What do you think?
Rate this book
Rush to Development
Currently unavailable.
- GenresHistoryNonfiction
509 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1993
33 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 25, 2025
4.5
More than the specific economic argument Hart-Landsberg is making about Korea's development in the 20th century, I found a lot of value in how The Rush to Development retells 20th century Korean history. This book gives a decent understanding of large scale events in Korea from the end of the Joseon era till the beginning of the nineties, when it was published. This covers: Japanese colonialism, WWII-Korean War period, the Korean War, and the sucessive regimes of Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-Hee, and Chun Doo-Hwan. It covers socioeconomic moves these regimes made and the ways Koreans of all walks of life, from laborers to the urban poor, from women's rights activists to clergymen, resisted, and how they organized their resistance.
The main argument of The Rush to Development is that Korea, despite what mainstream economists (and U.S. propaganda) say, is not free-market capitalism's "economic miracle," and even though its development was miraculous in some ways, by no means should it be a model to other developing countries. Hart-Landsberg divides his reasoning into two buckets. One, he shows that Korea's economic development can't be attributed to free-market capitalism. A strong state controlled and planned many aspects of the economy (more typical of socialist countries), and huge amounts of aid and loans from countries with their own geopolitical interests (namely the U.S. and Japan) enabled rapid industrialization. Second, Korea's development came at an unacceptable cost to the Korean people. Over three decades of rapid growth, Korea's U.S.-supported military dictators policed, strike-broke, jailed, tortured, and massacred laborers into submission. And even excepting this extraordinary oppression, working conditions in the 60s, 70s, and 80s in Korea were unlivable.
The Rush to Development's strength is its quotes. The stories of workers and resistance fighters illuminate the ample statistics Hart-Landsberg provides, which alone are often staggering but of course gain from actual experiences. If the book has a weak point, it's that I felt it ends on an overly simplified note. Perhaps this is because I'm reading thirty years after its publication. But Hart-Landsberg ends the book talking about the position of the resistance movement in Korea as of 1990, and emphasizing how well-poised it was to bring about change on the peninsula, a new economic system and/or reunification. He acknowledges the "flexibility" of the right and its ability to absorb shocks, but I felt his analysis of the right veered on strawmanning. Perhaps this is just what happens living in Daegu and seeing Very Many working-class folks who are probably also right-leaning.
Anyway, lastly here are some moments that stood out to me and some takeaways I had:
- The 38th parallel as dividing line for Korea was decided upon by two U.S. army colonels, in a room, in thirty minutes. The U.S., determined to maintain its foothold in East Asia, had to come to an agreement about the partition of the peninsula with the Soviets, who were already landed and moving south toward Seoul. So the 38th parallel. Koreans tried a depressing number of times to hold a nationwide election and reunify, but every time the U.S. stepped in (likely because the majority of Koreans were supportive of the left-led Korea's Peoples Republic that had been organizing food distribution and land takeovers since the end of WWII). The U.S. unilaterally requested the UN organize a national election in Korea. But they specified it'd be a seperate election in the North and the South. The Soviet Union "vigorously opposed this plan, which violated all earlier U.S.-Soviet agreements on Korea. As an alternative to the U.S. plan, the Soviet Union proposed the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the end of trusteeship, and the right of the Korean people to come to the United Nations and present their position on national election procedures." The U.S. of course rejected this, placed Syngman Rhee in power through sham elections, and with him violently repressed rebellions across the peninsula. When North Korean soldiers crossed over and began pushing toward Busan in 1950, they began restoring the disbanded people's committees and beating "the drum of Korean unification and independence." But, again, U.S. intervention in the Korean War led to the minority vision for the future of Korean society (capitalism and imperialism) winning over the majority one (a revolutionary transformation).
- The Jeju massacre (4.3) was because the people of Jeju were not accepting the U.S.-Rhee sham government. Former people's committee leader guerrillas reestablished popular control of most villages on the island. The Korean military killed 12% of the island's population and forcibly relocated another third.
- As with most good history books, I finished this one hating the U.S. more than before. All U.S. military out of Korea ffs!
- Stories from women workers in the 70s of not being able to go to the bathroom because the machines had to keep running, so people would just go on the factory floor where they were standing. Another woman mentioned how textile factories would put a floor in the middle of a floor, in order to double working floor space. This meant that for their 12-18 hour shifts (sometimes longer) workers could not stand up the entire time because the ceiling was so low.
- The church was a pillar of resistance in the 70s and 80s, and was instrumental in supporting labor and other movements. Hart-Landsberg mentions how church activists led unionization trainings and provided supplies to striking workers. This image of the church is surprising to me, but maybe also explains the amount of very Christians in Korea and its enduring popularity.
More than the specific economic argument Hart-Landsberg is making about Korea's development in the 20th century, I found a lot of value in how The Rush to Development retells 20th century Korean history. This book gives a decent understanding of large scale events in Korea from the end of the Joseon era till the beginning of the nineties, when it was published. This covers: Japanese colonialism, WWII-Korean War period, the Korean War, and the sucessive regimes of Rhee Syngman, Park Chung-Hee, and Chun Doo-Hwan. It covers socioeconomic moves these regimes made and the ways Koreans of all walks of life, from laborers to the urban poor, from women's rights activists to clergymen, resisted, and how they organized their resistance.
The main argument of The Rush to Development is that Korea, despite what mainstream economists (and U.S. propaganda) say, is not free-market capitalism's "economic miracle," and even though its development was miraculous in some ways, by no means should it be a model to other developing countries. Hart-Landsberg divides his reasoning into two buckets. One, he shows that Korea's economic development can't be attributed to free-market capitalism. A strong state controlled and planned many aspects of the economy (more typical of socialist countries), and huge amounts of aid and loans from countries with their own geopolitical interests (namely the U.S. and Japan) enabled rapid industrialization. Second, Korea's development came at an unacceptable cost to the Korean people. Over three decades of rapid growth, Korea's U.S.-supported military dictators policed, strike-broke, jailed, tortured, and massacred laborers into submission. And even excepting this extraordinary oppression, working conditions in the 60s, 70s, and 80s in Korea were unlivable.
The Rush to Development's strength is its quotes. The stories of workers and resistance fighters illuminate the ample statistics Hart-Landsberg provides, which alone are often staggering but of course gain from actual experiences. If the book has a weak point, it's that I felt it ends on an overly simplified note. Perhaps this is because I'm reading thirty years after its publication. But Hart-Landsberg ends the book talking about the position of the resistance movement in Korea as of 1990, and emphasizing how well-poised it was to bring about change on the peninsula, a new economic system and/or reunification. He acknowledges the "flexibility" of the right and its ability to absorb shocks, but I felt his analysis of the right veered on strawmanning. Perhaps this is just what happens living in Daegu and seeing Very Many working-class folks who are probably also right-leaning.
Anyway, lastly here are some moments that stood out to me and some takeaways I had:
- The 38th parallel as dividing line for Korea was decided upon by two U.S. army colonels, in a room, in thirty minutes. The U.S., determined to maintain its foothold in East Asia, had to come to an agreement about the partition of the peninsula with the Soviets, who were already landed and moving south toward Seoul. So the 38th parallel. Koreans tried a depressing number of times to hold a nationwide election and reunify, but every time the U.S. stepped in (likely because the majority of Koreans were supportive of the left-led Korea's Peoples Republic that had been organizing food distribution and land takeovers since the end of WWII). The U.S. unilaterally requested the UN organize a national election in Korea. But they specified it'd be a seperate election in the North and the South. The Soviet Union "vigorously opposed this plan, which violated all earlier U.S.-Soviet agreements on Korea. As an alternative to the U.S. plan, the Soviet Union proposed the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the end of trusteeship, and the right of the Korean people to come to the United Nations and present their position on national election procedures." The U.S. of course rejected this, placed Syngman Rhee in power through sham elections, and with him violently repressed rebellions across the peninsula. When North Korean soldiers crossed over and began pushing toward Busan in 1950, they began restoring the disbanded people's committees and beating "the drum of Korean unification and independence." But, again, U.S. intervention in the Korean War led to the minority vision for the future of Korean society (capitalism and imperialism) winning over the majority one (a revolutionary transformation).
- The Jeju massacre (4.3) was because the people of Jeju were not accepting the U.S.-Rhee sham government. Former people's committee leader guerrillas reestablished popular control of most villages on the island. The Korean military killed 12% of the island's population and forcibly relocated another third.
- As with most good history books, I finished this one hating the U.S. more than before. All U.S. military out of Korea ffs!
- Stories from women workers in the 70s of not being able to go to the bathroom because the machines had to keep running, so people would just go on the factory floor where they were standing. Another woman mentioned how textile factories would put a floor in the middle of a floor, in order to double working floor space. This meant that for their 12-18 hour shifts (sometimes longer) workers could not stand up the entire time because the ceiling was so low.
- The church was a pillar of resistance in the 70s and 80s, and was instrumental in supporting labor and other movements. Hart-Landsberg mentions how church activists led unionization trainings and provided supplies to striking workers. This image of the church is surprising to me, but maybe also explains the amount of very Christians in Korea and its enduring popularity.
October 25, 2007
a really insightful book... Marty is very knowledgeable about korea and a masterful economist.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews