Some parts of my review for the class (yes, I cheat the reading challenge).
Giddens’ The Consequences of Modernity gives an interesting take on how we should scrutinize from modernity. He elaborates the reasons behind the dynamism of modernity; the reorganization and/or the separation of time and space, the disembeddedness, and the reflexivity of modernity (p. 53). Rather than jump into the debate whether the situation that we have now is post-modern(ism), thus implies the break from “modernity”, Giddens focuses on the more fruitful discussion on the consequences of modernity, whether they are intended or not. These consequences also signify how knowledge plays role in the process of transition to modernity, until the modernity itself creates those unintended and intended effects. “the circulation of social knowledge… that alters the circumstances to which the knowledge originally referred” (p. 54). In our discussion, I would like to focus on Giddens’ explanation on risk and would like to connect to his historical investigation.
Giddens writes that the most classical thinkers “did not see how extensive the darker side of modernity would turn out to be” (p.7), implying that no one had predicted the “negative” side of modernity. I would like to dig the question to what extend we should do this risk calculation? What gave birth to the risk speculations that fuel our modern need to rigorously calculate risk and danger; using statistics, mega planning, high-modernist development, overcoming existential crisis, etc. And why should we? What systemic benefit that ones could gain by keep predicting the unstable world – especially when the modern knowledge (this means the statistics, modern urban planning, heavy industrialization) contributes to this instability (p.45)? The reason we have risks calculated in certain manners, because we already plan something ahead in a grandiose universal manner. Rather than answering the question, Giddens justifies the spectrums of risk, that we all now have, which are closely tied to modernity. In pre-modern era, risk was already available, but more to “natural causes”, i.e., earthquake or “natural” disasters (p. 102, p. 110) and how it did not evolve to more structured manner, for example systemic risk – a scapegoat that was to blame for the 2008 economic crisis by the British economists.
How was the spectrum of risk different in pre-modern/traditional time? Especially when the tradition, according to Giddens, never really fades away and even co-exists with the modernity (p…). Trust in the abstract system and confidence in risk calculation, for example, have become the replacement of fate/fortuna (p. 111). Giddens says that the risk in modernity tends to have more future-oriented rather than the past. Although it is convincing enough if we look at the current system from Wall Street to Chicago Climate Exchange, it does not really explain the once-existing future-oriented behavior in traditional society, especially in the concept of survivability, e.g., inheritance, food storing, the expectations from offerings for the elder and dead people. Giddens’ take on this, for me, is quite high-modernistic. Although it is true that risk is not just about “danger and peril” (Hacking, p. 199) and more about “probability, eventuality” (ibid), it is still unclear for me what brings to more sophisticated risk management (like insurance).
In the most “acultural” (or material-based) sense, we might investigate this emergence of modern risk through the scale of the constituted risk, or the problem of accumulation – whether it is in the system of capitalism (Weber and Marx) or industrialism (Durkheim). Growth–be it personal (overcoming the existential crisis/ontological security), economic, or cultural (globalization)—has been a key feature in modernity. Growth can mean anything that gradually or not expands, but to put in the definition, growth is an enlarged accumulation (Levebfre, 1981). Although Giddens did not explain anything specific about growth (I assume it is both in the darker and brighter side of modernity), the idea that we need to expand for better or worse (as unintended consequences?) contribute to the modern management of risk. In the spectrum of capitalism, risk is critical in sustaining the system.
In the 2008 financial crash, a lot of economists explained that housing bubble in China and the market crash occurred due to the “systemic risk” – a risk that is in-built within a system that is highly speculative like financial and stock markets. If imaginary investments are the fuel for this systemic risk, that what would it be for general modern spectrums of risk? We did not have this systemic and complicated system to handle risk in pre-modern society because the idea of growth was still rudimentary; a peasant dared not to imagine being a successful merchant whose wealth was as many as the Dutch King, for example—let alone in the colonial society during the colonialization.