Disappointed by this lecture-converted-to-a-book by a very smart, well-read, long-tenured Harvard English prof that came recommended by two friends for whom this was an influential tract (and also after reading Scarry's masterful 1985 articulation that "To have great pain is to have certainty; to hear about pain is to have doubt").
Scarry, in On Beauty and Being Just, seems to me to advance various straw man arguments to advance her proposition that beauty is valuable and that it draws us toward justice.
For the record, I agree that beauty is valuable. I don't disagree it can draw us toward justice.
I would have preferred a more beautiful work of words in beauty's defense, should one on this order actually be merited, which Scarry here has not convinced me is the case, in that she suggests that beauty had been disregarded for decades and she must somehow restore its quasi-Platonic status.
I'm pretty sure she never defines or attempts to define beauty, yet invests it mainly in external objects in ways that seem to me overly simplistic and not all that illuminating in that she never asks why a thing should be beautiful, starting only from the assertion that it is. It's difficult to extend a rational argument from this kind of premise if we do not hold such a premise to be true or unassailable (even if we might agree with some of the case studies Scarry happens to find beautiful).
As an aside, after the first few dozen pages, her prose style also began to wear on me. Her voice felt haughty (perhaps as mine does in this review!) and her thought experiments somewhat indulgent. She also seems to use the word "capacious" more than seems called for. She also spends considerable words asserting questionable connections between her personal epiphany that she actually finds palm trees beautiful and the works of Matisse, which she has apparently plastered around her kitchen to keep her from despair when she cannot see her garden.
It is fortunate the biosphere that evolved during Earth's Cretaceous period persists, for Scarry also spends inordinate time making beauty comparisons and analogs to birds and flowers. (For the record, I, too, find many birds, which are dinosaurs, and flowers beautiful, but this in itself does not make an argument befitting the title of this volume.)
I found her most compelling pseudo-arguments in the back quarter of this book, when drawing out familiar-trodden arguments comparing beauty's characteristic of symmetry to societal justice and a harmony of relations (basically what Confucius said) or a desire to move toward such a state of more justice (been a while, but basically Plato). In this case, however, she cites most heavily the work of other philosophers and historians, while to bolster her earlier passages she cites mainly classical literary references, leaning on Homer and Dante, or her own personal observations. This approach makes for an overall asymmetric approach to Scarry's subject, ironic considering the potential *capaciousness* such a topic affords.
This book, published in 1999, also has not aged well in my view. Considering the polarization of the body politick, the radicalization and sexualization of the internet, the collective failure of nations to rally in confronting climate change, and many unfavorable facets of capitalism seem to make the thought experiments Scarry advances about whether people would *want* the world to have various forms of beauty in it, whether or not they personally experience it, as pollyannish.
I do agree with Scarry when she argues against the politicization of one's "gaze" in terms of the potential for effect on the perceiver and the perceived. Interestingly, the one page in the library copy of this book that had a margin note in pen objected to Scarry's emphasis on this point. The offended margin note states: "But not vulnerable in the same way" in response to Scarry's claim that "...if anything, the perceiver [of beauty] is as vulnerable as, or more vulnerable than, the person looked at." I give Scarry credit for being bold enough to assert this, safely ensconced though she is in the East Coast academic stratosphere and therefore risking little reputational damage from her late-20th-century perch. Were she to make such a claim today, in 2022, her reputational damage might be much greater. Essentially, I think she's correct and that criticism of the "male gaze" has grown overwrought. Whoever penned the margin note had a different view.
On the whole, this book is a bit extraneous, in my view (and I've spent too much of my life reviewing it!). To appreciate fundamentally the same sense of beauty Scarry advances, we could just read Plato and go listen to some bird song in the woods (neither a bad idea!). The fact that this book doesn't do more for me makes me react more strongly against it, however, especially as it flows from such an obviously rigorous intellect as Scarry wields. It really does feel like someone just told her, hey, we need you to write a lecture, and she wandered around for a semester organizing her notes about what to say; greater constraint of mission may have led to greater focus on her part, but this criticism is speculative on my part.
What I think she misses, or omits, (and which also offends, considering her intellect) is the role of biology, physics, and evolution in any accounting of beauty. The two brief walk-and-talks she cites with her political philosopher colleagues asking her what she's doing do not in my view constitute interdisciplinary inquiry. Had she further pursued the consideration of symmetry's role in what is perceived as beautiful, much of her earlier rhetorical house of cards may be seen to collapse as unnecessary. (Her early arguments aren't necessarily wrong; they're just not solving any real problem. And they miss the gap--perhaps the gulf--between her just-so rhetoric that matches with literary, classical, and her personal experience, and a framework that makes sense from the perspective of the evolution of life itself.) For example, it can fairly easily be argued that much of what Scarry regards as beautiful flows from biological survival value of one form or another: symmetry of forms facilitating movement or reproductive fitness, appreciation of patterns key to navigating or manipulating one's environment, attention to faces in mammals--particularly primates--critical to social survival, reaction to or memory of surprise and newness similarly valuable for resource extraction or risk aversion. But she doesn't face this--which I suspect a Harvard undergrad would encounter in any intro to anthropology course--as a plausible alternative to her hand-waving.
If there's a contemporary philosopher out there who can fully and honestly face biological and evolutionary science and still articulate or reconcile a theory of aesthetics beyond the biological, I'd like to read them. But to simply ignore these spheres of truth actually weakens the defense of the humanities, in my view, by not subjecting it to nuanced scrutiny. The humanities, in my view, are not a "sacred cow." They do not need to be isolated to be protected. To adopt Scarry's parlance, they may be considered an object of beauty worthy of one's gaze. The humanities are deeply valuable, but this doesn't mean we can or should exclude what has been learned from centuries of scientific inquiry in articulating their defense. (Indeed, a just argument demands that we must seek further integration rather than impose the fields' rarified isolation.) The realms are nested and deeply complementary if appreciated as such, but arguments such as Scarry's, in my view, do this deeper unity a disservice.