Splendid Isolation?: Britain and the Balance of Power 1874-1914

by John Charmley

This text offers a different interpretation of Britain's role in the world in the period leading up to World War I. It draws on evidence from previously private papers to offer an account of the methods Disraeli used to establish his ascendency over British foreign policies.

Genres: History, Politics, World War I, Nonfiction, 19th Century

518 pages, Hardcover

First published March 30, 2000

About the author

John Denis Charmley was a British academic and diplomatic historian. From 2002 he held various posts at the University of East Anglia: initially as Head of the School of History, then as the Head of the School of Music and most recently as the Head of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Humanities. From 2016 he was Pro-Vice-Chancellor for Academic strategy at St Mary's University, Twickenham. In this role he was responsible for initiating the University's Foundation Year Programme, reflecting Professor Charmley's commitment to widening educational access.

Reviews

[Simon Mee · Rating 4 out of 5]

Germany's programme may have looked threatening, but it was inspired by the feeling of being threatened.
So it might surprise you that the British have a history of being somewhat underhanded. Occasionally overbearing even. They might have even gotten a little nasty from time to time.

'[H]e treated scruples of this kind with marked contempt, saying truly enough, that if our ancestors had cared for the rights of other people, the British Empire would not have been made.'

Fortunately, Charmley is here to make us face the uncomfortable truths about the lead up to World War One, and provider a useful rejoinder to those who attach too much blame on the Central Powers – It was all the Liberals’ fault with their unmoored radicalism.

It is not usual to become a Conservative to promote radical change.

My understanding of Charmley’s position is that the Conservative Governments from 1874, with occasional intra-Cabinet wobbles, kept British policy on an even keel. They intervened when necessary, but not too much, such as during the Russo-Turkish war in 1878. They had also by 1905 apparently left Germany isolated and unable to threaten peace in Europe, all the while not being slaves to public opinion:

'First-rate men', he once said, 'will not canvass mobs; and if they did, the mobs would not elect the first-rate men.'

Or the views of others:

Tories like Salisbury did not require lessons in the importance of sea power from American sea captains.

In contrast successive Liberal governments blundered. The (unnecessary?, I was not clear here) occupation of Egypt in the 1880s lead to concessions to Bismarck, while Sir Edward Grey’s fixation on Germany being the menace of Europe drove it to hostility and clinging to the worm-eaten galleon of Austria-Hungary. Further, Grey’s deception over communications between French and British militaries, and his deceptive disclosures to Cabinet, committed the latter to France’s aid even prior to Germany’s invasion of Belgium.

Splendid Isolation? isn’t out to make case of Britain being responsible for World War One (an impossibility to determine objectively), more that Britain was an active player in the long lead up, not merely a reactive party to things like the Anglo-German Naval Race or the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. When Britain made the wrong call, options narrowed:

With his admirals treating their ships as though they were made of porcelain, and his soldiers fantasising about Russians coming through the Khyber Pass, Salisbury had to face the fact that Britain could do nothing..

Splendid Isolation? is a useful tale of “cause and effect” without necessarily being deterministic. Charmley notes himself that his subjects did not operate in a solipsism, but nor were they puppets of some hidden reality. You do not have to agree with whether (Liberal-run) Britain was making the “wrong” choices, nor that Germany’s policies were no more than the expression of a vague, confused, and unpractical statesmanship, not fully realizing its own drift but Splendid Isolation? is a reasonably readable example of differing interpretations of known events. Historiography in action, you could say.

I have read Charmely’s style described as “dry”. I would personally say that it is more that his subject matter is dry, being the discussions within Cabinet and exchanges of notes and ultimatiums, rather than his writing itself which is often quite colloquial whether imagining a saucy Victorian triptych or making it very clear he was no fan of the Queen’s hereditary loopiness.

Charmely is weak when it comes to describing actual events and appears disinterested in anything outside of foreign policy leaks over Society dinners. I was bemused by his chiding Henry Kissinger in misdating Chamberlain's birth by a generation while Charmely gets the number of British casualties wrong at Isandlwana by an order of magnitude. Play to your strengths is the lesson there, I guess.

[Olly Colluphid · Rating 4 out of 5]

Heavy going but rewarding.

An openly Conservative country party view of the foreign policy leading to WW1.

As a Liberal I think he over argues some points and is overly forgiving of Salisbury, but it raises many good questions and challenges the ideas of a "traditional foreign policy" for Britain.

Worth reading.