Historians and political scientists will admit that there has never been a perfect democracy. If the same academics are honest, they will admit that there has never been a perfect socialist government, 100% absolutist monarchy or true-to-Marx Communist example either. In every instance, and seemingly more-so in the 21st century, the reality are blends and layers of isms and their specific cultural influences. Consensus would say that good governance is more important than the government style itself.
Is there an expected or acceptable degree of illiberalism inherent in a liberal democracy? What is the acceptable amount of mercantile in a liberal economy or a condoned level of socialist in the free market? Every government style has its exceptions to its own rules. Perhaps it is the reasons and motives for these exceptions, not a hard fast dogma, that should be considered. Some researchers have claimed that procedural democracy is of secondary importance to substantive democracy. Other respected scholars argue the opposite; all context dependent on important nuances. Some scholars consider the benefits of the benevolent dictator while others the dictatorship of the elected majority.
Few contemporary challenges bring these questions to the fore as much as Xi Jinping’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and China’s national and foreign policies. “Beijing Rules” by Bethany Allen is as good a book as any to consider how black and white or nuanced the China vs. West debate should or could be. The book’s sub-title gives away a clear preference against the CCP’s foreign policies. But the author begins with a few words to balance the debates.
Some capitalist strategies, based on neoliberal economic policies have caused damage to inter-country relations. The US has violated its own liberal economic trade policies numerous times and both the US and China are guilty of promoting illiberal policies to advantage their respective economies; short term self-interests with lasting moral effects.
Before the CCP ever resorted to coercing Hollywood as a means to grant access to the country’s hundreds of millions of movie-goers, Hollywood, and American culture writ-large had a penchant for China bashing. It was a reality check repeating the warnings of Edward Said’s “Orientalism” but on the Far East.
Kudos to Allen for levelling the playing field, at least somewhat, early in the book, because the testimonies against the CCP pile up high and quickly. The book looks at one of the earliest wake-up calls to the CCP’s tactics by looking at pre-2016 Australia. Australia did not have the military, political or economic might to counter what, almost too late, looked to be a CCP attempt to control more than just Australia’s opinion on “core China issues”.
In 2017, Allen tells the story of how Matt Pottinger, part of President Trump’s National Security Council, switched tactics after spending time learning about Australia’s ordeal. As more countries became wise to the CCP coercion, China was still growing, developing at an incredible rate, bringing millions out of poverty and enabling the CCP to flex its increasing muscles. In 2020, the CCP leaked a fourteen-point warning against the Australian government. The fourteen points went far beyond issues of what had become known as China’s core issues: Taiwan, South China Sea claims, Tibet and other sovereignty claims or “internal issues”. The CCP appeared to be demanding that Australia police its own social media and refrain from calling out the CCP in any area of potential bad conduct to include the cyber realm.
The book’s chapters about CCP coercion in the US focus on the souring of sister city relationships; a people-to-people concept started under Eisenhower which grew to 157 partnerships. As in Australia, there were signs that the CCP was meddling at the sub-national level in US politics, had infiltrated sincere student exchange programs with intelligence officers (MSS) and were using coercive methods to control Chinese populations in the US to ensure the CCP’s brand of “one China policy” on Taiwan was enforced. The United Front Workers Party (UFWP), whose external shell might look like a social networking and community organizing team, worked directly with Chinese intelligence, reaching in to the Chinese Diaspora as if they were sovereign CCP property and responsibility.
Political commentators often mention the bipartisan nature of the US policy towards China. The non-partisan approach more quickly reaches consensus; one that currently promotes a strong collective deterrence against a hostile CCP-controlled People’s Liberation Army (PLA). But non-partisan thinking should also take care not to paint complex issues in black and white and instead understand nuance in international politics, strategize wisely, act prudently and avoid hyperbole. There is a risk that bipartisan unity on a topic can perpetuate ignorance, diminish understanding, drown out contrary voices and confirm a bias that ignores other important perspectives. Save for a few exceptions, critical debate on the role of China in the world is lacking. The CCP’s own insulated echo-chamber of power politics is a case in point.
Of all the challenges to 21st century international politics, information operations and media control is perhaps the most wicked (in IR terms) of challenges. In the very space where information is most accessible, it is also the most manipulated.
Allen (with the help of Emily Walz in the final pages) writes that China could not be “coaxed in to transparency”. Transparency, depending on a nation’s size, relative power and power aspirations, is both a liability and an asset. When knowledge is power, stronger nations can afford to be more transparent than weaker ones; which is why the CCP’s lack of transparency is a bright red flag.
Allen writes that, “Glorification of the market and the individual has also made it difficult for Americans to think creatively about possible solutions to the challenges posed by China. A philosophy of neoliberalism, especially when taken to the extremes, often precludes government action. It’s the reason that, for years, civil society responses – such as public shaming of companies, opt-in university codes of conduct, and legal measures promoting transparency but not prohibiting any particular actions – were considered the only democratic options to pushing back against China’s authoritarian influence.” Pg. 206
Finally, to end with things that China does well, serious thought should be put in to why much of Africa and Latin America are quick to partner with China. China may not have been most countries’ first option for development and technology partnerships, but for so many, it was the only option.
The CCP and every country’s policy towards and with its “Communism with Chinese characteristics” is challenging the practice of politics. The theory of liberal democracy and free market capitalism has many layers and flavors. It is good to highlight the destructive modes of CCP policies, but we would also be wise to consider where and if theories of good governance are seeing different ways to adapt to new social and global phenomena.
Yes, some governance styles are better than others. Some leaders more prudent, some citizens more patient, some lower classes more content and some uber rich more rapacious. Historical, cultural, religious and social aspects in each nation and country have a lot to say about the success or failure of any governance system. Factors that come in to the 21st debates include levels of: corruption, mass media, media control, population increases, population plateaus, cultural diversity, historical grievances, pros and cons of transparency, conflicting sovereignty claims and others. China’s Communist Party with Chinese characteristic is not only forcing a continued internal debate on good governance, but also demanding an external perception of China’s government that could be re-writing the accepted status quo concept of democracy, capitalism, free market, security and even stability. It is at least showcasing the divide between democratic theory and democracy in practice.