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Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress
This volume presents two closely related essays by Thomas ?Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge? and ?Moral Reality and Moral Progress.? Both essays are concerned with moral epistemology and our means of access to moral truth; both are concerned with moral realism and with the resistance to subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality; and both are concerned with the historical development of moral knowledge. The second essay also proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments. The result is that only some advances in moral knowledge are discoveries of what has been true all along.
- GenresPhilosophy
80 pages, Kindle Edition
Published August 4, 2023
10 people are currently reading
78 people want to read
About the author
Thomas Nagel
81 books532 followersThomas Nagel is an American philosopher, currently University Professor and Professor of Philosophy and Law at New York University, where he has taught since 1980. His main areas of philosophical interest are philosophy of mind, political philosophy and ethics. He is well-known for his critique of reductionist accounts of the mind in his essay "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" (1974), and for his contributions to deontological and liberal moral and political theory in The Possibility of Altruism (1970) and subsequent writings.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
Thomas Nagel was born to a Jewish family in Belgrade, Yugoslavia (now Serbia). He received a BA from Cornell University in 1958, a BPhil from Oxford University in 1960, and a PhD from Harvard University in 1963 under the supervision of John Rawls. Before settling in New York, Nagel taught briefly at the University of California, Berkeley (from 1963 to 1966) and at Princeton University (from 1966 to 1980), where he trained many well-known philosophers including Susan Wolf, Shelly Kagan, and Samuel Scheffler, who is now his colleague at NYU. In 2006, he was made a member of the American Philosophical Society.
Nagel is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy, and has held fellowships from the Guggenheim Foundation, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. In 2008, he was awarded a Rolf Schock Prize for his work in philosophy, the Balzan prize, and the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters from Oxford University.
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
May 13, 2024
While I still think it's worth the read, namely because Nagel is a clear thinker and writer (and this is short!), his main essays in this really fall short of their intended goal. He finishes the first by saying "Those who disagree [with my core argument] will see me as simply begging the question--but perhaps that is unavoidable." Begging the question is precisely what he does when he 'argues' that a normative framework cannot be reduced to evaluations of consequences (and related explanations for other moral theories and practices). It was a bit surprising, because I thought he seemed to do a great job so explaining the appeals of a single framework such as consequentialism, which made me think he would be following up with nuanced arguments against such a framework. Instead, it seemed to more or less amount to "I don't agree with this single framework approach."
The disagreements with Essay 2 are in part a consequence of to disagreements with Essay 1, but also because I don't think that the nature of normative truth necessitates creatures with the capacity, in principle, to appreciate 'reasons' for a given ethical action (p. 32).
"I said earlier that there are two very different ways of understanding moral progress, depending on different conceptions of the structure of morality. One is to see progress as resulting from the gradual recognition and application of a single timeless normative principle such as that of impartial benevolence. The other is to see it as the gradual development of a pluralistic system of norms and values, some of which become available only after earlier stages, both normative and institutional, have been traversed. My account is of the second kind..." (p. 49)
The disagreements with Essay 2 are in part a consequence of to disagreements with Essay 1, but also because I don't think that the nature of normative truth necessitates creatures with the capacity, in principle, to appreciate 'reasons' for a given ethical action (p. 32).
"I said earlier that there are two very different ways of understanding moral progress, depending on different conceptions of the structure of morality. One is to see progress as resulting from the gradual recognition and application of a single timeless normative principle such as that of impartial benevolence. The other is to see it as the gradual development of a pluralistic system of norms and values, some of which become available only after earlier stages, both normative and institutional, have been traversed. My account is of the second kind..." (p. 49)
September 17, 2023
Thomas Nagel is one of the leading analytic philosophers of his generation. In this short book, he offers a wonderfully brief and clear analysis of the nature of morality, how we discover what is and is not moral, and how morality can change over time. The book provides limited background, so it is best for readers already familiar with the relevant debates and Nagel’s past writings on the subjects. For those who are, the book is brimming with insights, synthesis, and good sense. In particular, it offers guidance on the role of the first person perspective—of subjectivity—in moral reasoning, suggesting that morality can be bound by time and location yet remain objectively right and wrong.
December 19, 2024
This book is Nagel's Dewey Lecture on moral epistemology in 2015 and a follow up lecture to include also moral progress.
In the first lecture "Gut Feeling and Moral Knowledge", Nagel addresses the epistemic value of moral intuition, namely, how much our moral intuition in deciding right or wrong in ordinary situations give prima facie evidence into moral truth. Nagel believes that moral intuition is much more disadvantageous than empirical observation in scientific investigation which we know our empirical investigation is in direct causal interaction with the physical world. In moral intuition, when we try to establish that Rawlsian reflective equilibrium by test principles against judgments about particular situations, we aren't in any direct causal interaction with some moral reality to find the moral truths. The undertaking is a one-sided reflection by abstraction. There are two typical moral intuitions one uses to assess the right action to take in a given situation. One type is consequentislist which decides right or wrong based on the overall good or bad outcome an action results. The other is deontological which assesses whether an action is right or wrong based on some guiding principles applicable to that act, instead of the outcome of the action. Nagel mentions an approach from evolutionary psychology tends to see some shortcomings in a deontological approach if deciding merely on principle leads to more harm than good. But it seems a natural conclusion from evolutionary theory if its concern is survival for the collective. Nagel suggests looking at ourselves from the outside in a given situation may give further epistemic insight. We can come to see our attachments to right and deontology as an unnecessary cluttered outlook which grossly magnifies the claims of the person facing us that limits our rationality. Nagel thinks moral progress may favour a more consequential outlook than being stubborn in some deontology.
The second essay "Moral Reality and Moral Progress" proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth accessibility and moral progress. This account suggests a realism of moral truth independent of our beliefs so that a change in moral beliefs can be described as objectively correct or incorrect. Nagel suggests that moral intuition is dependent on the accessibility of a person's ability to understand the reason for action based on the knowledge he has. On this approach, moral progress is possible due to greater accessibility of reasons facts, and concepts of how one can act, leading to an historical progress. Nagel drew attention to views of homosexuality or sex not just for procreation as greater accessibility to knowledge, concepts, and understanding of facts surrounding the issues. He also suggests people in earlier days that had different views on these issues could hypothetically have views that modern people have, had such accessibility to knowledge was available to them. Nagel thinks such moral progress is not biologically innate but takes time from culturel development over time. This view of moral progress is historically developmental. Since he thinks views can be objectively right or wrong, moral progress involves progressively moving to moral perspectives that are more correct over history.
These two essays shed some original analysis on moral epistemology and the second essay is much more indepth into various moral issues. They both contributes to some original discussion in moral epistemology
In the first lecture "Gut Feeling and Moral Knowledge", Nagel addresses the epistemic value of moral intuition, namely, how much our moral intuition in deciding right or wrong in ordinary situations give prima facie evidence into moral truth. Nagel believes that moral intuition is much more disadvantageous than empirical observation in scientific investigation which we know our empirical investigation is in direct causal interaction with the physical world. In moral intuition, when we try to establish that Rawlsian reflective equilibrium by test principles against judgments about particular situations, we aren't in any direct causal interaction with some moral reality to find the moral truths. The undertaking is a one-sided reflection by abstraction. There are two typical moral intuitions one uses to assess the right action to take in a given situation. One type is consequentislist which decides right or wrong based on the overall good or bad outcome an action results. The other is deontological which assesses whether an action is right or wrong based on some guiding principles applicable to that act, instead of the outcome of the action. Nagel mentions an approach from evolutionary psychology tends to see some shortcomings in a deontological approach if deciding merely on principle leads to more harm than good. But it seems a natural conclusion from evolutionary theory if its concern is survival for the collective. Nagel suggests looking at ourselves from the outside in a given situation may give further epistemic insight. We can come to see our attachments to right and deontology as an unnecessary cluttered outlook which grossly magnifies the claims of the person facing us that limits our rationality. Nagel thinks moral progress may favour a more consequential outlook than being stubborn in some deontology.
The second essay "Moral Reality and Moral Progress" proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth accessibility and moral progress. This account suggests a realism of moral truth independent of our beliefs so that a change in moral beliefs can be described as objectively correct or incorrect. Nagel suggests that moral intuition is dependent on the accessibility of a person's ability to understand the reason for action based on the knowledge he has. On this approach, moral progress is possible due to greater accessibility of reasons facts, and concepts of how one can act, leading to an historical progress. Nagel drew attention to views of homosexuality or sex not just for procreation as greater accessibility to knowledge, concepts, and understanding of facts surrounding the issues. He also suggests people in earlier days that had different views on these issues could hypothetically have views that modern people have, had such accessibility to knowledge was available to them. Nagel thinks such moral progress is not biologically innate but takes time from culturel development over time. This view of moral progress is historically developmental. Since he thinks views can be objectively right or wrong, moral progress involves progressively moving to moral perspectives that are more correct over history.
These two essays shed some original analysis on moral epistemology and the second essay is much more indepth into various moral issues. They both contributes to some original discussion in moral epistemology
June 2, 2025
I didn’t get much out of the first essay. I do like Nagel’s way of framing deontological values:
But I would point out that we don’t seem to feel a need to respect most “autonomous beings”. Plants, bacteria, and robots are in some sense autonomous beings, but most of us don’t think this creates moral obligations not to interfere with them. What makes humans and (I hope you’ll grant) animals different? I would argue the most important difference is “their susceptibility to pleasure and pain”—including the psychological pain an intelligent being is likely to experience when its autonomy is interfered with. Consequentialist values thus still seem, to me, more fundamental. (Or perhaps I only think that’s the most important difference because I’m drawn to consequentialist values.)
The second essay is more interesting, but not more convincing. Although Nagel (like me) believes “moral propositions can be true or false independent of what we believe”, he also argues that some moral propositions that were not true in the past can come to be true:
If you don’t believe in libertarian free will (I don’t; I don’t know whether Nagel does) then I don’t know how (or why) you would distinguish between reasons that a person could recognize and reasons they do recognize. I’m also not clear on what the practical implications of Nagel’s view would be, if any.
(crosspost)
The positive interpretation of deontological values is less transparent [than that of consequentialist values], but I believe we can give them a definite sense. When we think in this way about how to value others, it is their status as autonomous beings independent of us that is central, not their susceptibility to pleasure and pain, or other good or bad things that might happen to them. Deontological requirements govern our direct interaction with each other person; they determine how we may treat him rather than what we should want to happen to him. As with consequentialist values, this is an extension to everyone of a value whose importance we can recognize in our own case.
But I would point out that we don’t seem to feel a need to respect most “autonomous beings”. Plants, bacteria, and robots are in some sense autonomous beings, but most of us don’t think this creates moral obligations not to interfere with them. What makes humans and (I hope you’ll grant) animals different? I would argue the most important difference is “their susceptibility to pleasure and pain”—including the psychological pain an intelligent being is likely to experience when its autonomy is interfered with. Consequentialist values thus still seem, to me, more fundamental. (Or perhaps I only think that’s the most important difference because I’m drawn to consequentialist values.)
The second essay is more interesting, but not more convincing. Although Nagel (like me) believes “moral propositions can be true or false independent of what we believe”, he also argues that some moral propositions that were not true in the past can come to be true:
Sometimes moral progress will be presentable as the discovery of what was true all along; sometimes it won’t. In the latter case, it will be because the recognizability of such truth (like the progress of scientific knowledge) is path-dependent: that a certain policy or practice would be an improvement may be understandable on reflection only by those who have already passed through certain prior stages of moral thought and practice.
If you don’t believe in libertarian free will (I don’t; I don’t know whether Nagel does) then I don’t know how (or why) you would distinguish between reasons that a person could recognize and reasons they do recognize. I’m also not clear on what the practical implications of Nagel’s view would be, if any.
(crosspost)
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews