Hilary Putnam deals in this book with some of the most fundamental persistent problems in philosophy: the nature of truth, knowledge and rationality. His aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought which have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.
Hilary Whitehall Putnam was an American philosopher, mathematician, and computer scientist who was a central figure in analytic philosophy from the 1960s until his death, especially in philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, and philosophy of science. He was known for his willingness to apply an equal degree of scrutiny to his own philosophical positions as to those of others, subjecting each position to rigorous analysis until he exposed its flaws. As a result, he acquired a reputation for frequently changing his own position. Putnam was Cogan University Professor Emeritus at Harvard University.
اگر کسی بخواهد دورهی «رئالیسم درونی» پاتنم را بخواند، باید اول سراغ این کتاب بیاید. قبل از این کتاب، پاتنم دو مقاله دارد که در آنها به شکل تکنیکال استدلال مدلتئوریکش را توضیح داده که البته در اینجا هم تکرارشان کرده است.
کتاب پروژهی هیجانانگیزی را دنبال میکند. آنگونه که در مقدمه نوشته است، میخواهد جایی میان دو اردوگاه اندیشه بیابد: اردوگاههایی که یکیشان به غیرتاریخی بودن عقلانیت و اصول فراتاریخی ِ آن اعتقاد دارند و اصطلاحا میتوانند «ارغنون»ی برای همهی دوران بنویسند؛ و دیگری که معتقد است عقلانیت بالکل سوبژکتیو است و هیچ چیزی فرای پارادایمها و کانتکستها و ... نیست.
كتاب "العقل والصدق والتاريخ" للفيلسوف التحليلي هيلاري بُتنام، هو كتاب لافت، جيد الصياغة يبحث في مجموعة واسعة من المسائل كـ "نظرية" المعرفة، الميتافيزيقيا، نظرية القيم وفلسفة اللغة، في آراء ومفكرين متنوعين بدءا من أفلاطون، بيركلي، وكانت إلى كارناب، كواين، كون، فنغشتاين وفوكو. تنبع أهمية الكتاب من محاولة جدية لوضع حد لقبضة العلوم الطبيعية على الفكر الفلسفي في هذا القرن، ومع أن بتنام لم يكن ماديا للعلوم، فإنه رفض معادلة الفكر العقلاني بالتفكير العلمي والزعم بأن العلم يوفر الأوصاف والشروح الحقيقية للواقع.
Alternating between a course of a wide-range of topics in this short but provocative book, Hilary Putnam eventually shifts his investigation from the truth-coherent accreditation of value-propositions to the nature of the philosophy of philosophy itself. Putnam points out that the distinction between being right and thinking that one is right can be used and, indeed, has been used by thinkers throughout history as a central point from which a multitude of meanings can arise. This state of affairs necessarily leads to the creation of a variety of concepts in which values are carried out in real-world problems such as the VAT ("we are only brain in a vat") may be proven or disproved solely on the basis of the discursive logic of philosophy, rather than by making an appeal to one of the sciences. Putnam goes on to point out that a rejection of the metaphysical correspondence idea of truth does not necessarily imply the necessity of regarding all forms of rational acceptability as subjective. The world where the real is abolished and suffocated out of existence by the advancement of manipulative images that can be altered by the free commerce of truth and illusion, is a world dominated by hyperreality; this is a world where the real becomes an aesthetic hallucination without origin or reference. In regard to my intellectual life, I would put Hilary Putnam on the same level as Jurgen Habermas, who was a key turning-point in my education. He taught me that even arguments stemming from a humanities-style set of propositions can be demonstrably proven and, indeed, can function as truth-objects even if they cannot be proven logically on the one-to-one scale favored by logicians and that, nevertheless, they are to be seen as the fit representations of truth as according to and as needed by a scientifically trained set of thinkers. Prior to that I considered the writing of a paper as a matter of who could 'fool the professor' most thoroughly by using a mass deployment of the impersonal rhetoric of censorship and applause. Looking back, although I wanted to pursue a Ph.D. , I did not because my parents thought I had enough education and I should pursue a work-career. I sort of agreed with them, too. Sometimes I wish I had applied to Chapel Hill in North Carolina. However, I think that if I published my collected reviews from Goodreads, they could be featured in a book that could win me suitable plaudits and that I would be merited a Ph.D. on the basis of their superiority and in due course I could find myself back at Bard College as a professor of writing. Does this dream appear to be insubstantial to you? Then you haven't read my reviews thoroughly enough. Unfortunately, the reviews have stopped coming to me as if they were unbidden phantasms of my literary-minded consciousness. The truth is, I don't merely want to be merely the adumbrator and compiler of secondary sources; I want to be a creator, the primary source that lesser lights are drawn to. Like Thomas Merton, I want to have my cake and eat it, too! However, to return to my discursus on Hilary Purnam, and I believe he speaks to this point directly, that by taking the special case of deductive logic as the critical step in the process of formalization, if and only if it is the case that this step led to the development of logical positivism, could it not have been the discovery that there was an algorithm for the empirical science that led to the development of the position of logical positivists and, additionally, the anarchist position that is currently being cleared out to make way for Artificial Intelligence? Putnam affirms that not only does the empirical world depend on our criteria for acceptability, he says it is a fact that the real world is mind-dependent on our values in order to conceptualize and actualize what he calls "optimal speculative intelligence." Hello, Elon Musk and Sam Altman and the creators of DeepSeek and DeepResearch and the plethora of all living-language models and chatbots that serve as precursors to the creation of AGI's intelligent and living saviour machines, this is the book to read in order to see how the worlds of culture and science are mutually dependent on one another. Three stars.
Reason, Truth, and History is a short, dense book rife with ideas, some of which are mind-blowing, others of which seem rather suspect.
First and probably foremost, I'm impressed by the man's embrace of pragmatism and rejection of the scientism and so-called "realism" that dominates so much of the philosophical discourse, especially in the present American intellectual landscape.
However, I am suspicious of some of his analytical techniques. I'm afraid I find most of Putnam's thought experiments to be slightly wankish and not actually reveal much about truth or meaning. But on the whole, I feel his arguments stand alone without a reliance on these thought experiments.
Damn you Hilary Putnam for giving me an appetite for metaphysics! By the way...why only 4 stars? Since you asked: because of loss of sleep, tormented thoughts, the copious hours I spent trying to figure this book out (thank you Chris!). And, I am still trying to figure it out. Word to the wise, read to the end! The last few chapters are a pleasant surprise if you can get past the first 6. But then the first 6 are so worth while at the same time. This is a mind bender for sure, but very accessible if you stick with it.
This has got to be one of the best books putnam has written. The arguments are well made and accompanied by punctual and entertaining intuition pumps. I found the best about it though is how it attempts at least to discuss issues in such away that distances away from the notorious analytical/continental breakdown. Also definitely recommended for general audience to get their feet wet in philosophy.
This book has some fascinating philosophical ideas in it. I think it should be a must read for anyone studying philosophy. While I may not agree with everything He has written, Putnam does a good job at staying generally clear. Over all a good book.
الكتاب يحمل الكثير من اتباع لفلسفه الشك خصوصا في الروايات الاولي، وبعد ذلك مجرد اطلالات مثل وضوح الشيء في وقت معين عن مرور الزمن عليه واستعان بالفرق عن وضع التقدم في القرن التاسع عشر والقرن العشرين وفكرة اليقين عن وجوده في القرن التاسع عشر وملاحظته الفجه عن ملاحظته بعدها بقرن، ونشأه العلم الوضعي. ان الفلسفه التقنيه تعتمد اعتمادا كليا علي الولوج الي العقل الباطن ، الخبرات الشخصيه والقاء الكلمات التي تختبر مدي صياغتها في العقل حتي ان بعض الفقرات قد تشعر انها تتطرق الي علم الدلاله ، حيث ان كل دلاله معينه او لفظ يوضع في مكان تحاول الوصول الي الصله الغريبه التي تربطهما مثل فكره الاوعيه الكبيره او حتي تلك القطط التي لا تنمو علي الاشجار، فمتعه الكتاب تتلخص في العصف الذهني الذي يحدثه مع كل ضرب لمثال لاول وهله تراه غير منطقي. ولكن الفلسفه التقنيه لا تستطيع ان تصمد امام العلم او البراهين كثيرا حيث انها تحدث فقط في العقل كما اقر ديكارت علي سبيل المثال وهو في القرن السابع عشر! كما انه يحدث ان تتخلي عن جميع البراهين لو ان برهانا واحدا فقط تراه كافيا ليس موجودا مثلما فعل فيتغنشتاين ، وكما حدث مع نظريه النشوء لداروين فانه تم دحض النظريه بالكامل لمجرد ان لا احد قد اشرف عليها! ، ان هذا المبدأ باتباعه لن يكون هناك يقينا علي الاطلاق ولا حتي بوجود نفسه علي الاقل لانه لم يشرف علي عمليه ولادته! وبالحديث عن الصدق فان هناك من المعايير الموضوعيه للمتحدث والمقبوليه للعقل بالنسبه للمتلقي وكل ذلك من منظور العلم رغم ان تعميمه لا ضرر فيه اما مصداقيه الاديان فقد اصابها الضيق تماما تبعا للتحدث من منظور الخلاص. ان التاريخ ليس نظره ذاتيه لا تصيب الا موجموعه معينه من البشر كالنازيين او اللوطيين ،وبالتالي فان التعامل مع حقائقه ستكون علي وعي كامل بعدم انحيازها ولكن هذا ما لايحدث فان النظام الملكي يدرك ان الديموقراطيه تؤدي الي الفوضي فيقمعها والكنيسه مبنيه علي اعتبارات سياسيه -بعيدا عن انها سبب نشأتها- وبالتالي فان الانحياز واقع لاشك.
This book made me want to claw my eyes out. I was really excited about it at first because he discusses the philosophy of language, which is incredibly interesting. Then he talks about being a brain in a vat, and who doesn't want to consider that? It was downhill from there, though. Exactly how downhill I can't honestly say because I did not finish the book. I was faced with the following choice: 1)continue living my life with my sanity intact and preserving at least a tiny bit of assurance that I am an intelligent, capable person, or 2) finish the book. I chose number one. I gave it two stars because the man is obviously a genius and therefore deserves a little something more than my incessant whining.
I only read an excerpt of this book, namely the “Brain in a Vat” section. I will not comment on the rest (I have a habit of summarizing what I read in a goodreads review on the same day, in case I forget about the topic later). The paper/essay section on “brain in a vat” section doesn’t exist on goodreads, so I’m writing about it here.
This was a relatively short essay of about 20 pages, where Putnam argues that a “Brain in a Vat” - I.e. a situation where our brain is inside of a vat attached to a mechanical system that feeds us sensations similar to the movie The Matrix - is logically impossible, due to the limitations of language. Namely, that for such a possible world to exist, a sentient being ought not be able to make the self-contradictory statement “I am a brain in a vat” or “I am not a brain in a vat”, where, essentially if the statement is true, then it is false, so therefore the statement is false. I.e., it’s like saying, “all general statement are false”. If that statement is true, then it is false.
Perhaps I misunderstood the argument and I’m not summarizing it correctly. I think the assumption that a metaphysical world is limited because of a limitation of our language seems to be false from the start. Here, Putnam is assuming that because the phrase “I am a telling a lie”, if true, would then be false, and is therefore false (or some sort of other tricky language situation), that such a situation makes it impossible for someone to actually be telling the truth at that time. In general, I don’t think the argument here proposed by Putnam was not very convincing.
I can see the appeal of it, however, in that the “brain in a vat” concept can be pretty disorienting and an unpleasant possibility. It can be nice to have someone “prove” that possibility is actually an impossibility, as Putnam said he is convinced that he has been able to do. I just don’t think he was successful in the process of denying that possibility on the grounds that he proposed.
Hilary Putnam puts forth a transcendental analysis of reference and intentionality. He outlines the inadequacy of a physicalist theory of mind while later discussing the problems with a correspondence theory of truth and the plausibility of a coherence theory of truth. He concludes with his own take on the debate of the distinction between facts and values stating that, if for a sentence to be true it must satisfy conditions of rational acceptability then it must satisfy epistemic values held in particular conceptual frameworks, he namely cites coherence among them. He wants to affirm that a sentence can be both factual and evaluative if for us to judge facts we presuppose values. His thought is a mixed bag for me, although on one hand many of his theories hold even today and remain relevant talking points, on the other hand there are many theories whose anti-realist assertions I find largely dissatisfactory conclusions on the nature of truth.
While this book can be dense, the brain in a vat scenario is the doorway, and it ended up being my favorite entry point into everything that follows. I first read Reason, Truth and History in college, but it has followed me into adulthood in ways I did not expect. Putnam is not really asking whether reality could be fake. He is asking whether meaning survives without context, intention, or shared reference. The claim that “I am a brain in a vat” collapses under its own language, and that insight still feels quietly radical. What stayed with me is not the sci-fi thought experiment itself, but the reminder that we do not access the world as it “is.” We interpret it through experience, memory, and language, and maybe that is not a weakness. Maybe that is the most honest version of truth we have.
I think I'll make this a standard disclaimer on my reviews: the book really deserved more attention than I gave it in one reading. Nonetheless, I'll start by saying that since I did not really take his "brains in a vat" problem so seriously, it was tough to slog through the arguments. But his conclusion is well worth noting:
"The existence of a 'physically possible world' in which we are brains in a vat (and always were and will be) does not mean that we might really, actually, possibly be brains in a vat." Most importantly he adds that "what rules out this possibility is not physics but PHILOSOPHY."
Putnam non mi convince, le argomentazioni che propone non sono stringenti come vorrebbe. Carina la proposta del realismo interno ma il testo presenta alcune incoerenze e la visione "evoluzionistica" della razionalità rimane aperte a critiche relativistiche
"Vision is certified as good by its ability to deliver description which fits the objects for us not metaphysical things-in themselves. Vision is good when it enables us to see the world as it is- that is, the human, functional world which is partly created by vision itself."
I really like reading books on reason, truth, and history. But boy, this book is dry and it doesn't get to the point. It didn't offer me any advice on how I could reason better, distinguish truth from lies better or teach me a new concept of history. For this reason, I can't recommend this.
I haven't found a great book on critical thinking. But, "The Death of Truth: Notes on Falsehood in the Age of Trump" is a better book than this. It's not on critical thinking specifically but more on critical thinking (i.e truth, reason etc) in the age of Trumpism. I gave this a 5-star.
I discovered the work of Putnam after he was mentioned in an online philosophy course I am enrolled on, offered by the University of Edinburgh, entitled "Introduction to Philosophy". Putnam wrote a paper in 1967 on the concept of multiple realisability and how humans, octopi and hypothetical aliens can feel pain, even if the physical states that realise the psychological state of pain are very different.