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The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays
If philosophy has any business in the world, it is the clarification of our thinking and the clearing away of ideas that cloud the mind. In this book, one of the world's preeminent philosophers takes issue with an idea that has found an all-too-prominent place in popular culture and philosophical the idea that while factual claims can be rationally established or refuted, claims about value are wholly subjective, not capable of being rationally argued for or against. Although it is on occasion important and useful to distinguish between factual claims and value judgments, the distinction becomes, Hilary Putnam argues, positively harmful when identified with a dichotomy between the objective and the purely "subjective."
Putnam explores the arguments that led so much of the analytic philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology to become openly hostile to the idea that talk of value and human flourishing can be right or wrong, rational or irrational; and by which, following philosophy, social sciences such as economics have fallen victim to the bankrupt metaphysics of Logical Positivism. Tracing the problem back to Hume's conception of a "matter of fact" as well as to Kant's distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments, Putnam identifies a path forward in the work of Amartya Sen. Lively, concise, and wise, his book prepares the way for a renewed mutual fruition of philosophy and the social sciences.
Putnam explores the arguments that led so much of the analytic philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology to become openly hostile to the idea that talk of value and human flourishing can be right or wrong, rational or irrational; and by which, following philosophy, social sciences such as economics have fallen victim to the bankrupt metaphysics of Logical Positivism. Tracing the problem back to Hume's conception of a "matter of fact" as well as to Kant's distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments, Putnam identifies a path forward in the work of Amartya Sen. Lively, concise, and wise, his book prepares the way for a renewed mutual fruition of philosophy and the social sciences.
204 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2002
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October 20, 2010
The first essay establishes that the fact/value distinction (a later incarnation of Hume’s “you cannot derive an “is” from an “ought” thesis) rests on a dubious positivist definition of “fact” that derives from sense impression. In the second, Putnam explains that the values that science assumes aren’t necessarily moral or ethical ones, but epistemic ones. Epistemic values like “coherence” and “simplicity” are assumed in the scientific pursuit, yet science continues to be thought of as wholly objective. John Mackie argued that words like “cruel” and “just” were simply words that described “natural facts,” instead of realizing that they cannot be used intelligibly without employing some kind of evaluative judgment.
The third essay transposes this debate into the world of classical economic theory. This same debate found itself transposed into the field of economics ensconced within the framework of a Benthamist moral calculus, but were removed by the empiricist is/ought distinction (later, the work of the positivists.) Amartya Sen’s project is to reintroduce ethical concepts and norms (once so lauded by Adam Smith, but since having been forgotten) back into the discourse on classical economics without losing any of its original rigor. Sen realizes that people are motivated by non-self-interested motives, as well. In its place, Sen posits a capabilities approach which emphasizes a plurality of human rights, freedoms, and goals, instead of the poverty of utilitarian ethical monism.
Throughout the three lectures, Putnam carefully picks apart one of the most enduring shibboleths of modern philosophy. Like Rorty, with whom he shares many intellectual affinities, he has an explicit, self-conscious relationship with the analytic tradition. Unlike Rorty, however, he has not wholly eschewed that tradition. While he disagrees with many of its conclusions, he is able to use some of its assumptions and to break outside of the box of morally bankrupt positivism.
The last part of the book contains five essays of in tangential relation to the three main lectures. “On the Rationality of Preferences,” one of the essays included in the collection, but not one of the three original lectures, is Putnam’s answer to an interlocutor who made a curious criticism of the paper that he presented. Putnam’s presentation considered a person who had two choices before them, A and B, neither of which the chooser preferred. Would it matter, he asks, if, instead of the chooser making the decision simply tosses a coin or gets a random person to make the decision for him? After all, they don’t have a preference, right? Most classically trained economists would assert that it didn’t matter who made the decision. In fact, that’s what the interlocutor pointed out. However, this essay, Putnam’s response, is a brilliant response defending the idea that, even though one might not prefer A to B, the ability to choose one’s own option engenders a kind of “dignity of the self” which economists have heretofore ignored.
The third essay transposes this debate into the world of classical economic theory. This same debate found itself transposed into the field of economics ensconced within the framework of a Benthamist moral calculus, but were removed by the empiricist is/ought distinction (later, the work of the positivists.) Amartya Sen’s project is to reintroduce ethical concepts and norms (once so lauded by Adam Smith, but since having been forgotten) back into the discourse on classical economics without losing any of its original rigor. Sen realizes that people are motivated by non-self-interested motives, as well. In its place, Sen posits a capabilities approach which emphasizes a plurality of human rights, freedoms, and goals, instead of the poverty of utilitarian ethical monism.
Throughout the three lectures, Putnam carefully picks apart one of the most enduring shibboleths of modern philosophy. Like Rorty, with whom he shares many intellectual affinities, he has an explicit, self-conscious relationship with the analytic tradition. Unlike Rorty, however, he has not wholly eschewed that tradition. While he disagrees with many of its conclusions, he is able to use some of its assumptions and to break outside of the box of morally bankrupt positivism.
The last part of the book contains five essays of in tangential relation to the three main lectures. “On the Rationality of Preferences,” one of the essays included in the collection, but not one of the three original lectures, is Putnam’s answer to an interlocutor who made a curious criticism of the paper that he presented. Putnam’s presentation considered a person who had two choices before them, A and B, neither of which the chooser preferred. Would it matter, he asks, if, instead of the chooser making the decision simply tosses a coin or gets a random person to make the decision for him? After all, they don’t have a preference, right? Most classically trained economists would assert that it didn’t matter who made the decision. In fact, that’s what the interlocutor pointed out. However, this essay, Putnam’s response, is a brilliant response defending the idea that, even though one might not prefer A to B, the ability to choose one’s own option engenders a kind of “dignity of the self” which economists have heretofore ignored.
April 25, 2015
I came to this book hoping for great things. At a high level, Putnam is advancing a theory that few philosophers accept and that, I believe as a pseudo-pragmatist myself, is the right path for philosophy (to wit, the eponymous dichotomy).
I left very disappointed. Part of my problem is Putnam's overbearing tone - he's frequently obnoxious to philosophers greater than him, and even where he gives credit to his opponents, it often feels patronising. Alfred Ayer, a great logician, is contrasted with 'greater logical positivists', Richard Hare (compared to John Mackie) is 'by far the more sophisticated thinker', an unnamed economist who spoke to Putnam after a lecture is 'not without a certain ingenuity' but then later 'dumb' and 'naive', and so on.
Then there's his research ethos. Another review says that he doesn't engage much with contemporary meta-ethics, and I don't know enough about the field to confirm or deny, but it does seem odd that in a book published in 2002, most of the writings it engages with are from pre-1980. But what bothered me more is his constant self-citation.
At age c72, he's perhaps earned some leeway in this respect, but he quickly burned through my patience for such narcissism. Glancing through the endnotes now, I would guess nearly half of his references, perhaps more, are to himself. Either other people will have advanced similar arguments, in which case I would think it more appropriate to refer to them, or no-one has, in which case the lack of support for the argument in question might have prompted greater reservation - in a less self-absorbed writer.
But the main question of course, is whether the philosophy is any good. For the most part, I would say it isn't. Putnam does advance some a couple of decent arguments, but they're all tangential to his main theses, and in a book-length work, I don't think 'not all the arguments are terrible' is enough to merit a second star.
Putnam frequently puts words in his opponents' mouths, and at least once massively misrepresents their views in the process. He says that in Hare's philosophy:
'the statement "capital punishment should be abolished," is equivalent to the imperative "Let us abolish capital punishment," where this means: "No matter what reasons may be given against doing it, let us abolish capital punishment."'
A basic understanding of Hare's utilitarian beliefs renders Putnam's claim ludicrous: utilitarianism of any flavour, Hare's included, requires (and indeed is often criticised for requiring) a willingness to make moral trades - to compromise on any moral issue except the most fundamental one of what the ultimate goal is. This misrepresentation is mostly tangential to Putnam's argument, but since Hare is one of the main dramatis personae in Putnam's story it's worrying how profoundly he's misrepresented.
The logical positivists as a whole come under predictable attack, being as a friend once described them, the philosophical whipping boys of the 20th century. I'm not as familiar with their views as with Hare's, but here too I got the impression Putnam's portrayal of their position was ungenerous. He claims that for some of them, any claim not directly based on unmodified experience would be meaningless - ie that knowledge gained from looking through a microscope is unscientific if it's of something we can't see with the naked eye.
Perhaps this is an accurate claim of their beliefs, but the logical positivists comprised some of the greatest logicians of the mid-twentieth century, no less so for the fact that the logical positivism project ultimately failed. I find it extremely hard to believe that any of them would have argued that the claim of Neptune's existence, for example, was unscientific, and not at all hard to believe that the author of this book would be sloppy and/or ungenerous enough to falsely represent them that way.
Ultimately though, my main complaint against Putnam is one that few academic philosophers will sympathise with - his core arguments have essentially the form pilloried so well (IMHO) by Zach Weiner.
More specifically, they generally take the following form:
1. Find a topic-relevant word, such as 'cruel' (using an actual example from the book)
2. Try to break down the word's use (or rather, examine other people's attempts to do so) and find that this naturally evolved and imprecise word used by several million native English speakers doesn't have just one or two set meanings that are easily representable in short phrases.
3. Infer from this that the word therefore represents an emergent and indivisible concept, ie 'cruelty'.
4. Since 'cruelty' has both descriptive and evaluative content, assert that we've now proven the indivisibility of fact and value.
This is nothing more than an argument from Putnam's lack of imagination, yet he writes as though it's conclusive. Needless to say, Putnam advances other arguments in the book, but many of them have a closely analogous form, and few are any more persuasive.
Another weak and recurring argument is his underdefined and overgeneralised concept of 'a value'. He claims that science requires such 'values' as 'plausibility', 'coherence', and 'simplicity'. Even though I also believe science presupposes values of a sort, none of these examples seem anywhere near as self-evident as he treats them.
'Plausible', in the mouth of a scientist is shorthand for something like 'greater than n% probability', where n would typically be obvious from the context. I suppose you could call that obviousness a value, but in any decisions of practical importance, a scrupulous scientist would consider the actual probability, not some arbitrarily chosen threshold.
'Coherence' can just mean internal consistency, which is extremely well defined (as 'does not result in contradiction'). It admittedly has fuzzier meanings, but Putnam doesn't even try to establish that scientists actually rely on these for any part of their activity.
Similarly, 'simplicity' can mean 'parsimony', which is well definable as 'having low Kolmogorov complexity'. Again, scientists might use it more casually, but again Putnam makes no effort to show that they need do so qua scientists.
Lastly, call me pedantic, but I'd have hoped a book on pragmatist philosophyto be a lot more pragmatic! Putnam starts out by urging us to accept this philosophical discussion as having great real world significance but (with the caveat that I skipped a couple of chapters and so might have missed something there) he seems completely uninterested in offering applications for his views. He speaks repeatedly of economics, and frequently criticises specific economic theories, but never (that I saw) offers any theories of his own.
His views on ethics, when the dust has settled from his attacks on the usual suspects, are decidedly unclear. We're frequently impressed upon to 'reflect philosophically' upon ethical questions, but this is nonsensical in the position he leaves us with - to wit, having (at least, in his view) refuted all the traditional ethical systems. One cannot usefully contemplate a move in a game without knowing either the game's rules or its victory conditions, yet this is precisely the actively that Putnam thinks ethics should ideally comprise.
Despite my sympathy with at least some part of his project, I can think of little to say for Putnam's book. I came to it following a reference in Sam Harris's The Moral Landscape. I've not yet formed a strong opinion of Harris's overall argument, but honestly I found as much profit in reading the short paragraph in which Harris references Putnam as I did in reading this entire book.
I left very disappointed. Part of my problem is Putnam's overbearing tone - he's frequently obnoxious to philosophers greater than him, and even where he gives credit to his opponents, it often feels patronising. Alfred Ayer, a great logician, is contrasted with 'greater logical positivists', Richard Hare (compared to John Mackie) is 'by far the more sophisticated thinker', an unnamed economist who spoke to Putnam after a lecture is 'not without a certain ingenuity' but then later 'dumb' and 'naive', and so on.
Then there's his research ethos. Another review says that he doesn't engage much with contemporary meta-ethics, and I don't know enough about the field to confirm or deny, but it does seem odd that in a book published in 2002, most of the writings it engages with are from pre-1980. But what bothered me more is his constant self-citation.
At age c72, he's perhaps earned some leeway in this respect, but he quickly burned through my patience for such narcissism. Glancing through the endnotes now, I would guess nearly half of his references, perhaps more, are to himself. Either other people will have advanced similar arguments, in which case I would think it more appropriate to refer to them, or no-one has, in which case the lack of support for the argument in question might have prompted greater reservation - in a less self-absorbed writer.
But the main question of course, is whether the philosophy is any good. For the most part, I would say it isn't. Putnam does advance some a couple of decent arguments, but they're all tangential to his main theses, and in a book-length work, I don't think 'not all the arguments are terrible' is enough to merit a second star.
Putnam frequently puts words in his opponents' mouths, and at least once massively misrepresents their views in the process. He says that in Hare's philosophy:
'the statement "capital punishment should be abolished," is equivalent to the imperative "Let us abolish capital punishment," where this means: "No matter what reasons may be given against doing it, let us abolish capital punishment."'
A basic understanding of Hare's utilitarian beliefs renders Putnam's claim ludicrous: utilitarianism of any flavour, Hare's included, requires (and indeed is often criticised for requiring) a willingness to make moral trades - to compromise on any moral issue except the most fundamental one of what the ultimate goal is. This misrepresentation is mostly tangential to Putnam's argument, but since Hare is one of the main dramatis personae in Putnam's story it's worrying how profoundly he's misrepresented.
The logical positivists as a whole come under predictable attack, being as a friend once described them, the philosophical whipping boys of the 20th century. I'm not as familiar with their views as with Hare's, but here too I got the impression Putnam's portrayal of their position was ungenerous. He claims that for some of them, any claim not directly based on unmodified experience would be meaningless - ie that knowledge gained from looking through a microscope is unscientific if it's of something we can't see with the naked eye.
Perhaps this is an accurate claim of their beliefs, but the logical positivists comprised some of the greatest logicians of the mid-twentieth century, no less so for the fact that the logical positivism project ultimately failed. I find it extremely hard to believe that any of them would have argued that the claim of Neptune's existence, for example, was unscientific, and not at all hard to believe that the author of this book would be sloppy and/or ungenerous enough to falsely represent them that way.
Ultimately though, my main complaint against Putnam is one that few academic philosophers will sympathise with - his core arguments have essentially the form pilloried so well (IMHO) by Zach Weiner.
More specifically, they generally take the following form:
1. Find a topic-relevant word, such as 'cruel' (using an actual example from the book)
2. Try to break down the word's use (or rather, examine other people's attempts to do so) and find that this naturally evolved and imprecise word used by several million native English speakers doesn't have just one or two set meanings that are easily representable in short phrases.
3. Infer from this that the word therefore represents an emergent and indivisible concept, ie 'cruelty'.
4. Since 'cruelty' has both descriptive and evaluative content, assert that we've now proven the indivisibility of fact and value.
This is nothing more than an argument from Putnam's lack of imagination, yet he writes as though it's conclusive. Needless to say, Putnam advances other arguments in the book, but many of them have a closely analogous form, and few are any more persuasive.
Another weak and recurring argument is his underdefined and overgeneralised concept of 'a value'. He claims that science requires such 'values' as 'plausibility', 'coherence', and 'simplicity'. Even though I also believe science presupposes values of a sort, none of these examples seem anywhere near as self-evident as he treats them.
'Plausible', in the mouth of a scientist is shorthand for something like 'greater than n% probability', where n would typically be obvious from the context. I suppose you could call that obviousness a value, but in any decisions of practical importance, a scrupulous scientist would consider the actual probability, not some arbitrarily chosen threshold.
'Coherence' can just mean internal consistency, which is extremely well defined (as 'does not result in contradiction'). It admittedly has fuzzier meanings, but Putnam doesn't even try to establish that scientists actually rely on these for any part of their activity.
Similarly, 'simplicity' can mean 'parsimony', which is well definable as 'having low Kolmogorov complexity'. Again, scientists might use it more casually, but again Putnam makes no effort to show that they need do so qua scientists.
Lastly, call me pedantic, but I'd have hoped a book on pragmatist philosophyto be a lot more pragmatic! Putnam starts out by urging us to accept this philosophical discussion as having great real world significance but (with the caveat that I skipped a couple of chapters and so might have missed something there) he seems completely uninterested in offering applications for his views. He speaks repeatedly of economics, and frequently criticises specific economic theories, but never (that I saw) offers any theories of his own.
His views on ethics, when the dust has settled from his attacks on the usual suspects, are decidedly unclear. We're frequently impressed upon to 'reflect philosophically' upon ethical questions, but this is nonsensical in the position he leaves us with - to wit, having (at least, in his view) refuted all the traditional ethical systems. One cannot usefully contemplate a move in a game without knowing either the game's rules or its victory conditions, yet this is precisely the actively that Putnam thinks ethics should ideally comprise.
Despite my sympathy with at least some part of his project, I can think of little to say for Putnam's book. I came to it following a reference in Sam Harris's The Moral Landscape. I've not yet formed a strong opinion of Harris's overall argument, but honestly I found as much profit in reading the short paragraph in which Harris references Putnam as I did in reading this entire book.
July 24, 2018
Remarkable meta-ethics, which establishes itself in large part by undermining neoclassical economics. Important quibble: The title evokes sexy French relativism – e.g. there is no fact of the matter, il n’y a pas de hors-texte – whereas his actual thesis is that only the strictest, stupidest partition between facts and values collapsed. (A distinction is the mild statement that A is not the same thing as B – whereas a dichotomy is the strict logical exclusion of two things: ‘if something is A, it is a priori not B’.) A pedantic quibble: god he is fond of italics.
Anyway. It collapsed, but still lives on in other fields, decades after the fall of the positivism that was the only thing motivating it. Book is: a scathing modern history of the distinction, a Pragmatic reconstruction, a love letter to Amartya Sen. Putnam blames the philosophical dichotomy for the failures of economics, and from there for real suffering.
Some claims: Factual and evaluative statements are necessarily entangled, since; Facts are ascertained as such only by the application of epistemic values: "coherence, plausibility, reasonableness, simplicity, and elegance... if these epistemic values do enable us to correctly describe the world... that is something we see through the lenses of those very values."; i.e. facts are thick too; i.e. he has been made to "rethinking the whole dogma (the last dogma of empiricism?) that facts are objective and values are subjective". Of course, coupled to his ditching foundationalism, this leads him a long way down the Rortyan road - 'science is just another social practice' yada yada - but he tries to salvage a sort of pragmatic objectivity for science. Dunno if he's winning, but I loved the race.
Anyway. It collapsed, but still lives on in other fields, decades after the fall of the positivism that was the only thing motivating it. Book is: a scathing modern history of the distinction, a Pragmatic reconstruction, a love letter to Amartya Sen. Putnam blames the philosophical dichotomy for the failures of economics, and from there for real suffering.
The word “cruel”... has a normative and indeed, ethical use. If one asks me what sort of person my child’s teacher is, and I say "he is very cruel," I have both criticized him as a teacher and…as a man. I do not have to add, "he is not a good teacher" or "he is not a good man." I cannot simply... say, "he is a very cruel person and a good man," and be understood. Yet "cruel" can also be used purely descriptively, as when a historian writes that a certain monarch was exceptionally cruel, or that the cruelties of the regime provoked a number of rebellions. "Cruel" simply ignores the supposed fact/value dichotomy and cheerfully allows itself to be used sometimes for a normative purpose and sometimes as a descriptive term. (Indeed, the same is true of the term "crime.")
Some claims: Factual and evaluative statements are necessarily entangled, since; Facts are ascertained as such only by the application of epistemic values: "coherence, plausibility, reasonableness, simplicity, and elegance... if these epistemic values do enable us to correctly describe the world... that is something we see through the lenses of those very values."; i.e. facts are thick too; i.e. he has been made to "rethinking the whole dogma (the last dogma of empiricism?) that facts are objective and values are subjective". Of course, coupled to his ditching foundationalism, this leads him a long way down the Rortyan road - 'science is just another social practice' yada yada - but he tries to salvage a sort of pragmatic objectivity for science. Dunno if he's winning, but I loved the race.
November 21, 2009
An excellent takedown of both the fact/value dichotomy in the philosophy of science and its connection to the model of agency promoted by mainstream economics. Putnam spends a good chunk of time on Amartya Sen's development and hints at the promise of combining capacities theory with a pragmatic foundation. He closes by arguing stridently against both Peirce and Apel's notion of truth as well as Habermas' strict separation of facts and norms.
I would give four and 1/2 if I could.
I would give four and 1/2 if I could.
November 15, 2017
La thèse de la normativité ou prescriptivité de la signification admet plusieurs formulations. Par référence à la 'loi de Hume', elle a un caractère principalement moral - la prescriptivité des propositions morales. Grosso modo : il est impossible de dériver d'une ou de plusieurs descriptions ('La neige est blanche' etc.), une obligation ('Tu ne dois pas tuer', etc.). La disposition psychologique dans laquelle on prescrit est identique avec une obligation ressentie à l'évocation des propositions prescriptives, comme 'Paul doit donner à la charité'. L'examen serré de ces propositions, et à plus forte raison des propositions descriptives, ne donne pas la disposition en question si elle manque au départ. La normativité ou prescriptivité est donc sui generis. Mais - se sont empressés d'ajouter deux siècles d'épistémologie - à la différence des descriptions qui représentent des faits (observables, vérifiables), les 'doit' sont inobservables et seulement discutables (subjectifs, relatifs, etc.). Contra Hume, ils ne relèvent donc pas d'une science ou d'un 'raisonnement cognitif'. Par référence à la 'meaning platitude' en philosophie sémantique, la thèse s'élargit et se décline différemment : les conditions d'usage correct qui différencient un mot d'un son sont les conditions dans lesquelles un mot doit être utilisé (par où condition d'usage coïncide avec prescription d'usage ; étant donné que l'obligation n'est pas distincte du mot lui-même). Cette prescription n'est pas une contrainte rationnelle (fin > moyen) ou un impératif catégorique ('ce qu'il faut faire indépendamment, ou à l'encontre, de ses désirs'). Elle est constitutive de ce qui se comprend conceptuellement. Elle précède de ce fait l'intentionnalité. Stricto sensu, la normativité est donc le 'substrat de la compréhension'* (du raisonnement, de l'évaluation, du jugement, etc.).
L'enjeu traditionnel de ce genre de thèse est d'ériger la portion (ou la totalité) de notre vocabulaire et de nos sciences qui est réfractaire à la computation rationnelle et causaliste en la personnification du 'fantôme dans la machine'. Comme l'inventaire admis du mobilier du monde ne comprend pas, outre les atomes, quarks, gluons et autres neutrinos, des relations et des obligations, toute connaissance de ces nobjets est le parent pauvre de la pensée, en instance de promotion au rang ''d'ignorance passagère''. Mais s'il s'avère impossible de dériver un doit d'un est, s'ensuit-il que le premier est le fait d'une matière pensante (ou obligeante) distincte de l'autre (la froide et neutre aléthée)? Pour la plupart, les philosophes se sont résignés à une version en tenue de galas de cette solution (le fonctionnalisme ou dualisme des propriétés), ou à un acte de foi naturaliste (l'inscrutabilité de la référence étant, nous n'avons pas réussi à réduire le prescriptif au descriptif, mais nous y parviendrons sûrement un jour, cf. dans ce genre Hattiangadi, 2007, Oughts and Thoughts). Dans The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, Putnam défend une formulation étendue de la thèse qui s'ancre, non à la 'meaning platitude' (présupposée mais non nommée comme tel), mais à l'anthropologie pragmatique (d'ascendance aristotélicienne sur ce point) pour laquelle la délibération sur le sens d'un mode de vie désirable et supérieur à d'autres forme le grand moteur de l'activité humaine ; anthropologie pour laquelle, par voie de conséquence, ''normative judgments are presupposed in all reasoning [...] in all of life'' (p.VII).
En substance, The Collapse compte parmi ses autres, et principales clefs : (1.) la réduction des dichotomies inconditionnelles et universelles en distinctions contextuelles et historiques ; (2.) les thèses d'un encastrement conceptuel de la perception ; d'un encastrement affectif-conditionné de l'expérience ; (3.) d'une identité de nature entre normes épistémiques (objectivité, cohérence, élégance, etc.) et normes morales-éthiques (courage, gentillesse, etc.) ; (4.) le rétablissement du raisonnement cognitif au substrat normatif* ; (5.) l'encastrement normatif global du raisonnement ; ou réalisme interne. La réduction au sens de (1.) s'exerce sur la 'loi de Hume' et son correlat kantien (analytique / synthétique) : la définition du 'fait' sur laquelle toute deux reposent, peut-on apprendre, s'est avérée intenable au fur et mesure des avancées de la physique. Qui, en effet, soutiendrait que les torsions de l'espace-temps ou les cordes sont un fait au sens d'une image mentale d'expérience sensorielle? Elle s'est avérée intenable sans induire une remise en question, mais au contraire un durcissement et une généralisation ex cathedra de la distinction fait / valeur, avec pour conséquence que les positivistes logiques ont dû se doter en bout de ligne, en terme de définition d'un fait, d'une compréhension pour le moins surprenante (soit le holisme de la confirmation : aucune proposition isolée n'est vraie ; la théorie comme tout affronte le tribunal de l'expérience, mais comme toute théorie peut être critiquée ou rescapée moyennant le renvoi à une autre théorie, seule la science comme totalité est vraie - confrontée au tribunal de l'expérience qu'elle spécifie). La restitution du jugement et raisonnement cognitifs au substrat normatif au sens large (non pas la 'meaning platitude', mais la forme ou mode de vie*) procède de (2.) et de (3.), à savoir : le rôle du concept "rouge" est non moindre ni différent dans l'organisation de la perception correspondante que celui du concept "colère" dans la perception du comportement correspondant ; et à savoir : les normes "cohérence" et "simplicité" sont tout autant dédiées à motiver l'acceptation d'une théorie scientifique que les attributs à caractère explicitement moral ("courage", "honnêteté") le sont vis-à-vis des comportements courants. Par voie de conséquence, bien qu'il y ait plus de relativité et de flottement dans l'identification d'un geste 'généreux' que dans celle d'un tableau 'rouge', il y a un apprentissage préalable dans les deux cas, et il n'y a aucune différence de nature entre eux (seulement, pourrait-on dire, une différence d'usage dans la forme de vie). La restitution au sens de (4.) et (5.) découle de (2.) et de (3.) de manière à rendre intenable les séparations inconditionnelles ou dichotomiques d'une subjectivité de valeurs relative et d'une objectivité-de facto ; séparation d'une réalité perçue subjectivement d'une autre perçue innocemment.
Putnam poursuit cette critique dans le bastion économique où la revendication de scientificité et de neutralité demeure bien vivante. Il soutient un pronostique optimiste : l'application de la dichotomie fait/valeur à la théorie-pratique économique procède d'une mauvaise lecture de Adam Smith (qui construisait non seulement la théorie économique mais aussi, comme Hume, une science morale), et les développements récents (la 'place de Amartya Sen dans l'histoire') montrent que la table est mise pour leur abandon, c'est-à-dire pour une théorie-pratique de l'économie comme science morale. « [W]elfare economics has found itself forced to recognize that its ''classical'' concern with economic well-being (and its opposite, economic deprivation) is essentially a moral concern and cannot be adressed responsibly as long as we are unwilling to take moral argument seriously » (p.57). Passée la réduction des dichotomies inconditionnelles en des distinctions contextuelles, la réduction holiste des distinctions au substrat moral commun du mode de vie désirable et supérieur à d'autres s'effectue, après une discussion serrée d'Habermas, en suivant Dewey sur la "démocratisation de la recherche" :
« We do know something about how inquiry should be conducted, and the principle that what is valid for inquiry in general is valid for value inquiry in particular [...] the principle of fallibilism (do not regard the product of any inquiry as immuned from criticism), the principle of experimentalism (try out different ways of resolving problematic situations, or if that is not feasible, observe those who have tried other ways, and reflect carefully on the consequences) [...] the[se] principles put together make up what I called ''the democratization of inquiry'' » (p.110). [we are] never in the position of starting ex nihilo in ethics any more than anywhere else, or in the law any more than anywhere else, there is no reason that it should be impossible to discover in individual problematic situations – however fallibly – that one putative resolution is superior to another » (p.106).
Certains ont vu dans The Collapse..., livre sobre et facile d'accès, une culmination de l'oeuvre de Putman ; philosophe qui a certainement traité avec aplomb de tous les secteurs de la philosophie américaine et qui s'est imposé comme un interlocuteur incontournable de ses figures les plus cardinales (Chomsky, Fodor, Quine, Davidson, Rorty). Il offre un rempart contre l'auto-dénigrement de la condition politique et contre l'empêtrement des sciences sociales dans leur déni de la normativité comme globalité. Et certainement un puissant stimulant à la défense de la dernière théorie anthropologique de la culture comme ordre sui generis en date, c'est-à-dire de la dernière lutte en date contre les interminables aberrations de la raison pratique (utilitaire, naturaliste). Mais sur un autre plan, il reste à savoir si, comme certains l'ont remarqué tout en lui restant sympathiques (cf. Bernstein, 2005, "The Pragmatic Turn"), ce remède s'avérera suffisamment pragmatique au moment de trancher sur des enjeux collectifs à chaud.
L'enjeu traditionnel de ce genre de thèse est d'ériger la portion (ou la totalité) de notre vocabulaire et de nos sciences qui est réfractaire à la computation rationnelle et causaliste en la personnification du 'fantôme dans la machine'. Comme l'inventaire admis du mobilier du monde ne comprend pas, outre les atomes, quarks, gluons et autres neutrinos, des relations et des obligations, toute connaissance de ces nobjets est le parent pauvre de la pensée, en instance de promotion au rang ''d'ignorance passagère''. Mais s'il s'avère impossible de dériver un doit d'un est, s'ensuit-il que le premier est le fait d'une matière pensante (ou obligeante) distincte de l'autre (la froide et neutre aléthée)? Pour la plupart, les philosophes se sont résignés à une version en tenue de galas de cette solution (le fonctionnalisme ou dualisme des propriétés), ou à un acte de foi naturaliste (l'inscrutabilité de la référence étant, nous n'avons pas réussi à réduire le prescriptif au descriptif, mais nous y parviendrons sûrement un jour, cf. dans ce genre Hattiangadi, 2007, Oughts and Thoughts). Dans The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, Putnam défend une formulation étendue de la thèse qui s'ancre, non à la 'meaning platitude' (présupposée mais non nommée comme tel), mais à l'anthropologie pragmatique (d'ascendance aristotélicienne sur ce point) pour laquelle la délibération sur le sens d'un mode de vie désirable et supérieur à d'autres forme le grand moteur de l'activité humaine ; anthropologie pour laquelle, par voie de conséquence, ''normative judgments are presupposed in all reasoning [...] in all of life'' (p.VII).
En substance, The Collapse compte parmi ses autres, et principales clefs : (1.) la réduction des dichotomies inconditionnelles et universelles en distinctions contextuelles et historiques ; (2.) les thèses d'un encastrement conceptuel de la perception ; d'un encastrement affectif-conditionné de l'expérience ; (3.) d'une identité de nature entre normes épistémiques (objectivité, cohérence, élégance, etc.) et normes morales-éthiques (courage, gentillesse, etc.) ; (4.) le rétablissement du raisonnement cognitif au substrat normatif* ; (5.) l'encastrement normatif global du raisonnement ; ou réalisme interne. La réduction au sens de (1.) s'exerce sur la 'loi de Hume' et son correlat kantien (analytique / synthétique) : la définition du 'fait' sur laquelle toute deux reposent, peut-on apprendre, s'est avérée intenable au fur et mesure des avancées de la physique. Qui, en effet, soutiendrait que les torsions de l'espace-temps ou les cordes sont un fait au sens d'une image mentale d'expérience sensorielle? Elle s'est avérée intenable sans induire une remise en question, mais au contraire un durcissement et une généralisation ex cathedra de la distinction fait / valeur, avec pour conséquence que les positivistes logiques ont dû se doter en bout de ligne, en terme de définition d'un fait, d'une compréhension pour le moins surprenante (soit le holisme de la confirmation : aucune proposition isolée n'est vraie ; la théorie comme tout affronte le tribunal de l'expérience, mais comme toute théorie peut être critiquée ou rescapée moyennant le renvoi à une autre théorie, seule la science comme totalité est vraie - confrontée au tribunal de l'expérience qu'elle spécifie). La restitution du jugement et raisonnement cognitifs au substrat normatif au sens large (non pas la 'meaning platitude', mais la forme ou mode de vie*) procède de (2.) et de (3.), à savoir : le rôle du concept "rouge" est non moindre ni différent dans l'organisation de la perception correspondante que celui du concept "colère" dans la perception du comportement correspondant ; et à savoir : les normes "cohérence" et "simplicité" sont tout autant dédiées à motiver l'acceptation d'une théorie scientifique que les attributs à caractère explicitement moral ("courage", "honnêteté") le sont vis-à-vis des comportements courants. Par voie de conséquence, bien qu'il y ait plus de relativité et de flottement dans l'identification d'un geste 'généreux' que dans celle d'un tableau 'rouge', il y a un apprentissage préalable dans les deux cas, et il n'y a aucune différence de nature entre eux (seulement, pourrait-on dire, une différence d'usage dans la forme de vie). La restitution au sens de (4.) et (5.) découle de (2.) et de (3.) de manière à rendre intenable les séparations inconditionnelles ou dichotomiques d'une subjectivité de valeurs relative et d'une objectivité-de facto ; séparation d'une réalité perçue subjectivement d'une autre perçue innocemment.
Putnam poursuit cette critique dans le bastion économique où la revendication de scientificité et de neutralité demeure bien vivante. Il soutient un pronostique optimiste : l'application de la dichotomie fait/valeur à la théorie-pratique économique procède d'une mauvaise lecture de Adam Smith (qui construisait non seulement la théorie économique mais aussi, comme Hume, une science morale), et les développements récents (la 'place de Amartya Sen dans l'histoire') montrent que la table est mise pour leur abandon, c'est-à-dire pour une théorie-pratique de l'économie comme science morale. « [W]elfare economics has found itself forced to recognize that its ''classical'' concern with economic well-being (and its opposite, economic deprivation) is essentially a moral concern and cannot be adressed responsibly as long as we are unwilling to take moral argument seriously » (p.57). Passée la réduction des dichotomies inconditionnelles en des distinctions contextuelles, la réduction holiste des distinctions au substrat moral commun du mode de vie désirable et supérieur à d'autres s'effectue, après une discussion serrée d'Habermas, en suivant Dewey sur la "démocratisation de la recherche" :
« We do know something about how inquiry should be conducted, and the principle that what is valid for inquiry in general is valid for value inquiry in particular [...] the principle of fallibilism (do not regard the product of any inquiry as immuned from criticism), the principle of experimentalism (try out different ways of resolving problematic situations, or if that is not feasible, observe those who have tried other ways, and reflect carefully on the consequences) [...] the[se] principles put together make up what I called ''the democratization of inquiry'' » (p.110). [we are] never in the position of starting ex nihilo in ethics any more than anywhere else, or in the law any more than anywhere else, there is no reason that it should be impossible to discover in individual problematic situations – however fallibly – that one putative resolution is superior to another » (p.106).
Certains ont vu dans The Collapse..., livre sobre et facile d'accès, une culmination de l'oeuvre de Putman ; philosophe qui a certainement traité avec aplomb de tous les secteurs de la philosophie américaine et qui s'est imposé comme un interlocuteur incontournable de ses figures les plus cardinales (Chomsky, Fodor, Quine, Davidson, Rorty). Il offre un rempart contre l'auto-dénigrement de la condition politique et contre l'empêtrement des sciences sociales dans leur déni de la normativité comme globalité. Et certainement un puissant stimulant à la défense de la dernière théorie anthropologique de la culture comme ordre sui generis en date, c'est-à-dire de la dernière lutte en date contre les interminables aberrations de la raison pratique (utilitaire, naturaliste). Mais sur un autre plan, il reste à savoir si, comme certains l'ont remarqué tout en lui restant sympathiques (cf. Bernstein, 2005, "The Pragmatic Turn"), ce remède s'avérera suffisamment pragmatique au moment de trancher sur des enjeux collectifs à chaud.
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January 3, 2025Aparte de ser un tío majete, Putnam nunca se cansó de renovar la filosofía para mejor.
La dicotomía entre hecho y valor, entre lo epistémico y lo político, no ha sido más que un despiste filosófico elevado a conveniencia para algunas instancias académicas y políticas. Deconstruir esta dualidad y avanzar hacia una filosofía que prescinda de ella es una necesidad que Putnam supo visualizar como nadie.
La dicotomía entre hecho y valor, entre lo epistémico y lo político, no ha sido más que un despiste filosófico elevado a conveniencia para algunas instancias académicas y políticas. Deconstruir esta dualidad y avanzar hacia una filosofía que prescinda de ella es una necesidad que Putnam supo visualizar como nadie.
October 28, 2020
This is a well crafted useful work in fact/value dichotomy which Putnam guides the reader from the historical origins of the concept to its applications in economic and political theories. Putnam introduces the history of the dichotomy from the is/ought distinction in Hume, analytic/synthetic distinction in Kant to the Logical Positivist’s Verification Principle and Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism.
Putnam suggests that fact and value have “entanglement”; that is, their exemplification in the world is often convoluted instead of the naive dichotomy of fact as objective while value as subjective. One example is the notion of “thick moral concepts”, the idea that some moral concepts cannot have their descriptions easily factored out of their valuation. Acts of bravery, cruelty, courage, kindness cannot have their moral valuation to be factored out of the acts’ descriptions while maintaining conceptual integrity. The thin/thick moral concept dichotomy is a well known presentation of the fact/value dichotomy in moral philosophy. Also important in Putnam’s analysis is that epistemic notions in scientific criteria such as simplicity, coherence, cogency, and inductive consistency ARE themselves valuation, not descriptive. This is not to say there is no difference between epistemic and ethical values. But this shows scientific criteria aren't by themselves descriptive.
Putnam then discusses the fact/value entanglement in Amartya Sen’s economic theory. Sen thinks that economic rationality in classical economic theories presupposes some values for satisfaction. For instance the notion of pure internal consistency of choice for self-interest is based on the “values” for which choices are made. The relation between economic performance and social well being is not purely a descriptive relationship based on just monetary outcome or utilitarian happiness, but on a more diverse valuations pertained to a given society. Sen introduces the notion of “capabilities approach” to assess economic well being. The capabilities use language that employs concepts of “capacities for valuable functions” that don’t simply factor notions separately in to descriptive and evaluative part. The functions are something people in a society would value, such as “well nourished”, “self respect”, “premature mortality” and “community life” etc. These Sen's functions feature fact/value entanglement. The upshot of Sen’s approach is to assess economics and ethics as complementary domains. Economic performance is not something that can be assessed without some presupposed ethical outlook.
Putnam then provides an analysis of Habermas communication theory. In Habermasian communicative action in ideal condition, interlocutors respect "rational norms"of sincerity, of truth-telling, of asserting that which is rational etc for communication. Putnam suggests that the norms of Habermasian communication should not be just necessary conditions but also need to be sufficient conditions for arriving at justified ethical beliefs. Otherwise such rational prolonged communication does not necessarily lead to the desired product of justified ethical beliefs, assuming such discourse can lead to such products which is another assumption.
This book is quite valuable to learn about the fact/value dichotomy given the scope it covers and should be a key reference work for the subject.
Putnam suggests that fact and value have “entanglement”; that is, their exemplification in the world is often convoluted instead of the naive dichotomy of fact as objective while value as subjective. One example is the notion of “thick moral concepts”, the idea that some moral concepts cannot have their descriptions easily factored out of their valuation. Acts of bravery, cruelty, courage, kindness cannot have their moral valuation to be factored out of the acts’ descriptions while maintaining conceptual integrity. The thin/thick moral concept dichotomy is a well known presentation of the fact/value dichotomy in moral philosophy. Also important in Putnam’s analysis is that epistemic notions in scientific criteria such as simplicity, coherence, cogency, and inductive consistency ARE themselves valuation, not descriptive. This is not to say there is no difference between epistemic and ethical values. But this shows scientific criteria aren't by themselves descriptive.
Putnam then discusses the fact/value entanglement in Amartya Sen’s economic theory. Sen thinks that economic rationality in classical economic theories presupposes some values for satisfaction. For instance the notion of pure internal consistency of choice for self-interest is based on the “values” for which choices are made. The relation between economic performance and social well being is not purely a descriptive relationship based on just monetary outcome or utilitarian happiness, but on a more diverse valuations pertained to a given society. Sen introduces the notion of “capabilities approach” to assess economic well being. The capabilities use language that employs concepts of “capacities for valuable functions” that don’t simply factor notions separately in to descriptive and evaluative part. The functions are something people in a society would value, such as “well nourished”, “self respect”, “premature mortality” and “community life” etc. These Sen's functions feature fact/value entanglement. The upshot of Sen’s approach is to assess economics and ethics as complementary domains. Economic performance is not something that can be assessed without some presupposed ethical outlook.
Putnam then provides an analysis of Habermas communication theory. In Habermasian communicative action in ideal condition, interlocutors respect "rational norms"of sincerity, of truth-telling, of asserting that which is rational etc for communication. Putnam suggests that the norms of Habermasian communication should not be just necessary conditions but also need to be sufficient conditions for arriving at justified ethical beliefs. Otherwise such rational prolonged communication does not necessarily lead to the desired product of justified ethical beliefs, assuming such discourse can lead to such products which is another assumption.
This book is quite valuable to learn about the fact/value dichotomy given the scope it covers and should be a key reference work for the subject.
August 23, 2020
An almost average collection of essays otherwise, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy shines most in its first three chapters, offering a sweeping argument spanning the history of philosophy, ethics, and normativity, and finally economics for a pragmatist conception of the fact/value distinction.
Other reviewers have complained that the essays taken as a whole are not very strong, and I must agree. Putnam's overbearing tone, coupled with the relative superficiality of (most of) the represented issues and the annoying recurrence of one argument about "thick" ethical concepts do bog down the reading experience.
But the first three chapters are really brilliant. The first recounts the history of the fact/value dichotomy from Hume to logical empiricism, highlighting what the fuss is all about; mainly, that the dichotomy is not merely a semantic distinction, but rather a metaphysical thesis about the status of ethical concepts. The second argues, I'd say successfully, against the dichotomy, offering a more nuanced view. The third deals with the topic's role in economics.
The third is somewhat the weakest of these three, in that it ignores what economists are actually doing when they expound their theories. It ignores, for example, that economists, like all scientists, tend toward a type of simplicity incompatible with Putnam's more subtle offering of the fact/value distinction (just look how slowly they've adopted prospect theory). It also ignores that economists are at their most influential when in dialogue with policymakers, and that the latter usually don't want to hear about abstract theories of values in economics, but rather how economists' findings can advance their agenda.
At the same time, it can be the most enlightening. It taught me more about utility theory than I'll ever learn in any social science class. It offered an interesting critique of the current economic paradign, in particular its critique of Pareto efficiency. Lastly, it sheds a light on the curious figure of Amartya Sen, whom I can't wait to find out more about.
Other reviewers have complained that the essays taken as a whole are not very strong, and I must agree. Putnam's overbearing tone, coupled with the relative superficiality of (most of) the represented issues and the annoying recurrence of one argument about "thick" ethical concepts do bog down the reading experience.
But the first three chapters are really brilliant. The first recounts the history of the fact/value dichotomy from Hume to logical empiricism, highlighting what the fuss is all about; mainly, that the dichotomy is not merely a semantic distinction, but rather a metaphysical thesis about the status of ethical concepts. The second argues, I'd say successfully, against the dichotomy, offering a more nuanced view. The third deals with the topic's role in economics.
The third is somewhat the weakest of these three, in that it ignores what economists are actually doing when they expound their theories. It ignores, for example, that economists, like all scientists, tend toward a type of simplicity incompatible with Putnam's more subtle offering of the fact/value distinction (just look how slowly they've adopted prospect theory). It also ignores that economists are at their most influential when in dialogue with policymakers, and that the latter usually don't want to hear about abstract theories of values in economics, but rather how economists' findings can advance their agenda.
At the same time, it can be the most enlightening. It taught me more about utility theory than I'll ever learn in any social science class. It offered an interesting critique of the current economic paradign, in particular its critique of Pareto efficiency. Lastly, it sheds a light on the curious figure of Amartya Sen, whom I can't wait to find out more about.
August 15, 2017
From around the turn of the century, this is Putnam during his later neo-pragmatist phase. It's all about dismantling old dualisms and getting philosophy away from abstractions and back into thick particulars, dealing with objectivity without the sceptical pitfalls of metaphysical realism. Many of these chapters started as lectures presented to non-philosophers, and so arguments get skated over awfully quickly. Also the historical dimension is too focussed on logical positivism, missing that there may have been other currents abroad. In the middle chapters Putnam turns to taking issue with the interpretation of rational preference theory by economists, whilst lauding the broader-based work by his chum Amartya Sen. Scepticism about orthodox economics is not limited to these sources and, again, Hilary is concentrating on the story at western universities. The final chapter relates his engagement with Habermas, and indicates he has travelled and worked outside Anglophone departments. Reading this straight after "Free Speech" by Timothy Garton-Ash I notice how differently the German gets treated: for TGA he's of marginal relevance, notable mainly for how little importance he gave to religion when he first formulated his theory of communication. That's a datum that Putnam might have considered, though it doesn't fit his critique. Reminiscent of Putnam's comment about a disagreement with Richard Rorty about Rawls' "Theory Of Justice": Hilary thought it was a valuable work because it analysed and explored principles; Richard thought what we really need are "moralising stories".
June 24, 2020
First of all, let me say that Putnam seems to be on a topic very similar to the book "After Virtue" but has quite a different language of discussing it.
This mostly seems like a fanboy book for Amartya Sen and John Dewey. The book promises to discuss how the subject matter will apply to economics but I find that it never really elaborates on this point.
It is true that not all propositions are either facts or values. It is true that even these two aren't completely independent, much like how analytic and synthetic don't seem to capture the whole spectrum.
The problem is that this doesn't even begin to try and dig into WHY this is problematic for economists. Economics just says people have subjective value, this isn't so much a normative statement as a descriptive statement. It doesn't even say anything about whether their values or objective or subjective, it is only a way of saying that not everybody will make the same choice.
It seems like the whole book could be summarized in 3-4 paragraphs. Even the critique of Hume's law seems very hollow… he seems to not understand that Hume’s law is a linguistic contribution… there is no need to talk of metaphysics.
He seems to conflate self-interest with "selfish" which many economists have gone through the trouble of clarifying. Anyway, it is mostly garbage, the book is unclear, focuses on completely trivial issues, and argues with positions of people I have never heard of.
This mostly seems like a fanboy book for Amartya Sen and John Dewey. The book promises to discuss how the subject matter will apply to economics but I find that it never really elaborates on this point.
It is true that not all propositions are either facts or values. It is true that even these two aren't completely independent, much like how analytic and synthetic don't seem to capture the whole spectrum.
The problem is that this doesn't even begin to try and dig into WHY this is problematic for economists. Economics just says people have subjective value, this isn't so much a normative statement as a descriptive statement. It doesn't even say anything about whether their values or objective or subjective, it is only a way of saying that not everybody will make the same choice.
It seems like the whole book could be summarized in 3-4 paragraphs. Even the critique of Hume's law seems very hollow… he seems to not understand that Hume’s law is a linguistic contribution… there is no need to talk of metaphysics.
He seems to conflate self-interest with "selfish" which many economists have gone through the trouble of clarifying. Anyway, it is mostly garbage, the book is unclear, focuses on completely trivial issues, and argues with positions of people I have never heard of.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews