What do you think?
Rate this book
Allies: Why the West Had to Remove Saddam
The Cold War certainties that had seemed so fixed in the 20th Century were overturned by the war in Iraq. Saddam Hussein's Republican Guards were the battlefield victims of a brutally quick war of shock and awe. No less shocked and awed were some of America's former "old" Europe, large blocks of the UN, and half the G8 nations suddenly found themselves outside the chain of command and influence.
Bush, Blair, and their allies were driven by a new global vision. Their mission, expressed with great moral certainty, has been called imperialist. In fact, it was simply inevitable after 9/11: that terrible event ushered in a new era with new rules. Shawcross shows what the future will hold for Iraq, Israel, and the Middle East, how Western alliances will be changed forever, and demonstrates that the war was the definitive proof that a new era of 21st Century international politics has begun.
Bush, Blair, and their allies were driven by a new global vision. Their mission, expressed with great moral certainty, has been called imperialist. In fact, it was simply inevitable after 9/11: that terrible event ushered in a new era with new rules. Shawcross shows what the future will hold for Iraq, Israel, and the Middle East, how Western alliances will be changed forever, and demonstrates that the war was the definitive proof that a new era of 21st Century international politics has begun.
336 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2003
1 person is currently reading
41 people want to read
About the author
William Shawcross
42 books39 followersWilliam Shawcross is a widely renowned writer and broadcaster.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
September 15, 2014
Overall a good read, probably deserves three-and-a-half stars. Shawcross is a British "neocon" journalist who tells the story of the build-up and aftermath of the 2003 Iraq War. While the book cover seems to cast this as a book about the British-U.S. relationship in terms of the war, it is as much a book about the United Nations as anything. Those who found themselves frothing at the mouth and chanting "Bush lied and people died" during the Bush years should probably read this with an open mind. It gives a cogent articulation for the neocon case for war against Iraq, and shows that those in favor of this were not some evil conspiracy or irrational actors. Furthermore, Shawcross is not uncritical of the Bush-Blair team and exposes faults where he finds them.
Shawcross starts his work with some unquestionable observations about problems in the Arab world, to include the tendency of the Arab dictatorships to blame the United States for everything (even as they accept aid and protection from the same), and the startling results of the UN's 2002 Arab Development Report. (p 15) He specifically keyed in on the lack of freedom in the Arab world, to include civil liberties, political rights, media, and women's rights. He assesses, "very little of this will change until Arab countries somehow acquire decent governments and good governance. Political freedom and political representation must be freed up; public administration must be reformed; civil society must be liberated; the media must be freed." (p 16) He points out Baathism's direct connection to Nazism, as it is explicitly Arab Nationalist Socialism. (p 17) An irony, really, that those who were most vehemently against the Iraq war characterized Bush as "Hitler" for overthrowing an avowed Arab Nazi.
Shawcross also examined the rise of anti-Americanism in the post-Cold War era, particularly in Europe. He cites Robert Kagan, Robert Kaplan, and Samuel P. Huntington, though he ought to also have included Jean-François Revel. Shawcross noted Europe's impotence and its failure to take any concrete action in the Balkans, much less further afield in Rwanda or elsewhere. This left effective action solely in the hands of America, which was the only power that proved again and again able and willing to intervene and end misery or evil in the world. (pp 78-79) As his review of the 1990s concluded:
By the end of the decade, some 200,000 people had died in the Balkans on Europe's watch. It was America that put a stop to it. In 2001, it was only America that could liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban regime. The results in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan are far from perfect. But all those countries are better off than they were, and only America could have initiated those changes. American participation is essential to the world. (p 85)
Shawcross rightly identifies the threat posed to civilization by extremist Islam, and he even quotes Ayatollah Khomeini to prove his point. (p 224) This begins to highlight what was really flawed, not only with Shawcross' argument in the abstract, but the execution of the Iraq war and reconstruction in the reality. The more significant threat to U.S. and Western interests generally came, not from Iraq, but from neighboring Iran. Shawcross spent much of his book pointing out both the proliferation danger of Iraq and the flouting of UN resolutions, not to mention the potential for use of WMDs by terror organizations. But Iran had a demonstrated history of ties to violent terrorists, murdering thousands abroad (including hundreds of Americans) and calling for/fomenting Islamic revolution in other Muslim-majority states. As Shawcross notes himself, experts like David Kay found that Iraq posed no immediate threat. (p 189 and 192)
The only argument Shawcross uses against any other interventions, aside from Iraq, is a brief quote from Tony Blair: "They ask me why we don't get rid of Mugabe, why not the Burmese lot? Yes, let's get rid of them all. I don't, because I can't, but when you can, you should." (p 150) Shawcross takes it as self-evident that Iraq was the main country to focus on; while one can see Iraq taking priority over Burma, the same does not hold true for Iran. Iran's military was far more intact in 2003 than Iraq's, along with its nuclear and other WMD programs. Much of the resistance in Iraq (and Afghanistan) found sanctuary, intelligence, arms, and training in Iraq, including Sunni groups completely hostile to the Shia rulers of Iran. Shawcross points out that Ansar al-Islam was the main initial resistance to the American occupation, and it found refuge in Iran when cornered by American forces. (195) The "EFPs" designed and supplied by Iran, that murdered hundreds of American soldiers, were yet to come when Shawcross published this. Yet Iran's strong ties to terror and enormous investment in its nuclear and rocket programs were not. Had a hostile Iran been out of the picture, both Iraq and Afghanistan would have gone far more smoothly, and the world would not be today calculating how many months were left before Iran possessed real nuclear weapons.
Shawcross also briefly notes how the war in Iraq weakened and pulled away from the hunt for Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida, not to mention reconstruction in Afghanistan, without much apology. Given that Saddam was more or less contained, although at great cost and with U.S. pilots being shot at almost daily, the world community had an opportunity to carefully review priorities and play things out a bit more intelligently. Sadly, these points are largely omitted from Shawcross' work. I cannot dispute Shawcross' case that Saddam had to go and UN authority had, sooner or later, to be enforced or risk undermining the UN completely. But that did not make Saddam the world's number one priority; it is too bad that Shawcross' work is so narrow that such considerations are not debated.
The work is reasonably short, easy to read, and, while there are not foot or end notes per se, Shawcross does list his sources for each chapter. It gives a good overall argument "for" the war in Iraq, though it honestly reviews the many mistakes of the reconstruction (from my own experience in Iraq, Shawcross needed to focus more on de-Baathification and how that alone doomed any hope of success). I especially recommend it to anyone opposed to this point of view but willing to read it with an open mind; at least it might reduce the frenzy and fervor of some opponents, even if it doesn't foreclose all objections. My main criticism is that Shawcross assumes Iraq to be both the biggest problem of its time and the easiest to solve, without really reviewing those assumptions with the reader.
Shawcross starts his work with some unquestionable observations about problems in the Arab world, to include the tendency of the Arab dictatorships to blame the United States for everything (even as they accept aid and protection from the same), and the startling results of the UN's 2002 Arab Development Report. (p 15) He specifically keyed in on the lack of freedom in the Arab world, to include civil liberties, political rights, media, and women's rights. He assesses, "very little of this will change until Arab countries somehow acquire decent governments and good governance. Political freedom and political representation must be freed up; public administration must be reformed; civil society must be liberated; the media must be freed." (p 16) He points out Baathism's direct connection to Nazism, as it is explicitly Arab Nationalist Socialism. (p 17) An irony, really, that those who were most vehemently against the Iraq war characterized Bush as "Hitler" for overthrowing an avowed Arab Nazi.
Shawcross also examined the rise of anti-Americanism in the post-Cold War era, particularly in Europe. He cites Robert Kagan, Robert Kaplan, and Samuel P. Huntington, though he ought to also have included Jean-François Revel. Shawcross noted Europe's impotence and its failure to take any concrete action in the Balkans, much less further afield in Rwanda or elsewhere. This left effective action solely in the hands of America, which was the only power that proved again and again able and willing to intervene and end misery or evil in the world. (pp 78-79) As his review of the 1990s concluded:
By the end of the decade, some 200,000 people had died in the Balkans on Europe's watch. It was America that put a stop to it. In 2001, it was only America that could liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban regime. The results in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan are far from perfect. But all those countries are better off than they were, and only America could have initiated those changes. American participation is essential to the world. (p 85)
Shawcross rightly identifies the threat posed to civilization by extremist Islam, and he even quotes Ayatollah Khomeini to prove his point. (p 224) This begins to highlight what was really flawed, not only with Shawcross' argument in the abstract, but the execution of the Iraq war and reconstruction in the reality. The more significant threat to U.S. and Western interests generally came, not from Iraq, but from neighboring Iran. Shawcross spent much of his book pointing out both the proliferation danger of Iraq and the flouting of UN resolutions, not to mention the potential for use of WMDs by terror organizations. But Iran had a demonstrated history of ties to violent terrorists, murdering thousands abroad (including hundreds of Americans) and calling for/fomenting Islamic revolution in other Muslim-majority states. As Shawcross notes himself, experts like David Kay found that Iraq posed no immediate threat. (p 189 and 192)
The only argument Shawcross uses against any other interventions, aside from Iraq, is a brief quote from Tony Blair: "They ask me why we don't get rid of Mugabe, why not the Burmese lot? Yes, let's get rid of them all. I don't, because I can't, but when you can, you should." (p 150) Shawcross takes it as self-evident that Iraq was the main country to focus on; while one can see Iraq taking priority over Burma, the same does not hold true for Iran. Iran's military was far more intact in 2003 than Iraq's, along with its nuclear and other WMD programs. Much of the resistance in Iraq (and Afghanistan) found sanctuary, intelligence, arms, and training in Iraq, including Sunni groups completely hostile to the Shia rulers of Iran. Shawcross points out that Ansar al-Islam was the main initial resistance to the American occupation, and it found refuge in Iran when cornered by American forces. (195) The "EFPs" designed and supplied by Iran, that murdered hundreds of American soldiers, were yet to come when Shawcross published this. Yet Iran's strong ties to terror and enormous investment in its nuclear and rocket programs were not. Had a hostile Iran been out of the picture, both Iraq and Afghanistan would have gone far more smoothly, and the world would not be today calculating how many months were left before Iran possessed real nuclear weapons.
Shawcross also briefly notes how the war in Iraq weakened and pulled away from the hunt for Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida, not to mention reconstruction in Afghanistan, without much apology. Given that Saddam was more or less contained, although at great cost and with U.S. pilots being shot at almost daily, the world community had an opportunity to carefully review priorities and play things out a bit more intelligently. Sadly, these points are largely omitted from Shawcross' work. I cannot dispute Shawcross' case that Saddam had to go and UN authority had, sooner or later, to be enforced or risk undermining the UN completely. But that did not make Saddam the world's number one priority; it is too bad that Shawcross' work is so narrow that such considerations are not debated.
The work is reasonably short, easy to read, and, while there are not foot or end notes per se, Shawcross does list his sources for each chapter. It gives a good overall argument "for" the war in Iraq, though it honestly reviews the many mistakes of the reconstruction (from my own experience in Iraq, Shawcross needed to focus more on de-Baathification and how that alone doomed any hope of success). I especially recommend it to anyone opposed to this point of view but willing to read it with an open mind; at least it might reduce the frenzy and fervor of some opponents, even if it doesn't foreclose all objections. My main criticism is that Shawcross assumes Iraq to be both the biggest problem of its time and the easiest to solve, without really reviewing those assumptions with the reader.
Read
December 21, 2012Le principal intérêt du livre de William Shawcross n’est pas son contenu mais son auteur.
"Allies" se présente comme un plaidoyer sans nuance en faveur de la politique anglo-saxonne en Iraq. C’est un mauvais travail de journalisme, forgé à partir d’une documentation de seconde main et non exempt d’erreurs matérielles. Si l’auteur critique les carences américaines à reconstruire l’Iraq (il écrivait au lendemain de l’attentat qui a coûté la vie à Sergio Vieira de Mello, son ami, et alors que les actes de résistance à l’occupation américaine se multipliaient dans le pays), c’est la seule ombre à une présentation idyllique du combat qu’auraient mené George W. Bush et Tony Blair contre le terrorisme et pour les droits de l’homme. Qu’aucun lien crédible n’ait jamais pu être identifié entre Saddam Hussein et Al-Qaïda ne gêne en rien William Shawcross, alors même que les Etats-Unis ont toujours présenté le renversement du dictateur irakien comme une étape nécessaire de la guerre contre le terrorisme. Qu’aucune arme de destruction massive n’ait été retrouvée sur le sol irakien embarrasse plus l’auteur, ressortissant d’un pays qui entendait justifier son intervention par la violation répétée par l’Iraq des régimes de non-prolifération. Mais, il s’en tire par une pirouette, tirant des rapports des experts la conclusion, sinon de l’immédiate accession de l’Iraq au statut de puissance nucléaire, du moins de son inéluctabilité. Cet argument, une fois exposé, peut tout justifier : dès lors que Saddam Hussein a, par le passé, démontré son mépris des lois internationales, sa mégalomanie et sa cruauté, il est inéluctable qu’il cherche à se doter des moyens d’une puissance absolue et l’utilise contre sa propre population et contre ses ennemis, proches ou lointains. Dès lors, la communauté internationale est en situation de légitime défense pour mener contre lui une « guerre préventive ». CQFD.
La seule ombre au tableau est le manque de solidarité des soi-disant « alliés ». William Shawcross n’a pas de mots assez durs pour Gerhard Schröder et la coupable faiblesse avec laquelle il a utilisé l’anti-américanisme de ses concitoyens comme argument de campagne électorale à l’automne 2002. Mais il réserve ses critiques les plus acerbes pour la France de Jacques Chirac et Dominique de Villepin. « Super Liar » est présenté comme « le plus proche ami de Saddam Hussein à l’étranger » (p. 91), lequel aurait financé son élection à la mairie de Paris en 1977. Tout y passe, depuis la participation de la France au programme nucléaire irakien aux arrières pensées commerciales qui auraient justifié la réticence française à sanctionner trop durement le régime baathiste après la première guerre du Golfe en passant par la visite de Jacques Chirac à Bagdad en 1974. W. Shawcross franchit les limites de la décence et de l’honnêteté intellectuelle en faisant porter au président français la responsabilité des morts américains et britanniques en Iraq (p. 149).
La critique est d’autant plus excessive qu’elle vient d’un journaliste britannique, plus connu pour son combat en faveur des droits de l’homme que pour son américanolâtrie béate. En 1979, dans "Sideshow", il avait dressé un réquisitoire sans concession de la politique américaine au Cambodge. En 2000, avec "Deliver us from Evil", il critiquait la passivité des puissances internationales face aux nettoyages ethniques dans les Balkans ou en Afrique. Comment ce gauchiste droits-de-l’hommiste s’est-il mué en défenseur des Néoconservateurs ?
Il serait injuste de reprocher à William Shawcross d’avoir renié ses principes. Comme Bernard Kouchner ou Bernard-Henri Lévy, William Shawcross est, aujourd’hui comme hier, une « belle âme » sincèrement révoltée par les exactions commises par un dictateur. Non sans pertinence, il dénonce le paradoxe à voir la gauche humaniste réclamer à corps et à cri une « guerre juste » à Sarajevo au début des années 90 puis protester contre l’invasion de l’Iraq. Pour lui, l’opération américaine a avant tout permis de renverser un régime odieux. Et cela suffit à ses yeux à la justifier, nonobstant ses défauts ultérieurs.
Au delà de la première impression, la position de William Shawcross a donc le mérite de la cohérence. Est-elle pour autant justifiée ? Elle le serait si l’intervention américaine en Iraq avait été réellement motivée par un engagement sincère en faveur des droits de l’homme. Mais la vérité oblige à dire qu’à supposer que la défense des droits de l’homme ait compté au nombre des motivations de la Maison Blanche, ce ne fut, et de loin, pas sa principale : la lutte contre le terrorisme et contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, l’accès aux ressources pétrolières du Golfe, la stabilité régionale ont plus pesé dans la balance. Certes la guerre en Iraq a eu pour effet « collatéral » de débarrasser le monde d’un tyran sanguinaire. Mais cet hommage du vice à la vertu ne doit pas cacher les ressorts peu altruistes du nouvel interventionnisme américain. Si les Etats-Unis sont intervenus en Iraq, ce n’est pas pour en déloger un dictateur dont ils s’étaient bon an mal an accommodés depuis plus de vingt ans, mais pour se prémunir égoïstement d’une attaque terroriste, réelle ou fantasmée.
"Allies" se présente comme un plaidoyer sans nuance en faveur de la politique anglo-saxonne en Iraq. C’est un mauvais travail de journalisme, forgé à partir d’une documentation de seconde main et non exempt d’erreurs matérielles. Si l’auteur critique les carences américaines à reconstruire l’Iraq (il écrivait au lendemain de l’attentat qui a coûté la vie à Sergio Vieira de Mello, son ami, et alors que les actes de résistance à l’occupation américaine se multipliaient dans le pays), c’est la seule ombre à une présentation idyllique du combat qu’auraient mené George W. Bush et Tony Blair contre le terrorisme et pour les droits de l’homme. Qu’aucun lien crédible n’ait jamais pu être identifié entre Saddam Hussein et Al-Qaïda ne gêne en rien William Shawcross, alors même que les Etats-Unis ont toujours présenté le renversement du dictateur irakien comme une étape nécessaire de la guerre contre le terrorisme. Qu’aucune arme de destruction massive n’ait été retrouvée sur le sol irakien embarrasse plus l’auteur, ressortissant d’un pays qui entendait justifier son intervention par la violation répétée par l’Iraq des régimes de non-prolifération. Mais, il s’en tire par une pirouette, tirant des rapports des experts la conclusion, sinon de l’immédiate accession de l’Iraq au statut de puissance nucléaire, du moins de son inéluctabilité. Cet argument, une fois exposé, peut tout justifier : dès lors que Saddam Hussein a, par le passé, démontré son mépris des lois internationales, sa mégalomanie et sa cruauté, il est inéluctable qu’il cherche à se doter des moyens d’une puissance absolue et l’utilise contre sa propre population et contre ses ennemis, proches ou lointains. Dès lors, la communauté internationale est en situation de légitime défense pour mener contre lui une « guerre préventive ». CQFD.
La seule ombre au tableau est le manque de solidarité des soi-disant « alliés ». William Shawcross n’a pas de mots assez durs pour Gerhard Schröder et la coupable faiblesse avec laquelle il a utilisé l’anti-américanisme de ses concitoyens comme argument de campagne électorale à l’automne 2002. Mais il réserve ses critiques les plus acerbes pour la France de Jacques Chirac et Dominique de Villepin. « Super Liar » est présenté comme « le plus proche ami de Saddam Hussein à l’étranger » (p. 91), lequel aurait financé son élection à la mairie de Paris en 1977. Tout y passe, depuis la participation de la France au programme nucléaire irakien aux arrières pensées commerciales qui auraient justifié la réticence française à sanctionner trop durement le régime baathiste après la première guerre du Golfe en passant par la visite de Jacques Chirac à Bagdad en 1974. W. Shawcross franchit les limites de la décence et de l’honnêteté intellectuelle en faisant porter au président français la responsabilité des morts américains et britanniques en Iraq (p. 149).
