expertly and decisively beaten back by the United State Navy.
Tully, armed with a great many Japanese primary sources, tells a somewhat different story. In this account, the Japanese attack was a "special" operation -- a suicidal diversionary attack -- but conducted with reasonable competence. Tully points out that if the USN dispositions had been different -- as Japanese reconnaissance had shown they were -- the Japanese battleships might have gotten close enough to the American transport fleet to do real damage. Furthermore the US did not so much "expertly outmaneuver" the Japanese as they took advantage of radar and a 3-1 numerical superiority to defeat them.
Tully, armed with a great many Japanese primary sources, tells a somewhat different story. In this account, the Japanese attack was a "special" operation -- a suicidal diversionary attack -- but conducted with reasonable competence. Tully points out that if the USN dispositions had been different -- as Japanese reconnaissance had shown they were -- the Japanese battleships might have gotten close enough to the American transport fleet to do real damage. Furthermore the US did not so much "expertly outmaneuver" the Japanese as they took advantage of radar and a 3-1 numerical superiority to defeat them.
November 12, 2022
Awesome Book
The author has written a great book about a battle that has rarely been written about. I love his discussion about the PT Boat tactics that was rarely talk about and I was taken aback about what he said about the PT Boat battle scenes in “They were expendable” and “In Harms Way.” He said that PT battle scenes were not realistic and in reality would have been suicidal!!! The use of PT boats and DDs was throughly explained better in this book than in other sources. Because books that discuss this book do not give it justice or was not as accurate. Overall, an awesome book. Well Written and edited!!!
The author has written a great book about a battle that has rarely been written about. I love his discussion about the PT Boat tactics that was rarely talk about and I was taken aback about what he said about the PT Boat battle scenes in “They were expendable” and “In Harms Way.” He said that PT battle scenes were not realistic and in reality would have been suicidal!!! The use of PT boats and DDs was throughly explained better in this book than in other sources. Because books that discuss this book do not give it justice or was not as accurate. Overall, an awesome book. Well Written and edited!!!
May 2, 2019
Way, way way too detailed for a general reader
If one is into detailed analysis of pre-battle plans, biographies of almost every major player, and reviews of historical records word for word they might enjoy this book. This might be a good textbook for the War College but I gave up about halfway through. Maybe it got better but I had already spent way too much time waiting for a clear story of what happened in the actual battle.
If one is into detailed analysis of pre-battle plans, biographies of almost every major player, and reviews of historical records word for word they might enjoy this book. This might be a good textbook for the War College but I gave up about halfway through. Maybe it got better but I had already spent way too much time waiting for a clear story of what happened in the actual battle.
Read
October 26, 2025Deep detail
The book is extremely detailed and impressively researched. Some of the sentences are a little harder to follow than others and certainly mire maps would add to clarity and a better understanding.
Description of the battle is excellent and the epilogue provides detail seldom covered elsewhere. Very much worth reading the entire book.
The book is extremely detailed and impressively researched. Some of the sentences are a little harder to follow than others and certainly mire maps would add to clarity and a better understanding.
Description of the battle is excellent and the epilogue provides detail seldom covered elsewhere. Very much worth reading the entire book.
August 5, 2018
The kind of incisive analysis I hope for in any newer volume on a well-known and well-covered event. Tully’s investigative and iconoclastic data-driven approach tells new stories and fills in holes in the traditional narrative
September 24, 2020
You need to be very very familiar with not only the main Japanese naval officers, but the whole level of next level down officers and their histories, as well as the names and designations of the Japanese naval ships. I struggled with this, and ultimately skimmed and jumped to high points.
November 29, 2022
New use of Japan sources
Very well researched. Use of Japanese sources allows a balanced depiction of the battle, and a different understanding of the roles and intentions of some of the Japanese forces.
Very well researched. Use of Japanese sources allows a balanced depiction of the battle, and a different understanding of the roles and intentions of some of the Japanese forces.
January 2, 2023
Pretty interesting. Told almost exclusively from the Japanese point of view, with lots of new information. Writing was not good, Tully badly needed an editor.
January 6, 2023
An excellent book that is very detailed and focuses on the Japanese side of the battle. I learned a lot reading this book.
December 9, 2024
excellent detailed play by play of the last large scale naval gun battles of world war 2
January 1, 2026
Excellent book. Tully effectively and convincingly argues all his points and has written the account well. I found the book hard to put down and it was good to read about the battle in such detail.
July 15, 2017
You must all remember that there are such things as miracles. Admiral Kurita's words, spoken before he set out to fight the Battle of Leyte against a far superior enemy, were not the kind that inspires great confidence in success. His own chances were still a lot better than those of Admiral Nishimura, his seven ships, and his thousands of men, who were sent out by Kurita to fight the action that would evolve in the Battle of Surigao Strait. Tuly argues convincingly that Nishimura's old battleships were considered expendable, and were being sent on a one-way sacrificial mission. But then, by 1944 this was becoming more the rule than the exception in the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Tuly highlights this battle as the last capital ship action of the war, but in truth Fuso was sunk and Yamashiro crippled by American destroyers, before the latter nevertheless struggled on to face an enemy that completely outgunned it. Tuly does not address an interesting question: Do these events support the thesis of the innovators of the "Jeune Ecole" of the 19th century, who preached the superiority of light forces armed with torpedoes and other innovative weapons, over the huge battleships of old? Certainly it appears that Nishimura and his superiors were unwise to commit a pair of 35,000 ton battleships in confined waters patrolled by the enemy, even in the dark. It can be argued that the American admiral Lee did the same off Guadalcanal in November 1942 and was successful, but if the Japanese had just been a bit luckier with their torpedoes that night, Lee could have lost his ships too.
Overall, the story being told here is a detailed, lucid account of tragedy, destruction, defeat, and grim attempts to escape. While Nishimura led his forces to certain death, Admiral Shima did his best to escape from a doomed effort, and Kurita famously "retreated towards the enemy." But if there were shockingly few survivors from Nishimura's Third Section, it was also because the Japanese sailors did not want to be rescued. Tuly's examines the myths that have shrouded these events, to figure out what may really have happened in October 1944.
It is a fascinating story that manages to the very human story as told by the survivors, with a lot of analysis. It is fair-minded and thorough, though you could criticise its tendency to be a bit speculative and even veer into "docudrama". A few more maps to detail the unwinding would have been helpful, and the reproduction of photographs in the paperback edition could have been better.
Tuly highlights this battle as the last capital ship action of the war, but in truth Fuso was sunk and Yamashiro crippled by American destroyers, before the latter nevertheless struggled on to face an enemy that completely outgunned it. Tuly does not address an interesting question: Do these events support the thesis of the innovators of the "Jeune Ecole" of the 19th century, who preached the superiority of light forces armed with torpedoes and other innovative weapons, over the huge battleships of old? Certainly it appears that Nishimura and his superiors were unwise to commit a pair of 35,000 ton battleships in confined waters patrolled by the enemy, even in the dark. It can be argued that the American admiral Lee did the same off Guadalcanal in November 1942 and was successful, but if the Japanese had just been a bit luckier with their torpedoes that night, Lee could have lost his ships too.
Overall, the story being told here is a detailed, lucid account of tragedy, destruction, defeat, and grim attempts to escape. While Nishimura led his forces to certain death, Admiral Shima did his best to escape from a doomed effort, and Kurita famously "retreated towards the enemy." But if there were shockingly few survivors from Nishimura's Third Section, it was also because the Japanese sailors did not want to be rescued. Tuly's examines the myths that have shrouded these events, to figure out what may really have happened in October 1944.
It is a fascinating story that manages to the very human story as told by the survivors, with a lot of analysis. It is fair-minded and thorough, though you could criticise its tendency to be a bit speculative and even veer into "docudrama". A few more maps to detail the unwinding would have been helpful, and the reproduction of photographs in the paperback edition could have been better.
November 5, 2010
A very detailed re-examination of the Battle of Surigao Strait, mostly from the Japanese perspective. Similar in many respects to Shattered Sword, which Anthony Tully co-authored. I'm going to give it a 5-star rating, although I will say that the book's not perfect. Mr. Tully does a lot of hypothesizing on the thoughts and emotions of various participants, which is purely speculative. Also, the first chapters of the book set out to solve a mystery (the role of Adm. Shima's cruiser/destroyer force in Japanese plan to penetrate Surigao Strait) without first explaining that there *is* some historical mystery to be solved. As a result, I was left scratching my head and wondering "where's he going with this?" as I was reading, until I finally realized that Mr. Tully was solving a riddle he'd neglected to ask first. It can also be a bit of a challenge keeping Japanese ships sorted out once the battle commences, as a lot of them have similar names (Asagumo, Akebono, Ashigara, and Abukuma, for example). Nonetheless, highly recommended if you want a thorough account of this famous battle.
January 1, 2010
Detailed review of what was the last guns-only confrontation between battleships--the Battle of Surigao Strait in the Philippines at the end of World War II. This was one of several battles that formed the mega-battle of Leyte Gulf, and this part has always been given short shrift, with Halsey's dash to the decoy Japanese carriers off Cape Engano and the resulting ambush of the Taffy 3 escort carrier group always getting the lion's share of the coverage. This book covers the development of the Japanese thrust into Surigao strait and the way Adm. Jesse Olendorff arrayed the allied forces in defense. The fact that it turned out to be overwhelming odds against the Japanese doesn't alter the fact that inattention by the allies could have let them through to attach the invasion fleet. A good read for fans of detailed history, but it should be read with a good map of the area close at hand.
March 2, 2010
Excellent book that delves deep into one part of the massive Battle For Leyte Gulf. As with his previous book (the superb "Shattered Sword" about Midway), Tully uses previously overlooked and/or unavailable Japanese sources to answer questions, solve mysteries, and dispel myths to give a better and more accurate understanding of the battle.
October 30, 2009
This was a good look at a rarely-covered action. The author did his research, going into Japanese survivor accounts, something not usually done.
May 25, 2013
Great book. The detail might be too much for some but Tully is a great historian with an incisive and creative mind.
November 20, 2014
One of the key battles for Leyte Gulf in 1944. Learned a lot about this forgotten battle. Another book about the heroism of the Japanese.
November 4, 2015
Excellent. Required reading for anyone looking to understand Leyte Gulf. Sadly lacking in maps and diagrams but otherwise outstanding.
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