"Soon after the Big Bang of Freud's major discoveries--around the time of the Clark lectures--the historian of psychoanalysis notes a fork in the road. One path leads outward into the general culture, widening to become the grand boulevard of psychoanalytic influence--the multilane superhighway of psychoanalytic thought's incursions into psychiatry, social philosophy, anthropology, law, literature, education, and child-rearing. The other is the narrow, inward-turning path of psychoanalytic therapy: a hidden, almost secret by-way travelled by few (the analysts and their patients), edged by decrepit mansions with drawn shades (the training institutes and the analytic societies), marked with inscrutable road signs (the scientific papers)--the road along which Aaron Green is trudging. As for Freud himself, he travelled both routes, extending the psychoanalytic view to literature, art, biography, anthropology, and social philosophy in works such as LEONARDO DA VINCI, TOTEM AND TABOO, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY and MOSES AND MONOTHEISM, as well as sticking to the theoretical and clinical core of psychoanalysis" (23).
"As Freud groped his way toward the complexities of ego psychology, he was obliged to modify this simple view of human fallibility--to see that illness and character were not, after all, discrete--but, significantly, he never changed his profoundly amoral view of psychoanalytic therapy. 'Transforming your hysterical misery into common unhappiness' (STUDIES ON HYSTERIA) remained the ungarnished program, with no frills added of 'self-improvement' or 'fulfillment,' which such revisionists as Alfred Adler, Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm, and Karen Horney were to covertly offer their patients. Herbert Marcuse, in his 'Critique of Neo-Freudian Revisionism' (the epilogue to his book EROS AND CIVILIZATION), icily examines the tone of uplift and the Power of Positive Thinking that pervades the revisionists' writings, and mocks their claim to scientific seriousness" (27-28).
"'Don't things always look better from the outside?" I said.
Aaron agreed. 'I used to have a symptom. I used to have social anxiety before going to parties. Parties, you know, are highly instinctualized things. Well, the symptom fell away during my analysis, and now I go to parties, and they're so mundane.'
'The best parties are the ones you're not invited to.'" (61).
"I had read a writeup of the young woman's case which Aaron had prepared for the American Psychoanalytic Association as a prerequisite for certification and membership, and had found it baffling, irritating, boring, insulting to women, and self-damning. In its unrelenting pursuit of sexual matter and meaning, it brought to mind the Dora case, in which Freud often conducted himself more like a police inspector interrogating a suspect than like a doctor helping a patient. 'Aha!' Freud would say to poor Dora, an attractive and intelligent eighteen-year-old girl suffering from a nervous cough, migraine, and a kind of general youthful malaise. 'Aha! I know about you. I know your dirty little secrets. Admit that you were secretly attracted to Herr K. Admit that you masturbated when you were five. Look at what you're doing now as you lie there playing with your reticule-opening it, putting a finger into it, shutting it again!' I sensed some of the same badgering and needling quality in Aaron's case history. I asked him whether his own behavior might not have provoked some of the girl's belligerence and antagonism" (73).
"I thought of George Orwell's 'Reflections on Gandhi,' in which he objected to the side of Gandhi's nature that permitted him to do the moral equivalent of throwing the boy into the pot in the name of a higher ideal. To Orwell, there was no higher ideal than the humanistic one. 'The essence of being human is that one does not seek perfection, that one is sometimes willing to commit sins for the sake of loyalty, that one does not push asceticism to the point where it makes friendly intercourse impossible, and that one is prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by life, which is the inevitable price of fastening one's love upon other human individuals,' Orwell wrote with moving irascibility. To the notion that the ordinary man is a failed saint, Orwell retorted, 'Many people genuinely do not wish to be saints, and it is probable that some who achieve or aspire to sainthood have never felt much temptation to be human beings" (80).
"The people who work well with schizophrenics are people whose center of gravity is a bit displaced, who can make another person the center of their lives, who are endowed with an unusual measure of intuitiveness and sensitivity and kindliness. Ferenczi was such a person--his empathy reached the magnitude of genius, and he was a man of great personal kindness" (109-110).
"I believe that Brenner's view will prevail, because, for all its apparent harshness and reductionism, it contains a more profound and complex and interesting statement about human nature than any of the revisionist views do. To say 'Man is not an animal' is to say nothing that banal people haven't always said. To say that our essential humanity resides in precisely that part of our nature which is most instinctual, primitive, and infantile--*animal*--is to say something radical" (120).
"But implicit in even the most avant-garde position is a belief in a basic experience called psychoanalysis--a belief in its unique efficacy with mental suffering and in the (homeopathic) idea of curing suffering with suffering. to do its profound and searing work on the soul, analysis must be an ordeal. ('Cruel though it may sound, we must see to it that the patient's suffering, to a degree that is in some way or other effective, does not come to an end prematurely' Freud wrote in 'Lines of Advance in Psychoanalytic Therapy'.)" (126).
"Aaron and I had been talking about the difference between case histories and literature, and I said of the Chekhov story that it illustrated something that case histories don't allow for--namely, the profound effect that people can have on each other, the fateful difference that a meeting between two people can make on the outcome of their lives" (145).
"Cases that formally terminate--i.e., end by mutual agreement of analyst and patient--are relatively rare. The majority of analytic cases end because the patient moves to another city, or runs out of money, or impulsively quits the analysis, or agrees with the analyst that stalemate has been reached" (151-152).
"It says, as Freud wrote, that man isn't master in his own house. That he is determined, that his degree of freedom is zero, that he cannot change his destiny, that he is malleable at one formidable time and that everything in his life is settled and preordained ever after. Yes, it's a horrible idea to have to accept. And we analysts take it for common knowledge, and when we talk among ourselves it's a basic assumption derived from a tremendous amount of evidence" (159).