Confronted by the new challenges of the information age and the post-Soviet world, the U.S. intelligence community must adapt and change. And marginal change is not enough, the authors of this provocative book insist. Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman call for fundamental, radical reforms in the organization and approach of America’s intelligence agencies. They show why traditional approaches to intelligence fall short today, and they propose thoughtful alternatives that take into account recent changes in information technology and intelligence requirements.
An information-age intelligence service would move away from a rigid, hierarchical structure toward a more fluid, networked organization, the authors explain. They recommend a system that would utilize the private sector―with its access to more capital and its ability to move more quickly than a government organization. At the same time, this system would encourage government intelligence operations to concentrate on the specialized, high-risk activities they are uniquely able to perform. Berkowitz and Goodman examine recent failures of the intelligence community, discuss why traditional principles of intelligence are no longer adequate, and consider the implications for such broad policy issues as secrecy, covert action, and the culture of the intelligence community.
After _years_ of reading Biographies of Spooks and Propagandized "Tell All" CIA/KGB/NSA Books; it is truly refreshing and even fun to think along with Berkowitz as he explains precisely HOW & WHY old systems don't work as well as Network-based Topologies. All his examples are strictly from "Network Theory" branch of Mathematics and are not at all dependent on his opinion. Would be 5 star, but a little dy.
Written before the events of 9/11, and before the internet age took off to such a level that we would recognize today, Best Truth still has an important resonance in the ongoing challenge for western intelligence agencies transform from a Cold War world, through to an increasing focus on counter terrorism, and perhaps now back towards state actors. The authors, recognize the challenges and opportunities presented by what they call the information only, and these have only compounded since this was first written. The thrust of the argument is that intelligence agencies need to adapt their whole structure and approach in order to maintain their relevance and value to policy makers, embracing the technological change and tools to a new way of working.
My biggest frustration, was the statement of the use of tanks on the first day of the battle of the Somme, when they did not in fact appear until September over two months later. Not massively relevant but poor fact checking from authors arguing for the importance of intelligence and to policy makers!
Not likely to be of interest to the casual reader, but to anyone interested in the study of intelligence and decision making post Cold War world.
I read this book back in 2007. Unfortunately, while it's very well written and there is still some good information in it, it was published in early 2002, which means it was written before 9/11 and the intelligence reforms that followed. Several years ago, this would have been a solid 3 star book, but ultimately it suffers from being rather dated now. The Intelligence Community has changed and technology has advanced, which is something that the author can hardly be blamed for. If Berkowitz writes future books on Intelligence, I'll definitely be inclined to give them a look.