La critique est d’autant plus excessive qu’elle vient d’un journaliste britannique, plus connu pour son combat en faveur des droits de l’homme que pour son américanolâtrie béate. En 1979, dans "Sideshow", il avait dressé un réquisitoire sans concession de la politique américaine au Cambodge. En 2000, avec "Deliver us from Evil", il critiquait la passivité des puissances internationales face aux nettoyages ethniques dans les Balkans ou en Afrique. Comment ce gauchiste droits-de-l’hommiste s’est-il mué en défenseur des Néoconservateurs ?
Il serait injuste de reprocher à William Shawcross d’avoir renié ses principes. Comme Bernard Kouchner ou Bernard-Henri Lévy, William Shawcross est, aujourd’hui comme hier, une « belle âme » sincèrement révoltée par les exactions commises par un dictateur. Non sans pertinence, il dénonce le paradoxe à voir la gauche humaniste réclamer à corps et à cri une « guerre juste » à Sarajevo au début des années 90 puis protester contre l’invasion de l’Iraq. Pour lui, l’opération américaine a avant tout permis de renverser un régime odieux. Et cela suffit à ses yeux à la justifier, nonobstant ses défauts ultérieurs.
Au delà de la première impression, la position de William Shawcross a donc le mérite de la cohérence. Est-elle pour autant justifiée ? Elle le serait si l’intervention américaine en Iraq avait été réellement motivée par un engagement sincère en faveur des droits de l’homme. Mais la vérité oblige à dire qu’à supposer que la défense des droits de l’homme ait compté au nombre des motivations de la Maison Blanche, ce ne fut, et de loin, pas sa principale : la lutte contre le terrorisme et contre la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, l’accès aux ressources pétrolières du Golfe, la stabilité régionale ont plus pesé dans la balance. Certes la guerre en Iraq a eu pour effet « collatéral » de débarrasser le monde d’un tyran sanguinaire. Mais cet hommage du vice à la vertu ne doit pas cacher les ressorts peu altruistes du nouvel interventionnisme américain. Si les Etats-Unis sont intervenus en Iraq, ce n’est pas pour en déloger un dictateur dont ils s’étaient bon an mal an accommodés depuis plus de vingt ans, mais pour se prémunir égoïstement d’une attaque terroriste, réelle ou fantasmée.
December 30, 2008
A scathing indictment of French/German/EU policy going into the Iraq War which lauds the heroics of President Bush and Tony Blair. This book was written just following Bush's now infamous "Mission Accomplished" speech so obviously we look at with some hindsight and skepticism. In addition, the book is short on information and chopped full of opinion. That said, the author is one of the foremost journalists on foreign affairs and most famous for his early writings which were not friendly toward conservative, or for that matter any US, foreign policy. Taking this into account, it's a bit eye-opening to see such unabashed support for Bush and somewhat refreshing to read about, yes, his early accomplishments. The most interesting passages are where the author provides veteran insight into the international relations framework that existed following September 11th.
August 1, 2011
This book was written by a European correspondent and as such gave a view of the Iraqi War from someone who was European AND supported the war. He doesn't really cover any new ground, just a snapshot of the justification for the war before the problems of creating a new Iraqi constitution and government was seen. A short book that adds another dimension to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
November 4, 2015
A hugely unfashionable book now. Published in 2003, it makes the case for the war in Iraq very well. He points out, as just about no one else has since about 1963, that the UN Charter does not prohibit the taking of unilateral preventive action in self-defence prior to the occurrence of an armed attack". Oh yes. Read this book if you do not believe everything on Comment is Free is true.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews