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Historia mínima
A Short History of the Twentieth Century
The historian John Lukacs offers a concise history of the twentieth centuryits two world wars and cold war, its nations and leaders. The great themes woven through this spirited narrative are inseparable from the author's own intellectual preoccupations: the fading of liberalism, the rise of populism and nationalism, the achievements and dangers of technology, and the continuing democratization of the globe.The historical twentieth century began with the First World War in 1914 and ended seventy-five years later with the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1989. The short century saw the end of European dominance and the rise of American power and influence throughout the world. The twentieth century was an American centuryperhaps the American century. Lukacs explores in detail the phenomenon of national socialism (national socialist parties, he reminds us, have outlived the century), Hitler's sole responsibility for the Second World War, and the crucial roles played by his determined opponents Churchill and Roosevelt. Between 1939 and 1942 Germany came closer to winning than many people suppose.Lukacs casts a hard eye at the consequences of the Second World Warthe often misunderstood Soviet-American cold warand at the shifting social and political developments in the Far and Middle East and elsewhere. In an eloquent closing meditation on the passing of the twentieth century, he reflects on the advance of democracy throughout the world and the limitations of human knowledge.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
241 pages, Kindle Edition
First published August 1, 2013
40 people are currently reading
232 people want to read
About the author
John Lukacs
64 books116 followersLukacs was born in Budapest to a Roman Catholic father and Jewish mother. His parents divorced before the Second World War. During the Second World War he was forced to serve in a Hungarian labour battalion for Jews. During the German occupation of Hungary in 1944-45 he evaded deportation to the death camps, and survived the siege of Budapest. In 1946, as it became clear that Hungary was going to be a repressive Communist regime, he fled to the United States. In the early 1950s however, Lukacs wrote several articles in Commonweal criticizing the approach taken by Senator Joseph McCarthy, whom he described as a vulgar demagogue.[1]
Lukacs sees populism as the greatest threat to civilization. By his own description, he considers himself to be a reactionary. He claims that populism is the essence of both National Socialism and Communism. He denies that there is such a thing as generic fascism, noting for example that the differences between the political regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are greater than their similarities.[2]
A major theme in Lukacs's writing is his agreement with the assertion by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville that aristocratic elites have been replaced by democratic elites, which obtain power via an appeal to the masses. In his 2002 book, At the End of an Age, Lukacs argued that the modern/bourgeois age, which began around the time of the Renaissance, is coming to an end.[3] The rise of populism and the decline of elitism is the theme of his experimental work, A Thread of Years (1998), a series of vignettes set in each year of the 20th century from 1900 to 1998, tracing the abandonment of gentlemanly conduct and the rise of vulgarity in American culture. Lukacs defends traditional Western civilization against what he sees as the leveling and debasing effects of mass culture.
By his own admission a dedicated Anglophile, Lukacs’s favorite historical figure is Winston Churchill, whom he considers to be the greatest statesman of the 20th century, and the savior of not only Great Britain, but also of Western civilization. A recurring theme in his writing is the duel between Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler for mastery of the world. The struggle between them, whom Lukacs sees as the archetypical reactionary and the archetypical revolutionary, is the major theme of The Last European War (1976), The Duel (1991), Five Days in London (1999) and 2008's Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat, a book about Churchill’s first major speech as Prime Minister. Lukacs argues that Great Britain (and by extension the British Empire) could not defeat Germany by itself, winning required the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union, but he contends that Churchill, by ensuring that Germany failed to win the war in 1940, laid the groundwork for an Allied victory.
Lukacs holds strong isolationist beliefs, and unusually for an anti-Communist émigré, "airs surprisingly critical views of the Cold War from a unique conservative perspective."[4] Lukacs claims that the Soviet Union was a feeble power on the verge of collapse, and contended that the Cold War was an unnecessary waste of American treasure and life. Likewise, Lukacs has also condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In his 1997 book, George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946, a collection of letters between Lukacs and his close friend George F. Kennan exchanged in 1994-1995, Lukacs and Kennan criticized the New Left claim that the Cold War was caused by the United States. Lukacs argued however that although it was Joseph Stalin who was largely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, the administration of Dwight Eisenhower missed a chance for ending the Cold War in 1953 after Stalin's death, and as a consequence the Cold War went on for many more decades.
Lukacs sees populism as the greatest threat to civilization. By his own description, he considers himself to be a reactionary. He claims that populism is the essence of both National Socialism and Communism. He denies that there is such a thing as generic fascism, noting for example that the differences between the political regimes of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are greater than their similarities.[2]
A major theme in Lukacs's writing is his agreement with the assertion by the French historian Alexis de Tocqueville that aristocratic elites have been replaced by democratic elites, which obtain power via an appeal to the masses. In his 2002 book, At the End of an Age, Lukacs argued that the modern/bourgeois age, which began around the time of the Renaissance, is coming to an end.[3] The rise of populism and the decline of elitism is the theme of his experimental work, A Thread of Years (1998), a series of vignettes set in each year of the 20th century from 1900 to 1998, tracing the abandonment of gentlemanly conduct and the rise of vulgarity in American culture. Lukacs defends traditional Western civilization against what he sees as the leveling and debasing effects of mass culture.
By his own admission a dedicated Anglophile, Lukacs’s favorite historical figure is Winston Churchill, whom he considers to be the greatest statesman of the 20th century, and the savior of not only Great Britain, but also of Western civilization. A recurring theme in his writing is the duel between Winston Churchill and Adolf Hitler for mastery of the world. The struggle between them, whom Lukacs sees as the archetypical reactionary and the archetypical revolutionary, is the major theme of The Last European War (1976), The Duel (1991), Five Days in London (1999) and 2008's Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat, a book about Churchill’s first major speech as Prime Minister. Lukacs argues that Great Britain (and by extension the British Empire) could not defeat Germany by itself, winning required the entry of the United States and the Soviet Union, but he contends that Churchill, by ensuring that Germany failed to win the war in 1940, laid the groundwork for an Allied victory.
Lukacs holds strong isolationist beliefs, and unusually for an anti-Communist émigré, "airs surprisingly critical views of the Cold War from a unique conservative perspective."[4] Lukacs claims that the Soviet Union was a feeble power on the verge of collapse, and contended that the Cold War was an unnecessary waste of American treasure and life. Likewise, Lukacs has also condemned the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In his 1997 book, George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, 1944-1946, a collection of letters between Lukacs and his close friend George F. Kennan exchanged in 1994-1995, Lukacs and Kennan criticized the New Left claim that the Cold War was caused by the United States. Lukacs argued however that although it was Joseph Stalin who was largely responsible for the beginning of the Cold War, the administration of Dwight Eisenhower missed a chance for ending the Cold War in 1953 after Stalin's death, and as a consequence the Cold War went on for many more decades.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 37 reviews
October 26, 2013
Lukacs opens this book with the claim that: “There is no serious history of the twentieth century, that I know of.” He thus manages to be both arrogant and wrong before he’s even finished the first sentence. There are, in fact, at least a half-dozen– by historians like Eric Hobsbawm, Jeremy Black, Martin Gilbert, and Paul Johnson – nearly all of which would make a better introduction to the humankind’s last, most tumultuous hundred years.
The history offered here is, indeed, short at 228 pages. It’s also incomplete – Lukacs’ twentieth century runs from 1914 to 1989, and thus clocks in at a tidy 75 years – and riddled with factual errors ranging from the trivial (Warren Harding’s campaign slogan) to the jaw-dropping (getting the location of Pakistan wrong by 1000 miles; erasing three major wars from the history of 19C South America). It is also aggressively Eurocentric: spending chapters on that continent’s internal politics (particularly between 1920 and 1945) while glossing over the internal affairs of Asia, Latin America, and Africa in the broadest and vaguest of terms. The handling of post-colonial Africa is broad, dismissive, and dark enough that it dances up to the very edge of being racist caricature.
Readers already familiar with the history of the last century may well enjoy Lukacs’ take on it. He is fiercely opinionated and, as a self-proclaimed “reactionary,” perpetually and intensely cranky about this most modern (and modernizing) of centuries . . . all of which makes him fun to argue with. This should not, however, be anybody’s first (or second) book on the subject: Too much is left out, too much is gotten wrong, and too much is distorted.
The views expressed here are developed at greater length, backed up by examples, at: http://www.popmatters.com/review/1759...
The history offered here is, indeed, short at 228 pages. It’s also incomplete – Lukacs’ twentieth century runs from 1914 to 1989, and thus clocks in at a tidy 75 years – and riddled with factual errors ranging from the trivial (Warren Harding’s campaign slogan) to the jaw-dropping (getting the location of Pakistan wrong by 1000 miles; erasing three major wars from the history of 19C South America). It is also aggressively Eurocentric: spending chapters on that continent’s internal politics (particularly between 1920 and 1945) while glossing over the internal affairs of Asia, Latin America, and Africa in the broadest and vaguest of terms. The handling of post-colonial Africa is broad, dismissive, and dark enough that it dances up to the very edge of being racist caricature.
Readers already familiar with the history of the last century may well enjoy Lukacs’ take on it. He is fiercely opinionated and, as a self-proclaimed “reactionary,” perpetually and intensely cranky about this most modern (and modernizing) of centuries . . . all of which makes him fun to argue with. This should not, however, be anybody’s first (or second) book on the subject: Too much is left out, too much is gotten wrong, and too much is distorted.
The views expressed here are developed at greater length, backed up by examples, at: http://www.popmatters.com/review/1759...
March 3, 2022
Lukacs es uno de mis historiadores favoritos y por ello pienso que no soy del todo objetivo con él. Coincido en muchos de sus juicios y comparto su estima por varias figuras históricas pero lo que más me atrae de él son sus ideas que se suelen alejar de lo manido y del consenso general.
Quien se acerque a este libro buscando una narración de los hechos del siglo XX, que la tiene, casi mejor que no lo coja. Este es un libro de ideas, de perlas en forma de frases ingeniosas que nos hacen pensar durante un rato o unos días, de giros y opiniones que o no nos habíamos planteado o las descartábamos por improbables. Quién quiera pensar, que lo lea; quien sólo quiera leer un relato de hechos, quien no quiera hacerse preguntas incómodas o quien no quera cuestionar sus propias opiniones, que no se moleste.
Quien se acerque a este libro buscando una narración de los hechos del siglo XX, que la tiene, casi mejor que no lo coja. Este es un libro de ideas, de perlas en forma de frases ingeniosas que nos hacen pensar durante un rato o unos días, de giros y opiniones que o no nos habíamos planteado o las descartábamos por improbables. Quién quiera pensar, que lo lea; quien sólo quiera leer un relato de hechos, quien no quiera hacerse preguntas incómodas o quien no quera cuestionar sus propias opiniones, que no se moleste.
January 30, 2021
4,5 csillag
pre-scriptum: Ez a könyv miért külön könyvként van felvíve a eredeti magyar nyelvű kiadása helyett? Csak annyi a baj ezzel a szeparálódással, hogy az értékelések és csillagozások így nem összegződnek egy helyen. És sajnos nem találtam olyan funkciót, hogy legalább ajánlani lehessen a módosítást...
Úgy szeretem a vizsgaidőszak utáni pihenést, mert akkor van agyam olyasmit olvasni, aminek nem az a célja, hogy kikapcsoljon. ^.^
Nem vagyok egy kimondott történelemrajongó, és úgy igazán a 19., inkább 20. század érdekel. Ezért amikor a POKET-könyvek között feltűnt John Lukacs magyar születésű, ámde amerikai történész kötete, meg is vettem, majd (magamtól) meglepően hamar el is olvastam. És nagyon élveztem.
Ritkán olvasok tudományos igényű munkát, esszészerűségeket, pedig egyébként lenne igényem rá. Bizonyos értelemben a híreket pótlandó. Az esszék legalább képviselnek némi intellektuális színvonalat, ami néhány médiumról nem mondható el. Ez a kötet nem teljesen illik bele ebbe az elképzelésembe, hiszen az 1914-1989-es időszakot öleli fel.
A történelem szükségszerűen szubjektív mint ahogy a történész is. Mindenkinek meg kell találnia azt a közvetítőt, akinek a nézeteivel tud azonosulni, illetve talán fontosabb, hogy képes a saját nézeteitől elvonatkoztatni. John Lukacsban egy ilyen embert találtam, és nagyon érdekel a Budapest 1900 könyve is.
Ahogy mondani szokták, a múlt meghatározza a jelenünket, és a jövőnket is. Meg a történelem, ugye, mindig ismétli önmagát. De azért jó lenne, ha tanulnánk a hibáinkból – a „mi” alatt az egész emberiséget értem. Amikor a háborús filmeket nézem, mindig az jut eszembe, hogy egyáltalán hogyan lehetett az emberiség annyira idióta, hogy eljutott a háborúig. A pszichológiai vonatkozásait nagyjából fel tudom térképezni, de történelmi kontextusba csak nehezen tudom helyezni (pedig jó tanáraim voltak a 20. századot illetően, úgyhogy nem az ő hibájuk.) Most sikerült kicsit javítani ezen. Történelmi léptékkel ez a 100 év semmi. De a mi jelenünkre nagyon is hatással is van. Az pedig, hogy Lukacsnak magyar érdekeltsége is van, néhány magyar történeti bekezdéssel bővítette ezt az írást, amit magyarként különösen tudtam értékelni.
Tudom ajánlani azoknak, akik szeretik a történelmet és szeretnek kicsit összefüggéseiben gondolkodni róla. Fogyasztható tizenpár oldalas fejezetekből áll jórészt a kötet, napi 1-2 nekem pontosan elég intellektuális boost volt.
August 24, 2021
Nem tudom, korábban mikor olvastam el ilyen lassan egy ilyen rövid könyvet. Úgy tűnik, a történelem dióhéjban nem az én műfajom. Meglepő módon a 2. világháború történéseinek leírását egészen érdekfeszítőnek találtam, de az előtte és utána történtek leírását már korántsem ennyire. Tetszettek a filozofikus önreflexiók és kitekintések a szövegben (miért is ennyire Európa-központú? lesznek-e többségében fehérek lakta országok Afrikában és a Közel-Keleten 100 év múlva? stb.). Az is tetszett, hogy nem fél értékítéleteket megfogalmazni politikusokról. Legjobban talán az a gondolat fog megmaradni bennem, hogy Hitler egy személyben felelős a 2. világháborúért (ti. ha ő nincs, biztosan nem robban ki, mert az első után nagyon nem akartak egy másodikat a világ vezetői).
Még egy dolog: bármennyire is sűrítés a könyv, néhol meglepődtem, mennyire szűkszavúan foglalkozik egy-egy témával, eseménnyel (míg másoknak adott esetben relatíve sok bekezdést szentel).
Még egy dolog: bármennyire is sűrítés a könyv, néhol meglepődtem, mennyire szűkszavúan foglalkozik egy-egy témával, eseménnyel (míg másoknak adott esetben relatíve sok bekezdést szentel).
November 24, 2021
A könyv nekem abban segített, hogy megváltoztatta a történetírással kapcsolatos szemléletemet. Aki leírja, az állást foglal a szavak kiválasztásával. Ki erősebben, ki kevésbé. Ahhoz, hogy minél közelebb kerüljünk a tényekhez, érdemes több történetírót adott időszakból olvasni. Tehát a tankönyvi tudás erősen kérdőjeles.
Tartalmilag, noha Európa volt fókuszban, sajnos meg kell állapítanom, hogy világtörténelmi tudásanyagom fejlesztésre szorul…
Tartalmilag, noha Európa volt fókuszban, sajnos meg kell állapítanom, hogy világtörténelmi tudásanyagom fejlesztésre szorul…
April 12, 2022
Professor Lukacs was a very wise historian (based on this book alone), and he had quite different political views from mine but it doesn't matter because he gave a very complex and the same time easy-to-understand review of the 20th century. He gave me new perspectives to think about and I think I had some kind of revelation regarding history and politics while reading.
I really liked Lukacs's sarcastic commentary about some events and the fact that he refused to pose as some objective authority but he embraced his own biases and went through with them. It was refreshing.
I feel really clever after this book. I should read more history.
I really liked Lukacs's sarcastic commentary about some events and the fact that he refused to pose as some objective authority but he embraced his own biases and went through with them. It was refreshing.
I feel really clever after this book. I should read more history.
March 13, 2023
John Lukacs összegző műve inkább tűnt számomra a szerző szubjektív világképét lefestő esszégyűjtménynek, mintsem a magyar közoktatásban megszokott, a németes vonalat képviselő agyonadatolt munkának. A munka azonban mégsem válik a végére komolytalanná, kiegyensúlyozott marad.
A történészek jellemzően egy rövid XX. század időtartamában szokták felfogni ezt a korszakot, amelyet az I., a II. világháború, és a hidegháború konfliktusai határoztak meg. Sajnos ez meglátszik a mintegy 300 db A/5-ös oldal terjedelemben történő összefoglaláskor. Lukacs, hogy megfeleljen ennek a közmegegyezésnek, kénytelen volt a két világháborút apokaliptikus hatásainak megfelelően sokkal hosszabban tárgyalni, mint a többi sorsfordító eseményt.
Akit úgy untat a hadtörténelem, mint engem, azt jól összegző társadalomtörténeti, és gazdaságtörténeti fejezetekkel engeszteli ki Lukacs. Az ilyen gazdaság-és társadalomtörténeti gyors ismertetői közül a legjobb az Amerikai nacionalizmus, amerikai jóindulat című volt;a sok gazdasági mutató és társadalmi átalakulás ugyanúgy megjelenik benne, mint a klasszikus liberalizmus kiégése, és a szocializmustól való rettegés miatt kialakult neoliberális, és nyugati/angolszász konzervatív mozgalom megformálódása, s ezzel a régi meghatározások érvénytelenné válása.
Nem hallgatja el azokat a tényeket sem, amelyeket súlyukhoz képest igen kevésszer tárgyalnak, így a japán származású amerikaiak polgári jogait korlátozó törvényeket Kaliforniában 1907-től, vagy az Egyesült Államok csendes-óceáni birodalomépítését. Lukacs szerencsére a jól dokumentált évszázad csomóponti elemeire koncentrált a továbbiakban is, így a koreai háború, a kubai rakétaválság, a vietnami konfliktus, India függetlenedése és Pakisztán leválása, vagy a Szovjetunió felbomlása mentén tárgyalta az ilyen kis könyvben szinte összepaszírozhatatlan anyagot, így minden történelem rajongó kap egy gyors újraképzést, miközben megkapja a szerző politikatörténeti világnézetére jellemző fő nézeteket is. Ezek közé tartoznak az amerikai polgári eszmény magasztalása, az alkotmányos monarchia államformájába vetett nagy bizalma, és bizonyos történelmi személyiségek, -mint F.D.Roosevelt- idealizálása.Mégis, Lukacs kész volt ilyen rövid könyvben is némi árnyalt gondolkodást felmutatni, amelyhez volt egy-két megoldása.Például, ha egy jelenségre nem jutott kellő terjedelem, a leginkább sokkoló, legjellemzőbb részleteket emelte ki, ezzel ütve át az esetleg emelkedettebb ingerküszöböt, ezzel rögzítve a tudásanyagot az olvasók fejében. Így például önmagában is elég karakteres eseménye volt a XX. századnak Mohammed Moszadek iráni miniszterelnök 1951-es kísérlete az olajipar államosítására, s ezt követő eltávolítása a hatalomból Eisenhower elnök és a CIA által. De, ezen a helyen említhető még a XX. század második felének Afrikáját terrorizáló diktátorok elvtelen kiszolgálása az akkori két szuperhatalom részéről, még akkor is, hogyha ezen diktátorok jelentős része adott esetben nyíltan kannibalizmust követett el . A súlyponti események, és a karakteresebb világpolitikai jelenségek ábrázolásával lényegretörő, mégse unalmas beszámolót kapunk, mintha a szemtanúnak kellett volna rövid helyszíni tudósítást adnia.
Mindent egybevetve, egy egészen korrekt összefoglaló az adott történelmi korszakról ahhoz képest, hogy 300 szűkös oldalt tudtak rászánni. S hogy mi végkövetkeztetése számomra?: Lukacs azt sugallja Az emberi tudás határai című utolsó fejezetében, hogy a bizonytalanság a kvantumfizika eredményeivel mindennapjaink szerves részévé vált, s sokszor ezáltal minden, s mindennek az ellenkezője is adott szituációban igaz lehet. De, ne féljünk, mert ez lehetőségek sokaságát is tartogatja problémáink megoldására. A szerző pedig gördülékeny stílusával, árnyaltságra törekvésével, és az alkotmányos monarchia iránti szimpátiájával megszerezte a rokonszenvemet.
A történészek jellemzően egy rövid XX. század időtartamában szokták felfogni ezt a korszakot, amelyet az I., a II. világháború, és a hidegháború konfliktusai határoztak meg. Sajnos ez meglátszik a mintegy 300 db A/5-ös oldal terjedelemben történő összefoglaláskor. Lukacs, hogy megfeleljen ennek a közmegegyezésnek, kénytelen volt a két világháborút apokaliptikus hatásainak megfelelően sokkal hosszabban tárgyalni, mint a többi sorsfordító eseményt.
Akit úgy untat a hadtörténelem, mint engem, azt jól összegző társadalomtörténeti, és gazdaságtörténeti fejezetekkel engeszteli ki Lukacs. Az ilyen gazdaság-és társadalomtörténeti gyors ismertetői közül a legjobb az Amerikai nacionalizmus, amerikai jóindulat című volt;a sok gazdasági mutató és társadalmi átalakulás ugyanúgy megjelenik benne, mint a klasszikus liberalizmus kiégése, és a szocializmustól való rettegés miatt kialakult neoliberális, és nyugati/angolszász konzervatív mozgalom megformálódása, s ezzel a régi meghatározások érvénytelenné válása.
Nem hallgatja el azokat a tényeket sem, amelyeket súlyukhoz képest igen kevésszer tárgyalnak, így a japán származású amerikaiak polgári jogait korlátozó törvényeket Kaliforniában 1907-től, vagy az Egyesült Államok csendes-óceáni birodalomépítését. Lukacs szerencsére a jól dokumentált évszázad csomóponti elemeire koncentrált a továbbiakban is, így a koreai háború, a kubai rakétaválság, a vietnami konfliktus, India függetlenedése és Pakisztán leválása, vagy a Szovjetunió felbomlása mentén tárgyalta az ilyen kis könyvben szinte összepaszírozhatatlan anyagot, így minden történelem rajongó kap egy gyors újraképzést, miközben megkapja a szerző politikatörténeti világnézetére jellemző fő nézeteket is. Ezek közé tartoznak az amerikai polgári eszmény magasztalása, az alkotmányos monarchia államformájába vetett nagy bizalma, és bizonyos történelmi személyiségek, -mint F.D.Roosevelt- idealizálása.Mégis, Lukacs kész volt ilyen rövid könyvben is némi árnyalt gondolkodást felmutatni, amelyhez volt egy-két megoldása.Például, ha egy jelenségre nem jutott kellő terjedelem, a leginkább sokkoló, legjellemzőbb részleteket emelte ki, ezzel ütve át az esetleg emelkedettebb ingerküszöböt, ezzel rögzítve a tudásanyagot az olvasók fejében. Így például önmagában is elég karakteres eseménye volt a XX. századnak Mohammed Moszadek iráni miniszterelnök 1951-es kísérlete az olajipar államosítására, s ezt követő eltávolítása a hatalomból Eisenhower elnök és a CIA által. De, ezen a helyen említhető még a XX. század második felének Afrikáját terrorizáló diktátorok elvtelen kiszolgálása az akkori két szuperhatalom részéről, még akkor is, hogyha ezen diktátorok jelentős része adott esetben nyíltan kannibalizmust követett el . A súlyponti események, és a karakteresebb világpolitikai jelenségek ábrázolásával lényegretörő, mégse unalmas beszámolót kapunk, mintha a szemtanúnak kellett volna rövid helyszíni tudósítást adnia.
Mindent egybevetve, egy egészen korrekt összefoglaló az adott történelmi korszakról ahhoz képest, hogy 300 szűkös oldalt tudtak rászánni. S hogy mi végkövetkeztetése számomra?: Lukacs azt sugallja Az emberi tudás határai című utolsó fejezetében, hogy a bizonytalanság a kvantumfizika eredményeivel mindennapjaink szerves részévé vált, s sokszor ezáltal minden, s mindennek az ellenkezője is adott szituációban igaz lehet. De, ne féljünk, mert ez lehetőségek sokaságát is tartogatja problémáink megoldására. A szerző pedig gördülékeny stílusával, árnyaltságra törekvésével, és az alkotmányos monarchia iránti szimpátiájával megszerezte a rokonszenvemet.
June 27, 2020
A good concise recap of world war 2. The author drops a lot of the details from the narrative to make it easier to understand the outline. This is not a book for anyone who wants to find out about something particular in WW2; But for getting an idea of what was going on in each year and how each leader was reacting to those events, this is a great book!
(After reading a bunch of WW2 books, this book was the first time I understood why some of the iconic moments of the war are iconic: Churchill's involvement, the connection between Stalin and Hitler, Hitler's stale-mate situation on being unable to take England despite being wildly successful in Europe)
(After reading a bunch of WW2 books, this book was the first time I understood why some of the iconic moments of the war are iconic: Churchill's involvement, the connection between Stalin and Hitler, Hitler's stale-mate situation on being unable to take England despite being wildly successful in Europe)
June 21, 2024
I found this short history of the 20th-century to be surprisingly good: the text is illuminating, accessible, well-supported, and impressively concise. I also found its author, professor emeritus John Lukacs, to be well-informed on world history; I also found him to be honest and transparent with his opining on various causes and consequences of world events in the 20th-century. This well-paced and discerning history book is a superb if you're looking for a comprehensive yet concise, academic yet accessible examination of a dynamic and turbulent chapter of the great human story. Despite a handful of negative reviews posted here on Goodreads, I highly recommend this book!
January 3, 2018
As the title indicates, Lukacs provides a brief survey of major events in the twentieth century. He spends the largest amount of time on World War II, but several other key events are also addressed such as World War I, the Korean War, and the Cold War. Lukacs describes the twentieth century as a “European Century” and thus he spends less time on the history of other continents in the twentieth century. For me, I actually enjoyed these diversions into less well known history (post-WWII history and non-European history) since I feel like I have a pretty thorough understanding of the World Wars already. As a survey, it’s a fast and quality read which lays an excellent foundation for further reading in whatever area might interest you most.
May 16, 2021
Another well written book about the twentieth century and some significant developments that happened in that century and shaped the present world. This book covers something beyond historical events. It can definitely help you out to understand the politics, agreements, and, more importantly, their consequences in the subsequent time.
June 22, 2024
Niet heel sterke proza, veel westers en veel Amerika wat waarschijnlijk ook waar is.
October 4, 2013
Lukas reveals himself to be reactionary, opinionated and a Christian, in a nice, civilized sort of way. He has written a "short history" in which he often gives little explanation of his views, falling back on the "short" aspect of this work. I am certain that his thoughts are much more reasoned in his countless other books. Over all, it is a wonderful, short, read. Highly recommended.
The twentieth century is itself defined as being short as Lukas is only looking closely at the years 1914 (the outbreak of WWI) to 1989 (the end of the cold war). He rationalizes this well in that the Victorian era continued up until 1914 and that the end of the cold war announced a new era that has yet to be defined. This time period might also be seen as the era of U.S. dominance in the world, suggesting that this dominance is quickly on the wane.
The century is seen by Lukas as one where nationalism and democracy have been on the rise. He suggests that the two are not necessarily conducive to each other and that while he sees the rise of democracy as "...God's design" he also says that "[p]opulism and nationalism are the very worst (and, alas, powerful) components of democracy." We live in a world of mixed blessings.
As would be expected of a book about the twentieth century, it focuses on the wars, totalitarianism and barbarism of the century. We follow the outbreak of the horrors of WWI, the rise of Hitler and his responsibility for the outbreak of WWII as well as the role played by Churchill and Roosevelt. He makes it clear that he regards the latter two rather highly. He also shows some small sympathy for a misunderstood Stalin. Lukas believes that the cold war may have been avoided, or minimized, had the Americans and West Germans been more trusting.
The final chapter seems to be either an add-on to the book or its raison d'être. I'm not sure. This chapter is largely a short essay that could stand by itself. Basically, he sees the century as a transitional one where technology has had a huge influence but seems to be running its course. Whereas most of humanity is, as a result of technology, better off, there is also an apparent decline. America has led the way with this technology and has, for the most part, used it to improve the lives of, not only Americans, but of humanity. This technology is now capable of terrible actions. In a rather stark statement, Lukas says, "After the end of the American Century, a major problem is not so much the existence of American omnipotence as it is the way millions of Americans and many of their politicians unthinkingly believe in it."
Finally, drawing on the lessons of modern physics, Lukas points out the "shortcomings of scientific determinism-its dependence on mechanical causality...; its adherence to to the unwarranted belief that the same causes necessarily result in the same effects; its unwillingness to understand and actually see that the human mind interferes with and alters these very causalities." Because of this realization by some scientists that we affect causality just by looking at it, Lukas suggests that we are reversing the Copernican Revolution and moving the Earth, humankind, back into the centre of the universe. In order to continue to enrich ourselves through science, he suggests, we need to adopt a new humility.
The twentieth century is itself defined as being short as Lukas is only looking closely at the years 1914 (the outbreak of WWI) to 1989 (the end of the cold war). He rationalizes this well in that the Victorian era continued up until 1914 and that the end of the cold war announced a new era that has yet to be defined. This time period might also be seen as the era of U.S. dominance in the world, suggesting that this dominance is quickly on the wane.
The century is seen by Lukas as one where nationalism and democracy have been on the rise. He suggests that the two are not necessarily conducive to each other and that while he sees the rise of democracy as "...God's design" he also says that "[p]opulism and nationalism are the very worst (and, alas, powerful) components of democracy." We live in a world of mixed blessings.
As would be expected of a book about the twentieth century, it focuses on the wars, totalitarianism and barbarism of the century. We follow the outbreak of the horrors of WWI, the rise of Hitler and his responsibility for the outbreak of WWII as well as the role played by Churchill and Roosevelt. He makes it clear that he regards the latter two rather highly. He also shows some small sympathy for a misunderstood Stalin. Lukas believes that the cold war may have been avoided, or minimized, had the Americans and West Germans been more trusting.
The final chapter seems to be either an add-on to the book or its raison d'être. I'm not sure. This chapter is largely a short essay that could stand by itself. Basically, he sees the century as a transitional one where technology has had a huge influence but seems to be running its course. Whereas most of humanity is, as a result of technology, better off, there is also an apparent decline. America has led the way with this technology and has, for the most part, used it to improve the lives of, not only Americans, but of humanity. This technology is now capable of terrible actions. In a rather stark statement, Lukas says, "After the end of the American Century, a major problem is not so much the existence of American omnipotence as it is the way millions of Americans and many of their politicians unthinkingly believe in it."
Finally, drawing on the lessons of modern physics, Lukas points out the "shortcomings of scientific determinism-its dependence on mechanical causality...; its adherence to to the unwarranted belief that the same causes necessarily result in the same effects; its unwillingness to understand and actually see that the human mind interferes with and alters these very causalities." Because of this realization by some scientists that we affect causality just by looking at it, Lukas suggests that we are reversing the Copernican Revolution and moving the Earth, humankind, back into the centre of the universe. In order to continue to enrich ourselves through science, he suggests, we need to adopt a new humility.
November 6, 2023
I can only review this book in comparison with Lukacs' Democracy and Populism, especially since they seem like alternative expressions of much the same ideas. For me, this one is better and more persuasive--more palatable. What seemed like arrogance in the other book presents more as bold and assertive in this one. Perhaps the proportion of fact to judgment/opinion is better, so that his judgments seem better argued when they appear. This was a very useful broad-brush treatment of the 20th Century in European/American/Asian history as it is expressed in world war and Cold War terms. I'm alright that he doesn't treat much with most of the rest of the world, but I don't accept his arguments that events there mattered less. All in all, if I could do it over again, I'd read only this book and skip Democracy and Populism.
Read
January 29, 2021Far too much time spent discussing the major personalities of World War II (Churchill, Hitler, Stalin) relative to discussion of the rest of human history during the 20th century, using a dubious idealist philosophy as justification. The book is convincing that Hitler and Churchill's personalities were necessary conditions for the emergence and outcome of the war, but they certainly weren't sufficient- the innumerable socioeconomic, geographic, and other factors that set the stage for the interplay of these personalities get relative short shrift here. Otherwise, this is a helpful overview of the century.
October 5, 2022
A concise, carefully worded summary of the "historical century" 1914-1989. As you may infer from those dates, Lukacs considers the two World Wars and the Cold War to be the defining events of the century. He uses them to structure his overview, though he ranges into the marchlands to pick out important threads of public sentiment and culture shift. Lukacs has a specific philosophy of history that leads him into areas of nuance (he doesn't seem impressed with Reagan or American anti-Communism of the 1950s-1990s) as well as dogmatism (he says history and revision are equivalent). I want to reread this, and read more of Lukacs.
July 19, 2023
Muy interesante este libro. El autor es estadounidense de origen húngaro, y nos habla del siglo XX. Analiza con mucho detalle el período 1914 a 1945, y plantea que el siglo "históricamente hablando" empieza en 1914 y finaliza en 1989. Como siempre, la historiografía escrita por buenos historiadores es muy entretenida e instructiva, y este libro presenta una gran oportunidad. Creo que este libro es trampolín para otros. Por ejemplo, me interesa profundizar en el muro de Berlín, o en la figura de Winston Churchill.
April 7, 2014
Do you want a Joe Friday ("Just the facts, ma'am, just the facts") history of the 20th century? Go elsewhere. Do you want to read an extended essay on the crucial events of the century by a master writer and historian? Then read this book. Do you want someone who will mouth common platitudes? Go elsewhere. Do you want the reflections and insights of a man who's studied and written about the 20th century in as much detail and with as much insight as anyone I can think of. Then read this book; in fact, you'd do well to read the rest of John Lukacs's work, too.
Enjoying John Lukacs is the equivalent of enjoying a fine wine. Lukacs is a vineyard that keeps producing superb fare, now in his 90th year. Each new work provides a unique blend of insights. I'm a Lukacs connoisseur. But some do not care for what I consider an exquisite vintage. I read one review of this book that referred to him as "cranky", and in a charming sort of way, I can see that. Others find his opinions too harsh, dated, or limited in his perspective. I don't think so, but perfection isn't my primary concern.
Lukacs sets forth many propositions, some of which he's stated before. For instance, his 20th century runs from 1914 to 1989 (the collapse of Communism). This is foremost a political history, and many historians will agree with the shortened scope of the century about which he writes. He centers his concerns on Europe and America. He acknowledges that he gives short shrift to Latin America, Africa, and much of Asia (Japan the primary exception). But he argues, rightly I think, that in this century, with some exception for Japan and China (near the end) has centered on Europe. The main focus of U.S. policy has centered on Europe. In the short 20th century, Europe was at the center of the action, including the horrible killing fields of the two wars. Lukacs notes that we've now reached the End of the Modern Age (the title of an earlier work, by the way), which also marks the end of the European Age. We don't yet know what follows; just as those who lived in (what we now call) the Middle Ages didn't know what would follow from the changes they saw as thheir age waned. Lukacs also states that "the twentieth century was--an? the?--American century". (2-3).
Lukacs sees Democracy as the great movement, but Democracy (as popular sovereignty) was shaped in no small part by nationalism (different from patriotism, as Lukacs has often written) and populism, which differs from classical liberalism. Given his quote of Burkhardt near the end of the book, one senses that he feels uneasy about the continued success of Democracy subject to the demands of nationalism and populism.
Lukacs most blatantly transgresses popular dogma by contending that some individuals still guide history. He contends that World War II was Hitler's war. No Hitler, no war. He believes that the ascension of Churchill over Halifax made the difference that allowed Britain to survive until "the New World with all its power and might, sets forth to the liberation and rescue of the Old." (Churchill). Likewise, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin play outsized roles (for good and ill) in the course of events.
In addition to these perspectives and many others, Lukacs at the beginning and at the end of the book reflects on the project of history, knowing, and the human future. Of history as a discipline, he writes:
I have devoted much of my life to asserting, teaching, and writing that "objective" and "scientific" history are inadequate desiderata; but so, too, is "subjective" history. Our historical knowledge, like nearly every kind of human knowledge, is personal and participatory, since the knower and the known, while not identical, are not and cannot be entirely separate. We do not possess truth completely. Yet pursue truth we must. So many seemingly endless and incomplete truths about the history of the twentieth century are still worth pursuing, and perhaps forever. (1)
. . . .
Historical knowledge, nay, understanding, depends on descriptions rather than on definition. It consists of words and sentences that are inseparable from "facts"; they are more than the wrapping of facts. "In the beginning was the Word," and so it will be at the end of the world. (1-2)
At the end of this book, he cites Tocqueville and Jacob Burckhardt, who, along with Johan Huizinga, are the predecessors who have most influenced Lukacs. Among twentieth century thinkers, Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, formulators of the Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics, have influenced Lukacs. Lukacs writes of the uncertainty principle in human knowing:
The knower cannot be separated from the known. And with this is a greater and deeper meaning: that we, on our little, warm planet, are (again? anew?) at the very center of the universe. The universe was, and is, not our creation. But we human beings on this earth have invented it, and go on inventing it from time to time.
. . . .
Our twentieth-century recognitions, no matter how scattered and still hardly conscious, must, and will, issue not from human arrogance but from human humility. Perhaps just as important as our recognition of our central situation in the universe is our recognition that the limitations of our human knowledge do not restrict but enrich us. (212).
Enjoying John Lukacs is the equivalent of enjoying a fine wine. Lukacs is a vineyard that keeps producing superb fare, now in his 90th year. Each new work provides a unique blend of insights. I'm a Lukacs connoisseur. But some do not care for what I consider an exquisite vintage. I read one review of this book that referred to him as "cranky", and in a charming sort of way, I can see that. Others find his opinions too harsh, dated, or limited in his perspective. I don't think so, but perfection isn't my primary concern.
Lukacs sets forth many propositions, some of which he's stated before. For instance, his 20th century runs from 1914 to 1989 (the collapse of Communism). This is foremost a political history, and many historians will agree with the shortened scope of the century about which he writes. He centers his concerns on Europe and America. He acknowledges that he gives short shrift to Latin America, Africa, and much of Asia (Japan the primary exception). But he argues, rightly I think, that in this century, with some exception for Japan and China (near the end) has centered on Europe. The main focus of U.S. policy has centered on Europe. In the short 20th century, Europe was at the center of the action, including the horrible killing fields of the two wars. Lukacs notes that we've now reached the End of the Modern Age (the title of an earlier work, by the way), which also marks the end of the European Age. We don't yet know what follows; just as those who lived in (what we now call) the Middle Ages didn't know what would follow from the changes they saw as thheir age waned. Lukacs also states that "the twentieth century was--an? the?--American century". (2-3).
Lukacs sees Democracy as the great movement, but Democracy (as popular sovereignty) was shaped in no small part by nationalism (different from patriotism, as Lukacs has often written) and populism, which differs from classical liberalism. Given his quote of Burkhardt near the end of the book, one senses that he feels uneasy about the continued success of Democracy subject to the demands of nationalism and populism.
Lukacs most blatantly transgresses popular dogma by contending that some individuals still guide history. He contends that World War II was Hitler's war. No Hitler, no war. He believes that the ascension of Churchill over Halifax made the difference that allowed Britain to survive until "the New World with all its power and might, sets forth to the liberation and rescue of the Old." (Churchill). Likewise, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin play outsized roles (for good and ill) in the course of events.
In addition to these perspectives and many others, Lukacs at the beginning and at the end of the book reflects on the project of history, knowing, and the human future. Of history as a discipline, he writes:
I have devoted much of my life to asserting, teaching, and writing that "objective" and "scientific" history are inadequate desiderata; but so, too, is "subjective" history. Our historical knowledge, like nearly every kind of human knowledge, is personal and participatory, since the knower and the known, while not identical, are not and cannot be entirely separate. We do not possess truth completely. Yet pursue truth we must. So many seemingly endless and incomplete truths about the history of the twentieth century are still worth pursuing, and perhaps forever. (1)
. . . .
Historical knowledge, nay, understanding, depends on descriptions rather than on definition. It consists of words and sentences that are inseparable from "facts"; they are more than the wrapping of facts. "In the beginning was the Word," and so it will be at the end of the world. (1-2)
At the end of this book, he cites Tocqueville and Jacob Burckhardt, who, along with Johan Huizinga, are the predecessors who have most influenced Lukacs. Among twentieth century thinkers, Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, formulators of the Uncertainty Principle in quantum physics, have influenced Lukacs. Lukacs writes of the uncertainty principle in human knowing:
The knower cannot be separated from the known. And with this is a greater and deeper meaning: that we, on our little, warm planet, are (again? anew?) at the very center of the universe. The universe was, and is, not our creation. But we human beings on this earth have invented it, and go on inventing it from time to time.
. . . .
Our twentieth-century recognitions, no matter how scattered and still hardly conscious, must, and will, issue not from human arrogance but from human humility. Perhaps just as important as our recognition of our central situation in the universe is our recognition that the limitations of our human knowledge do not restrict but enrich us. (212).
May 18, 2017
Concise history of the two world wars and the Cold War. Mostly focused on Europe, but with some non-Western history covered as well. Beautifully written. Reads more like a philosophical work than a standard history.
July 29, 2017
Although Lukacs occasionally delivers flashes of brilliant insight, his book merits only three stars due to its numerous factual errors and its Eurocentric focus.
December 16, 2018
Een interessante samenvatting van de afgelopen eeuw, met een uitdagende blik op de toekomst. Al ben ik het niet met alle conclusies van de auteur eens. Dus compendium volstaat het redelijk goed.
June 14, 2019
Covered the ighpoints pretty well, and gave me a few things to think about along the way.
Read
June 27, 2019A lot of interesting perspective and new info. Would like to read "next" century book.
January 5, 2022
It summarizes the biggest moments of 20th century and describes in detail every important decision that was done by important leaders like Roosevelt, Churchill, Hitler etc. I like it a lot.
April 25, 2024
I like reading Lukacs. He has interesting perspectives and lots of opinions.
August 24, 2020
John Lukacs, who passed away last year at the age of 95, had an illustrious career in the teaching and writing of history. A self-described political conservative, he was a strong defender of liberal (in the traditional sense) democracy, which he saw under threat from nationalistic forces. The book was published in 2013, but seems even more relevant now than then. "When nationalism replaces older version of patriotism (every patriot is also a bit of a nationalist, but few nationalists are truly patriots), they seek enemies among their fellow citizens. . . Popular sovereignty - alas, often dependent on nationalist sentiment - is the professed basis of most governments now." p15
February 18, 2017
5 stars for the content and 2 stars for the quality of the editing.
As others have pointed out, Lukacs is an erudite Old World Catholic conservative, or “reactionary” in his terms, who presents an idiosyncratic view of the 20th century. Rather than presenting the events of the 20th century as the inevitable outcomes of technology and economics, or as the results of the struggle between the great ideologies of communism, fascism, and liberalism, he sees nationalism, and in particular a sort of “soft national socialism”, along with the personalities of key political figures, as the defining features of 20th century politics.
These observations help to bring together many of the major currents of 20th-century politics. Some of these are obvious like the role of nationalism in the origins of WWI and WWII and in Wilson’s principle “national self-determination”. But it also helps explain Stalin’s abandonment of international Communism, the actions of post-Mao Chinese governments, the anti-colonial movements, and the domestic politics of post-WWII Europe. It turns out that class solidarity did not triumph over national solidarity. The goal of politics remains getting the best deal for the people of a particular nation. For Lukacs, Stalin, Mao, Castro, Thatcher, Ho Chi Minh, Reagan, Nehru, Sadat, Meir, Franco, Salazar, De Gaulle, De Valera, Tito, etc., despite their vast ideological differences were at heart nationalists. The future of the nation state is again at the forefront of politics.
In one of my favorite passages he attempts to explain why the hammer and sickle can be worn ironically, but the swastika cannot—Lukac posits that this is because national socialism remains a viable option in ways that communism does not. He notes that national socialist parties get 20% of the vote in Europe—he never mentions anyone by name, but he must be thinking of Jobbik and other parties like Kotleba and Golden Dawn.
While the prose is well crafted and the thesis is provocative, the book needs much better editing. It reads like lecture notes or an unfinished article. Sentences are repeated multiple times, almost verbatim. And, as other reviewers have pointed out, there are numerous factual errors that a quick google search can sort out. For example, it was not Gen. Allenby who rose from private to field marshal but Gen. William Robertson. If this had been published by some third tier publishing house this would be understandable. But I am disappointed in Harvard University Press.
Lukacs fans will enjoy it, but others will be disappointed.
As others have pointed out, Lukacs is an erudite Old World Catholic conservative, or “reactionary” in his terms, who presents an idiosyncratic view of the 20th century. Rather than presenting the events of the 20th century as the inevitable outcomes of technology and economics, or as the results of the struggle between the great ideologies of communism, fascism, and liberalism, he sees nationalism, and in particular a sort of “soft national socialism”, along with the personalities of key political figures, as the defining features of 20th century politics.
These observations help to bring together many of the major currents of 20th-century politics. Some of these are obvious like the role of nationalism in the origins of WWI and WWII and in Wilson’s principle “national self-determination”. But it also helps explain Stalin’s abandonment of international Communism, the actions of post-Mao Chinese governments, the anti-colonial movements, and the domestic politics of post-WWII Europe. It turns out that class solidarity did not triumph over national solidarity. The goal of politics remains getting the best deal for the people of a particular nation. For Lukacs, Stalin, Mao, Castro, Thatcher, Ho Chi Minh, Reagan, Nehru, Sadat, Meir, Franco, Salazar, De Gaulle, De Valera, Tito, etc., despite their vast ideological differences were at heart nationalists. The future of the nation state is again at the forefront of politics.
In one of my favorite passages he attempts to explain why the hammer and sickle can be worn ironically, but the swastika cannot—Lukac posits that this is because national socialism remains a viable option in ways that communism does not. He notes that national socialist parties get 20% of the vote in Europe—he never mentions anyone by name, but he must be thinking of Jobbik and other parties like Kotleba and Golden Dawn.
While the prose is well crafted and the thesis is provocative, the book needs much better editing. It reads like lecture notes or an unfinished article. Sentences are repeated multiple times, almost verbatim. And, as other reviewers have pointed out, there are numerous factual errors that a quick google search can sort out. For example, it was not Gen. Allenby who rose from private to field marshal but Gen. William Robertson. If this had been published by some third tier publishing house this would be understandable. But I am disappointed in Harvard University Press.
Lukacs fans will enjoy it, but others will be disappointed.
January 5, 2015
An exceedingly concise and insightful piece ("essay"?).
The historical twentieth century (1914-1989) saw...
> an increasingly democratic age (S. America, India, East Asia), but democracy is not the same as populism or nationalism.
> one where states took priorities and acted over nations.
> A Cold War between two super-states, the USSR and USA; and that war was less about ideologies than state-protectionist interest.
> The miracle of Churchill not losing World War II in 1940.
"'International Relations' is an inaccurate and often false term, in spite of its widespread employment in the twentieth century, the creation of institutions devoted to its study, and the high positions and prestigious academic degrees awarded by its representatives. It is a misnomer, because what almost all of them are talking about are not relations between nations but relations between states."
"Our historical knowledge, like nearly every kind of human knowledge, is personal and participatory, since the knower and known, while not identical, are not and cannot be entirely separate."
The historical twentieth century (1914-1989) saw...
> an increasingly democratic age (S. America, India, East Asia), but democracy is not the same as populism or nationalism.
> one where states took priorities and acted over nations.
> A Cold War between two super-states, the USSR and USA; and that war was less about ideologies than state-protectionist interest.
> The miracle of Churchill not losing World War II in 1940.
"'International Relations' is an inaccurate and often false term, in spite of its widespread employment in the twentieth century, the creation of institutions devoted to its study, and the high positions and prestigious academic degrees awarded by its representatives. It is a misnomer, because what almost all of them are talking about are not relations between nations but relations between states."
"Our historical knowledge, like nearly every kind of human knowledge, is personal and participatory, since the knower and known, while not identical, are not and cannot be entirely separate."
August 4, 2014
Historian John Lukacs's "A Short History of the Twentieth Century" focuses on the period between 1914, the start of World War I, and 1989, the end of the Cold War. Much of this concise book deals with the rise and fall of Hitler, the Soviet Union under Stalin, Britain under Churchill and the United States under (Franklin) Roosevelt. He comes to the conclusion that the 20th century was the American century because of its impact militarily, economically, and culturally. Lukacs also discussion nationalism, socialism, capitalism, patriotism, and other isms, and how they have been defined and misinterpreted through the years. I enjoy reading about history, and Lukacs' book is a well-written reflection of many of the world-changing events during the 75 years he records in the 212 pages.
August 4, 2014
Excellent book for those who wish to get a quick overview of major world events, which was my intention. Additionally, the language is easy to understand and the content deals mostly with facts, the author does get philosophical and interprets but only sometimes. I just wish that it had a few more chapters on the "third world"; although the omission is repeatedly justified, I still found it amiss.
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